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I. Judges and Counsel
A. Disqualification of Judges
Disqualification of judges generally is governed by Rule 1.432 and
Florida Statutes chapter 38. Grounds which will support a suggestion
of disqualification are stated in section 38.02. Where the basis for dis-
qualification is prejudice, an applicant must file an affidavit stating the
facts and reasons for the movant's belief that bias or prejudice exists.'
The affidavit "shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of
record that such affidavit and application are made in good faith."' 2
Although the judge must determine the legal sufficiency of the motion
for disqualification, she "shall not pass on the truth of the facts al-
l. FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (1985).
2. Id.; see Parsons v. Motor Homes of America, Inc., 465 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no error in judge's refusal to recuse where motion legally insuffi-
cient for failure to allege facts and reasons for belief of bias or prejudice and failure to
file certificate of counsel).
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leged" in a legally sufficient motion.' A judge who undertakes to con-
trovert the asserted grounds for recusal assumes an adversarial posture,
and on that basis alone is disqualified.4 The remedy for a judge's re-
fusal to recuse herself is sought by petition for writ of prohibition filed
in the appropriate appellate court.'
The rulings made before recusal of a judge are not invalid.8 How-
ever, an order entered simultaneously with an order of recusal is inva-
lid.7 "[A] successor judge may not modify or otherwise disturb an un-
appealed final order of his predecessor permanently enjoining the use of
a business name ... ." A successor judge who has not heard all the
evidence may not make determinations of fact or enter final judgment
except after retrial or upon stipulation of the parties to use of the rec-
ord of prior proceedings as the basis for the judgment. 9
B. Counsel
1. Generally
The Third District Court of Appeal in Lackow v. Walter E. Heller
& Co. Southeast, Inc.10 found that the plaintiff's counsel should have
been disqualified because an appearance of professional impropriety
was created, contrary to the provision of Canon 9 of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, when a secretary who was employed by the
defendant's counsel left the firm and went to work for plaintiff's coun-
sel. The court noted that the defendant's firm consisted of only two
lawyers, that the secretary had been primarily involved in the case and
continued to be involved in the case in her employment with the plain-
tiff's firm.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Hub Financial Corp. v.
3. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432(d); Mangina v. Cornelius, 462 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
4. Gieske v. Moriarty, 471 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
5. See Mangina, 462 So. at 602; Gieske, 471 So. 2d at 80.
6. Foresight Enters., Inc. v. Leisure Time Properties, Inc., 466 So. 2d 283 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 476 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1985).
7. Barnett Bank v. Garrett, 468 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
8. Master Cleaners v. Chantres, 471 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
9. See Paragon Group, Inc. v. Hoeksema, 475 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985), petition for review denied, 486 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1986).
10. 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
1986]
5
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
Olmetti11 decided that a trial court erred in allowing counsel for a cor-
poration to "withdraw on the day of trial without granting a continu-
ance to permit [the corporation] to obtain new counsel ....
Florida Statutes section 454.18 guarantees the right of self-repre-
sentation. The Third District Court of Appeal in Herskowitz v. Her-
skowitz13 quashed an order of an administrative law judge which re-
quired parties to be represented by counsel. The court distinguished
another Third District case1 4 in which the court "prohibited self-repre-
sentation to prevent abuse of court proceedings and interference with
the orderly process of judicial administration."15
2. Attorney's Fees
(a) Frivolous Actions
Section 57.105, Florida Statutes,"6 is designed to discourage frivo-
lous civil litigation by permitting courts to award fees against losing
parties who bring meritless actions.17 Attorney's fees statutes are nar-
rowly construed,1 8 The Florida Supreme Court in Whitten v. Progres-
sive Casualty Insurance Co.19 upheld the constitutionality of the stat-
ute and identified incipient district court standards for use by trial
courts in determining whether to award fees under the statute. The
action must be found "so clearly devoid of merit both on the facts and
11. 465 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
12. Id. at 619.
13. 466 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
14. Shotkin v. Cohen, 163 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed,
163 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1964).
15. Herskowitz, 466 So. 2d at 9.
16. FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1985) provides: "The court shall award a reasonable
attorney's fee to the prevailing party in any civil action in which the court finds that
there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the
losing party."
17. Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 1982).
18. The rationale supporting narrow construction has been based on a premise
that such statutes are "in derogation of the common law." See Whitten, 410 So. 2d at
505. However, the Florida Supreme Court in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v.
Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), stated that this premise is "histbrically incorrect,"
and that the statutes rather are exceptions to a general American rule that "attorney
fees may be awarded by a court only when authorized by statute or by agreement of
the parties." Id. at 1147-48.
19. 410 So. 2d at 501.
[Vol. 10
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the law as to be completely untenable." 20 A frivolous attempt to create
a controversy justifies such a finding.21 The statute "may not be ex-
tended to every case and every unsuccessful litigant."2 "Merely losing,
either on the pleadings or by summary judgment, is not enough to in-
voke the operation of the statute. '2 3 The entire action, not merely a
portion of it, must be meritless. 24
Fees may not be awarded under section 57.105 merely because
"events during the course of a lawsuit ... reveal that the litigation is
not sustainable."2 5 Fees may not be awarded against a party who
merely defends a judgment on appeal.2 6 Where an action is voluntarily
dismissed as to some parties, but the action raised justiciable issues
against them, those dismissed may not recover fees under the statute.2 7
In a case of first impression, the Fourth District in Ferrara v.
Caves28 stated that fees may be awarded against an intervenor under
section 57.105. The case arose when three town commissioners sought
to have enjoined and declared void a recall petition which had been
initiated against them. Although the commissioners originally sued the
deputy town clerk and the town, the person who initiated the recall
petition was granted leave to join as an indispensable party. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the commissioners on the
ground that the recall petitions were legally insufficient. The court also
awarded fees against the losing parties, which included the intervenor,
under section 57.105. The district court reversed the award of fees,
20. Id. (quoting Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 384 So. 2d 171, 175 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 392 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1980) (emphasis in
original)).
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing City of Deerfield Beach v. Oliver-Hoffman Corp., 396 So. 2d 1187
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 407 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 1981)).
23. Id. at 504 (citing City of Deerfield Beach and Allen).
24. Glover v. School Board of Hillsborough County, 462 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
25. Greater Clearwater Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Gray, 464 So. 2d 594
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
26. McNee v. Biz, 473 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
27. Poliard v. Zukoff, 482 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); accord
Simmons v. Schimmel, 476 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), petition for
review denied, 486 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1986) (voluntary dismissal of one of the party
defendants not related to merits of case but rather for strategic purpose; error to award
fees where issue of negligence was raised against party who was dismissed).
28. 475 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 479 So.
2d 118 (Fla. 1985).
1986] 899
7
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
stating that the standard that must be met to win a summary judgment
is not the same as that required to support a finding of frivolousness,
which must be supported by competent substantial evidence. 2 The dis-
trict court found that although the parties eventually reached a stipula-
tion that the recall petition was legally insufficient and the intervenor
accordingly lost on the merits, the intervenor had raised a justiciable
issue of law which precluded an award of fees. The district court ex-
pressed concern that a contrary result might have a chilling effect on
Florida's recall mechanisms.
The Fifth District affirmed an award of fees against a plaintiff
who initiated an action for ejectment and trespass against one whom he
erroneously believed was the owner of adjoining property.30
(b) Frivolous Appeals
Florida Statutes section 57.105 has been invoked by district courts
in awarding fees as penalties for frivolous appeals.31 In Menkes v.
Menkes3 2 the district court awarded appellate attorney's fees because it
regarded as "completely frivolous" a challenge to an equitable distribu-
tion of marital assets which was "plainly within the discretion of the
trial court under the Canakaris3s doctrine." 34 The Third District also
awarded fees against an insurer whose arguments on appeal were char-
acterized by the court as "patently frivolous."'35
The Fifth District in Beasley v. Beasley 6 warned that motions for
fees under section 57.105 would be "favorably entertained"37 in appeals
relating to alimony awards where no record or stipulated statement was
presented to the reviewing court. That court subsequently acted on its
warning and awarded appellate attorney's fees where an appellant chal-
29. Id. at 1299.
30. Parrino v. Ayers, 469 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for re-
view denied, 479 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1985).
31. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.400(b) governs awards of appellate attorney's fees, which
may not be awarded "unless otherwise permitted by substantive law." Id. at R. 9.400
committee notes on 1977 Revision.
32. 478 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
33. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).
34. Menkes, 478 So. 2d at 457.
35. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Gelfand, 477 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
36. 463 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
37. Id. at 1248.
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lenged a trial court's order increasing child support payments.3 8 No
record was made of the trial court proceedings. The appellant did not
take advantage of Rule 9.200(b)(3),39 which permits appellants to sub-
mit "statement[s] of the evidence or proceedings from the best availa-
ble means, including . .. recollection. '40 The district court character-
ized the appeal as "spurious" 4' because without a transcript or a Rule
9.200(b)(3) statement, the court had nothing upon which to evaluate
the trial court's factual determination. The Fifth District seems to have
disregarded the permissive nature of Rule 9.200(b)(3), and under pen-
alty of section 57.105 has required that either a transcript or a Rule
9.200(b)(3) statement be presented on appeal.
(c) Wrongful Acts
Fees may be awarded to "an innocent party drawn into litigation
with a third party by the wrong of another party. '4 2 Glace and Rad-
cliffe, Inc. v. City of Live Oak'3 involved a suit by a surety on a per-
formance bond against the city and an engineering firm after a general
contractor defaulted on a sewage construction project. The city pre-
vailed on its cross-claim for indemnity against the firm, which a jury
found was negligent in its work on the project. The district court af-
firmed an award of fees to the city. Similarly, in Auto-Owners Insur-
ance Co. v. Hooks,44 the district court affirmed an award of fees to a
party who was forced to defend title to a car because of a prejudgment
writ of replevin which was wrongfully obtained.
(d) Fee Contracts
Agreements that the prevailing party's fees shall be paid by the
losing party are indemnificatory in nature.45 As such, the amount of the
fee awardable is the lesser of the amount agreed. to by the prevailing
38. Nicholason v. Bryant, 468 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
39. FLA. R. App. P. 9.200(b)(3).
40. Id.
41. Nicholason, 468 So. 2d at 312.
42. Glace & Radcliffe, Inc. v. City of Live Oak, 471 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st
Ct. App. 1985).
43. Id.
44. 463 So. 2d 468 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
45. Dunn v. Sentry Ins., 462 So. 2d 107. 108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. Ann. 19
Dist.
85
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party and her attorney or the amount which has actually been paid.4
That amount must be reasonable; that is, it must not be "excessive"
within the meaning of that term in Florida's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.47 Where the actual fee is found excessive, the court should
award a reasonable fee.4R Contractual provisions governing attorney's
fees are strictly construed.49
Fees may not be awarded under a contract against a partner who
was not a party to the contract which created the partnership con-
tract.50 Fees may be awarded under contract to one who defended a
suit which was voluntarily dismissed. 51 Fees may be awarded under the
"common fund rule" only in the absence of a controlling contract or
statute52 and only where certain criteria are met.53 Fees ordinarily may
not be awarded where no basis for an award is pleaded or proved.5 4
The First District Court of Appeal in Cheek v. McGowan Electric
46. Id.; accord Pezzimenti v. Cirou, 466 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.),
review dismissed sub nom. Musca v. Cirou, 475 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1985).
47. Id.; see FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(b); ac-
cord Ennia Schadeverzekering, N.V. v. Buzinski, 468 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); see also Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145
(Fla. 1985) (discussing lodestar process).
48. Hurley v. Slingerland, 461 So. 2d 282, 283-84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
49. Id.
50. Hatch v. Dance, 464 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
51. Dunn, 462 So. 2d at 109.
52. Hurley, 461 So. 2d at 283-84.
53. The court in Estate of Hampton v. Fairchild-Florida Constr. Co., 341 So. 2d
759, 761 (Fla. 1976), stated that attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing party
from a fund created or brought into court through an attorney's services. The Fourth
District, in a second Hurley decision, 480 So. 2d 104, 107-108 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985), recited a five-part test which must be satisfied for the rule to apply:
1. The existence of a fund over which the court has jurisdiction and from
which fees can be awarded;
2. The commencement of litigation by one party which is terminated
successfully;
3. The existence of a class which received, without otherwise contributing
to the lawsuit, substantial benefits as a result of the litigation;
4. The creation, preservation, protection or increase of the fund as a di-
rect and proximate result of the efforts of counsel for that party;
5. A reasonable relationship between the benefit established and the fees
incurred.
54. See American Housing and Dev. Corp. v. Sun Island Ass'n, 466 So. 2d 4
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Brown v. Brown, 473 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (trial court erred in awarding fees without evidentiary hearing).
[Vol. 10
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Supply Co.55 ruled that fees may be awarded under a contract after
final judgment even though the claim for fees was not presented to the
jury. This ruling conflicts with decisions in the Second, Third, and
Fifth Districts in which those courts held that claims for fees under
contract are elements of damages which require determination by the
jury.56
The Fifth District affirmed an award of fees in a section 1983
suit5 7 on a post-judgment motion to tax costs where there was no
prayer for fees in the original complaint.58 The court stated that the
federal statute gives courts discretion to award fees to prevailing par-
ties as part of the costs of litigation, and that costs, as opposed to dam-
ages, need not be pleaded. 59
The Second District reversed awards against losing parties' attor-
neys where the awards were not authorized by statute, contract, or the
common fund rule and where the awards were ordered as penalties for
improper attorney conduct.60
The attorney general provides free representation to circuit court
judges in suits for damages alleging that judicial immunity should not
apply because a judge acted "in the clear absence of jurisdiction. '61
The Fifth District affirmed a trial court's ruling that the fees of an
attorney privately retained by a judge to defend a suit against him may
55. 483 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
56. Id. at 1380-81. The First District certified this question as one of great pub-
lic importance:
Where attorney's fees are pled in a successful suit for recovery pursuant to
a promissory note, and the note provides that the maker shall pay "reason-
able attorney's fees," may the proof of such fees be presented for the first
time after final judgment pursuant to a motion for attorney's fees by the
prevailing party?
Id. at 1381.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
58. City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1327 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1985); cf. Compton v. Gator Office Supply and Furniture, Inc., 471 So. 2d 216 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (award of fees reversed where trial court failed to .reserve
jurisdiction to award fees).
59. Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1327.
60. See American Bank v. Hooven, 471 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(where trial court found attorney's conduct which lead to mistrial was not contemptous,
no authority to award fees and expenses as sanction); Israel v. Lee, 470 So. 2d 861
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no authority to hold attorney personally liable for appel-
late attorney's fees of prevailing opposing party, even when contempt rulings against
client and attorney were jointly appealed).
61. Salfi v. Ising, 464 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
1986]
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not be awarded under section 57.105 against the losing party.62 The
court did not decide whether the attorney general could be awarded
fees under section 57.105.63
In C.U. Associates, Inc. v. R.B. Grove, Inc.64 the Florida Supreme
Court found that a prevailing party in a mechanic's lien action may be
entitled to fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes,6 5 only where the
party recovers an amount greater than a prior settlement offer.6 The
court distinguished Rule 1.442, which provides only for awards of costs
incurred after an offer of judgment where the amount recovered by the
party who rejected an offer does not exceed the amount offered.6"
The Fifth District in George v. Northcraft68 decided that although
one who accepts an offer of judgment under Rule 1.442 may be re-
garded as a "prevailing party" under a contractual provision entitling
that party to fees, where an accepted offer makes no reference to fees,
the party is precluded from later seeking them. The court noted that
such fees are unliquidated and are part of the prevailing party's dam-
ages.69 Thus, where the offer does not reserve to the accepting party a
right to seek fees, any claim for fees is deemed included in the claim
for damages, which was satisfied by the offer and acceptance of
judgment.
II. Pleadings
A. Generally
A complaint must make specific allegations of fact to support the
elements of a cause of action. 0 It is improper to draft a complaint so
that subsequent counts incorporate by reference all the paragraphs of
all the preceding counts. 1
62. Id. at 689.
63. Id. at n.2.
64. 472 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1985).
65. FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1981).
66. C.U. Assocs., 455 So. 2d at 1110.
67. Id.; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
68. 476 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
69. Id. at 759.
70. See, e.g., Reddish v. Smith, 468 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1985) (complaint alleging
liability of state agency for personal injury inflicted by escaped prisoner insufficient as
matter of law on elements of causation and foreseeability; insufficient allegations of
fact on claim of impropriety and bad faith).
71. Frugoli v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
[Vol. 10
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The Florida Supreme Court in Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cot-
ton72 found that the second count in a two-count pleading was fatally
defective for misjoinder of claims and parties. Two plaintiffs sued a
common defendant and his employer. The first count of the complaint
alleged tortious interference with a business relationship enjoyed by one
of the plaintiffs. The second count consisted of the other plaintiff's alle-
gation of battery. The court found that the causes of action were sepa-
rate and the plaintiffs' interests not identical. 73 The misjoinder was not
cured through incorporation by reference of the first count in the
second.74
Rule 1.190(b) provides that pleadings may be amended to conform
to the evidence. It further provides that issues not presented by the
pleadings but nonetheless tried by the parties are to be treated as if
raised in the pleadings although no formal amendment was made. 5
B. Counterclaims
Counterclaims generally are governed by Rule 1.170.76 A counter-
claim may be stricken and dismissed as a sanction for failure to furnish
discovery. 77 An order dismissing a compulsory counterclaim is nonfinal
and not reviewable by interlocutory appeal.7 8 An order denying a mo-
tion for leave to amend a counterclaim is also nonfinal and nonreview-
able.79 The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Allie v. Ionata0 ex-
1985).
72. 463 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1985).
73. Id. at 1128.
74. Id.
75. Cf. Wassil v. Gilmour, 465 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (where
statute of limitations barred action on oral loan contract and subsequent promises to
repay created new causes of action, plaintiff failed to raise this theory at trial and
defendant's failure to object to testimony about the promises did not justify amendment
under the rule where the testimony was relevant on other grounds and thus not objec-
tionable); 99 Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Crider, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1157 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. May 8, 1985) (error to permit amendment at close of evidence based on
theory of damages suggested by witness whose name did not appear on witness list)
(motion for rehearing filed May 20, 1985).
76. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170.
77. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2)(C); Cedars Assoc. v. E.R. Brownell & Assocs.,
Inc., 466 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
78. Dennis v. Pavlokos, 464 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
79. Sciabbarrasi v. Uddo, 466 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
80. 466 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), cause dismissed, 469 So. 2d 749
(Fla. 1985).
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amined the extent of recovery obtainable through the defense of
recoupment raised in response to a counterclaim. lonata sued Allie for
recision and restitution on real estate contracts on grounds of fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty. Allie prevailed on an affirmative defense that
the applicable statute of limitations had run and maintained a counter-
claim for the unpaid balance on purchase money notes for the property.
Ionata defended against the counterclaim by raising the defense of re-
coupment in a "counter-counterclaim" on the basis of constructive
fraud. The Fifth District decided that the defense of recoupment was
permissible. Although the statute of limitations barred Ionata from ini-
tiating an action based on constructive fraud, Ionata was free to raise
the fraud as a defense to Allie's counterclaim.8' However, the court
was persuaded by a decision of the Third District 2 and decided that
Ionata's recovery should be limited by the amount sought by Allie in
his counterclaim. The court acknowledged conflict with Cherny v.
Moody,83 in which the First District permitted affirmative recovery on
a counterclaim in recoupment although the claim would have been
time-barred as an independent action. The Fifth District certified the
question to the supreme court.84
A timely amendment to a counterclaim (or any other pleading)
that asserts a claim or defense that "arose out of the conduct, transac-
tion or occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading" relates back
to the time of the original pleading. 85 "Even where there is a change in
the legal theory upon which the action is brought, or in the legal
description of the rights to be enforced, the amendment relates back if
it is based on the same factual situation."8 " The Second District re-
viewed a case in which a plaintiff sought discharge of a mechanic's lien
and the defendant timely brought a counterclaim seeking foreclosure
on the lien. The counterclaim was dismissed with leave to amend. An
amended counterclaim was filed later than the twenty days within
which a lienor must show cause why the lien should not be discharged
81. Id. at 1111-13.
82. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. De Mirza, 312 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
83. 413 So. 2d 866 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
84. "Does the running of the statute of limitation on an independent cause of
action bar the recovery of an affirmative judgment in recoupment on a compulsory
counterclaim?" Id. at 869.
85. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c).
86. Wen-Dic Constr. Co. v. Mainlands Constr. Co., 463 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 482 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1986).
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as required by Florida Statutes section 713.21(4).17 The district court
noted that a "counterclaim seeking to foreclose [a] mechanic's lien is a
proper means to avoid cancellation of the lien" under the statute,88 and
found that the show cause requirement was satisfied and the lien im-
properly discharged by the trial court because the amended counter-
claim related back.
The plaintiff in Quality Coffee Service, Inc. v. Tallahassee Coca-
Cola Bottling Co.89 sued for breach of contract and the defendant
counterclaimed for breach of contract and express warranty. With
leave of the court, the defendant amended its counterclaim to allege
fraud and civil theft, and demanded a jury trial. The First District
Court of Appeal quashed the trial court's order denying a jury trial.
The court began its well-reasoned analysis by observing that a demand
for a jury trial must be made in compliance with Rule 1.430(b), or else
the right to trial by jury is waived."' When leave is given to amend a
counterclaim and new issues triable of right by jury are presented by
the amendment, "the time for demand of jury trial is revived, despite
an initial waiver."91 When the original complaint is in equity and the
counterclaim injects a legal issue, the legal issue may be tried sepa-
rately before a jury unless the legal issue is so "similar or related to"
the equitable issue that the finding of fact in the equitable proceeding
would "bind the legal fact finder" and thus operate to "deprive the
legal counterclaimant of his right to trial by jury."92 The district court
found that the factual elements common to causes of action based on
breach of contract and warranty, fraud, and civil theft entitled the de-
fendant to jury trial on all the issues raised by its counterclaim. 93
III. Parties, Witnesses, and Jurors
A. Parties
Rule 1.210(a) provides that a nominal beneficiary under a con-
tract may prosecute in its own name, even though it is not the real
party in interest. The Third District Court of Appeal in Corat Interna-
87. FLA. STAT. § 713.21(4) (1983).
88. Wen-Dic, 463 So. 2d at 1188.
89. 474 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
90. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430(d).
91. Quality Coffee Serv., 474 So. 2d at 429.
92. Id. at 429.
93. Id.
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tional, Inc. v. Taylor94 accordingly reversed a trial court's ruling that a
party who was not the real party in interest could not properly prose-
cute an action in its own name. A consignor shipped goods under a
C.I.F. (shipment) contract. Title passed to the consignee upon delivery
to the carrier. The consignee bore the risk of loss. The consignor caused
insurance on the goods to be purchased in its own name. Some of the
goods were destroyed during shipment. The consignor paid for replace-
ment of the goods and sued on the insurance contract. The trial court
entered summary judgment for the insurer because the consignor was
not the real party in interest under the insurance contract. The district
court reversed on the basis of Rule 1.210(a). The Florida rule differs
from its federal counterpart, Rule 17(a), which requires that "[e]very
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."9 5
Rule 1.260(a)(1) permits substitution of parties within ninety days
after service of notice of the death of a party. The ninety day period
may be extended upon a showing of excusable neglect,96 inadvertance,
or mistake.9 7 The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Stroh v. Dudley98
held that "Rule 1.260(a)(1) does not require mandatory, non-discre-
tionary dismissal even in light of the terminology 'shall be dismissed as
to the deceased party.' " The court reversed an order dismissing a
counterclaim with prejudice for failure to timely substitute a personal
representative after the death of a counterclaimant. In a dissenting
opinion, Judge Downey expressed his view that the mandatory lan-
guage of the rule should be followed unless "the party has procured an
extension of time prior to expiration of the ninety days or unless he can
bring himself within the purview of Rule 1.540(b) . . .,,"'
The individual members of a partnership are generally regarded as
indispensable parties to an action brought in behalf of the partnership,
because "[e]ach partner is deemed to have an interest in the chose in
94. 462 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 471 So.
2d 44 (Fla. 1985).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a); see Corat Int'l, 462 So. 2d at 1187 n.2.
96. See Somero v. Hendry Gen. Hosp., 467 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied sub nom. Hayslip v. Somero, 476 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1985) (revers-
ing order dismissing cause where plaintiff's attorney failed to timely seek substitution
of decedent's estate as party defendant).
97. Stroh v. Dudley, 476 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dis-
missed, 482 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1985).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 232 (Downey, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 10
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/15
Civil Procedure
action .... "101 This rule protects defendants from exposure to the
possibility of multiple suits and liability arising from the same claim.102
The composition of the partnership may be such that the rationale sup-
porting treatment of the partners as indispensible parties is inapplicable
as, for example, where claims by or against some of the partners are
time-barred. 10 3 The composition of a partnership is a question of fact
which may not be resolved by a trial judge on a directed verdict.104
B. Witnesses
The common law rule permitting sequestration of witnesses has
not been codified in the Florida Statutes or adopted as a rule of
court.10 5 The rule is invoked "to avoid the coloring of a witness' testi-
mony by that which he has heard from other witnesses who have pre-
ceded him on the stand." 10 6 The Third District Court of Appeal in Del
Monte Banana Co. v. Chacon07 decided that a new trial was required
where an attorney attempted to impeach the credibility of a witness by
cross-examining him about a suspected violation of the rule. The dis-
trict court stated that the attorney had usurped the function of the trial
court by determining whether the rule was violated and what remedy
was appropriate.108 The court outlined the procedure which should be
followed when a witness' compliance with the court's order is
questioned.109
In a pretrial order, a court may limit the names of the witnesses
101. DeToro v. Dervan Invs. Ltd., 483 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Waterfront Developers, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 467 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); cf. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530
(Fla. 1985) (no error in failure to add two additional members of law firm under
circumstances).
102. DeToro, 483 So. 2d at 721.
103. See Farish v. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 12, 16 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982), modified, 464 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1985).
104. See DeToro, 483 So. 2d at 721-22.
105. Del Monte Banana Co. v. Chacon, 466 So. 2d 1167, 1170 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
106. Id. at 1170.
107. Id. at 1167.
108. Id. at 1170-71; see also FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 7-108(G): "A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court improper conduct by a
venireman or a juror, or by another toward a venireman or a juror or a member of his
family, of which the lawyer has knowledge."
109. See Del Monte, 466 So. 2d at 1171.
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who may be called. For example, the court may order the parties to
exchange witness lists and forbid testimony by unlisted witnesses. 110
This pretrial practice serves as an aid to case management. It also
serves as a discovery function in that disclosure of witnesses helps pre-
vent unfair surprise and "trial by 'ambush.' """ The Third District
Court of Appeal in Capital Bank v. G & J Investments Corp."2 de-
cided that a new trial was necessary where an expert witness was per-
mitted to testify although his identity had not been disclosed, as was
required by a pretrial order. The expert, who was a handwriting ana-
lyst, presented damaging testimony about a sequence of events which
was determinative of liability on a negotiable instrument. The court
found that the party against whom the testimony was offered was
prejudiced by the testimony because the party was unprepared to con-
duct cross-examination of the witness. The court further found that the
party was unable "to cure the prejudice ... and that [the] noncompli-
ance with the pretrial order was not in good faith.""'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal decided in 99 Broadcasting
Co. v. Gulfstream Broadcasting Co. 1 4 that a party should not have
been permitted to amend its pleadings to add a new issue in conformity
with testimonial evidence of a witness whose name did not appear on a
witness list. The list had been furnished without a court order. The
court reasoned that the outcome of the case may have been affected
because the jury may have based its verdict on the new theory of dam-
ages raised by the witness. The district court directed the trial court on
remand to order the parties to stipulate to the witnesses they would
call.
C. Jurors
1. Jury Selection
Florida Statutes chapter 913 and Rule 1.431 provide for peremp-
tory challenges1 5 and challenges of jurors for cause." 6 Neither the rule
110. See generally FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200.
111. Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (Fla. 1981).
112. 468 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
113. Id. at 535.
114. 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (motion for rehear-
ing filed May 20, 1985).
115. FLA. STAT. § 913.08 (1985); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(d).
116. FLA. STAT. § 913.03 (1985); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(c).
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nor the statute states the time for making a peremptory challenge in
civil actions. However, in a criminal trial, the "defendant has a right to
retract his acceptance and object to a juror at any time before the juror
is sworn." 117 There is conflict among the districts over whether in a
civil action the "trial court [may] require the parties to exercise all of
their peremptory challenges simultaneously in writing where the origi-
nal panel has been thoroughly examined and challenges for cause exer-
cised, and there remain sufficient members to comprise a jury after all
peremptory challenges have been exhausted."""" The Third District has
approved this method and twice certified the question to the supreme
court.119 The Fourth District has disapproved the method, opining that
the trial court "must permit either party to 'exercise any remaining pe-
remptory challenges at any time before the jury is sworn."12 0
The First District in Video Electronics, Inc. v. Tedder'z' reviewed
a trial court's limitation of the use of backstrikes in the jury selection
process. The court permitted only one round of backstrikes before
swearing some members of the jury panel. Counsel were not permitted
to use peremptory challenges after the full panel was obtained. The
district court found this procedure was contrary to the "better prac-
tice" recommended in King v. State122 and operated to deny the parties
the effective and intelligent use of their peremptory challenges. '123 The
court stated that the better practice is to permit counsel to consider the
panel as a whole when exercising peremptory challenges. 124 Finding
that unnecessary limitations on the use of peremptory challenges had
brought many cases before the appellate courts, the court in Video
Electronics announced a rule intended to guide trial courts in the exer-
cise of their discretion over the jury selection process: "[W]henever a
trial court exercises its discretion to . . . determine whether potential
jurors should be sworn before the entire panel is selected . . . , the
record should reflect substantial reasons therefore arising from excep-
117. Dobek v. Ans, 475 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); accord King
v. State, 461 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.310.
The exercise of this right is known as "backstriking." Dobek, 475 So. 2d at 1267.
118. Oliver v. Ghisiawan, 478 So. 2d 104, 104 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
119. Id. (quoting Ter Keurst v. Miami Elevator Co., 453 So. 2d 501, 501 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
120. Dobek, 475 So. 2d at 1268.
121. 470 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
122. 125 Fla. 316, 169 So. 747 (1936).
123. Video Electronics, 470 So. 2d at 8.
124. Id.
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tional circumstances in the particular case.' 1 25 The court certified the
question to the supreme court."2 6
The Fourth District in Battle v. Safeway Insurance Co.'2 7 cau-
tioned trial courts "to be certain that prospective jurors are selected on
purely a random basis. The jurors themselves should play no role in
determining whether they are called to the box."12 In another case,
that court cautioned that "the impartiality of the finders of fact is an
absolute prerequisite to our system of justice. Close cases should be
resolved in favor of excusing the juror rather than leaving a doubt as to
his or her impartiality.' 129
The Third District in City of Miami v. Cornett'30 decided that
"both parties may challenge the alleged improper use of peremptory
challenges to exclude from jury service prospective jurors solely on the
basis of race."'' The court thus adopted the rule of the criminal case
of State v. Neil'32 for application in civil actions. The court reasoned
that the right to jury trial afforded by the Florida Constitution' 3 would
be meaningless without a requirement that the jury be impartial.'
2. Post-Trial Interviews of Jurors
Rule 1.431 (g) provides that a party who believes grounds exist to
challenge a verdict may move the court for an order permitting inter-
view of jurors to find out whether the verdict is subject to challenge. 3 5
The rule requires that the movant state the grounds for the challenge.
125. Id.
126.
In the absence of substantial reasons arising from exceptional circum-
stances shown to exist in the particular case, is it an abuse of discretion for
a trial court to employ a jury selection procedure in which some but not all
prospective jurors are sworn for the purpose of prohibiting the exercise of
peremptory challenges to backstrike such jurors?
Id. at 9.
127. 468 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
128. Id. at 463.
129. Sydleman v. Benson, 463 So. 2d 533, 533 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
130. 463 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
131. Id. at 400.
132. 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
133. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22.
134. Cornett, 457 So. 2d at 402.
135. See also FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-29; id.
DR 7-108(D).
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The movant must allege specific facts and the challenge must not be
based on matters which "inhere in the verdict," but rather must be
based on matters that are "extrinsic to the verdict." '136 For example, an
allegation that a juror misunderstood the verdict is inadequate. 137 An
allegation that jurors improperly considered the finances of tortfeasors
is likewise inadequate. 38 However, an allegation that a bailiff improp-
erly told the jurors that they could not communicate with the judge is
adequate. 39 Notice and hearing on the motion are required. 40
IV. Jurisdiction Over the Person
A. Service of Process on Natural Persons
Process and service of process generally are governed by Florida
Statutes chapter 48 and Rule 1.070. Proper service effected through
compliance with the applicable statute is necessary for a court to obtain
personal jurisdiction over a defendant."4' Process may be served by the
local sheriff or his appointee, " 2 or by a court-appointed server.' 43
When a return of service is regular on its face,144 a presumption of
136. Dover Corp. v. Dean, 473 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
137. See id.
138. See Clark v. Merritt, 480 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), peti-
tion for review denied, 488 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1986).
139. See Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp. v. Silva, 476 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
140. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(g).
141. See, e.g., Smith v. Import Birds, Inc., 461 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985). While service on nonresident defendants in compliance with an applicable
statute and rule is sufficient to satisfy the notice component of the process due those
defendants under the fourteenth amendment, plaintiffs of course must have proper ba-
ses for asserting that a Florida court or a federal court applying Florida law should
have jurisdiction over the persons of the nonresidents. The United States Supreme
Court in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985), decided that plain-
tiffs who sue under a provision of Florida's long-arm statute, FLA. STAT. §
48.193(1)(g), through which the legislature has attempted to confer jurisdiction over
nonresidents who breach contracts in this state, must show more than mere facial com-
pliance with the statute. In addition, plaintiffs must satisfy the constitutional due pro-
cess requirements stemming from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), and its progeny. See generally Note, Due Process Limits the Reach of Flor-
ida's Long-Arm Statute in Bringing Contract Defendants to the Home of the Whop-
per, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 127 (1986).
142. FLA. STAT. § 48.021 (1985).
143. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(b).
144. The return of execution of process is governed by FLA. STAT. § 48.21 (1985)
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valid service arises which may be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. 145
The Third District Court of Appeal was twice faced with chal-
lenges to service on the ground that the persons served were not "resid-
ing" at the defendants' usual places of abode within the meaning of
section 48.031(1)."' The court in Magazine v. Bedoya147 decided that
a mother-in-law enjoying a six week stay at the defendant's residence
satisfied the statutory requirement. However, in Montano v.
Montano141 the court found that the presumption of valid service was
overcome where evidence showed process was served at the defendant's
residence upon a visitor who spoke no English.
Service of process not only determines jurisdiction over the person,
but may also determine venue. "When two actions between the same
parties are pending in different circuits, jurisdiction lies in the circuit
where service of process is first perfected. ' 149 The Second District
Court of Appeal in Radice Corp. v. Sound Builders, Inc.150 examined a
rather complicated chronicle of events to determine where service was
first effected when opposing parties filed suits very close in time in dif-
ferent circuits over the same contractual dispute. Radice's attorney had
agreed to accept service on behalf of his client and had thus waived the
necessity of service of process. The court ultimately determined that
Sound Builders' complaint was received by Radice's attorney in the
mail before service of Radice's summons was perfected. Thus, venue
lay in the circuit where Sound Builders filed.
In a suit on a guaranty of payment of a promissory note, the Third
and FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(b).
145. Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); cf.
Gonzalez v. Totalbank, 472 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (return facially
defective).
146. FLA. STAT. § 48.031(1) provides:
Service of original process is made by delivering a copy of it to the
person to be served with a copy of the complaint, petition, or other initial
pleading or paper or by leaving the copies at his usual place of abode with
any person residing therein who is 15 years of age or older and informing
the person of their contents. Minors who are or have been married shall be
served as provided in this section.
147. 475 So. 2d at 1035.
148. 478 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
149. Mabie v. Garden Street Management Corp., 397 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1981),
quoted in Radice Corp. v. Sound Builders, Inc., 471 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
150. 471 So. 2d at 86.
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District in Gonzalez v. Totalbank'5' found that a return of service
upon one of the defendants was facially defective for failure to comply
with Florida Statutes section 48.21.152 The court further found that a
general appearance by an attorney retained by another of the defend-
ants did not operate to waive objection to lack of personal jurisdiction
by a defendant who had not engaged the attorney's services.
Section 48.171 provides that substituted service on nonresident
motor vehicle owners may be effected on the secretary of state as agent
for that defendant. The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Journell v.
Vitanzo'53 found that a complaint which alleged that the defendant
was a Florida resident and did not allege concealment of whereabouts
was facially insufficient to permit service on the secretary of state as
agent.
B. Service of Process on Corporations
Service of process on corporations generally is governed by Florida
Statutes section 48.081.154 The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Space
Coast Credit Union v. First'"5 found that a final default judgment was
void because jurisdiction was not perfected. The server, who was an
employee of a firm engaged in the subpoena service business, was not
authorized under section 48.021 to serve process. Further, the service
did not comply with section 48.081 because it was made on a low-level
employee with no attempt in the first instance to serve higher-level cor-
porate functionaries.
Substituted service of process on a corporation's designated regis-
tered agent'56 is authorized by section 48.081(3). If a corporation fails
to designate a registered agent as required by section 48.091, service
may be made upon "any employee at the corporation's place of busi-
ness.' 157 The Fourth District in Sierra Holding, Inc. v. Sayner58 de-
cided that attempted service under this provision was ineffective be-
cause the person served in the defendant's office was not an employee.
Strict compliance with the statute is required for effective substi-
151. 472 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
152. FLA. STAT. § 48.21 (1979).
153. 462 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
154. FLA. STAT. § 48.081 (1985).
155. 467 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
156. See FLA. STAT. § 48.091 (1985).
157. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(3) (1985).
158. 469 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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tuted service on a nonresident under section 48.161.151 The plaintiff
bears the initial burden of showing compliance. "Once the defendant
makes a prima facie showing of failure to comply, the burden again
shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the statute's applicability." 160 In
Major Appliances, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Co., 6' the
Third District reviewed a plaintiff's attempted substituted service on a
nonresident defendant under section 48.161(1). A notice of suit was
sent by certified mail to a member of the corporation's board of direc-
tors at the address listed in the last annual report filed before the cor-
poration was involuntarily dissolved. The returned receipt was marked
"unclaimed" and "unknown." The court held that "where the nonresi-
dent defendant doing business in the state fails to file a correct address
for the purpose of substituted service, plaintiff's attempt to effect ser-
vice at the address furnished by the defendant is valid."' 2 This deci-
sion marks a departure from the strict compliance with the statute or-
dinarily required for effective substituted service.
C. Constructive Service of Process by Publication
Florida Statutes chapter 49 permits constructive service of process
by publication when personal service cannot be had. In a dissolution of
marriage action, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Whigham v.
Whigharnm' decided that a trial court was without jurisdiction to adju-
dicate certain property rights because the published notice of action did
not describe the property proceeded against, as required by section
49.08(4). Because the husband did not receive notice that his interests
in property were to be adjudicated, he was denied the process due him
under the Constitution.
In an action seeking foreclosure on a mortgage on real property,
the Fifth District in Tompkins v. Barnett Bank'" decided that service
by publication was effective although the affidavit in support of service
159. Smith v. Import Birds, Inc., 461 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985); but cf. Major Appliances, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 462 So. 2d 561
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (plaintiff excused from strict compliance with statutory
requirements where nonresident corporate defendant doing business in state failed to
file correct address for purpose of substituted service).
160. Smith, 461 So. 2d at 1027.
161. 462 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
162. Id. at 563.
163. 464 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
164. 478 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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required by sections 49.031 and 49.041 contained an incorrect mailing
address. The affidavit did contain the defendants' correct residential
address, which the court found was sufficient.
V. Discovery
The rule governing the scope of discovery is that "[p]arties may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant
to the subject matter of the pending action .... Information may
be discovered regardless of its admissibility at trial, provided that "the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence." 166 Matters are discoverable only if "rele-
vant to the subject matter of the litigation. A matter is relevant if it
tends to establish a fact in controversy or to render a proposition in
issue more or less probable.'1 67 Certiorari is the appropriate procedure
for obtaining review of discovery orders, because "erroneously com-
pelled disclosure, once made, may constitute irreparable harm which
cannot be remedied by way of appeal.' 68
A. Privileges
1. Attorney-Client
Matters protected by the attorney-client privilege are outside the
scope of discovery. 69 The court must determine whether the privilege
165. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1).
166. Id.
167. Oil Conservationists, Inc. v. Gilbert, 471 So. 2d 650, 654 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (discovery of corporate books and records not relevant to action seeking
imposition of statutory penalty for corporation's denial of demand by shareholder to
inspect books and records); see Baron, Melnick & Powell, P.A. v. Costa, 478 So. 2d
492 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error to order production of documents where no
allegation or showing of relevancy to subject matter of action or relation to a claim or
defense); Whitman v. Bystrom, 464 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (post-
assessment discovery of taxpayer's financial records not relevant to issue in litigation).
168. Florida Cypress Gardens, Inc. v. Murphy, 471 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); accord Carson v. Jackson, 466 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Baron, Melnick & Powell, P.A. v. Costa, 478 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
169. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1); Gross v. Security Trust Co., 462 So. 2d
580 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Merlin v. Boca Raton Community Hosp., Inc., 479
So. 2d 236 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (medical malpractice plaintiff's handwritten
notes "prepared for and transmitted to [his] attorney either in contemplation of or
19861 917
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protects a matter. 170 The attorney-client privilege yields to the general
requirement of disclosure found in Florida's Public Records Act,17' ex-
cept that records in an agency attorney's litigation files reflecting a
"mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory" are
exempted from disclosure until the conclusion of the litigation. 17 2 The
scopes of the discovery permissible under the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Public Records Act are not coextensive.' 73
2. Work Product
The work product privilege applies only to matters "prepared in
contemplation of litigation."'1 74 A mere likelihood of litigation is not
sufficient.17 5 While the attorney-client privilege, if applicable, is abso-
lute, work product may be discovered upon a showing of need and un-
due hardship. 76 The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Airocar, Inc.
during the litigation and kept confidential throughout" were protected by attorney-cli-
ent privilege); see also FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1985).
170. See Gross, 462 So. 2d at 581 (court properly made in camera examination
of tape to determine existence of privilege).
171. FLA. STAT. ch. 119 (1985).
172. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(o) (1985); see City of Melbourne v. A.T.S. Mel-
bourne, Inc., 475 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (court properly ordered
city attorney to appear at deposition and bring notes, memoranda, and correspondence
between attorney and city relating to enactment of ordinances where order stated that
scope of deposition would be limited by § 119.07(3)(o)); see also Brevard County v.
Nash, 468 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that "all state, county
and municipal records are controlled by the Public Records Act"; emphasis in original;
question on this issue certified); see generally Smith, The Public Records Law and the
Sunshine Law: No Attorney-Client Privilege Per Se, and Limited Attorney Work
Product Exemption, 14 STETSON L. REV. 493 (1985); Comment, Florida's Open Gov-
ernment Laws: No Exceptions for Attorney-Client Communications, 13 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 389 (1985).
173. Department of Professional Regulation v. Spiva, 478 So. 2d 382, 383 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (grade reports exempt from disclosure under Florida Public
Records Act are discoverable in administrative proceeding).
174. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turtle Reef Assocs., 444 So. 2d 595, 596
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
175. Id.
176. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2) provides in part:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(3) of this rule, a party
may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discover-
able under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that party's repre-
sentative, including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or
918 [Vol. 10
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v. Goldman'7 found that a bus driver's written report of an incident
was not privileged because the record failed to show the report was
made in contemplation of litigation. The court explained that because
the driver was required to report every incident, if the standard were
read too broadly, every document, photograph, or tangible item would
be protected because every incident could conceivably result in litiga-
tion. However, because the record showed that the statements elicited
from the driver by management were part of an investigation for a
pending suit, those statements were protected. The court encouraged
trial courts to make specific findings about whether matters were pre-
pared in contemplation of litigation.
The Second District has adopted a more expansive view of the
work product privilege. In Florida Cypress Gardens, Inc. v. Murphy17 9
the court extended protection to materials in Cypress Gardens' accident
investigation file which were prepared by the corporation's insurer
before a claim was filed. Although the trial court found the documents
and photographs "were only obtained in the 'mere likelihood of litiga-
tion,' and ordered their production," 80 the district court quashed the
order on policy grounds. The court stated that a contrary result would
penalize entities who were diligent in promptly investigating potential
claims.' 8'
The Third District has examined the scope of discovery of expert
witnesses under Rule 1.280(b) and held that "reports prepared by ex-
perts expected to testify at trial are not protected by the work product
privilege and are discoverable.' 8 2 The court noted that Rule 1.280 is
derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which permits such
discovery.18 3 The court agreed with a note in which the federal advisory
agent, only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has need of
the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means.
177. 474 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
178. Id. at 270.
179. 471 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
180. Id. at 204.
181. Id. (citing City of Sarasota v. Colbert, 97 So. 2d 872, 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1957)); see also Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, 435 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985), petition for review denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1985) (grocery
store's internally produced accident reports protected).
182. Mims v. Casdemont, 464 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
183. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
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committee stated that "discovery of expert trial witnesses [is] needed
for effective cross-examination and rebuttal in 'cases present[ing] intri-
cate and difficult issues as to which expert testimony is likely to be
determinative.' "184
In a toxic shock syndrome case, the First District has held that
"scientific and technical documents or tangible things prepared [by a
company's in-house scientists and staff] in anticipation of litigation"
may be protected as work product. 18 5 The court further decided that
certain outside research received by the company was not protected
and noted that there is no academic privilege recognized in Florida.'86
3. Other Privileges
Florida also recognizes a psychotherapist-patient privilege, 8 7 and
by statute protects the proceedings of medical review committees. 8
The constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination was
involved in two cases presenting discovery issues. In Carson v. Jack-
184. Mims, 464 So. 2d at 643. In another case dealing with discovery of experts,
but not in the context of work product, the Fourth District held that "a request for
admissions pursuant to Rule 1.370(a) is an inappropriate method in the first instance to
obtain discovery regarding another party's expert." Continental Ins. Co. v. Cole, 467
So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985). A party must first seek discovery
through interrogatories under Rule 1.280(b)(3)(A) (discovery of experts expected to
testify at trial) or proceed under subsection (b)(3)(B) (discovery of experts not ex-
pected to testify).
185. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Swilley, 462 So. 2d 1188, 1193 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
186. Id.
187. See Carson v. Jackson, 466 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(psychotherapist-patient privilege in FLA. STAT. § 90.503(2) yields to § 415.512, which
provides for abrogation of the privilege in cases involving child abuse or neglect); Hall
v. Spencer, 472 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (tort defendant's record of
alcohol abuse treatment protected by psychotherapist-patient privilege; exception under
FLA. STAT. § 90.503(4) inapplicable where defendant patient did not place his emo-
tional condition in issue as element of defense).
188. FLA. STAT. § 768.40(5) (1985); see HCA of Florida, Inc. v. Cooper, 475 So.
2d 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (protection of FLA. STAT. § 768.40(4) (1983)
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.40(5) (1985)) not overcome where no showing of
exceptional necessity or extraordinary circumstances); Suwanee County Hosp. Corp. v.
Meeks, 472 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (proceedings and records of
hospital medical staff meeting protected where requirements of FLA. STAT. § 768.40
were satisfied).
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son"89 the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that records of a
court-ordered examination by a psychologist as a condition of probation
in an unrelated criminal case were discoverable in a negligence and
child-abuse action. The court reasoned that any statements to the psy-
chologist were made with the understanding that they would be dis-
closed to others. Because the privilege was not asserted at the time of
the session with the psychologist, the defendant's statements were not
compelled. 119 The court noted, however, that although the psychothera-
pist-patient priyilege is abrogated as to communications dealing with
child abuse, other defenses to discovery such as irrelevancy and imma-
teriality might apply.19'
The Fourth District in Austin v. Barnett Bank of South Florida,
N.A. "' 2 decided that failure to produce documents under Rule 1.380(d)
may be excused where a party makes a belated assertion of fifth
amendment privilege. The court construed a part of the rule providing
that failure to make discovery may not be excused when based on ob-
jectionability unless a protective order was sought and decided this pro-
vision should be inapplicable to objections on grounds of privileges. The
court opined that "rule 1.380(d) does not require timely objection to
privileged matters," and certified conflict with a decision of the First
District.19 3
In a case of importance to the increasing litigation surrounding the
AIDS epidemic, the Third District decided that the identities of blood
donors should be protected from discovery by a plaintiff who alleged he
contracted the disease through a blood transfusion. The court in South
Florida Blood Service, Inc. v. Rasmussen9 4 reached this conclusion by
applying a balancing test under Rule 1.280(c), weighing the plaintiff's
interests against the donors' privacy interests under the Federal and
Florida Constitutions and the institutional and societal interests in the
free flow of donated blood. The court certified the issue to the supreme
court as a question of great public importance. 9 5
189. 466 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. .1985).
190. Id. at 1192.
191. Id.
192. 472 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
193. Id.; see American Funding, Ltd. v. Hill, 402 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
194. 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
195. Id. at 804 n.13.
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B. Discovery in Aid of Execution
Rule 1.560 permits judgment creditors to obtain discovery under
the rules to find assets on which to levy execution. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Lumpkins v. Amendola'98 found that compelled
attendance at a deposition was a proper sanction against a defendant
who failed to furnish discovery on a judgment awarding child support,
arrearages, and attorney's fees. The Third District in Citibank, N.A. v.
Plapinger9 7 decided that federal income tax returns and other financial
records of partnerships in which a judgment debtor was general partner
were not privileged and were discoverable. The court found that the
information was relevant and "reasonably likely to disclose" assets and
that the debtor had not asserted a need for protection.'9 8
C. Discovery on Claims for Punitive Damages
A plaintiff who properly states a factual basis to support a claim
for punitive damages may discover a defendant's financial resources. 98
Because the threat of such discovery might be used coercively by plain-
tiffs against innocent defendants to force settlement, a court in ruling
on a motion for protection under Rule 1.280(c)(3) may consider
"whether or not an actual factual basis exists for an award of punitive
damages. '2 00 Accordingly, in a legal malpractice action, the Fifth Dis-
trict in Solodky v. Wilson 2 0 examined the standards governing the suf-
ficiency of claims for punitive damages and ruled that a trial court
erred in denying protection where the allegations in the complaint were
insufficient.
D. Discovery Sanctions
Rule 1.380 provides that a party may move for an order compel-
ling discovery, and provides penalties for failure to comply with a dis-
covery order. The severity of the punishment must be commensurate
with the violation. 02 Sanctions enumerated in the rule include orders
196. 466 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
197. 461 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
198. Id. at 1027.
199. See generally Tennant v. Charlton, 377 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1979).
200. Id. at 1170.
201. 474 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
202. Harless v. Kuhn, 403 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. 1981).
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striking pleadings and dismissing actions or entering judgment, 203 and
orders of contempt.20 4
The Fifth District in Wallraff v. T.G.L Friday's, Inc. 205 decided
that a trial court may dismiss an action with prejudice as a sanction for
a plaintiff's failure to appear at a deposition although no order compel-
ling appearance has issued. Conflict with cases in the Third and Fourth
Districts was certified.20 6
VI. Default
Rule 1.500 provides that a clerk or a court may enter a default
"[w]hen a party against whom affirmative relief is sought has failed to
file or serve any paper in the action .... If the party "has filed or
served any paper in the action," only a court may enter default, and
203. See Pey v. Turnberry Towers Corp., 474 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (order striking pleadings and entry of default judgment for failure to
timely file answers to interrogatories too harsh under the circumstances); Campagna
Constr. Co. v. Riverview Condominium Corp., 467 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (trial court properly struck pleadings and entered default judgment for "contin-
ued and willful" violations of discovery orders); Cedars Assocs. v. E.R. Brownwell &
Assocs., 466 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court properly struck and
dismissed counterclaim as discovery sanction); Weck v. Weck, 464 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court properly struck defenses under Rule 1.380(b)(2)(C)).
204. See Tubero v. Ellis, 472 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (con-
tempt citation inappropriate where element of intent not shown and defendant techni-
cally complied with order of post-judgment discovery in aid of execution by deposition);
Sun-Crete, Inc. v. Sun Deck Prods., Inc., 473 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (evidence too speculative to support amount of compensatory fine for contempt
relating to discovery order).
205. 470 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
206. Id. at 734; see Rashard v. Cappiali, 171 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1965); Reliance Builders v. City of Coral Springs, 373 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
207. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(a); see Building Inspection Servs. v. Olemberg, 476
So. 2d 774, 774 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that "a letter filed in a cause by
an officer of a defendant corporation, advising the court that the corporation is at-
tempting to engage an attorney to represent it, constitutes a 'paper' under Rule
1.500(a) .... "); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(b); Fernandez v. Colson, 472 So. 2d 868 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("stipulation of counsel for respective parties agreeing to a
mutual restraining order which was filed as part of the record constituted a 'paper'
within the meaning of" Rule 1.500(b)); Reicheinbach v. Southeast Bank, 462 So. 2d
611 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (letter confirming agreement to extend time before
foreclosure constituted a paper served).
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the party "shall be served with notice of the application for default." '
Relief from a default judgment may be obtained under Rule 1.540(b).
Florida courts espouse a liberal policy in favor of setting aside defaults
and deciding causes on their merits. 0 9
Reasonable doubt about whether a default should be vacated
should be resolved in favor of vacation.210 On review of an order dispos-
ing of a motion to set aside a default, an appellant must show a gross
abuse of discretion.21' A movant for vacation of default must show "a
meritorious defense and ... a legal excuse for failure to comply with
the rule." '212 Grounds for relief include excusable neglect and meritori-
ous defense,2 13 mistake,214 due diligence,21 5 inappropriate sanction, 16
208. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(b); see Connecticut Gen. Dev. Corp. v. Guson, 477
So. 2d 665 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (parties whose answers were stricken with
leave to amend were entitled to service and hearing on motion for default); Bloom v.
Palmetto Fed. Savs. and Loan Ass'n, 477 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(error to enter default without adequate notice); Fernandez v. Colson, 472 So. 2d 868
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (unnecessary to show excusable neglect or meritorious
defense in motion to set aside and vacate where notice of application for default not
given); Austin v. Papol, 464 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (summary
judgment on counterclaim imposed as sanction for failure to appear at depositions im-
proper without hearing on whether failure to appear was willful or in bad faith).
209. Reicheinbach v. Southeast Bank, 462 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
The court in Locklear v. Sampson, 478 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
held that a trial court erred in denying a motion to set aside a default judgment which
established paternity. The court stated that because of unknown collateral conse-
quences flowing from an adjudication of paternity, such a judgment "should not be
entered solely upon the basis of unadmitted and unproven allegations of paternity... ;
rather, it should be based upon some competent, substantial evidence." Id. at I 115.
The court in Hobbs v. Florida First Nat'l Bank, 480 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985), decided that a party whose demand for trial was untimely because it was made
after default was nevertheless entitled to a jury trial on the issue of damages because
her coparties had made a timely demand.
210. Kindle Trucking Co. v. Marmar Corp., 468 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
211. Id. at 504.
212. Id.
213. See Marine Outlet v. Miner, 469 So. 2d 251, 252 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985) ("[t]o justify setting aside a default, the defaulted party must show both excusa-
ble neglect and a meritorious defense"; excusable neglect shown where telephone con-
versation with secretary to plaintiffs' attorney lead defendant to believe plaintiffs would
not seek default if answer not filed within 20 days); La Nacion Newspaper, Inc. v.
Santos Rivero, 478 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court erred in
refusing to set aside default where court clerk erred in filing answer after default when
Rule 1.500(c) required return of papers, no engagement in dilatory tactics evident,
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timely motion to set aside default and affidavit stating basis for excusable neglect filed,
and answer showed meritorious defense) (subdivision (c) has been amended, effective
Jan. 1, 1985, and now provides that the clerk shall file papers submitted after default
and notify the party that a default has been entered); Kindle Trucking, 468 So. 2d at
502 (delay in answer caused by language in summons which was ambiguous about
whether a party was served in his capacity as individual or as corporate representative
constituted excusable neglect where followed by prompt motion to set aside clerk's de-
fault); Kuehne & Nagel, Inc. v. Esser Int'l, Inc., 467 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (excusable neglect caused by office clerk's mistaken removal and storage of
complaint and summons which had been on lawyer's desk); but see Doane v.
O'Donnell, 467 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Judge Letts, in dissent,
criticizes treatment of clerical error as excusable neglect and chastens majority for
equating "simple negligence with excusable neglect"); Fratus v. Fratus, 467 So. 2d
484, 485 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (failure of "man of little business or legal
experience" to respond to papers served pursuant to long-arm statute constituted excus-
able neglect). Cf. Newkirk v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 464 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (error to set aside default where allegations of excusable neglect and
meritorious defense insufficient, and no supporting affidavit or sworn statement filed);
Rhines v. Rhines, 483 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no excusable neglect in
disregarding summons).
214. See Savela v. Fisher, 464 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (excusa-
ble neglect found where attorneys who represented multiple defendants in same case
inadvertently failed to perceive that date summonses were served on two defendants
differed from date of service on another defendant); Zwickel v. KLC, Inc., 464 So. 2d
1280 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (attorney's failure to timely file responsive pleading
caused by confusion over interrelationship between a pending case and a settled com-
panion case was excusable neglect).
215. In deciding whether an incidence of neglect is excusable, the trial court may
consider as a factor the "diligence demonstrated by the movants upon learning of the
default." Kindle Trucking, 468 So. 2d at 504. See Bayview Tower Condominium Ass'n
v. Schweizer, 475 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (motion to vacate insuffi-
cient for failure to show excusable neglect on part of defendant but rather of insurer in
losing file; lack of due diligence found because insurer took five months to find file after
learning defendant was required to file answer).
216. In a dissolution of marriage action, the court in Whiteside v. Whiteside, 468
So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), held that default is an inappropriate sanc-
tion for contempt. The court stated that default is authorized only under Rules
1.380(b)(2)(C) (failure to comply with a discovery order), 1.200(b) (failure to attend a
pretrial conference), and 1.500(b) (failure to plead or otherwise defend the action), and
expressed concern that due process rights might be violated by a default judgment. See
also Pey v. Turnberry, 474 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (default as
sanction for untimely filing of answers too harsh where answers were due on November
1, were air expressed from Germany on October 29 and filed on November 5); Campa-
gna Constr. Co. v. Riverview Condominium Corp., 467 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (default as sanction for "continued and willful violations of orders of the
court regarding discovery proceedings" affirmed).
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lack of jurisdiction, 21 7 and misrepresentation.218
VII. Dismissal
A. Generally
A motion to dismiss tests whether the plaintiff's complaint is suffi-
cient to state a cause of action. 21 9 The court must consider only the
allegations within the four corners of the complaint.220 The complaint
must contain sufficient allegations of ultimate facts which, if proven,
would entitle the plaintiff to relief.221 The allegations are taken as
true222 and considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
217. Metropolitan Drywall Syss. v. Dudley, 472 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter final default judg-
ment because claim did not exceed $5,000); Gonzalez v. Totalbank, 472 So. 2d 861
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (final default judgment void for lack of jurisdiction over
the person).
218. See Marine Outlet v. Miner, 469 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(failure to timely file answer constitued excusable neglect where conversations with
plaintiffs' counsel lead insurance adjuster to believe extension of time would be permit-
ted); cf. Moore v. Powell, 480 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (neglect
inexcusable where no reasonable basis for belief that third party's insurance carrier
would handle defense).
219. Abrams v. General Ins. Co., 460 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
220. Id. at 572; Home Says. Ass'n v. Attorney's Title Ins. Fund, 479 So. 2d 191
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Kupperman v. Levine, 462 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
221. See Feagle v. Florida Power & Light Co., 464 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (claim for punitive damages properly dismissed for failure to allege
ultimate facts); Nicholson v. Kellin, 481 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(allegations sufficient to state cause of action in fraudulent conspiracy); Technicable
Video Syss. v. Americable of Greater Miami, Ltd., 479 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (allegations sufficient to state cause of action on third party beneficiary
theory); Auto World Body & Paint, Inc. v. Sun Elec. Corp., 471 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("bare bones" factual allegations in counterclaims would provide
basis for at least partial relief from claims of plaintiff); Kupperman, 462 So. 2d at 90
(sufficient allegations of dangerous condition in slip and fall case); Frugoli v. Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (allegations sufficient
to withdraw motion to dismiss but not sufficient to permit defendant to adequately
respond; on remand, plaintiff permitted to amend under Rule 1.190); cf. Rishel v. East-
ern Airlines, Inc., 466 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (dismissal of negli-
gence action proper for failure to allege willful and wanton misconduct so as to over-
come presumption of nonliability for injuries suffered by police officers and firemen in
discharge of duties).
222. Gilbert v. Oil Conservationists, Inc., 471 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
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party.2 23 Any ground upon which a cause of action is stated is sufficient
to preclude dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. 24
Leave to amend a deficient complaint should be given unless the
privilege of amendment has been abused or the face of the complaint
shows the deficiency is incurable.225 Pleadings may be amended in ac-
cordance with Rule 1.190. Failure to allege a specific statutory basis
for suit does not in itself subject a complaint to summary judgment of
dismissal, because the basis for the action may be clarified by
amendment.226
Failure to substitute a personal representative within the ninety
day time limit of Rule 1.260(a) may not be fatal to a claim. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Stroh v. Dudley22" held that the
rule "does not require mandatory, nondiscretionary dismissal even in
light of the terminology 'shall be dismissed as to the deceased
party.' ",228 The court reversed an order of dismissal, stating that the
rule should be liberally construed to permit substitution of parties after
ninety days where mistake, inadvertance, or excusable neglect is
shown. 29 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Downey criticized the major-
ity's invocation of Rule 1.540(b)(1) to override an otherwise mandatory
dismissal for failure to substitute because on the facts of the case the
majority's decision was "tantamount to a holding that ignorance of the
law is excusable neglect. '230
The trial court must not resolve issues of fact,231 weigh evi-
1985); Nicholson v. Kellin, 481 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
223. Delves v. Kingdom Voice Publications, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1327, 1328 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
224. Nicholson v. Kellin, 481 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
225. Unitech Corp. v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 472 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (trial court not divested of jurisdiction to vacate order denying rehearing
on order dismissing original complaint with prejudice); Thompson v. McNeill Co., 464
So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error to dismiss with prejudice where com-
plaint had been amended only once and no showing privilege had been abused or that
complaint was clearly unamendable).
226. Williams v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 471 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
227. 476 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
228. Id. at 231.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 232 (Downey, J., dissenting).
231. L.M. Duncan & Sons v. City of Clearwater, 466 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1985)
(in workers' compensation case, dismissal of third party complaint alleging right of
indemnity premature where factual issue whether city was at fault unresolved).
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dence, 23 2 or consider affirmative defenses' 3 in ruling on the motion. 23 4
Although a court in its discretion may use dismissal as a sanction
for failure to attend a pretrial conference03 5 or for failure to abide by a
legitimate order of the court,2 36 such a drastic remedy should be in-
voked only in extreme circumstances because it punishes the litigant
for his lawyer's shortcomings.237
232. Christie v. General Elec. Corp., 462 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 1.420(b) granted at
close of plaintiff's evidence reversed as premature where plaintiff established prima fa-
cie case).
233. N.E. at West Palm Beach, Inc. v. Horowitz, 471 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (court may not consider affirmative defenses or sufficiency of evidence
plaintiff may produce); Thomas v. Soper, 464 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (defenses of laches, statute of limitations, and subsequent assignments improper
grounds for dismissal of contract action); cf. Kulpinski v. City of Tarpon Springs, 473
So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (court may consider defense of statute of
limitations on motion to dismiss where facts constituting defense are affirmatively
stated on face of complaint); City of Clearwater v. United States Steel Corp., 462 So.
2d 1171 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (defense of res judicata properly considered on
motion to dismiss where stipulation permitted court to judicially notice other proceed-
ings between parties).
234. Home Savs. Ass'n v. Attorneys' Title Ins. Fund, 479 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court properly considered provisions of contract in granting
motion to dismiss) (on motion for rehearing); Kulpinski, 473 So. 2d at 814 (although
statute of limitations should be raised as affirmative defense, it may be raised on mo-
tion to dismiss "only if the facts constituting the defense appear affirmatively on the
face of the complaint."); City of Clearwater v. United States Steel Corp., 462 So. 2d at
1171 (although res judicata should be raised as affirmative defense, it was properly
considered on motion to dismiss where parties stipulated that court should consider and
take judicial notice of all other proceedings between them); Huszar v. Gross, 468 So.
2d 512 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (in libel action, court on motion to dismiss prop-
erly decided issue whether privilege applied).
235. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200(c).
236. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b), 1.420(b); Livingston v. Department of Correc-
tions, 481 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
237. Id. The court in Livingston reversed a dismissal predicated on the failure of
a lawyer to comply with the terms of a pretrial order. See also Austin v. Papol, 464 So.
2d 1338 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (dismissal with prejudice without hearing on
failure to appear at deposition reversed as too severe); Jackson v. Layne, 464 So. 2d
1242 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (dismissal with prejudice of paternity and child
support action for plaintiff's failure to comply with pretrial order requiring parties to
take blood tests where plaintiff not given additional opportunity to comply reversed as
too severe); cf. Wallraf v. T.G.I. Friday's, Inc., 470 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (dismissal with prejudice as sanction under Rule 1.380(d) and 1.380(b)(2)(C)
for discovery violation affirmed; court certified conflict with decision in Rashard v. Cap-
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When an action is dismissed under Rule 1.420, costs are awarded
against the party who sought relief.2 38 When a party voluntarily dis-
misses a claim under Rule 1.420(a)(1)(i) and subsequently commences
another action based on the same claim against the same party, the
court shall tax the costs of the claim previously dismissed against the
party seeking affirmative relief pursuant to Rule 1.420(d).23 9
In a case of first impression, the Third District in MacArthur
Dairy, Inc. v. Guillen2 40 held that a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses
a claim, pays costs to the defendant upon recommencement of an ac-
tion on the claim, and prevails in the second action may recover costs
paid which the defendant would have expended had the claim not been
previously dismissed. 41 The court reasoned that the purpose of Rule
1.420(d) is to discourage the use of voluntary dismissals to abuse de-
fendants and that the new rule would not disserve that purpose.2 42 The
law in the Third District now accords the practice of federal courts of
awarding expenses and costs as one of the terms and conditions of vol-
untary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2).243
There is conflict among the districts over whether and to what ex-
tent a trial court may grant relief from judgment under Rule 1.540(b)
following voluntary dismissal under Rule 1.420(a)(1)(i). The courts
have lent disparate interpretations to Randle-Eastern Ambulance Ser-
vice, Inc. v. Vasta,2" in which the Florida Supreme Court ruled that
"voluntary dismissal under Rule 1.420(a)(1)(i) divests the trial court
of jurisdiction to relieve the plaintiff of the dismissal. 2 45 The First and
Second Districts appear to have taken this language at face value,
piali, 171 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965), interpreting predecessor of the rule
to preclude use of the sanction against plaintiff).
238. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(d).
239. But see Douglas v. Wilson, 472 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(error to render joint judgment for costs on one count of a complaint which was basis
of previously dismissed action but which had been brought in behalf of only one of the
parties).
240. 470 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
241. Id. at 748.
242. Id.
243. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2); see McLaughlin v. Cheshire, 676 F.2d 855 (D.C.
Cir. 1982). It should be noted, however, that the court in MacArthur Dairy modeled
its analysis on a federal court's interepretation of proper practice under Rule 41(a)(2),
rather than on any case interpreting Rule 41(d), the federal counterpart to Florida's
Rule 1.420(d).
244. 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978).
245. Id. at 69.
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while the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts have distinguished Randle-
Eastern and granted limited relief under Rule 1.540(b) after voluntary
dismissal. The cases distinguishing Randle-Eastern indicate that some
courts will consider granting any relief from voluntary dismissal obtain-
able by way of Rule 1.540(b)(3) short of reinstatement of an action.246
Where an action is dismissed by a court sua sponte because of a
clerical error in processing a court's internal documents, the action may
be reinstated pursuant to Rule 1.540(a). 241
246. See Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Prescott, 445 So. 2d 591 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (plaintiff not entitled to reinstatement of action after voluntary dismissal where
second suit would be time-barred by statute of limitations); see also id. at 594-96 (Er-
vin, C.J., specially concurring) (general discussion of divergencies in post-Randle-East-
ern case law and proposal that a question be certified to the Florida Supreme Court:
"Whether a voluntary dismissal divests a trial court of jurisdiction to relieve a plaintiff
of such dismissal when it is alleged, pursuant to Rule 1.540(b)(3), that the dismissal
was caused by the fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party?"
Id. at 596); South Florida Nursing Servs. v. Palm Beach Business Servs., 474 So. 2d
1289 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Randle-Eastern in finding trial court erred
in reinstating action even where fraud and misrepresentation were alleged); see Ander-
son v. Watson, 475 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error to grant plaintiffs'
motion under Rule 1.540(b) to expunge words "with prejudice" from notice of volun-
tary dismissal); Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (plaintiff not entitled to relief from effect of voluntary dismissal where filing of
notice "with prejudice" resulted from secretarial error or excusable neglect); cf.
Shampaigne Indus., Inc. v. South Broward Hosp. Dist., 411 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982) (permitting relief from words "with prejudice," distinguishing Randle-
Eastern as prohibiting reinstatement of action through Rule 1.540(b)(3) but not
prohibiting other relief). The court in Shampaigne Industries certified the following
question, which the supreme court has as yet not answered: "May Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.540(b) be used to afford relief if a party can demonstrate that a voluntary
dismissal was filed as the result of secretarial error, mistake, inadvertence or excusable
neglect?" 411 So. 2d at 367. See Bender v. First Fidelity Says. & Loan Ass'n, 463 So.
2d 445 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (following Shampaigne Industries on similar
facts); Atlantic Assocs. v. Laduzinski, 428 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(same); Siler v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 420 So. 2d 357, 358 n.2 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (error to deny relief from effect of "voluntary dismissal with
prejudice" on basis of Randle-Eastern because that case does not apply to dismissal of
a party but only of action itself; suggesting that Randle-Eastern does "not hold that
proper grounds for relief under Rule 1.540 from a notice of voluntary dismissal can
never be alleged."); Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co. v. Wellenreiter, 475 So. 2d 1302
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Randle-Eastern in finding trial court erred in
reinstating action after voluntary dismissal where plaintiff failed to present evidence of
damages on cross-claim and moved to dismiss to avoid adverse ruling on defendant's
motion for directed verdict).
247. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Rolly Marine Serv., Inc., 475 So. 2d
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The Second District in Laursen v. Filardo2 48 held that where the
wrong person is named defendant in a tort action timely commenced,
and the parties stipulate to dismissal with prejudice as to that party
and that the plaintiff would be permitted to file an amended complaint
naming others as defendants, the trial court erred in dismissing the ac-
tion for lack of jurisdiction based on the running of the statute of limi-
tations where the order of dismissal stated that the amended complaint
was deemed filed at the time of dismissal. The district court found the
amended complaint was properly filed with the court under Rule
1.080(e).2 49 The First District in Corcoran v. Federal Land Bank250
found error when a trial court dismissed a counter cross-claim where
the same claim was pending in an action in federal court. The district
court noted that a stay or abatement of a case in one court is the ap-
propriate remedy in instances of concurrent jurisdiction pending deter-
mination of the claim in the court where jurisdiction first attached.
B. Failure to Prosecute
Rule 1.420(e) provides that an action shall be involuntarily dis-
missed for failure to prosecute when there has been no record activity
for a period of one year.251 The one-year period is computed by exclud-
ing the day of the last record activity and including the day the motion
to dismiss is filed. Thus, in Zentmeyer v. Ford Motor Co., 25 the Fifth
District found that where the last record activity was an order filed
265 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (wrong form used indicating case was settled rather
than transferred; court to which case was transferred erroneously dismissed, believing
case had been settled in former court).
248. 468 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
249. Id. at 252.
250. 470 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
251. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e) provides:
All actions in which it appears on the face of the record that no activ-
ity by filing of pleadings, order of court or otherwise has occurred for a
period of one year shall be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on
the motion of any interested person, whether a party to the action or not,
after reasonable notice to the parties, unless a stipulation staying the ac-
tion is approved by the court or a stay order has been filed or a party
shows good cause in writing at least five days before the hearing on the
motion why the action should remain pending. Mere inaction for a period
of less than one year shall not be sufficient cause for dismissal for failure
to prosecute.
252. 464 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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October 6, 1982, the one year period began to run on October 7, 1982,
and a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute filed on October 6,
1983, was one day premature.
The record activity must be calculated to move the cause toward
conclusion,2 53 although "[w]here activity is facially sufficient, as op-
posed to merely passive, e.g., a name change . . . [or] substitution of
counsel .... a court cannot inquire further as to how well the activity
advances the cause. ' '254
Record activity sufficient to preclude a dismissal under Rule
1.420(e) includes notice of deposition, although the deposition was
never taken;255 a two-question interrogatory propounded to the defend-
ant;25 16 settlement with one of the plaintiffs; 57 a notice to produce;25 8
and filing a notice of hearing. 59
Before granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 1.420(e), the trial
court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether good
cause is shown so that the action should remain pending.2 ° The stan-
dard applied to determination of good cause on the issue of failure to
prosecute is more strict than that of excusable neglect on the issue of
whether a default judgment should be vacated.2 "6 Good cause "must
include a showing of contact with the opposing party during the one-
year period and some form of excusable conduct or happening other
than negligence or inattention to deadlines. 26 2 The First District Court
of Appeal in Paedae v. Voltaggio263 catalogued several examples of cir-
253. See Grooms v. Garcia, 482 So. 2d 407, 408 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Hunter v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., 477 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (dis-
missal reversed although arguable the act of discovery would not move matter toward
trial posture; benefit of doubt given to nonmovant); Philips v. Marshall Berwick Chev-
rolet, Inc., 467 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (record activity must move
cause toward resolution and not merely represent effort to keep cause on docket).
254. Marshall Berwick Chevrolet, 467 So. 2d at 1069-70.
255. Orange Elec. Co. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 467 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
256. Marshall Berwick Chevrolet, 467 So. 2d at 1068.
257. Koenig v. Deloite Haskins & Sells, 474 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
258. Hunter, 477 So. 2d at 642.
259. Grooms, 482 So. 2d at 407.
260. Withers v. Flagship Peoples Bank, 473 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
261. Paedae v. Voltaggio, 472 So. 2d 768, 769 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
262. Withers, 473 So. 2d at 790.
263. 472 So. 2d at 768.
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cumstances where good cause was not shown.2"4 Abatement and re-
moval of a case from the active case docket by order of the court is
good cause.265 When an action is stayed as to one of the defendants by
federal bankruptcy law, the action may not be dismissed as to any of
the defendants for failure to prosecute.266 The trial court may not dis-
miss for lack of prosecution where the plaintiff gives notice of readiness
for trial and then takes no further action during a one-year period, be-
cause it is the trial court's responsibility to enter an order setting the
trial date.2 67 However, a plaintiff's failure to file any pleading in re-
sponse to a trial court's notice preceeding order of dismissal justifies an
order of dismissal.26 8
VIII. Summary Judgment
Rule 1.510(c) provides that a party may upon motion be granted a
summary judgment if the record "show[s] that there is no genuine is-
sue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."'2 9
The Florida Supreme Court in Moore v. Morris270 summarized
the gloss it has placed on the rule:
[A] party moving for summary judgment must show conclusively
the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and the court
must draw every possible inference in favor of the party against
whom a summary judgment is sought .... A summary judgment
should not be granted unless the facts are so crystallized that noth-
ing remains but questions of law ....
If the evidence raises any issue of material fact, if it is con-
flicting, if it will permit different reasonable inferences, or if it
tends to prove the issues, it should be submitted to the jury as a
question of fact to be determined by it .... 271
264. See id. at 769.
265. Rudolph v. Chase, 468 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
266. List v. St. Petersburg Hotel Ass'n, 466 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
267. Mikos v. Sarasota Cattle Co., 453 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. 1984).
268. Govayra v. Straubel, 466 So. 2d 1065, 1066 (Fla. 1985).
269. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
270. 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
271. Id. at 668 (citations omitted). The supreme court in Moore overturned a
summary judgment for the defendants in a medical malpractice case where a factual
issue remained about when the applicable statute of limitations began to run. Id. at
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The standard of review is less deferential to the trial court on a
summary judgment, which is based only a written record, than it is
when the court has heard witnesses or reached a decision after weigh-
ing conflicting evidence.272
The burden is on the movant to demonstrate an absence of genuine
issue of material fact and his entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law.21 3 Once the movant has shown that no issue of material fact exists,
the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce counterevidence
which reveals a genuine issue of material fact.274 Trial courts should
give a strict reading to the movant's filed papers, and a liberal reading
to those of the opposing party.27 5
Where affirmative defenses are raised, a plaintiff seeking summary
judgment must overcome the defenses by presenting evidence which
disproves the facts alleged or establishes that the defenses are legally
insufficient.276
Parties may submit affidavits, depositions, and answers to interrog-
668-70; see also Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533, 539 (Fla. 1985) (question
of when the "creeping-disease" of asbestosis manifested itself for purposes of statute of
limitations is question of fact which may not be resolved by summary judgment).
272. Savage-Hawk v. Premier Outdoor Prods., Inc., 474 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
273. City of Live Oak v. Arnold, 468 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
274. Golden Hills Golf & Turf Club, Inc. v. Spitzer, 475 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Landers v. Milton, 370 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1979)); Jackson v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 469 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (sum-
mary judgment for defendant insurer affirmed, as plaintiff had presented no evidence to
rebut defendant's evidence of written rejection of uninsured motorist coverage); Wil-
liams v. Hunt Bros. Constr. Co., 475 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (sum-
mary judgment for defendant affirmed in malicious prosecution action where plaintiff
failed to rebut conclusive presumption created by magistrate's finding of probable
cause to issue warrant through record evidence of fraud or corrupt means used by one
who initiated prosecution); Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 469 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Blits v. Blits, 468 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (in will contest, summary judgment for defendant affirmed on issue of proper
execution where plaintiff failed to rebut prima facie case of formal execution by prov-
ing facts sufficient to support revocation).
275. Swift Indep. Packing Co. v. Basic Food Int'l, Inc., 461 So. 2d 1017 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
276. O'Neal v. Brady, 476 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Fischer v.
Rodriguez-Capriles, 472 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Home Health
Servs. v. McQuay-Garrot, Sullivan & Co., 462 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985); International Commercial Properties, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 462 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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atories in support of their relative positions on a motion for summary
judgment. 77 In Cary v. Keene Corp.,2"' the First District reversed a
summary judgment after finding that the trial court should not have
excluded the plaintiff's affidavit, which contradicted his earlier deposi-
tion testimony. The court noted the rule that a party may not create an
issue of fact by repudiating or contradicting his own deposition testi-
mony by affidavit.279 However, the court found that this case fit under
an exception to that rule providing that an affidavit which presents a
credible explanation for the discrepancy may be sufficient to establish
that a factual issue is before the court.280 The First District in Marlar
v. Quincy State Bank281 reversed a summary judgment where the trial
court erroneously relied on an affidavit which was not served and filed
by the movant at least twenty days before the hearing, as required by
Rule 1.510(c). The rule is designed to provide the opposing party an
opportunity to prepare a challenge to the factual basis of the motion.282
The court found the affidavit was not authorized by Rule 1.510(e),
holding that, under the rule, "a movant may file supplemental affidavits
less than twenty days prior to the summary judgment hearing only
upon written stipulation and agreement by the adverse party affected
or upon leave of court granted by written order after written applica-
tion, notice to the adverse party, and the opportunity for a hearing. '283
If the provisions of a contract are susceptible of different infer-
ences, summary judgment is inappropriate where the inferences must
be resolved by determination of fact.284 Summary judgment is appro-
277. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a), (b), (e); see Montejo Invs., N.V. v. Green Compa-
nies, Inc., 471 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (supporting affidavit insuffi-
cient for failure to comply with Rule 1.5 10(e)); Testa v. Pfaff, 464 So. 2d 220, (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (affidavits insufficient because based on ultimate facts or conclu-
sions of fact without stating facts which would support such conclusions); Evens v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 468 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (summary
judgment for defendant affirmed where uncontroverted affidavits negated existence of
element of tort).
278. 472 So. 2d 851 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
279. Id. at 853.
280. Id.; accord R & W Farm Equip. Co. v. Fiat Credit Corp., 466 So. 2d 407
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
281. 463 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
282. Id. at 1233.
283. Id.
284. See Baugher v. Banker's Life Co., 471 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (summary judgment for insurer reversed where different inferences could be
drawn from provisions of life insurance contract and amount of death benefits payable);
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priate where "no interpretation of the undisputed material facts would
support a finding of liability."28
IX. Directed Verdict
A motion for directed verdict must be made at the close of all the
evidence or the opportunity is waived.2" 6 An exception is made where
there is a total lack of evidence to support the verdict.287 When there is
evidence in the record about which reasonable people could differ, a
jury issue of liability or damages is raised and the motion may not
properly be granted.28 The evidence must be considered in a light most
Miranda v. Julian, 463 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (summary judgment
reversed where contract contained latent ambiguity); Master Antenna Syss. v. Number
One Condominium Ass'n, 466 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (ambiguity in
master television system contracts precluded summary judgment); cf. Tampa Port
Auth. v. Tampa Barge Servs., Inc., 463 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
("[m]ere contractual ambiguity does not necessarily preclude summary judgment";
summary judgment affirmed where evidence showed parties had given same interpreta-
tion to an ambiguity).
285. Clark v. Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co., 465 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed on negligence suit arising from
diving accident on canoe trip; defendant sustained its burden of showing there was no
evidence to indicate a breach of duty causing injury); Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgom-
ery, Inc., 469 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (summary judgment for em-
ployer proper where Worker's Compensation Act provided exclusive remedy precluding
suit alleging battery and intentional infliction of mental distress where male supervisor
was alleged to have grabbed employee's breast); cf. Robbins v. Department of Natural
Resources, 468 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (summary judgment for
defendant DNR in diving accident case improper where DNR failed to conclusively
establish facts going to element of defense of assumption of risk and failed to demon-
strate it was not negligent or that plaintiff was solely responsible for his own injuries);
see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Weathers Bros., 453 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed where plaintiff failed to introduce
bill of lading upon which issue of liability was predicated); Reina v. Gingerale Corp.,
472 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (summary judgment for defendant af-
firmed where complaint failed to allege factual predicate upon which liability could be
based).
286. The court in Waltman v. Prime Motor Inns, Inc., 480 So. 2d 88, 90 (Fla.
1985), articulated the general rule that "one who submits his cause to the trier of fact
without first moving for directed verdict at the end of all evidence has waived the right
to make that motion."
287. Sundale Assocs. v. Southeast Bank, 471 So. 2d 100, 102 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
288. See Fayden v. Guerrero, 474 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(conflicting evidence about liability); R.A. Jones & Sons v. Holman, 470 So. 2d 60
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favorable to the nonmovant. s8 A directed verdict is improper if any
record evidence would support a jury verdict. 90 A directed verdict is
proper where the record does not support a jury issue,291 as where the
evidence and all reasonable inferences which might be drawn from it
point to but one possible conclusion.2 92 A directed verdict is proper
where there is no evidence to support a party's position, 9 3 no rebuttal
of a legal presumption,294 no recognized legal theory upon which liabil-
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (in contract action, factual issues about breaches of
warranties presented); Curran v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp., 469 So. 2d 872 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (factual issue about hospital's participation in and control over
construction project precluded directed verdict on ground of immunity conferred by
workers' compensation law); Sistrunk v. Douglas, 468 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (in negligence action, issue whether defendant acted reasonably under the
circumstances); Wills v. Snapper Creek Nursing Home, 465 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (issue whether husband suffered loss of consortium).
289. E.g., Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
290. See id.
291. Roshkind v. Fay, 474 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (issue of
tortious interference with business relationship not supported in record); Kalivas v.
Miller, 473 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (uncontradicted evidence estab-
lished claim to liability for assault); Schimmel v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 464 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (uncontradicted evidence
proved liability for amount overdrawn from account).
292. See Trend Realty, Inc. v. Bullard, 461 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Williams v. Meyer, 474 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
293. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Vosburgh, 480 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no evidence of comparative negligence); Williams v. Meyer, 474
So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (in wrongful death action, no evidence
driver of car could have avoided hitting child); Tri-County Truss Co. v. Leonard, 467
So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no evidence to support comparative negli-
gence defense to strict liability claim); Sussman v. City of Daytona Beach, 462 So. 2d
595 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (in action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution, no evidence of facts relied upon by police to find probable
cause); cf. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Parker, 472 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (although plaintiff did not introduce signed parental consent form
which would by statute establish liability for minor child's automobile accident, di-
rected verdict improper where evidence of routine practice of licensing agency created
factual issue of whether parents signed); Ray-Mar Beauty College, Inc. v. Ellis Rubin
Law Offices, P.A., 475 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (evidence supported
punitive damages claim); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kimmel, 465 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (evidence walkway was built contrary to building code supported
claim of negligence).
294. Tozier v. Jarvis, 469 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (presump-
tion of negligence which attaches to driver of rear vehicle in rear-end collision not
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ity could be predicated,2 9 5 where the defendant's conduct was not the
legal cause of injury,298 or where the minimum legal standard of culpa-
bility was not met.297
X. Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata is invoked as an affirmative defense 298
to bar a suit where substantially the same claim or cause of action has
rebutted).
295. NN Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Professional Group, Inc., 468 So. 2d 532 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Florida does not recognize tort of economic duress).
296. See Florida Power and Light Co. v. Lively, 465 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (no duty or breach of duty on part of utility where airplane collided
with electrical lines, as accident was not foreseeable); Caranna v. Eades, 466 So. 2d
259 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no duty of city to inspect vertical openings in bal-
cony railings through which child fell).
In Snow v. Nelson, 475 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1985), the supreme court decided that a
directed verdict was proper where the evidence would not support a finding of parental
liability for a child's tortious conduct under the restrictive rule of Gissen v. Goodwill,
80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955). See generally Note, Liability of Parents for Negligent
Supervision of Their Minor Children, 12 FLA. S. U.L. REV. 935 (1985); Note, Paren-
tal Liability for the Torts of Their Minor Children: Limits, Logic & Legality, 9 NOVA
L.J. 205 (1984).
297. The supreme court in Como Oil Co., v. O'Loughlin, 466 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.
1985), held that a directed verdict was proper on a claim for punitive damages where
the trial court found the evidence showed only gross negligence of the defendant. The
court stated that "the degree of negligence necessary for punitive damages is willful
and wanton misconduct equivalent to criminal manslaughter." Id. at 1062. In a sepa-
rate opinion, Justice Shaw, joined by Justice Ehrlich, stated that the lines drawn be-
tween the relative degrees of negligence are indistinct and are matters of public policy.
These justices thought the evidence was sufficient in that case to preclude a directed
verdict. Id. at 1063.
The court in Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Robinson, 472 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1985),
held that a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages was improper on the
evidence presented in a malicious prosecution action. The court decided that the higher
standard of negligence necessary to support a finding of vicarious liability for punitive
damages under Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1981),
was inapplicable because the allegations, proof, and jury verdict were predicated on a
theory that the corporate defendant, rather than an agent, "acted with malice, moral
turpitude, wantonness, willfulness or reckless indifference to the rights of others ..
Id. at 723.
298. City of Clearwater v. United States Steel Corp., 469 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (defense of res judicata properly raised in motion to dismiss
where parties stipulated that court should take judicial notice of earlier proceedings
between them).
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been finally adjudicated in a prior proceeding.2 99 The doctrine is appli-
cable only where the suits involve overlapping identities of "the thing
sued for .... the causes of action . . . , [the] persons and parties ....
[and] the quality or capacity of the persons for or against whom the
claim is made." 300 The prior adjudication must have been final.30 1
The First District Court of Appeal in Thomson v. Petherbridge°2
ruled that the doctrine operated to bar a suit where an earlier action to
reform and enforce payment on a note was dismissed with prejudice for
lack of consideration, although the subsequent action was brought to
enforce the underlying debt rather than the note itself. The court stated
that the doctrine applies where the causes of action are "substantially
the same," and that the "[i]dentity of causes of action is defined by
similarity of the facts essential to the maintenance of both actions. '"303
The court found that both actions involved identical facts because the
suit on the debt was necessarily predicated on the same debt contract
adjudicated unenforceable in the earlier action. 304
Because "a partnership is not a legal entity apart from the mem-
bers composing it,"30 5 a summary final judgment for the partners in
their capacity as individuals may operate through the doctrine of res
judicata to bar a subsequent suit designating those individuals as part-
ners in a partnership. 306
A party may be estopped from pleading res judicata upon taking
299. Thomson v. Petherbridge, 472 So. 2d 773, 774 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
300. Husky Indus., Inc. v. Griffith, 422 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1982), quoted in Thomson, 472 So. 2d at 775.
301. Thomson, 472 So. 2d at 774.
302. See id. at 773; State v. LaPlante, 470 So. 2d 832, 834 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (doctrine inapplicable where "no clear cut former adjudication"); Falkner
v. Amerifirst Fed. Says. and Loan Assoc., 467 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(trial court correctly entered judgment of dismissal on ground of res judicata where no
rehearing or appeal was timely sought from earlier order of dismissal).
303. Thomson, 472 So. 2d at 775 (quoting Pumo v. Pumo, 405 So. 2d 224, 226
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
304. Id. at 775.
305. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Fike, 304 So. 2d 136, 137 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1974).
306. See Olympian West Condominium Ass'n v. B.K., Inc., 467 So. 2d 413 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Thus, the absence of the fourth "identity" under the test of
Thomson, 472 So. 2d at 775, does not prevent application of the doctrine at least in the
context of a partnership although the suits name the same persons in different
capacities.
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inconsistent positions in separate suits where the opposing party would
be injured.30 7 The Fifth District in Wooten v. Rhodus3 8 decided that it
would be unfair to give res judicata effect to a dissolution judgment so
as to bar a subsequent suit brought by Wooten to determine his interest
in real property owned as tenants in common at the time of dissolution.
In the dissolution action, Rhodus had moved to dismiss Wooten's coun-
terclaim through which Wooten had sought to have his rights in the
property adjudicated. Rhodus asserted that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion to determine the interests in the property and that the determina-
tion should be made in a subsequent partition suit. Wooten acquiesced
by dropping his counterclaim. When Wooten later brought a partition
suit, Rhodus raised the defense of res judicata, arguing that the inter-
ests were adjudicated by the dissolution judgment. Finding that
Rhodus' contrary positions in court would operate unfairly to deny
Wooten his day in court, the district court disallowed the defense and
ordered the case tried on its merits.
Where a "motion merely renews the allegations upon which relief
was previously denied, the doctrine of res judicata precludes relitiga-
tion of the issue presented."309
The doctrine of res judicata operates to bar relief from final judg-
ment under Rule 1.540(b) even where there is a change in the control-
ling rule of law in a later unrelated case.310
Where the verdict for a plaintiff in a personal injury suit does not
apportion responsibility for damages among joint tortfeasors, the doc-
trine operates to bar a subsequent suit against one jointly liable.31" '
Thus, the Second District Court of Appeal in Roberts v. Rockwell In-
ternational Corp.31 2 affirmed a summary judgment for the manufac-
turer of a saw which injured the plaintiffs hand, where the plaintiff
had earlier recovered in a negligence action against the county whose
ambulance transporting the plaintiff had broken down enroute to the
hospital. The plaintiff had "affirmatively argued to the jury that appor-
tionment was not possible."3 ' Because the plaintiff failed to obtain a
307. Wooten v. Rhodus, 470 So. 2d 844, 847 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
308. 470 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
309. Streater v. Stamper, 466 So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
310. Theisen v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 468 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
311. See Roberts v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 462 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 506.
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special verdict finding the damages apportionable, the court reasoned
that the defendants were joint tortfeasors, and the adjudication of the
liability of one precluded a subsequent adjudication as to the other who
was not named in the earlier suit.
XI. Stays and Injunctions
A. Stays
Removal of a civil action to federal district court is governed by
federal statute.314 Claims over which federal courts have original juris-
diction are removable. Nonremovable claims joined with removable
claims may be decided by a federal court through its pendent jurisdic-
tion. 315 The plaintiffs in Sunshine State Service Corp. v. Dove Invest-
ments316 filed suit in state court on a claim over which the federal
courts did not have concurrent jurisdiction. Defendants filed counter-
claims and also filed claims in federal district court predicated on fed-
eral statutes. Not all the defendants in the state action were named in
the federal action. Defendants invoked the pendent jurisdiction of the
federal court by joining the counterclaims. The defendants then moved
to stay the proceedings in the state court. The motion was granted and
the Fifth District reversed. The district court extrapolated a rule from
an opinion of the Florida Supreme Court3 17 providing that "a stay of a
subsequently filed action in a court of concurrent jurisdiction involving
the same parties and same subject matter is appropriate." '318 The dis-
trict court applied the rule even though the courts did not have concur-
rent jurisdiction and found that the conditions of the rule were not met
because the parties were not identical. The court further found that the
stay should not have been granted because, as a general rule in matters
of concurrent jurisdiction, the court whose jurisdiction is first invoked
has exclusive jurisdiction over the cause.
The court in Cole v. Douglas31 9 quashed a trial court's order stay-
ing part of a complaint first filed in state court and five years later filed
in federal court. The court characterized the filing in federal court as a
314. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982).
315. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
316. 468 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 478 So.
2d 53 (Fla. 1985).
317. Wade v. Clower, 114 So. 548 (Fla. 1927).
318. Sunshine State, 468 So. 2d at 283 (emphasis in original deleted).
319. 464 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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dilatory tactics and said that "stays should be rare, and the circum-
stances of each case should be scrutinized carefully to preclude manip-
ulation of the state and federal court systems." ''
In Robinson v. Royal Bank of Canada,22 the Fourth District
reached an opposite conclusion in a case in which a Canadian court
had prior and concurrent jurisdiction over an essentially identical ac-
tion. The trial court should have "decline[d] jurisdiction as a matter of
comity." 323
B. Injunctions
The Second District Court of Appeal in Lingelbach's Bavarian
Restaurants, Inc. v. Del Bello324 analyzed the procedure for obtaining a
temporary injunction under Rule 1.610(a) and decided that the remedy
is appropriately sought through a verified motion for preliminary in-
junction. The nonmovant argued that under Deanza Corp. v. Vo-
noflororio 25 injunctive relief must be sought by "pleading" rather than
"motion. 3 26 The court concluded that an amendment 327 had harmo-
nized Florida's rule with its counterpart, Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 65(a)(2), which provides that injunctive relief is sought by "appli-
cation for a preliminary injunction." The district court reasoned that
under Florida Rule 1.100(b), an application for relief is made by mo-
tion; therefore, a motion, rather than a pleading, is the proper mecha-
nism for seeking temporary injunctive relief under Rule 1.610. The
court went on to find that the motion itself did not contain the allega-
tions customarily required to gain injunctive relief, and that the mo-
tion, notice, and hearing combined to make the procedure by which
relief was granted fair.
320. Id. at 231.
321. Id.
322. 462 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
323. Id. at 102.
324. 467 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 476 So.
2d 674 (Fla. 1985).
325. 393 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
326. Id. at 1146-47.
327. In re Rules of Civil Procedure, 391 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1980).
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XII. Costs and Interest
A. Costs
1. Generally
Section 57.041 of the Florida Statutes provides that "[t]he party
recovering judgment shall recover all his legal costs and charges which
shall be included in the judgment .... -121 Nevertheless, a trial court
has discretion whether to award costs after judgment.3 29 The party
against whom costs are to be taxed must be given opportunity to chal-
lenge the items claimed as costs by presenting argument and evi-
dence.3 30 Parties need not specifically plead costs, as they do not consti-
tute part of the relief sought from damages claimed. 331 Courts take a
liberal view of the time when a motion for trial costs may be filed.
33 2
Costs incurred in an appeal "shall be taxed in favor of the prevail-
ing party unless the court orders otherwise. 3 33 A motion for appellate
costs must be filed within thirty days after the appellate court's man-
date issues .3 3 The standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a mo-
tion to tax costs is one of a clear showing of abuse of discretion.33 5
Costs of depositions may be taxed against a losing party if the
depositions "serve a useful purpose, even though not introduced into
evidence."336 Where the terms of a settlement agreement between par-
ties to the original action require the parties to pay their own costs, a
third party defendant who also asserts a derivative claim as a counter-
328. FLA. STAT. § 57.041 (1985).
329. Goslin v. Racal Data Communications, Inc., 468 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 479 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1985).
330. Morgan v. Plantation-Sysco, 471 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
331. City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1327 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
332. "[A] motion to tax costs may be filed at various times, before or after judg-
ment, and even after an appeal of the judgment has been taken, so long as the motion
is filed within a reasonable time after the appeal is concluded." Id. (attorney's fees
taxable as costs pursuant to federal statute although motion for fees made after entry
of final judgment and no prayer for fees was stated in complaint).
333. FLA. R. App. P. 9.400(a).
334. Id.; see Thornburg v. Pursell, 476 So. 2d 323, 324 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
335. Goslin, 468 So. 2d at 392 (no abuse of discretion in denying motion to tax
costs of trial transcript).
336. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Vote, 463 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
19861
51
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
claim may not be taxed with costs which are required to be paid under
the agreement.337 Costs paid by a plaintiff upon recommencement of an
action voluntarily dismissed may be recovered to the extent of the costs
the defendant would have expended had the claim not been previously
dismissed.3 38
Rule 1.442 provides that where the amount recovered by a suc-
cessful plaintiff does not exceed the amount of a properly served offer
of judgment, the plaintiff must pay the costs incurred by the defendant
after the offer was made. 89 Separate offers from multiple defendants
may not be aggregated; rather, the rule applies only when the plaintiff
fails to recover an amount greater than the highest single offer. 34°
The First District in Douglas v. Wilson 41 decided that the trial
court erred in awarding a joint judgment for costs under Rule 1.420(d)
to the extent of costs incurred in preparing to defend one count which
stated a cause of action by only one of the plaintiffs. 342 The Second
District in American Bank of Lakeland v. Hooven3 found that a trial
court erred in taxing as costs the defendant's attorney's fees and travel
expenses as a sanction against the plaintiff for misconduct of its attor-
ney. The trial court found the objectionable conduct directly resulted in
a mistrial, at substantial cost to the opposing parties. The district court
reasoned that such a sanction is improper where the attorney is not
accused or found guilty of contempt.
2. Expert Witnesses
The supreme court in Travieso v. Travieso344 held that "pursuant
to Section 92.231, expert witness fees, at the discretion of the trial
court, may be taxed as costs for a lawyer who testifies as an expert as
337. Caranna v. Eades, 466 So. 2d 259, 267 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
338. See MacArthur Dairy, Inc. v. Guillen, 470 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); see also supra notes 238-43 and accompanying text.
339. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
340. Thornburg, 476 So. 2d at 324.
341. 472 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
342. See also Okuboye v. Hubert Rutland Hosp., 466 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 476 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1985) (physician who suc-
cessfully defended malpractice suit not entitled to indemnity from joint tortfeasor hos-
pital for attorney's fees and costs where record showed plaintiff attempted to prove
active rather than passive negligence).
343. 471 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
344. 474 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1985).
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to reasonable attorney's fees."' 345 The court expressed its preference
that attorneys so testify as a courtesy and expect compensation only
"where the time required for preparation and testifying is burden-
some."346 In a separate opinion, Justice Ehrlich noted the mandatory
language "shall be allowed a witness fee"3 47 and disagreed with the
majority's treatment of that provision as permissive.348 He nevertheless
agreed with the majority that a lawyer called to testify about fees gen-
erally should do so without charge as a courtesy. Justice Overton, in
dissent, would have modified the principle that a court must hear ex-
pert testimony before awarding attorney's fees. He suggested that the
determination whether testimony was needed might be left to the attor-
neys and trial court. The Justice reasoned that testimony about the
value of other experts' services is not required, and that testimony
about attorney's fees may unnecessarily add to the cost of litigation.3 49
The Travieso decision served as the basis for the decision by the
Second District in Straus v. Morton F. Plant Hospital Foundation,
InC.3 50 The district court added its gloss by construing the holding in
Travieso as making the "award of such expert fees discretionary only
where the testifying attorney expert does not expect to be compensated
for that testimony." 351 Thus, if an attorney testifies as an expert with
the expectation of compensation, the trial court must tax her fee as a
cost.
The First District in Digital Systems of Florida, Inc. v. Com-
mitte 52 affirmed a denial of the plaintiff's motion for costs where the
expert fees were not broken down in such a manner that any charges
not properly includable as costs would be revealed. 353 The same court
345. Id. at 1185 (emphasis added).
346. Id. at 1186.
347. FLA. STAT. § 92.231 (1983) (emphasis added).
348. Travieso, 474 So. 2d at 1187 (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
349. Id. at 1188 (Overton, J., dissenting).
350. 478 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
351. Id. at 473.
352. 472 So. 2d 533 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985), petition for review denied,
482 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1986).
353. In an administrative order, the Florida Supreme Court has issued guidelines
for taxation of costs in civil actions. The guidelines address taxation of costs of expert
witnesses and comment on whether certain of those costs should be taxable. See State-
wide Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs in Civil Actions in Reeser v. Boats
Unlimited, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1346, 1349 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), reprinted in
FLORIDA RULES OF COURT 559 (West 1986).
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in Thursby v. Reynolds Metal Co. 354 found no abuse of discretion in
the trial court's order taxing expert witness costs, although no evidence
was presented showing the time the experts actually spent in prepara-
tion of their testimony. The court reasoned that the trial court's knowl-
edge of the length and the nature of the testimony given enabled it to
determine a reasonable fee. Also, the fees taxed did not appear grossly
excessive to the appellate court.3 55
B. Interest
1. Prejudgment Interest on Pecuniary Losses
Prejudgment interest is an element of pecuniary damage35 which,
when properly pled,357 is awarded as a matter of right in actions for
damages to property.3 58 The policy behind awarding prejudgment inter-
est is to encourage settlement of claims. 359 "[P]rejudgment interest is
not recoverable on awards for personal injury."3 60
The supreme court in Argonaut Insurance Co. v. May Plumbing
Co.3 16 held that "when a verdict liquidates damages on a plaintiffs out-
of-pocket, pecuniary losses, plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to
prejudgment interest at the statutory rate from the date of that
loss. ''se2 The court thus resolved a conflict among the districts over
whether prejudgment interest should be awarded on unliquidated
claims for damages. The Fourth District had held that prejudgment
354. 466 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 476 So.
2d 676 (Fla. 1985).
355. Id. at 252.
356. A.R.A. Servs., Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 474 So. 2d 396
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
357. See Harry E. Robbins Assocs. v. Sudbury, 467 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
358. See Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212, 215 (Fla.
1985); Zorn v. Britton, 120 Fla. 304, 162 So. 879 (1935), cited in A.R.A. Servs., 474
So. 2d at 396 n.1.
359. A.R.A. Services, 474 So. 2d at 396 n.1.
360. Argonaut, 474 So. 2d at 214 n.1. The court in Argonaut implied that it
might permit an award of prejudgment interest in a personal injury action. The court
noted that the rule of Zorn stemmed from a trial court's failure to apportion property
loss and personal injury damages. Id. The court may thus be indicating a willingness to
extend the scope of permissible awards of prejudgment interest to include such awards
on personal injury damages.
361. Id. at 212.
362. Id. at 215.
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interest could not be awarded where the presence of a comparative neg-
ligence claim created uncertainty about the award of damages." 3 The
claim was viewed as unliquidated and therefore incapable of supporting
an award of interest. The First District had adopted a "better rule"
providing that "for the purpose of assessing prejudgment interest, a
claim becomes liquidated and susceptible of prejudgment interest when
a verdict has the effect of fixing damages as of a prior date."364
The supreme court approved the view of the First District and
quashed the decision of the Fourth District, but decided the case on the
basis of two nineteenth-century decisions from which the court had not
receded. 36 5 In reannouncing the law of prejudgment interest, the su-
preme court removed from the province of the jury any consideration of
interest in finding the amount of damages. Rather, "[o]nce a verdict
has liquidated damages as of a date certain,"3 6 the trial judge or clerk
is to do the mathematical computation of interest according to section
687.01 of the Florida Statutes. The rule of Argonaut Insurance has
since been applied by the district courts.367
2. Interest on Interpleaded Funds
Generally, no interest is allowable on funds deposited with a
court. 3 8 However, interest is allowable on disputed funds which a court
has ordered deposited in an interest-bearing account.3 69 "[I]nterest
earned on interpleaded and deposited funds follows the principal and
363. Id. at 213-14; see Chicago Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 451 So. 2d 876
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
364. Bergen Brunswig Corp. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs.,
415 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), petition for review denied, 426 So.
2d 25 (Fla. 1983).
365. See Argonaut, 474 So. 2d at 214-15.
366. Id. at 215.
367. See Morcyl Distrib. Co. v. Farrelly, 477 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1985), petition for review denied, 486 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1986) (awarding prejudgment
interest on damages arising from breach of subdistributorship agreement); Hurley v.
Slingerland, 461 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming award of pre-
judgment interest on damages sustained by limited partner arising from general part-
ner's self-dealing); A.R.A. Servs., Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 474 So.
2d 396 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985 (awarding prejudgment interest on damages to
airplane).
368. Burnett v. Brito, 478 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
369. Id. at 849.
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shall be allocated to whomever is found entitled to the principal. 37 0
Thus, the Third District in Burnett v. Brito37' decided that a defendant
real estate broker was liable to a prevailing plaintiff for interest on
money advanced to the broker where the broker delayed in complying
with a court order to deposit the money in an interest-bearing account.
XIII. Relief from Judgment
Rule 1.540 provides for relief from judgments, decrees, or orders
on bases which include clerical mistakes, mistakes, inadvertence, excus-
able neglect, 7 2 newly discovered evidence, 3  fraud,374 voidness,3 75 sat-
370. Id.
371. 478 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
372. Williams v. Roundtree, 464 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(relief granted from effect of failure to timely file notice of appeal on bases of clerical
error and excusable neglect where judicial assistant gave erroneous information about
date decision was rendered; trial court would be permitted to set aside judgment and
re-enter at later date to permit timely perfection of appeal).
373. Kline v. Belco, Ltd., 480 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), petition
for review denied, 491 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1986) (new trial ordered on basis of new evi-
dence of tax records which controverted false testimony of adverse witness whose testi-
mony had damaged plaintiff's credibility).
374. See generally DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1984); Comment,
Rule 1.540(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure: In Search of an Equitable Standard
for Relief from Fraud, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 851 (1985); see Gomez v. Espinosa, 466
So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error to grant relief under rule on basis of
extrinsic fraud upon the court by misrepresentation where unsuccessful party not pre-
vented from participating in action, or on intrinsic fraud where alleged fraudulent con-
duct in the proceeding did not pertain to the issues tried; Rule 1.540 may not be used
as substitute for appeal to attack ruling on jurisdiction); Streater v. Stampes, 466 So.
2d 397 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (motion to vacate adjudication of paternity based
on intrinsic fraud - perjury - must be brought within one year; under Rule 1.540(b)
relief predicated on intrinsic fraud may not be obtained after one year through provi-
sion of rule authorizing independent action; however, extrinsic fraud may be raised
under rule later than one year); Weitzman v. F.I.F. Consultants, Inc., 468 So. 2d 1085,
1087 n.3 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 479 So. 2d 117 (Fla.
1985) (discussing time for bringing motion under Rule 1.540(b) for relief from intrin-
sic and extrinsic fraud).
375. See generally DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 375; Whigham v. Whigham, 464 So.
2d 674 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 475 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1985)
(void judgment may be attacked at any time under Rule 1.540(b)); Kuehne & Nagel,
Inc. v. Esser Int'l, Inc., 467 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error to deny
motion to vacate default under Rules 1.500(d) and 1.540(b) on evidence which showed
one day delay in filing answer was caused by excusable neglect when lawyer's clerk
mishandled complaint and summons); Palmer v. Palmer, 479 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 5th Dist.
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isfaction, 37 6 or inequity of prospective application.3 77
Clerical mistakes "may be corrected by the court at any time on
its own initiative or on the motion of any party ... *"378 The charac-
terization given an error is determinative of the proper mode of relief.
"Clerical" errors may be remedied at any time under Rule 1.540(a).
Where a written order does not accurately reflect the terms of a settle-
ment agreement announced in open court, the error is clerical and may
be remedied under that rule. 79 Errors of "inadvertance," which result
from a court's failure to order something it meant to order, may be
remedied through timely motion under Rule 1.540(b).380 "Judicial" er-
rors arise when a court intentionally orders something which is legally
erroneous. This kind of error must be remedied through direct ap-
peal.38' The Fourth District Court of Appeal in In re Estate of
Beeman382 announced a test for distinguishing clerical from judicial er-
ror as "whether or not the court reached a decision in the intentional or
purposeful exercise of its judicial function. If the pronouncement re-
flects a deliberate choice on the part of the court, the act is judicial;
errors of this nature are to be cured by appeal. 38 3
A related question arises in the consideration of what error may be
remedied through Rule 1.540. Some courts have ruled that substantive
change in a judgment may not be effected through the rule. This con-
clusion is reached by equating the labels "substantive error" and "judi-
Ct. App. 1985) (error to grant motion for relief under Rule 1.540(b) on basis judgment
was void for lack of jurisdiction where judgment was not void but voidable).
376. See Security Ins. Co. v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 471 So. 2d 1302
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (satisfaction of judgment extinguishes any remaining
rights in the judgment).
377. See Weitzman, 468 So. 2d at 1085 (on motion for relief under Rule
1.540(b)(5), district court remanded for cancellation of record of judgment obtained
through stock fraud scheme, where perpetrator of fraud purchased and was assigned
the judgment and sought to enforce it against defrauded party).
378. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(a).
379. See Marks v. Wertalka, 475 So. 2d 273, 274 n.2 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
380. See Mills v. Mills, 353 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (trial
court's failure to rule on attorney's fees remediable upon timely motion under Rule
1.540(b)).
381. See Marks, 475 So. 2d at 274 n.2.
382. 391 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
383. Id. at 281, quoted in Pompano Atlantis Condominium Assoc. v. Marlino,
415 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (tardy motion for clarification
under Rule 1.540 could not be treated as motion for relief under Rule 1.540 because
the error attempted to be remedied was judicial and not clerical or inadvertent).
1986]
57
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
cial error." Thus the Second District Court of Appeal in Clearwater
Oaks Bank v. Plumtree314 decided that a nunc pro tunc judgment
amending an order relating to fees was void because the trial court was
without jurisdiction. The district court stated that a substantive change
in a judgment must be pursued under Rule 1.530(g), and not under
Rule 1.540; the court followed with a statement that "[t]he remedies
permitted through Rule 1.540 do not apply to judicial errors." 315 While
the latter statement is generally accepted as true, it does not follow
that all substantive inaccuracies in a judgment stem from judicial er-
ror. Further, such an approach introduces definitional problems into the
equation, for after a court decides that the criteria in Rule 1.540(b) are
met, it must determine whether a proposed change would alter the sub-
stance of the judgment. Because any change to a judgment may be
viewed as substantive, the reach of Rule 1.540(b) would thus be so
severely circumscribed as to render it of no practical use. Rule 1.530(g)
expressly provides that it "does not affect the remedies in Rule
1.540(b)." Where a party meets the restrictive criteria for relief under
Rule 1.540(b), a court's ability to fashion a remedy should not be fur-
ther affected by a limiting notion of substance.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Peters v. Peters386 has
taken the better view by stating that errors in the substance of an order
may not be corrected through Rule 1.540(a), but may be corrected
upon timely motion under Rule 1.540(b). The court indicated that it
would have permitted correction of a contempt order to change the
amount of child support arrearages had a motion under the latter rule
been timely filed. 317 A need for relief in that case arose because the
judgment was predicated on incorrect financial information given by a
governmental agency.
The court must, of course, have jurisdiction to grant relief. Thus,
where a motion for relief is not brought under Rule 1.540(b)(1)-(3)
within "one year after the judgment, decree, order or proceeding was
entered or taken," the court is without jurisdiction to grant relief under
the rule.3 "8 Although Rule 1.540(b) provides that motions under sub-
384. 477 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
385. Id. at 1025.
386. 479 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
387. Id. at 841.
388. See Marks, 475 So. 2d at 274 (where a judgment debtor went bankrupt
several years after a settlement and agreed final judgment was entered, and plaintiff
moved to "correct and amend" judgment to add other names as judgment debtors,
relief could not be obtained under Rule 1.540(b) because motion was untimely); cf.
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section (b)(1), (2), and (3) must be made within one year, motions
under subsection (b)(4) and (5) must be made "within a reasonable
time." The requirement of reasonableness of time may no longer be
applicable to motions alleging voidness for lack of jurisdiction. The
Fifth District in Whigham v. Whigham 89 explained that "a void judg-
ment may be attacked 'at any time' because such judgment creates no
binding obligation upon the parties, is legally ineffective, and is a nul-
lity. ' ' 390 Relief from judgment obtained through fraud upon a court
may be sought later than one year by an independent action.3 91
The applicable standard of review of a grant or denial of relief
under the rule is one of gross abuse of discretion.3 92 An order setting
aside a judgment must be supported by a basis in the record.39 3 Under
Rule 1.540, relief may be sought from a settlement,394 offer of judg-
ment,'3 5 or summary judgment.396 Relief may not be obtained merely
because of a change in an applicable rule of law.3 97
Chang v. Chang, 469 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (divorce judgment
entered in 1969 could be attacked by motion filed in 1982 alleging voidness for lack of
jurisdiction because of ineffective service of process).
389. 464 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 476 So.
2d 696 (Fla. 1985).
390. Id. at 676.
391. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).
392. Rhines v. Rhines, 483 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), petition for
review denied, 488 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1986).
393. Citibank v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 478 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
394. See Vantage Broadcasting Co. v. WINT Radio, Inc., 476 So. 2d 796 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error to deny defendant relief under Rule 1.540(b) where
evidence failed to establish that his attorney had authority to settle claim); Mortgage
Corp. of America v. Inland Constr. Co., 463 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
petition for review denied, 475 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1985) (error to deny motion to vacate
judgment made during pendency of appeal where parties reached settlement).
395. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Volkswagen South, Inc., 471 So. 2d
585 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), petition for review denied, 484 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1986)
(no error in denial of relief from offered judgment which contained unilateral mistake
as result of inexcusable lack of due care).
396. See Ratner v. Garson, 475 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (mo-
tion for relief from final summary judgment modifying indemnity agreement proper
under 1.540(b)(5); however, no genuine issue of fact shown).
397. Theisen v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 468 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
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Contracts*
Keara M. O'Dempsey**
I. Introduction
The Florida Supreme Court during the Survey period of January 1
through November 30, 1985, decided cases involving a wide variety of
contracts: insurance, antenuptial, employment, sale of goods, sale of
real property, mortgage, option and settlement. The variety of clauses
considered was also broad: covenants not to compete, due-on-sale,
choice of law, and others.
Insofar as one emerges at all, two themes are discernible. First, the
court appears strongly inclined to enforce contracts as the parties have
written them. In 1985 it enforced contracts according to their literal
terms despite lower court cases of long-standing, despite statutes that
purported to amend such contracts, and in the face of public policy
arguments of considerable force.
Second, a lawyer trained in the common law tradition will be sur-
prised at the extent to which the cases reflect the growing impact of
statutes on private contracts. Nearly half of the thirteen cases discussed
in this article raised substantial statutory issues.
II. Contracts, Fraud and Duties to Disclose
Fraud, although a tort, is probably the most frequent ground upon
which cancellation of a contract is sought.' Rules concerning fraud
may be changed either by judicial decision or by legislation. The 1985
Florida cases include examples of both means. Two cases in this area
* A survey article of this type requires some streamlining of the primary
material. Emphasis here will be given to changes and clarifications of the law as
enunciated by the Florida Supreme Court during the Survey period; procedural
complexities and non-relevant issues of the cases will be largely disregarded.
** A.B., 1971, Cornell University; J.D., 1980, New York University; Assistant
Professor of Law, St. Thomas University.
1. See generally W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 105 at 726
(5th ed. 1984). Although formally a tort, the development of fraud and contract have
been closely related: "in the great majority of the [fraud] cases which have come
before the courts the misrepresentations have been made in the course of a bargaining
transaction between the parties."
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concern a contracting party's duty to disclose material facts to the
other party to the transaction. In a third, the court reduced the stan-
dard of proof necessary to establish fraud.
A. Creation of a Duty to Disclose Material Defects: Johnson v.
Davis
As recently as 1982, a Florida district court had upheld the tradi-
tional rule, generally called caveat emptor, that the seller of a home
could remain silent as to material defects in the home without fear of
liability.2 In Johnson v. Davis,3 the Florida Supreme Court unani-
mously imposed a new duty on the seller of a home: the duty to disclose
to a purchaser material defects in the home. Where the new duty is not
fulfilled, a purchaser injured by the seller's silence will have a cause of
action in "fraudulent concealment." 4
The case under review was brought by the Davises, the purchasers
of the defendants' home. The Johnsons' home was three years old when
in 1982, they entered into a contract with the Davises to sell it for over
$300,000. The contract was signed and the D.avises paid the $5,000 to
the Johnsons. Before the next, larger down payment was made, Mrs.
Davis noticed some ceiling stains and some buckling and peeling in the
house, all suggesting water damage. When questioned, Mr. Johnson ex-
plained that these resulted from several causes, none having to do with
the roof or water damage. The Johnsons assured the Davises that there
were no problems with the roof.5
The Davises then made an additional payment. Several days later
Mrs. Davis discovered water "gushing" from at least five areas of the
ceiling and windows, including the light fixtures. The roof in fact was
full of "problems." The Davises sought rescission of the contract on the
grounds of fraud and misrepresentation.
The court had little difficulty in finding that the Johnsons had
committed fraud by representing that there were "no problems" with
the roof. Since the second down payment had been made after this
misrepresentation, traditional rules of fraud applied and restitution was
granted.
2. See Banks v. Salina, 413 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Accord,
Ramel v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., 135 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
3. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
4. Id. at 629.
5. Id. at 626.
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The more difficult question was whether the Davises should be
able to recover the $5,000 payment made before the misrepresentation.
The issue required the court to reconsider the traditional Florida rule
that the seller of a home has no affirmative duty to disclose "latent
material defects" to a buyer.
Like most common law jurisdictions, Florida had traditionally im-
posed liability for affirmative acts of deceit and harm (misfeasance) but
not for simply remaining silent (nonfeasance).6 In Johnson, however,
the court observed that both misfeasance and nonfeasance could result
in a false belief and were therefore equally "violative of the principles
of fair dealing and good faith. .... ".
Finding earlier Florida cases relying on caveat emptor "unappetiz-
ing," 8 the court noted that numerous other jurisdictions - including
California, Illinois, and New Jersey - had rejected the caveat emptor
tradition and imposed a duty on the seller of a home to disclose latent
material defects. The court decreed that Florida should join these
states, and accordingly laid down a new rule: "[W]here the seller of a
home knows of facts materially affecting the value of the property
which are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer, the
seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer."
The court added, "This duty is equally applicable to all forms of
real property, new and used." That is, both the developer-builder and
the individual owner have the same obligation toward a purchaser.
Having formulated its new rule of law, the court held that the
Davises were entitled to the return of the initial $5,000 deposit since
"the Johnsons were aware of roof problems prior to entering into the
contract of sale and receiving the $5,000 deposit payment."10
B. Antenuptial Agreements and the Duty to Disclose: Stregack
v. Moldofsky
The result could hardly have been more different in Stregack v.
Moldofsky.1' Here the supreme court held not only that prospective
6. Id. at 628.
7. Id.
8. Id. The court referred specifically to Banks, 413 So. 2d at 851, and Ramel,
135 So. 2d at 876.
9. 480 So. 2d at 629.
10. Id.
11. 474 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1985).
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spouses in Florida have no duty of disclosure when entering into ante-
nuptial agreements, but - more astoundingly - that even conceal-
ment or active misrepresentation will not invalidate such an agreement.
That is, no cause of action exists by which a surviving spouse can seek
to set aside an antenuptial agreement on the ground of fraud in the
inducement.
Before their marriage, the Moldofskys had both signed a written
agreement in which each waived all rights in the other's estate. Mr.
Moldofsky made no provisions for his wife in his will, inserting only a
reference to the antenuptial agreement. When her late husband's will
was admitted to probate, Mrs. Moldofsky filed both for an elective
share and cancellation of their antenuptial agreement. Mrs. Moldofsky
alleged her husband had committed fraud at the time the agreement
was signed by claiming that he had no assets when he in fact possessed
assets worth approximately $250,000.12
The supreme court precluded Mrs. Moldofsky from pursuing her
fraud action by strictly applying Florida Statute section 732.02, which
provides that no disclosure of assets need be made before entering into
an antenuptial agreement: "No disclosure shall be required for an
agreement, contract, or waiver executed before marriage.' 3 The stat-
ute was clear enough on its face, but the Third District Court of Ap-
peal had held that one loophole existed - that disclosure itself need
not be made but, where it was, it must be made truthfully. 4 Mrs.
Moldofsky alleged not that her husband had remained silent (failed to
disclose) but that he had affirmatively misled her (made a false
disclosure).
The-supreme court brushed aside this distinction, saying that such
an interpretation would reward the "silent spouse" but punish a spouse
who "attempts" some disclosure. 15 The court further stated that the
legislative intent was clear: in Florida there is to be no duty of disclos-
12. Id.
13. FLA. STAT. § 737.702(2) (1983). The reader should note that the statute
makes quite opposite provisions for postnuptial agreements: "Each spouse shall make a
fair disclosure to the other of his or her estate if the agreement, contract or waiver is
executed after marriage." Id. (emphasis added).
14. See Moldofsky v. Stregack, 449 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (reversed in the case under discussion): "A would-be spouse is under no duty to
make any disclosure .... The statute, however, cannot and should not protect one who
voluntarily averts the truth and thereby misleads a party into contracting the
marriage."
15. 474 So. 2d at 207.
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ure - truthful or otherwise - concerning antenuptial agreements.
Finally, the court did describe one ground upon which an antenup-
tial agreement could still be set aside in Florida. Where the surviving
spouse had been misled as to the nature of the document being signed
- for example, a marriage license application instead of an antenup-
tial agreement - cancellation of the antenuptial agreement may be
sought.16
In a case of lesser significance, Evered v. Edsell,17 the court again
faced a surviving spouse's challenge to an antenuptial agreement and
again dismissed the suit. In this case, Mrs. Edsell sought to have an
antenuptial agreement set aside on the ground of overreaching. The
crucial issue here was the applicability of the Second District's Lutgert
presumption. Under Lutgert v. Lutgert,18 once a spouse has submitted
certain evidence suggesting unfairness, 19 a presumption of undue influ-
ence or overreaching comes into existence. The presumption shifts the
burden to the other spouse to show voluntariness. The supreme court
held that Lutgert had no applicability in probate proceedings, appar-
ently accepting petitioners' argument that such a presumption is not
warranted in light of section 732.702.2o
Clearly, the court construes section 732.702 as a virtually impene-
trable shield protecting antenuptial agreements from subsequent at-
tack. In Edsell, as in Moldofsky, the court cited Estate of Roberts"
for the proposition that such an agreement may be set aside only on
such narrow grounds as coercion, incompetence, or a signature "other-
wise improperly obtained. 22
16. Id. (citing Estate of Roberts, 388 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1980)).
17. 464 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1985).
18. 338 So. 2d I111 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). By its own terms, Lutgert
had previously applied only to antenuptial agreements contested in a dissolution of
marriage.
19. Specifically, the spouse must: (1) demonstrate that an antenuptial agreement
benefited one party in a grossly disproportionate manner, and (2) submit evidence that
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement were coercive. Id. at
1115-16.
20. 464 So. 2d at 1198.
21. 388 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. 1980).
22. 464 So. 2d at 1199 n.2.
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C. Standard of Proof in a Fraud Case: Wieczorck v. H & H
Builders, Inc.
The parties had already settled the case, but the supreme court
nonetheless retained jurisdiction over Wieczorck v. H & H Builders,
Inc.2" in order to clarify a murky24 but highly significant area of law:
the standard of proof applicable in a fraud action. Specifically, the
question presented was whether in an action seeking equitable relief,
fraud need be proven by only a preponderance of the evidence or by
clear and convincing evidence.
The court chose the former standard. Fraud, in Florida, need be
proven only by a preponderance or the "greater weight" of the evi-
dence, not necessarily by "clear and convincing" evidence.25 The
Wieczorck opinion is cryptic and scarcely addresses the rationale for
this decision. The court did, however, cite and rely on the 1981 case of
Rigot v. Bucci,26 in which it had adverted briefly to the historical devel-
opment of differing standards for actions at law and actions in equity.
The Rigot court found that, since the "law and equity sides of the
court" had been merged in modern times, there was no longer "sound
reason" for a distinction concerning the proof requisite to establish
fraud.27
As Justice Overton noted in his dissent in Wieczorck, the holding
represents a "substantial modification of a well-established rule of
law."2 Justice Overton also stressed the potential practical disadvan-
tages of the newly-clarified rule. The traditional requirement of "clear
and convincing evidence" in equity was based upon "the need for
strength and reliability of written agreements in the market place."
The older rule had also recognized that equitable remedies with respect
to written documents - cancellation, reformation, rescission - are
23. 475 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1985).
24. The court had created uncertainty by its own conflicting pronouncements in
the past. Id. at 228. In 1971, in Rigot v. Bucci, 245 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1971), the court
held that "only a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence is required to estab-
lish fraud, whether the action is at law or in equity." Id. at 53. Much more recently,
however, the court had stated that "proof of fraud must be by clear and convincing
evidence." Canal Authority v. Ocala Mfg., Ice and Packing Co., 332 So. 2d 321, 327
(Fla. 1976).
25. 475 So. 2d at 228.
26. 245 So. 2d at 51.
27. Id. at 52-53.
28. 475 So. 2d at 228 (Overton, J., dissenting).
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generally regarded as "much harsher" than the award of mere
damages.2 9
The dissenting justice predicted unfortunate consequences would
flow from the new standard, urging that "the strength, reliability, and
viability of written documents" in property and commercial transac-
tions would be substantially weakened. 30
II. Commercial Contracts: Parties' Choice of Law, Private
Limitations Period and Public Policy
The case of Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc.31 is of
interest for at least two reasons. First, it has important implications for
the Florida lawyer drafting a commercial contract for an interstate
transaction. The second reason is related: Burroughs presented the su-
preme court with the year's only major Uniform Commercial Code
issue.
Specifically, Burroughs set up a conflict between two provisions of
Florida law. A provision of the Florida UCC permits contracting par-
ties to agree that the law of another state will apply to their transac-
tion; another Florida statute specifically prohibits the parties from con-
tractually diminishing the Florida period of limitation of actions. What
happens when the parties choose the law of another state and then
agree, in accordance with the laws of that state, to a diminished limita-
tions period?
The Burroughs Corporation, a Michigan entity, had sold computer
equipment to a Florida clothing manufacturer, Suntogs of Miami. The
written sales contract stipulated, inter alia, that the law of Michigan
would govern the effect and interpretation of the contract. It also con-
tained a two-year limitation of action provision, as is specifically sanc-
tioned by Michigan law.32
Suntogs subsequently found that the computers did not function as
expected, and eventually ceased using them. It did not, however, bring
its suit against Burroughs within two years of the accrual of its cause
of action, as required by the contract. Thus, its contractual cause of
action would be dismissed if the Florida courts upheld the validity of
the choice of Michigan law and, in particular the two-year limitations
29. Id. at 229.
30. Id.
31. 472 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1985).
32. Id. at 1167 (citing MICH. Comp. LAWS, § 440.2725 (1970)).
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period grounded in Michigan legislation.
Each party was able to marshall Florida law to its support. On the
one hand, Burroughs invoked Florida commercial legislation which ex-
plicitly permits parties to choose the law of another state so long as
that state bears a "reasonable relation" to the transaction. 33 The provi-
sion was facially applicable here, as Michigan was clearly "reasonably
related" to the contract. And, its law unquestionably permitted parties
to choose a two-year limitations period.
Suntogs, on the other hand, relied on two Florida statutes in sup-
port of its position that the court should deny enforcement of the con-
tractual limitations clause. One provision renders void any contractual
limitations period shorter than that provided by the applicable Florida
statute of limitations;3 4 the applicable statute, in turn, provides for a
five-year limitations period.35
Faced with these conflicting results, the district court plausibly
held that (a) the choice of Michigan law in general was permissible,
but that (b) the Florida statute of limitations embodied a "strong pub-
lic policy" and therefore took precedence in Florida over the more flexi-
ble Michigan provisions.3"
The supreme court reversed and ruled the shorter period enforcea-
ble. In order to reach this result, the court first turned to a rather elab-
orate test for identifying "strong public policies."13 7 Applying it to the
33. FLA. STAT. § 671.105(1) (1975) is part of the Florida version of the Uniform
Commercial Code. That section provides: "[W]hen a transaction bears a reasonable
relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the
law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and
duties." (Emphasis added).
This "party authority" principle has been approved by the Florida Supreme Court
in Morgan Walton Properties, Inc. v. Int'l City Bank & Trust Co., 404 So. 2d 1059
(Fla. 1981), and Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507
(Fla. 1981).
34. FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (1975) renders void any contractual limitations period
shorter than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations.
35. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(2)(b) (1975), provides a five-year limitations period for
actions based on written contracts.
36. See Suntogs of Miami, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 433 So. 2d 581, 584 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 472 So. 2d at 1166 (holding that § 95.03 expresses a
"strong public policy" of the State of Florida, so as to prevail over the "party
autonomy").
37. Burroughs, 472 So. 2d at 1168. The court had previously elaborated and
applied this test in Continental Mortgage, 395 So. 2d at 509-10.
The Burroughs court found that the legislation on limitations periods failed every
part of the test for a "strong public policy." Primary among the criteria used for identi-
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statutes at issue, the court held that the limitations provisions of Flor-
ida law do not embody a "strong policy."38
The court did not, however, end its analysis there. It added that
the Florida limitations provisions "must be read in pari materia with
other [Florida] laws," in particular commercial legislation.3 9 In permit-
ting parties to choose the laws of another state to govern their rights
and duties, the legislature "recognized the need for parties to interstate
commercial transactions to know in advance which state's laws were to
apply.... This advance knowledge serves to reduce confusion and en-
courage quicker, easier resolutions."40 The court held, then, that the
contractual provision shortening the period for bringing a suit was fully
enforceable in Florida.
By virtue of its adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, Flor-
ida law had previously granted to parties to a contract for the sale of
goods41 the right to have their contract interpreted according to the law
of a state bearing a "reasonable relationship" to the transaction.
Through Burroughs, the court has made clear that parties may adopt
the limitations provisions of such a state as well.
III. Insurance Contracts
A. Unconstitutional Impairment of Contracts: State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Gant
The*Supreme Court invoked the prohibition against the impair-
ment of contracts contained in the Florida Constitution in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Gant.2 In consequence, it upheld
the strict terms of an automobile insurance policy and refused to apply
a Florida statute purportedly changing the terms of the policy.
The parties in Gant were a well-known insurance company and the
holders of two insurance policies. Defendant State Farm insured the
Gants' automobiles under two separate policies. By their express terms,
fying such a policy are: (1) a relative lack of exceptions to the law or rule in question;
(2) few or no amendments to the rule or statute, reflecting a fairly rigid policy; (3) a
characterization of the rule or law as "fundamental to the legal system"; and (4) the
"effect" of the rule or law on the contract - that is, whether limited or broad.
38. Burroughs, 472 So. 2d at 1168-69.
39. Id. at 1168.
40. Id. at 1168-69.
41. FLA. STAT. § 671.105(1) (1975) quoted supra at note 33.
42. 478 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1985).
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the policies forbade "stacking" of uninsured motorist coverage - that
is, cumulating the coverage of both policies in recovering for a single
automobile accident.
The Gants sought to overcome the language of the two contracts
by relying on a Florida legislative enactment 3 which allows an insured
to cumulate ("stack") uninsured motorist coverage. State Farm pointed
out that the legislation had not come into effect until after the policies
were issued. Since stacking would greatly increase the company's liabil-
ity to the Gants, State Farm argued that the legislation impaired its
obligations of contract in violation of the Florida Constitution. 44
The potential effect of the legislation on State Farm's obligations
was substantial. If the policies were enforced according to their terms,
State Farm would owe the Gants nothing, having already paid the
maximum recovery allowable on one of the policies. 45 However, if the
post-policy legislation were applied, the coverage would stack and the
company would be liable for an additional $30,000 to $100,000.46
The supreme court held that the Florida Constitution prohibited
application of the newly-amended statute to the contracts in issue. Any
other result would "violate the constitutional restriction on the impair-
ment of contracts" by subjecting State Farm to a "loss exposure" en-
tirely unforeseeable at the time it had issued the two policies.47
The Gant case does not break new ground in Florida law, as the
impairment-of-obligations clause has been applied before under concep-
tually similar circumstances.48 Its immediate interest lies, of course, in
the application of the clause to this particular type of insurance policy.
More generally, perhaps, Gant has a fascination of its own as an exam-
ple of that relatively rare breed, a true impairment of the obligations of
a contract.
43. The legislation at issue consisted of an amendment, effective October 1,
1980, to FLA. STAT. § 627.4312. Prior to the effective date of this amendment, stacking
was prohibited.
44. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10, provides: "Prohibited laws. - No bill of attainder,
ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
45. 478 So. 2d at 26.
46. A secondary issue of the proceeding below was whether the uninsured motor-
ist coverage of the second policy should be $100,000 per accident or the $30,000 listed.
The Gants alleged that they had not knowingly rejected the higher limit. Id.
47. 478 So. 2d at 27.
48. The court found that Gant was controlled by its earlier decision in Dewberry
v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 1978) (then-new anti-stacking statute
inapplicable to insurance policy which specifically provided for stacking).
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B. Breach of Notice Clauses: Bankers Insurance Co. v. Macias
The Macias case, like Gant, is certain to gladden the hearts of
Florida insurance counsel. In Bankers Insurance Co. v. Macias,"9 the
Florida Supreme Court held that a presumption of prejudice to an in-
surance company arises when an insured fails to give timely notice of
an accident to the company, in breach of the policy's express terms.
Ms. Macias personal injury policy required that she give her in-
surer notice of an auto accident within a stated period. She was injured
in an accident in 1980, but the insurer was not notified until Ms. Ma-
cias brought a declaratory judgment against it two years later.50
I The supreme court ruled that in Florida the insurer is presumed to
have been prejudiced when the insured has not complied with the no-
tice requirement of an insurance contract. Under this presumption, the
burden is placed on the insured to rebut the presumption - in other
words, to show that no prejudice to the insurer has occurred. Since
plaintiff Macias failed to present any evidence on the prejudice issue,
judgment had properly been entered against her.51
Apart from this primary holding, two additional features of the
opinion are noteworthy. First, the court acknowledged that its decision
was contrary to the "modern trend" under which breach of the notice
clause is disregarded except where the insurer can show that "substan-
tial prejudice" resulted. 52 Here the court particularly noted the purpose
of the notice provision - to enable the insured to conduct a "timely
and adequate investigation of all circumstances surrounding the acci-
dent." Plaintiff Macias, through her failure to give notice, had deprived
State Farm of the opportunity to conduct any investigation into her
claims.
The court also indulged in a bit of dicta based on the classic con-
tract distinction concerning "conditions precedent" to a contractual ob-
ligation and "conditions subsequent." Very different procedural conse-
quences flow depending on what type of condition has been breached.
According to the court, the party seeking to avoid a condition prece-
dent, such as a notice requirement, should have the burden of showing
49. 475 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1985).
50. Id. at 1218.
51. Id. ("If the insured breaches the notice provision, prejudice to the insurer
will be presumed, but may be rebutted by a showing that the insurer has not been
prejudiced by the lack of notice."). Id.
52. Id. (citing Annot., 32 A.LR. 4TH 151 (1984)).
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lack of prejudice if he or she has failed to fulfill the condition.53 This
rule was, of course, applied to Macias.
The rule is otherwise, the court added, for a condition subsequent
for example, the cooperation clause of an insurance policy. There,
the party seeking to avoid liability (an insurer, for example) will bear
the burden of affirmatively showing prejudice due to the other party's
failure to fulfill the condition subsequent.54
C. Intended verses Incidental Beneficiaries: Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. McCarson
The greatest significance of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
McCarson55 unquestionably sounds in tort, for here the Florida Su-
preme Court recognized for the first time the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. A supreme court dictum on the contracts
issue, however, may come as "a surprise and disappointment" 56 in fu-
ture contracts cases in the State.
Briefly, the court in McCarson said that in Florida dependents
covered by a group medical insurance policy are "incidental" and not
intended beneficiaries of the insurance contract. A dependent who is
wrongfully denied coverage under such a policy will, therefore, have no
independent cause of action against the insurer.
IV. Contractual Issues and Employees
The supreme court decided two cases involving contracts of em-
ployment. In the first, it dealt with the contract status of special em-
ployees supplied by a temporary agency, and the second with tempo-
rary injunctions upholding covenants not to compete.
A. Contract Status of Employee Supplied by Temporary
Agency: Booher v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc.
The case of Booher v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc.58 stands alone in this
53. Macias, 475 So. 2d at 1217-18.
54. Id. at 1218.
55. 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985).
56. Id. at 281 (Shaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 278-80 ("It is axiomatic in contract law that an incidental beneficiary
cannot enforce the contract."). Id.
58. 468 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 1985).
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article as the sole case in which the supreme court held ineffective the
express language of a contract. Faced with the question whether a tem-
porary employee was an "employee" for worker's compensation pur-
poses, the court held that the facts and circumstances surrounding the
employment take precedence over contractual language designed to de-
termine the issue.
The plaintiff, Mr. Booher, had sued Pepperidge Farm in tort for
injuries he sustained while working as a temporary employee on Pep-
peridge Farm's premises. The company's ordinary employees would, of
course, be barred from bringing such a suit due to the worker's com-
pensation statute.5" However, Mr. Booher had been provided to Pepper-
idge Farm as a temporary employee by Dixie Driving Service, an
agency in the business of providing employees on a temporary basis.
Mr. Booher insisted he was employed by Dixie and not by Pepper-
idge Farm. He relied in great part on the written agreement between
the agency and Pepperidge Farm, which provided that Mr. Booher
would remain the agency's employee "for all purposes." 60 If enforced,
the contractual language would permit the suit against Pepperidge
Farm to go forward.
The supreme court found that, regardless of the language used in
the contract, Mr. Booher had consented to an implied contract of hire
with Pepperidge Farm and thus became its employee for purposes of
the worker's compensation statute. Here, "[t]he actual employment re-
lationship" should control. Neither the written contract nor the subjec-
tive intent of the parties could overcome the facts.6"
Although it affirmed the lower court's decision, the supreme court
pointedly did not adopt that forum's suggestion that virtually any tem-
porary employee is barred from suing his special employer for on-the-
job injuries.6 2 Rather, the supreme court appears to have retained the
test previously established in the cases for determining the question.
Under that test, the primary issue is whether the temporary employee
has consented, expressly or impliedly, to a contract of hire with the
non-agency employer.6 3 Booher does not amend the earlier case law,
59. Florida's Worker's Compensation statute limits an employer's liability to
payment of worker's compensation benefits. FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1985).
60. See Pepperidge Farm v. Booher, 446 So. 2d 1132, 1132-33 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984), rev'd, 468 So. 2d at 985.
61. 468 So. 2d at 985.
62. See Booher, 446 So. 2d at 1133.
63. See, e.g., Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 246 So. 2d 98, 101 (Fla.
1971); Stuyvesant Corp. v. Waterhouse, 74 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1954). See also Rainbow
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but establishes instead that the facts of the case will prevail over any
attempt by the employers to control the outcome through their written
agreement.
B. Temporary Relief for Violation of Covenant Not to Com-
pete: Capraro v. Lanier Business Products, Inc.
In Capraro v. Lanier Business Products, Inc. 4 the court approved
a presumption of "irreparable injury" to an employer seeking tempo-
rary relief against a former employee who violates a covenant not to
compete. Thomas Capraro, the defendant, had been employed by plain-
tiff Lanier Business Products. His written contract with Lanier con-
tained a covenant that Capraro would not engage in "competition"
with Lanier for one year after leaving their service. Subsequent to leav-
ing Lanier, Capraro violated the terms of the covenant and Lanier
sought a temporary injunction.
Underlying the lawsuit'was a Florida statute sanctioning covenants
not to compete and permitting enforcement by injunction. 65 In prelimi-
nary proceedings, Lanier adequately alleged a valid covenant and
breach by Capraro. The remaining pre-trial issue was whether "irrepa-
rable injury" could be presumed or whether Lanier had to shoulder the
burden of proving such injury in order to have Capraro enjoined from
pursuing his new employment.
The supreme court affirmed the lower court's holding that irrepa-
rable injury to Lanier would be presumed. To force the employer to
wait until irreparable injury had occurred, said the court, would often
"defeat the purpose" of both the covenant and the action."6 Where suit
is brought on an anti-competition covenant, "[i] mmediate injunctive re-
lief is [of] the essence. '67
Justice Overton's dissent is valuable in that it points out the degree
to which Florida law will protect an anti-competition agreement, in
derogation of the common law rule. 8 Defendant Capraro, for example,
had sold only one kind of product for Lanier and his sales territory had
Poultry Co. v. Ritter Rental System, Inc., 140 So. 2d 101, 103 (Fla. 1962) (main
factors in determining existence of employment relationship for worker's compensation
purposes).
64. 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985).
65. FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1981).
66. 466 So. 2d at 213.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 213-14 (Overton, J., dissenting).
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been confined to just one Florida county. The covenant in issue not only
prohibited Capraro from selling an entire array of products, but also
designated a five-county area as prohibited territory. Nonetheless, the
temporary injunction was issued.
Given the equities of this particular case, Justice Overton thought
that "At the very least, the employer should be required to prove that
irreparable harm will result to his business if a former employee is al-
lowed to work in a new territory not serviced by him in his prior em-
ployment." The justice also entered a plea that the legislature "modify
or repeal" the state's law so that judges would be free to apply proper
equitable principles to anti-competition agreements such as this one. 9
V. Miscellaneous
Several other cases decided by the court during the Survey period
are worthy of mention both for their individual holdings and as illustra-
tions of the court's strong tendency to enforce contracts as written.
A. Due-on-Sale Clause in a Mortgage: Weiman v. McHaffie
In Weiman v. McHaffie70 the Florida Supreme Court held that a
due-on-sale clause in a mortgage is enforceable in Florida. In order to
reach this result, the court was required to disapprove the earlier Lock-
wood rule that a due-on-sale clause was enforceable only if the mort-
gage lender could show impairment of security resulting from the sale
to another party.71 The Lockwood rule requiring impairment of secur-
ity prior to enforcement was based on a balancing of equities and pub-
lic policy.
The supreme court appeared to agree with none of the reasoning
69. Id. at 214. Justice Overton had made the same plea, namely, that the legisla-
ture modify or repeal § 542.33, in an earlier case. See Keller v. Twenty-Four Collec-
tion, Inc., 419 So. 2d 1048, 1050-51 (Fla. 1982) (Overton, J., dissenting).
70. 470 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1985). Note that the court in Weiman also answered a
question certified to it by the First District Court of Appeal involving the applicability
in Florida of the provision concerning due-on-sale clauses of the federal Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.
(1982). Not only is that portion of the opinion beyond the scope of this article, but the
court's holding in Weiman that such clauses are enforceable in Florida renders its dis-
cussion of Garn-St. Germain essentially academic.
71. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. of Englewood v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d
156, 160 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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behind Lockwood. Rather, it thought that the application of the im-
pairment rule might enable an individual mortgagor to avoid a reasona-
ble contract provision, and thus work an injustice to a given mortgage
lender.7 2 Apart from creating unfairness at the individual level, the
court predicted that judicial refusal to enforce due-on-sale clauses
could also result in a shortage of mortgage money in Florida, with neg-
ative consequences for both buyers and sellers in the state and for the
economy of Florida as a whole.73
At least one other case on the court's 1985 calendar was disposed
of by reference to Weiman, 7 4 and presumably other cases and contro-
versies now current in the state will also be settled by application of
that decision.
B. Gifts of Real Property to Non-Relatives: Chase Federal
Savings and Loan Association v. Schreiber
According to the dissenting opinion of Justice Overton, the su-
preme court in Chase Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Schrei-
ber75 created a "gigolo-mistress relief rule. '76 A judicial opinion calling
forth such a ringing condemnation is surely worthy of brief
examination.
The Schreiber plaintiff had, as a woman ninety years of age, trans-
ferred title to her home to a much younger man. The deed recited that
"[t]his quitclaim deed is being given with the consideration being love
and affection." The younger man in turn had sold the property to third
parties for $50,000, after which the elderly grantor sought cancellation
of both her deed of gift and the deed of sale to the third parties.7
The issue presented was whether "a deed given to a non-relative in
return only for 'love and affection' is without consideration" and there-
fore invalid, as was held by the court below.7 * The supreme court's
72. Weiman, 470 So. 2d at 684.
73. Id.
74. Pioneer Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985) (in Weiman
"we held that due-on-sale clauses are enforceable in Florida").
75. 479 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1985).
76. Id. at 104 (Overton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 94.
78. Id. at 95-96. In its discussion the supreme court cited and quoted from both
Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Havris, 366 So. 2d 491, 496 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), and Schreiber v. Chase Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 422 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3rd
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (en banc). The latter opinion had in turn adopted an earlier dis-
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examination of the issue took it back to the recondite origins of the so-
called "English rule" on which the lower court had relied and to the
Statute of Uses of 1535 from which it is derived. 9 Although clearly
fascinated with the arcana of both the rule and the Statute, the court
could find no basis in Florida equitable principles or in the state's legis-
lation for making consideration an absolute prerequisite to a binding
deed.
On these and other grounds, the court concluded that lack of con-
sideration does not by itself make voidable a gift of real property to a
non-relative.8 0 Rather, lack of consideration in such circumstances
should be merely a factor "to be considered along with others in decid-
ing whether fraud, undue influence, violation of confidence or uncon-
scionable advantage exists.""1
The court cautioned that its opinion should not be construed too
broadly, and did not "in any way affect the existing law of Florida"
requiring consideration to support contractual undertakings.8 2 Rather,
the court held only that "a deed, sufficient in form, voluntarily exe-
cuted by a competent grantor, is effective to convey the owner's legal
title regardless of whether he receives a contractual consideration."8 3
Despite the court's care in thus circumscribing its holding, Justice
Overton issued a dissent which surely ranks among history's most
sharply worded: "In my view the majority's decision provides a means
to protect title for gigolos, mistresses, and con artists, and alters four
and one-half centuries of common law in the process. '8 4 He saw -
perhaps correctly - the decision as likely to have extremely negative
effects on "the aged, infirm, and semiliterate members of our society"
for whom protective principles of law would no longer be in force.8 5
senting opinion of Judge Schwartz. Ross v. Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 424 So. 2d
779 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981). In both Schreiber and Havris, the Third DCA had
avoided a deed because no consideration had been given by the non-relative grantee.
79. Schreiber, 479 So. 2d at 97-99.
80. Id. at 100.
81. Id. at 99 (quoting I R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §
11.01 (1984)).
82. Id. at 101.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 102 (Overton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Id. at 104.
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C. Option Contracts: Robbinson v. Central Properties, Inc.
Another case reviewed by the court presented a quite tantalizing
issue under the rather dull garb of a contractual right of first refusal.
The plaintiffs in Robbinson v. Central Properties, Inc.86 alleged that
strict interpretation of their right of first refusal would effectively evis-
cerate the right. They argued that the contractual language should be
construed expansively so as to protect their opinion. The supreme court
rejected the argument, stating rather pointedly that parties will be held
to the "unambiguous" language of their contracts.
Under the contract at issue, plaintiff Central Properties had a
"right of first refusal" with respect to the defendant-optionor's water
and sewer system. The optionor's stockholders proposed to transfer the
system to another party but not through the direct means of an out-
right sale. Rather, they were exploring transfer through an indirect
means, namely sale of their capital stock. Since the company's primary
asset was the water and sewer system, a sale of the stock was tanta-
mount to a sale of the system itself.87
As holder of the option, Central Properties brought a suit pre-
mised on the notion that, under the circumstances, its right of first re-
fusal should extend to the stock transfer. The lower court accepted this
reading of the contract, since otherwise the purpose of the right of first
refusal "could be circumvented quite easily."88
The supreme court, however, agreed with the optionor that the
contract right could not be extended beyond its literal terms.89 Here,
the contractual language was unambiguous: the right of first refusal
referred to the water and sewer system, and made no reference at all to
the corporate stock. The contract contained no language upon which an
expansive reading could be based, nor any wording that rendered the
optionee's right ambiguous. Therefore, the right of first refusal was re-
stricted to the water and sewer system; Central Properties was helpless
to prevent the transfer of the system by sale of the stock.
As to Central Properties' argument that this holding allowed the
optionor's shareholders to "frustrate and circumvent" the purpose of
the option contract, the court found "no merit" in the contention: "the
parties were free at the time of entering into the contract to extend the
86. 468 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1985).
87. Id. at 988.
88. Id. at 987.
89. Id.
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right of first purchase to stock sales and transfers ... "90
The case sounds a clear warning to draftsmen of Florida contracts
to anticipate at the outset the various means through which a contrac-
tual purpose may be undercut. The warning may, however, be one
which the human drafter of a contract is simply unable fully to heed: to
foresee and make provision for the twists and turns that fate will pre-
sent during the lifetime of the document.
D. Settlement Agreements: Robbie v. City of Miami
It seems fitting that a review of Florida contracts cases should end
- as do the great majority of lawsuits - with a settlement agreement.
The supreme court reviewed a disputed settlement agreement in Robbie
v. City of Miami.91
The court upheld the agreement and, in doing so, reiterated sev-
eral well-established black-letter principles. For example, settlements
are "highly favored" and will be enforced "whenever possible." Their
existence as enforceable agreements is, moreover, to be determined by
an "objective test" which looks to "external signs" rather than to a
subjective meeting of the minds.92
More pertinently to the case under review, the court held that a
settlement becomes enforceable when objective evidence shows that the
parties have said the same thing as to the "essential elements" of the
agreement, regardless of whether agreement has been reached on all
"contingencies." The court cited with approval an earlier case where it
had written: "Even though all the details are not definitely fixed, an
agreement may be binding if the parties agree on the essential terms
and seriously understand and intend the agreement to be binding on
them."9 3
If ever a term represented a contingency, it was the disputed pro-
vision in the Robbie agreement. The Miami Dolphins and the City of
Miami had agreed to settle a contract dispute concerning the Dolphins'
use of the City's stadium. At the last minute, the Dolphins objected to
a single term of the agreement: the amount the team would owe if an
90. Id. at 988.
91. 469 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1985).
92. Id. at 1385 (citing Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976), and Blackhawk Heating and Plumbing
Co. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 302 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1974)).
93. Blackhawk Heating, 302 So. 2d at 408.
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"Act of God" prevented it from playing the last game of the season.
The court's approach to the problem was extremely practical - the
settlement would be enforced; if an Act of God prevents the last game
from being played, "the parties can litigate" the Dolphins' liability.9
The Robbie opinion does not expand, but certainly affirms the
principle that Florida courts will enforce settlements even when some
terms are still open, so long as the "essential elements" have been
agreed upon.
VI. Conclusion
The contracts cases of the Survey period are not necessarily typi-
cal of the supreme court's rulings in any given year. Taken by them-
selves, however, the 1985 cases do reveal a single overwhelming trend:
enforcement of consensual agreements according to their terms, against
all manner of inducements to the contrary. The Florida Supreme Court
showed itself careful to protect the expectations of the parties, highly
respectful of the legislature, yet individualistic in its own approach.
Undoubtedly the single greatest change in Florida contract law for
1985 comes out of Johnson v. Davis,95 the landmark case in which the
court overruled centuries of common law to create a duty of disclosure
in sale-of-home transactions.
94. Robbie, 469 So. 2d at 1386.
95. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985). See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
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Substantive Criminal Law*
William R. Eleazer**
This article will survey decisions of the Florida Supreme
Court during 1985 which dealt with substantive criminal law is-
sues in three important areas: (1) criminal offenses, (2) lesser in-
cluded and multiple offenses, and (3) defenses to crimes. Obvi-
ously, all cases addressing substantive criminal law issues are not
included. Those that are included represent certain important
(though sometimes quite narrow) changes in Florida's substantive
criminal law, or are representative of the Florida Supreme
Court's focus and direction with regard to the issue considered.
I. Criminal Offenses
(1) Escape. In State v. Ramsey,' the court addressed the issue of
whether Florida Statute section 944.402 is violated when an arrested
but unhandcuffed suspect escapes a police officer before being placed in
the police car. The Fifth District Court of Appeal had reversed Ram-
sey's conviction,3 concluding that in order to come within the statute
the escape must occur while the prisoner is being transported. In
quashing the district court of appeal decision, the supreme court ap-
* I extend my thanks to Stephen D. Hurm, a third-year student at Stetson, for
his assistance with this article.
** Professor of Law, Stetson University; B.A., 1953, Vanderbilt; J.D., 1967
George Washington College.
1. 475 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1985). State v. Iafornaro, 475 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1985), a
case presenting the same issue, was decided by the court about six weeks later, with the
same result.
2. FLA. STAT. § 944.40 (1981) provides:
Any prisoner confined in any prison, jail, road camp, or other penal institu-
tion, state, county, or municipal, working upon the public roads, or being
transported to or from a place of confinement who escapes or attempts to
escape from such confinement shall be guilty of a felony of the second
degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. The
punishment of imprisonment imposed under this section shall run consecu-
tive to any former sentence imposed upon any prisoner.
3. Ramsey v. State, 442 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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proved the holding of State v. Akers,4 from the Second District Court
of Appeal, which was in conflict. Akers held that to come within the
escape statute the state need show only (1) the right to legal custody
and (2) a conscious and intentional act of the defendant in leaving the
established area of such custody.5
The court went on to address the meaning of the words "being
transported to or from a place of confinement" as found in the statute.
In this regard the court noted that one who meets the definition of
"prisoner," as found in Florida Statute section 944.02(5),6 is at the
time he becomes a prisoner "being transported to a place of confine-
ment." As if to underscore the resoluteness of its decision, the court
held that even if the words of the statute did not lend themselves to this
interpretation, it would reach the same conclusion based on the purpose
of the legislature in enacting the law. That intent, according to the
court, was "to prevent lawfully arrested prisoners from escaping the
custody of the arresting officer." 7
(2) Attempted Manslaughter. Tillman v. State8 was an interest-
ing case in which the supreme court ruled that an issue on appeal had
not been properly preserved during the trial, but then went ahead and
considered it anyway. Tillman was convicted of second degree murder,
attempted manslaughter and carrying a concealed firearm. The defense
argued against the trial court's entering judgment on the attempted
manslaughter conviction, since there was no such offense under Florida
law. The judge disagreed and entered judgment on the three verdicts.
On appeal, Tillman raised, among others, the issue of the existence
of the crime of attempted manslaughter. The district court of appeal
affirmed all three convictions9 and certified to the Florida Supreme
Court the question of the existence of the crime of attempted man-
4. 367 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
5. Id. at 702, citing Warford v. State, 353 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
6. "Prisoner" is defined in FLA. STAT. § 944.02(5) (1981) as follows:
"Prisoner" means any person who is under arrest and in the lawful custody
of any law enforcement official, or any person convicted and sentenced by
any court and committed to any municipal or county jail or state prison,
prison farm, or penitentiary, or to the custody of the department, as pro-
vided by law.
7. Ramsey, 475 So. 2d at 673.
8. 471 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1985).
9. Tillman v. State, 440 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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slaughter as being of great public importance. 10
In Taylor v. State," an opinion written after the district court of
appeal affirmed Tillman's conviction, the supreme court stated that
there was a crime of attempted manslaughter in Florida, but such a
conviction "must be based on proof of an act ...with the requisite
criminal intent and may not be based on mere culpable negligence."2
In his brief to the supreme court, Tillman recognized that Taylor was
controlling but argued that he should get a new trial on the attempted
manslaughter count because of doubts about the evidence and the
jury's interpretation of it in light of the Taylor limitations.
Chief Justice Boyd, writing for a unanimous court approving the
district court of appeal's decision, stated that since Tillman had raised
no objection to the jury instructions which were given by the trial court
concerning the offense of attempted manslaughter, the issue was not
properly preserved for appeal. Moreover, the court went on to say that
after reviewing the record, there was sufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that Tillman had acted with the requisite criminal intent
and not with mere culpable negligence. 13
Tillman stands for the proposition that attempted manslaughter is
a prosecutable offense in Florida, but conviction must be based on a
showing of criminal intent and not mere culpable negligence.
(3) Drugs and Narcotics. Way v. State14 concerned the required
elements of proof for a proper conviction of trafficking in cocaine under
Florida Statute section 893.135(1)(b)(1).' 5 During Way's trial, the
court instructed the jury that in order to find Way guilty, they must
find that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Way know-
ingly sold, delivered or possessed a certain substance; that he knew the
substance was cocaine or a mixture containing cocaine; and that the
quantity of the cocaine involved was twenty-eight grams or more. Way
requested that the jury be instructed that it could vote for conviction
only if the state proved that Way knew that the cocaine he possessed
10. Id. "Is there a crime of attempted manslaughter under the statutes of the
state of Florida?" Id.
11. 444 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1983).
12. Id. at 934.
13. Tillman, 471 So. 2d at 35.
14. 475 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1985).
15. FLA. STAT. § 893.135(I)(b)(1) (1983) provides: "Any person who knowingly
sells, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or
constructive possession of, 28 grams or more of cocaine ... is guilty of a felony of the
first degree, which felony shall be known as 'trafficking in cocaine.'
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weighed twenty-eight grams or more; the judge refused the instruction.
Way was convicted and sentenced to three years imprisonment.
The district court of appeal affirmed,'16 expressly approving the
jury instructions given, and certified to the supreme court the question
of the requirement of proof of the defendant's knowledge of the weight
of the cocaine. 1
In a unanimous opinion, the supreme court approved the district
court of appeal's decision. Justice Overton, writing for the court, stated
that the statute requires proof of knowledge of the substance possessed,
but not proof of knowledge of its weight. "The word 'knowingly' as
used in the statute," the court stated, "modifies only the possession ele-
ment of the offense and not the quantity."' 8
(4) Grand Theft (of a motor vehicle). The facts in Davis v.
State'9 can be briefly stated. Davis attempted to purchase a $23,000
Mercedes-Benz automobile by means of a worthless check, and was
thereafter charged with first-degree grand theft under Florida Statute
section 812.014(2)(a) (theft of property with a value of $20,000 or
more). Davis moved to dismiss the information, arguing that he could
only be charged with second degree theft under Florida Statute section
812.014(2)(b) (theft of a motor vehicle). His argument was based on
State v. Getz,20 in which a conviction for grand theft of the second
degree by stealing a firearm was upheld notwithstanding the defend-
ant's contention that a firearm of a value less than $100 must be prose-
cuted under the petit theft statute. According to Davis, since Getz says
a firearm is a firearm, regardless of value, then an automobile is an
automobile, regardless of value - and theft of an automobile must be
charged as theft of "an automobile," and not theft of an item "of a
value of $20,000 or more." A majority of the supreme court found Da-
vis' reliance on Getz misplaced. While the legislature chose not to make
value an element of proof in certain named thefts (including firearms
and motor vehicles), it does not follow that the legislature has not given
the state discretion to make proof of value an element in more serious
thefts. Thus, the court held that the state could prosecute Davis for
16. Way v. State, 458 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
17. "It is proof that a defendant knows that the weight of the substance pos-
sessed equals 28 grams or more essential in obtaining a conviction under section
893.135(1)(b)?" Id. at 882.
18. Way, 475 So. 2d at 241.
19. 475 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1985).
20. 435 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1983).
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grand theft in the first degree and assume the burden of proving that
the value of the motor vehicle was $20,000 or more 1.2 The majority
opinion would appear unassailable in logic and reason; yet, interestingly
and surprisingly, three justices dissented, supporting Davis' position.2
(5) Retail Theft. In Emshwiller v. State,2 3 a case of interest but
of narrow scope, the supreme court answered the question of whether
or not "retail theft" was a separate crime from other theft. Reyling on
Tobe v. State,24 Emshwiller argued that retail theft of merchandise is a
separate crime from other theft and that a conviction under the retail
theft statute is necessarily a second-degree misdemeanor. The supreme
court disagreed. Retail theft under Florida Statute section 812.015 is a
species of the theft defined in section 812.014, not a separate crime for
penalty purposes. The court noted that section 812.015 does not contain
a penalty provision for first offenses, but merely provides for enhanced
penalties for second or subsequent convictions for theft of merchandise
or farm produce.25 Language in Tobe to the contrary was disapproved.
Another issue addressed by the court in the case involved the de-
termination of value. Emshwiller had requested a jury instruction that
"market value" was "what a willing seller is willing to accept and a
willing buyer is willing to pay when neither is compelled to sell or
buy." Instead, the trial judge instructed that the value was determined
by the sale price at the time the merchandise was stolen. The supreme
court approved the instruction of the trial judge. According to the
court, market value is the same as the retail price where the theft is
from a department store and salability at the retail price is
established.2"
(6) Burglary. The supreme court reviewed three cases in 1985
involving the burglary "presumption of intent" found in Florida Statute
section 810.07. The resulting opinions clarified the function and use
of the statute in burglary prosecutions.
21. Davis, 475 So. 2d at 224.
22. Id. at 225.
23. 462 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1985).
24. 435 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
25. Emshwiller, 462 So. 2d at 458.
26. Id.
27. FLA. STAT. § 810.07 (1983) provides: "In a trial on the charge of burglary,
proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance of any time stealthily and without
consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with
intent to commit an offense."
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In the first case, L.S. v. State,28 the defendant, a juvenile, had
been charged with burglary by petition for delinquency. The charging
document specified that the defendant "did unlawfully enter or remain
in a certain structure ... with the intent to commit an offense therein,
to wit: THEFT in violation of section 810.02, Florida Statutes."29
In obtaining a conviction, the state relied on the presumption of
intent statute, which presumes intent to commit a crime upon a show-
ing of stealthy non-consensual entry. The defendant argued that since
the state had charged an intention to commit a specific offense, reliance
upon the statutory presumption was improper. Rather, the defendant
stated, the state must prove intent to commit the offense specified in
the charging document without the benefit of section 810.07. The de-
fendant relied on Bennett v. State,30 a case from the Second District
Court of Appeal.
Justice Adkins, writing for an unanimous court, was not persuaded
by the defendant's contentions and approved the Third District Court
of Appeal's affirmance of the conviction.3 In doing so, the court disap-
proved Bennett and stated that "the exact nature of the offense alleged
is ... surplusage so long as the essential element of intent to commit
an offense is alleged."3 2
In July, the court decided Toole v. State.33 An unanimous court,
again through Justice Adkins, reiterated its decision in L.S. v. State
and in greater detail discussed the legislative history of section 810.07,
the presumption of intent statute. While noting that in a charge of bur-
glary at common law the state had the burden of proving "intent to
commit a specified crime to the exclusion of all others,"3 4 the court
stated that such a requirement was no longer valid. In enacting section
810.07, the legislature clearly said that proof of intent to commit any
offense would suffice.
The court went on to state that the Bennett case, relied on by de-
fendants Toole and L.S., was in error in "imposing upon the state the
burden of proving a specific intent and additionally disproving all other
possible criminal intent. '3 5
28. 464 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 1985).
29. Id. at 1195.
30. Bennett v. State, 438 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
31. L.S. v. State, 446 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
32. L.S., 464 So. 2d at 1196 (emphasis added).
33. 472 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 1985).
34. Id. at 1176.
35. Id.
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Graham v. State,36 decided by the court in June, presented a dif-
ferent question regarding section 810.07. Graham was charged with at-
tempted burglary. The state relied on the presumption of intent statute,
since there was evidence of unlawful entry. The Fifth District Court of
Appeal affirmed, 37 and certified to the supreme court the question of
whether reliance on section 810.07 in an attempted burglary case was
proper. 38 The court, again through Justice Adkins and again unani-
mous, answered the question in the negative, refusing to give the stat-
ute effect beyond its clear, unambiguous terms. Since the statute by its
express terms pertains only to "a trial on the charge of burglary," it
may not be used in a prosecution for attempted burglary, even where
there is some evidence of actual illegal entry.
With the presumption of intent statute thus defined and narrowed
by these cases, practitioners should be more aware of the limits on the
state's reliance on the statutory presumption as well as its clear areas
of applicability.
II. Lesser Included and Multiple Offenses
Many of the court's criminal law decisions during 1985 dealt with
the issue of lesser included and multiple offenses arising from the same
event. As confessed by Justice Shaw in his concurring opinion in State
v. Enmund,39 the court has had "a long-standing problem with this is-
sue in its various permutations: single transaction rule, double jeop-
ardy, application of the Blockburger rule, lesser included offenses, and
generally, legislative intent in adopting section 775.021(4), Florida
Statutes (1977). "14o The Florida Supreme Court has not struggled with
this issue alone. Addressing the double jeopardy aspect of the problem
in Albernaz v. United States,4' Justice Rehnquist has called the deci-
sional law in the area "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to
36. 472 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1985).
37. Graham v. State, 453 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
38. Id. at 529:
In a criminal case in which a defendant is charged with attempted bur-
glary, and there is proof at trial of defendant's unlawful entry into the
structure or residence involved, is it proper for the trial court to rely upon
the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07 in instructing the jury
on proof of intent to commit an offense?
39. 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1985).
40. Id. at 169.
41. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
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challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."42 Rather than trying to
navigate or fully understand the historical permutations of the problem,
it is better to examine what the Florida Supreme Court has most re-
cently said on the subject. Below is a brief survey of what appears to be
the most important Florida Supreme Court decisions in the area during
1985. 4s
A. State v. Watts.44 In Watts, the supreme court adopted a stat-
utory language oriented test which makes the legislature's choice of the
articles "a" or "any" determinative.
Watts had been adjudicated guilty and sentenced separately on
two counts of possession of prison-made knives. The First District
Court of Appeal held this to be in error, finding but a single offense for
the possession of both knives. 45 In reaching this conclusion, the court
applied the "chronological and special relationships" test previously
embraced by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Castleberry v.
State.4 In so doing, the court recognized, but refused to adopt, the test
applied by the Second District Court of Appeal in State v. Grappin.47
Grappin involved prosecution for theft of five firearms under Florida
Statute section 812.014(2)(b)(3). 48 The Second District Court of Ap-
peal held that Grappin could properly be charged with five thefts since
the statute proscribed theft of "a" firearm, rather than theft of "any"
firearm. The reasoning was that the "a" in reference to "firearm" indi-
cated that the legislature clearly intended to make each firearm sepa-
rate for prosecution purposes. 49
Unfortunately, when the First District Court of Appeal had the
Watts case on appeal, it was not aware that the Florida Supreme Court
42. Id. at 343.
43. For the reader who desires a quick review of the Florida decisional law in the
area from 1942 through 1983, with some rather accurate predictive conclusions as to
the future course of the Florida Supreme Court, see Kaden, End of the Single Trans-
action Rule, FLA. B.J., December, 1983, at 693.
44. 462 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1985).
45. Watts v. State, 440 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
46. 427 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
47. Grappin v. State, 450 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1984).
48. FLA. STAT. ] 812].014(2)(b)(3) (1983) provides: "It is grand theft of the
second degree and a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082,
775.083, and 775.084, if the property stolen is: 3. A firearm."
49. The exact reasoning process for reaching this conclusion was not entirely
clear, but apparently there was considerable reliance upon federal cases, cited in Grap-
pin, which had reached this conclusion when faced with similar statutory language.
Watts, 462 So. 2d at 814.
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would eventually not only affirm Grappin, but also adopt the reasoning
of the Second District Court of Appeal in the case. 50 Consequently,
when Watts reached the supreme court, the district court of appeal's
decision was approved, but not the court's reasoning. Watts had been
prosecuted under Florida Statute section 944.47, which essentially pro-
hibited as contraband in a correctional institution "any" firearm or
weapon. Looking at the statutory language, as was done in Grappin,
the court contrasted the article "any" with the article "a" and con-
cluded that the use of "any" by the legislature meant the transaction
must be treated as a single offense for prosecution purposes.
B. Wicker v. State.5" In Wicker, the supreme court considered
whether a defendant could be convicted of both first-degree felony bur-
glary and involuntary sexual battery, which served as the basis for the
burglary charge. The district court of appeal set aside the sexual bat-
tery conviction, based on its determination that the finding that the
defendant committed the assault was indispensible to the conviction of
the first-degree burglary.52 The supreme court found that the district
court of appeal erroneously analyzed the allegations in the charging
document to determine whether the convictions could stand, instead of
analyzing the offense's statutory elements.53 Relying on its 1984 deci-
sions in State v. Baker" and State v. Gibson,55 the supreme court
found that the convictions for both offenses were proper, and quashed
the district court of appeal's decision to the contrary.
C. Green v. State."6 Green was charged with first-degree premed-
itated murder as a result of a shooting death. At trial, he requested a
jury instruction on third-degree murder, asserting that the crime of dis-
charging a weapon into an occupied vehicle was the underlying felony.
The trial court refused, finding that third-degree murder is not a lesser
included offense of premeditated first-degree murder. On appeal, the
district court of appeal affirmed.57 Relying on the schedule of lesser
included offenses published in the 1981 version of the Florida Standard
Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, the appellate court found that
third-degree felony murder is not a lesser included offense of premedi-
50. 450 So. 2d at 480.
51. 462 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1985).
52. Wicker v. State, 445 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
53. Wicker, 462 So. 2d at 463.
54. 456 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1984).
55. 452 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1984).
56. 475 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1985).
57. Green v. State, 453 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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tated first-degree murder.
In its decision, the supreme court approved the result of the dis-
trict court of appeal but not the reasoning. While finding that third-
degree felony murder is not a necessarily included offense of first-de-
gree murder, the court stated that it is, under certain circumstances
and evidence, a proper, permissive, lesser included offense of first-de-
gree murder, requiring a jury instruction to that effect.
Since the court had repeatedly allowed a felony murder conviction
to be sustained under an indictment for first-degree premeditated mur-
der, and since third-degree felony murder was listed in the schedule of
lesser included offenses of first-degree felony murder, the court con-
cluded that the district court of appeal erred in its reasoning. However,
the district court of appeal was correct in its approval of the trial
court's refusal to give the instructions. This result was reached after an
analysis of Amended Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.490, which
requires the giving of instructions on a lesser included offense only
where supported by the evidence. Since the evidence did not support
the underlying felony required for third-degree felony murder, the re-
quested instruction on that offense was properly denied.
D. Garcia v. State.5 8 In Garcia, the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal certified to the supreme court the following question as being of
great public importance: "Whether one can be convicted, although not
sentenced, of a lesser included offense after he has been convicted of
the greater crime?" This question was framed similarly to the question
in State v. Enmund,5 9 except "lesser included offense" was used instead
of "the underlying felony." This is significant, because as the decision
points out, they are not the same. Garcia was found guilty of armed
robbery"0 and displaying, using, threatening, or attempting to use a
firearm during the commission of a felony.61 On appeal, the district
court of appeal "noted" in its position that the defendant had been
convicted of both a greater and a lesser included offense, and thus
framed its certified question.6 2
Referring to its Enmund decision, the supreme court wrote that it
had already essentially answered the question posed by the lower court.
58. 444 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), afl'd, 476 So. 2d 170 (Fla.
1985).
59. 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1985).
60. In violation of FLA. STAT. § 812.13(2)(a) (1981).
61. In violation of FLA. STAT. § 790.07(2) (1981).
62. Garcia, 444 So. 2d at 970.
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Actually the question had been answered in Bell v. State, 3 where the
court held that the double jeopardy clause prohibited multiple convic-
tions and sentences for both the greater and lesser included offenses,
and in State v. Baker,6 4 which limited Bell to necessarily lesser in-
cluded offenses. Therefore, the answer to the district court's question
was in the negative: One can neither be convicted of nor sentenced for
a necessarily lesser included offense.65
As noted by the court, however, this answer does not resolve the
case. Because they have different statutory elements, the firearm of-
fense is not necessarily included in the robbery offense. Both offenses
may be separately charged and punished.66 While the certified question
was therefore irrelevant to the case, it did result in further clarification
of this often confusing issue.
E. State v. Enmund.17 The Enmund case had a long journey
through the federal and Florida appellate courts before arriving at the
Florida Supreme Court for the third time. 8 The certified question from
the Second District Court of Appeal in the instant case was succinctly
stated: "When a defendant is convicted of felony murder, can he be
convicted of, although not sentenced for, the underlying felony?"'6 9
The question was not so succinctly answered, however, as the court
determined that the underlying felony (robbery) was not a necessarily
lesser included offense, and proceeded to overrule its earlier decision in
State v. Hegstrom.0 In Hegstrom, the court stated that the underlying
felony was a necessarily included offense within the crime of felony
murder, and held that the defendant could be convicted of the underly-
ing felony of robbery, but not sentenced for both the underlying felony
63. 437 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 1983).
64. 456 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1984).
65. 476 So. 2d at 170.
66. Id.
67. 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1985).
68. Enmund, a death penalty case, was initially affirmed by the Florida Supreme
Court in Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1981). In a leading eighth amend-
ment decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the death sentence, holding it
to be excessive for a participant in a felony murder who does not himself kill, attempt
to kill, or intend that the killing occur or that lethal force be employed. Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). On remand, the Florida Supreme Court vacated the
death penalty and returned the case to the trial court for resentencing. Enmund v.
Florida, 439 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1983). The instant case is thus the third visit of the case
to the Florida Supreme Court.
69. 459 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
70. 401 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1981).
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and the murder. The court based its holding in Enmund on its study of
Missouri v. Hunter,71 determining that the United States Supreme
Court in that case had made it clear that the Blockburger rule of statu-
tory construction 72 will not prevail over legislative intent. The court
went on to find sufficient intent on the part of the legislature for multi-
ple punishments when both a murder and a separate felony occur dur-
ing a single criminal episode. 73 Thus the court ruled in answer to the
certified question, "that the underlying felony is not a necessarily lesser
included offense of felony murder and that a defendant can be con-
victed of and sentenced for both felony murder and the underlying
felony. ' 74
F. State v. Snowden. 5 Snowden was tried for both first degree
murder and armed robbery. Upon request of defense counsel the jury
was instructed that grand theft could be considered as an underlying
felony of third-degree murder. Snowden was convicted for third-degree
murder and grand theft. The district court of appeal considered
whether the defendant may be legally convicted of third-degree (fel-
ony) murder and at the same time be convicted of the underlying fel-
ony on which the murder conviction is based.70 Making a determined
effort to analyze the maze of seemingly conflicting decisions extant at
that time, the court concluded that the jury had convicted Snowden of
grand theft as the underlying felony of third-degree murder and, on the
71. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
72. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). "The applicable rule is
that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at
304. The Blockburger rule has essentially been incorporated into FLA. STAT. §
775.021(4) (1983), which presently reads:
(4) Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, com-
mits separate criminal offense, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt,
shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing
judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively.
For the purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense
requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the
accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.
73. Enmund, 476 So. 2d at 167. Accord Vause v. State, 476 So. 2d 141 (Fla.
1985).
74. Enrnund, 476 So. 2d at 168.
75. 476 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1985).
76. 449 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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basis of Bell v. State,77 set aside both the conviction and sentence for
grand theft. Unfortunately, the district court of appeal did not have the
guidance of the supreme court's decision in State v. Baker,78 which
limited the Bell holding to "necessarily lesser included offenses," as the
Baker decision was still some three months away. Adhering to its cur-
rent reasoning on the issue, the supreme court concluded that grand
theft, as the underlying felony of third-degree murder, is not a lesser
included offense, and quashed the decision of the district court.79 In a
footnote to its decision, the supreme court called attention to Florida
Statute section 775.021(4), which incorporates the Blockburger rule;
the court said that henceforth, "the Florida Standard Jury Instructions
in Criminal Cases (1981), which set forth what had heretofore been
lesser included offenses, must be read and modified in light of this leg-
islative decision. s
°
G. State v. O'Hara.8' O'Hara involved the question of whether
one could be convicted of both extortion and theft for the taking of only
one sum of money. The district court of appeal answered the question
in the negative.82 The supreme court, relying on its decision in State v.
Baker,88 held that one can be convicted of two crimes for the taking of
only one sum of money, provided that neither crime is a necessarily
lesser included offense of the other. Since one may commit extortion
without thieving and one may commit theft without extorting, neither
crime is a necessarily lesser included offense of the other. Thus the
court held that the Baker test was satisfied, and quashed the decision
of the district court of appeal. 8'
III. Defenses to Crimes
A. Entrapment. Perhaps the most significant change in Florida
criminal law during 1985 was in the area of the entrapment defense. In
January, the supreme court decided State v. Glosson,8 5 determining
that the contingent fee agreement with the informant in that case vio-
77. 437 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 1983).
78. 456 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1984).
79. Snowden, 476 So. 2d at 191-92.
80. Id. at 192.
81. 478 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1985).
82. O'Hara v. State, 448 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
83. 452 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1984).
84. O'Hara, 478 So. 2d at 26.
85. 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985).
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lated the defendant's due process rights under the state constitution.
Within two months, in Cruz v. State,86 the court made even more sig-
nificant changes in the entrapment defense by adding an objective test
to the subjective test for entrapment. In April, the court decided State
v. Wheeler87 and Rotenberry v. State,88 which addressed the burden of
proof and jury instruction for the entrapment defense.
(1) State v. Glosson.89 Glosson and five co-defendants were
charged with trafficking and conspiring to traffic in cannabis. The
charges grew out of a "reverse-sting" operation run by the county sher-
iff's department. Motions to dismiss based on entrapment and
prosecutorial misconduct were filed. The motions were based primarily
upon an agreement struck between an informant and the county sheriff
whereby the informant would receive a percentage of all civil forfeit-
ures arising out of successful criminal investigations the informant in-
stigated in the county. The agreement with the sheriff was oral, but the
state attorney's office knew of the agreement and even supervised the
informant's investigations. In order to collect his 10% contingent fee,
the informant was required to cooperate in the criminal investigations
and testify in court. The fee would be paid out of civil forfeitures re-
sulting from the criminal investigation initiated by the informant. The
trial court dismissed the charges, finding a due process violation. The
district court of appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that the consti-
tutional due process issue was an issue of law for the trial court, and
that the contingent fee arrangement with the informant violated the
defendant's due process right.
In analyzing the issues, the Florida Supreme Court recognized
that the due process argument concerning the entrapment defense had
not fared well in the federal courts." Noting with approval decisions
from two states that recognize the due process defense to overturn
criminal convictions, 91 the court rejected as too narrow the application
86. 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1985).
87. 468 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1985).
88. 468 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1985).
89. 441 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
90. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court, in dicta in United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), seemed to recognize the due process entrap-
ment defense; however, it noted that in more recent years only one due process defense
has been raised successfully in only one federal circuit court. Glosson, 462 So. 2d at
1084.
91. State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) and People v.
Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 378 N.E.2d 78 (1978).
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of the due process entrapment defense found in the federal courts. Re-
lying on article 1, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, the court held
that governmental misconduct which violates the constitutional due
process right of the defendant, regardless of that defendant's predispo-
sition, requires the dismissal of criminal charges. Finding in this case
that the contingent fee agreement with the informant, who was a vital
state witness, violated the defendants' due process rights under the
Florida Constitution, the court approved the district court of appeal's
decision affirming the dismissal of the charges.92
(2) Cruz v. State.9 3 The decision in Cruz resulted from a
"drunken bum" police decoy operation undertaken in a high-crime area
of Tampa. A police officer, posing as a drunk, pretended to drink wine
from a bottle, while leaning against a building near an alleyway, face
to the wall. Plainly visible and hanging from his pants pocket was $150
in currency, paper-clipped together. Cruz and a woman companion
happened by about 10:00 P.M. Cruz initially approached the decoy,
but then went on his way. Returning ten to fifteen minutes later with
his companion, Cruz took the money from the decoy's pocket, where-
upon he was arrested. Subsequently charged with grand theft, he
moved for a dismissal, arguing that the arrest constituted entrapment
as a matter of law. The trial court granted the motion, relying on State
v. Casper94 in finding that the defendant was not predisposed to com-
mit the crime and had been entrapped as a matter of law. The district
court of appeal reversed, 95 holding that predisposition is a question of
fact and should not be decided on a motion to dismiss.
In one of its most important decisions of 1985, the supreme court
quashed the district court of appeal's decision, finding that the facts
surrounding the "drunken bum" police decoy operation constituted en-
trapment as a matter of law under its therein announced threshold test.
92. Glosson, 462 So. 2d at 1085.
.93. 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1985).
94. 417 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1280
(Fla. 1982). Casper involved a "drunken bum" decoy scenario almost identical to that
in Cruz. The Casper decision focused on "predisposition" and held that the state must
prove the defendant was predisposed to steal from the decoy. "Predisposition" could be
proved in one of four given ways, but under the facts the question boiled down to
whether the defendant readily acquiesced to the crime, or "succumbed to temptation."
According to Casper, this was a matter of law; where the trial judge finds the defend-
ant succumbed to temptation, the matter should not go to the jury, as it is entrapment
as a matter of law. Cruz, 465 So. 2d at 518-19.
95. State v. Cruz, 426 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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While agreeing with the lower court that the question of predisposition
will always be a question of fact for the jury, the supreme court found
that a second, independent, standard should be established for assessing
entrapment. This second standard would examine the official conduct
inducing the crime, and would be a question of law, decided by the
trial judge. Thus, a two-test approach was established by the Cruz de-
cision. The threshold test for the entrapment defense is an objective
test, decided by the trial judge. To answer this test, the judge must
determine if the police activity: (1) has as its end the interruption of a
specific ongoing criminal activity, and (2) utilizes means reasonably
tailored to apprehend those involved in the ongoing criminal activity. If
the judge answers both questions in the affirmative, then entrapment as
a matter of law has not occurred. The first prong of this threshold test
asks if the police activity is seeking to prosecute crime where no such
crime exists except for the police activity engendering the crime.96 The
second prong of the threshold test looks toward the appropriateness of
the police activity. In examining the appropriateness of the police activ-
ity, the court should consider whether a government agent
induced or encouraged another person to engage in conduct consti-
tuting such offense by either (a) making knowingly false represen-
tations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not pro-
hibited; or (b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement
which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be commit-
ted by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.97
Once the objective test is applied and the trial judge determines
that the state has established the validity of the police activity, the sub-
jective test for "predisposition" is to be answered by the jury. This test
requires that the jury determine whether the criminal design originated
with the government officials and was implanted in the mind of the
defendant who was an otherwise innocent person, or whether the de-
fendant was predisposed to commit the crime. Thus a dual test, both
objective and subjective, and involving determinations initially by the
judge and then by the jury, was adopted by the Florida Supreme Court
as the new entrapment defense. In Cruz, the court found that the
"drunken bum" police decoy activity constituted entrapment as a mat-
ter of law under the threshold objective test.
96. Cruz, 465 So. 2d at 522.
97. Id.
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Whether the new Florida standard is consistent with or departs
from the "great weight of judicial authority in the United States," was
debated in the specially concurring opinion of Justice Overton and the
dissenting opinion of Justice Alderman. 98 Regardless of the answer to
this question, a new standard for the entrapment defense has been es-
tablished in Florida by the Cruz decision.99
(3) State v. Wheeler and Rotenberry v. State. In State v.
Wheeler'00 and Rotenberry v. State,101 the supreme court addressed the
issue of the burden of proof in the entrapment defense. The problem in
Wheeler resulted from a colloquy between the defense counsel, assis-
tant state attorney, and trial judge during the closing argument.
Among other statements during the exchange, the trial judge stated in
front of the jury that in his proposed instruction he was not going to
include "any instruction to the effect that the State is required to prove
the defendant was not entrapped." The judge's statement was based on
the entrapment instruction found in Florida Standard Jury Instruction
(Criminal) 3.04(c).0 2 That jury instruction does not include a clear
98. Id. (quoting from MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1962)).
99. Id. at 523-24. The leading United States Supreme Court cases on entrap-
ment are Houpton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); and Sorrelli v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). A substantial portion of the majority opinion in
Cruz was devoted to a discussion of these cases.
100. 468 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1985).
101. 468 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1985).
102. The full text of instruction 3.04(c) reads:
3.04(c) Entrapment
The defense of entrapment has been raised. This means that (defendant)
claims he had no prior intention to commit the offense and that he com-
mitted it Only because he was persuaded or caused to commit the offense
by law enforcement officers.
(Defendant) was entrapped if:
1. he had no prior intention to commit (crime charged), but
2. he was persuaded, induced or lured into committing the offense and
3. the person who persuaded, induced or lured into committing the of-
fense was a law enforcement officer, or someone acting for the officer.
However, it is not entrapment, merely because a law enforcement officer in
a good faith attempt to detect crime:
a. (provided the defendant the opportunity, means and facilities to com-
mit the offense, which the defendant intended to commit, and would have
committed otherwise.)
b. (used tricks, decoys or subterfuge to expose the defendant's criminal
acts.)
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statement of the burden of proof. Nevertheless, the supreme court held
that in the usual case this instruction is adequate, when given in combi-
nation with the general reasonable doubt and burden of proof instruc-
tion found in Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 2.03. A
specific "burden of proof' instruction had not been included within the
entrapment instructions when the instructions were rewritten in 1981,
in order to avoid undue emphasis as to the state's burden of proof. In
Wheeler, however, the supreme court found that the statements of the
trial judge created an erroneous impression on the jury concerning the
burden of proof that was not corrected by a proper instruction. For a
general rule concerning the burden of proof in an entrapment defense,
the supreme court stated that "[w]hen the defendant has adduced suffi-
cient evidence to make a prima facie case of entrapment, the burden of
proof regarding entrapment shifts entirely to the state. After the bur-
den has shifted, no consideration of the defendant's initial burden is
uermissible. ' 'a03
In Rotenberry, the court carried the Wheeler decision one step fur-
ther. In Wheeler, the issue did not involve a specific request by the
defendant that the court instruct the jury that the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendaht was not the victim of
entrapment. In Rotenberry, the certified question from the district
court of appeal dealt with such a request.104 In answering the question,
the court held, as it did in Wheeler, that instruction 3.04(c) (the stan-
dard entrapment instruction), when given in combination with the gen-
eral reasonable doubt instruction, is adequate. This combination fully
informs the jury of the state's burden. The court noted that a "delicate
c. (was present and pretending to aid or assist in the commission of the
offense.)
If you find from the evidence that the defendant was entrapped, or if
the evidence raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, you
should find him not guilty.
A margin note advised that factors a, b, and c are to be given as applicable.
103. Rotenberry, 468 So. 2d at 981.
104. Rotenberry v. State, 429 So. 2d 378, 380 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1983):
If the state has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant was not entrapped when that defense has been raised, is the
giving of the present entrapment instruction as set forth in Standard Jury
Instruction 3.04(c) along with the general reasonable doubt instruction
sufficient, notwithstanding the defendant having specifically requested the
Court to instruct the jury that the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was not the victim of entrapment by law enforce-
ment officers?
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balance has been struck between informing the jury on the law of en-
trapment and avoiding undue emphasis on the state's burden of
proof."105 The court thus gave its approval of the trial judge's refusal to
give any additional, specific instruction on the state's burden of proof in
an entrapment defense, even when requested by the defense.
B. Self-defense. A self-defense issue of narrow applicability was
addressed by the supreme court in State v. Holley.0 6 Holley was
charged with resisting arrest with violence, among other crimes, stem-
ming from his arrest at an agricultural inspection station for carrying
cannabis. At trial, Holley contended that the agricultural inspector had
threatened him with a knife during the arrest and that this caused him
to resist arrest. He requested a jury instruction that resistance to arrest
is justified to the extent necessary for self-defense, as stated in two
First District Court of Appeal opinions.10 7 The trial court denied the
request, and instead gave the then existing standard instruction: "A
person is never justified in the use of any force to resist an arrest."10 8
Holley was convicted on all charges and appealed, inter alia, the denial
of the requested jury instruction. The First District Court of Appeal
reversed his conviction for resisting arrest with violence on the basis of
the denial of the requested instruction in light of Ivester and Allen, but
certified the issue as a question of great public importance. 0 9
The supreme court, in a 4-2 opinion authored by Justice Overton,
approved the First District Court of Appeal's reversal, stating that the
law permits a defendant to resist the use of excessive force in making
the arrest. The court further noted that the standard jury instruction at
issue in the case had been changed as of October 10, 1985, to reflect
the correct statement of the law."0 The standard jury instruction now
reads:
105. Rotenberry, 468 So. 2d at 975.
106. 480 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1985).
107. Ivester v. State, 398 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1981), review de-
nied, 412 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1982); Allen v. State, 424 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1982), review denied, 436 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1983).
108. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION (CRIM.) 3.04(d).
109. Holley v. State, 464 So. 2d 578, 579 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984): "Is the
Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 3.04(d) a correct statement of the law in
light of Ivester v. State, 398 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981), review denied,
412 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1982), and Allen v. State, 424 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1982), review denied, 436 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1983)?"
110. See The Florida Bar Re: Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases), 477
So. 2d 985 (Fla. 1985).
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A person is not justified in using force to resist an arrest by a law
enforcement officer who is known, or reasonably appears to be a
law enforcement officer. However, if an officer uses excessive force
to make an arrest, then a person is justified in the use of reasonable
force to defend himself (or another), but only to the extent he rea-
sonably believes such force is necessary.1 10.1
The court reversed only the conviction for resisting arrest, leaving
the conviction for the other crimes intact, since it found that the erro-
neous instruction applied only to the resisting arrest charge.11'
C. Voluntary Intoxication. Linehan v. State"' involved the de-
fense of voluntary intoxication to arson and felony murder. Briefly, the
facts included a confession by the defendant that he set fire to his girl-
friend's apartment, which resulted in one death. Testimony at trial in-
dicated that defendant had been intoxicated at the time he set the fire.
Based on this testimony, he requested, but was denied, an instruction
on voluntary intoxication as a defense."i 3 On appeal, the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's refusal,"4 finding that
voluntary intoxication is not a defense to arson"15 and, further, that
voluntary intoxication is not a defense to felony murder if it is not a
defense to the underlying felony.
However, the district court certified these two issues to the su-
preme court as being of great public importance."' The supreme court
affirmed the district court on both issues.
The court disagreed with the defendant's argument that the words
110.1 Id. at 1000.
111. Chief Justice Boyd, with whom Justice Shaw concurred, dissented only
from this part of the majority opinion. The Chief Justice would have reversed all of the
convictions arising from Holley's disarming his would-be captors and fleeing with their
weapons. The defendant was entitled, in Justice Boyd's view, to have the jury deter-
mine the facts pertaining to all of the charges (resisting arrest, two counts of aggra-
vated assault with a firearm, and two counts of robbery) under legally correct instruc-
tions from the court.
112. 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1985).
113. Id. at 1263. He also requested an instruction on second-degree (depraved
mind) murder as a lesser included offense of felony murder. This was also refused. The
latter refusal resulted in the district court of appeal reversing the conviction, and is
briefly discussed under the section above dealing with lesser included offenses.
114. Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
115. Id. at 253-254.
116. The two issues were framed as the following questions: "1. Whether volun-
tary intoxication is a defense to arson or to any other crime. 2. Whether voluntary
intoxication is a defense to first degree (felony) murder." Linehan, 442 So. 2d at 256.
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"willfully and unlawfully" as contained in the arson statute1 7 are
words of specific intent. The court noted that the present statutory defi-
nition of arson does not materially differ from the common law defini-
tion"' s with regard to the requisite intent, and that at common law ar-
son was a general intent crime. And while voluntary intoxication has
for many years been a defense to specific intent crimes, it does not
apply to general intent crimes such as arson. Finding no legislative in-
tention to change the common law intent requirement, the court held
that arson under Florida Statute section 806.01 was a general intent
crime and, therefore, voluntary intoxication is not a defense to arson.
With regard to whether voluntary intoxication could be a defense
to felony murder, the court noted its decision in Jacobs v. State,19
where it held that when robbery was the underlying felony of a felony
murder, the defendant could defend on the basis that he was too intoxi-
cated to form the intent to commit the underlying felony. However, the
court further noted, robbery at common law was a specific intent crime,
whereas in the instant case, the underlying felony of arson is a general
intent crime. The court concluded that when the underlying felony is
based on a specific intent offense, the defense of voluntary intoxication
may apply to felony murder, but when the underlying felony is a gen-
eral intent crime, voluntary intoxication is not a defense.12 0
D. Insanity Defense. In Patten v. State,'21 the supreme court had
the opportunity to reaffirm its test for insanity at the time of the of-
fense as being the modified M'Naghten test, as contained in Florida
Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases. 22 It also addressed a
rather unusual "burden of proof" issue related to the insanity defense.
Patten was charged with first-degree murder and a number of
other felonies. At a court-ordered competency hearing, four experts
were of the unanimous opinion that the defendant was competent to
stand trial, notwithstanding the fact that three years earlier he had
been found not guilty of receiving stolen property by reason of insanity.
At trial, defendant's counsel had urged the trial court to discard the
117. FLA. STAT. § 806.01 (1981).
118. The supreme court said that at common law, arson was defined as "the
willful and malicious burning of a dwelling house, or outhouse within the curtilage of a
dwelling of another," Linehan, 476 So. 2d at 1265, citing Duke v. State, 132 Fla. 865,
870, 185 So. 422, 425 (1938).
119. 396 So. 2d 1113 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
120. Linehan, 476 So. 2d at 1265.
121. 467 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1985).
122. See FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION (CRIM.) 2.11 (b)-I and 3.04(b).
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M'Naghten rule and adopt the American Law Institute Model Penal
Code rule, including the "irresistible impulse" test.123 After briefly al-
luding to the 1977 Wheeler decision, 2 which directed that the present
modified M'Naghten test be applied in all Florida criminal trials, the
court approved the trial judge's denial of the defendant's motion and
went on to address the burden of proof issue.
Patten had argued that because of his prior adjudication of not
guilty by reason of insanity, and subsequent civil commitment, the state
had the burden of establishing his sanity as an element of the offense,
despite his failure to offer any evidence of an insanity defense at
trial.125 Rejecting this argument, the supreme court noted that insanity
is an affirmative defense in Florida, and the burden is upon the defend-
ant to come forth and present some evidence of insanity at trial. It is
only upon this showing that the prosecution has the burden of disprov-
ing defendant's claim beyond a reasonable doubt. The court went on to
state that Patten's argument that his prior adjudication of not guilty by
reason of insanity, and subsequent civil commitment, require the state
to prove competency, "is correct only when the defense of insanity is
asserted and evidence of the adjudication and commitment is intro-
duced at trial."' 26 At the trial no such evidence was introduced; there-
fore, the prosecution had nothing to rebut. 27
A somewhat similar holding was made in Alvoid v. State,128 where
the supreme court rejected Alvoid's claims "that his prior adjudication
in Michigan of not guilty by reason of insanity, his resulting commit-
ment, and the fact that there has not been a subsequent judicial resto-
ration of sanity result in a continuing presumption of insanity.' 29
Yohn v. State,"10 another case involving the insanity defense, re-
minds us of the rather ironic warning by the supreme court that its
approval of the standard jury instructions does not insure that the use
of such instructions by the trial judge will meet with the supreme
123. Patten, 467 So. 2d at 978.
124. Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1977).
125. Patten, 467 So. 2d at 978.
126. Id. at 979.
127. The court noted that the reason for the lack of evidence of insanity was
clear from the record: "The appellant had no experts to testify as to his insanity. The
State had four witnesses who concluded he was sane and two went further and stated
that he was faking mental illness." Id. at 975.
128. 459 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1984).
129. Id. at 318.
130. 476 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1985).
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court's approval upon review of a specific case on appeal.131 Yohn had
been charged with the first degree murder, by shooting, of a woman
who had been having an affair with Yohn's husband.132 The defense
presented expert testimony by a psychiatrist and a psychologist that
Yohn was insane at the time of the shooting; thereafter, the defense
requested special jury instructions stating that the state had the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was sane at the
time of the incident.1 33 This special instruction was refused; however,
the relevant standard jury instructions, including the instructions on in-
sanity 34 and the state's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, 135 were given by the court.1 36 The First District Court of Appeal
concluded that even though the requested instructions correctly stated
the Florida law, the given instructions were adequate considering the
instructions as a whole. 137 In reversing, the Florida Supreme Court
ruled that the instructions given did not adequately and correctly
charge the jury as to the Florida law on the issue. The problem found
by the court with the standard jury instrufction on insanity was that the
instruction frames the issue as one of finding the defendant legally in-
sane, thus placing the burden on the defendant. The jury is never in-
structed in the standard charge that the state must prove anything with
regard to sanity. The court noted that the standard jury instruction on
reasonable doubt and burden of proof'3 8 did not remedy the problem as
this instruction was general and the insanity instructions were specific.
While the general instruction referred to the state's burden of proving
every element, nowhere in the instructions was it stated that sanity was
an element, which, according to the court, it clearly is.' 3 9 Since the
defendant's requested special instructions 4 ° correctly and accurately
131. See In the Matter of the Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions
in Criminal Cases, 431 So. 2d 594, modified, 431 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1981): "[T]he court
recognizes that no approval of these instructions by the court could relieve the trial
judge of his responsibility under the law to charge the jury properly and correctly in
each case as it comes before him."
132. Yohn v. State, 450 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
133. Id. at 899-900.
134. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM.) 3.04(b).
135. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM.) 2.03.
136. Yohn, 450 So. 2d at 900.
137. Id. at 901.
138. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM.) 2.03.
139. Citing Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971).
140. The requested instructions are set forth in both Yohn v. State, 476 So. 2d
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set forth the law, and the standard jury instructions given did not, the
supreme court quashed the decision of the district court of appeal and
ordered the case remanded for a new trial.
It should be noted that the supreme court split four to three in the
decision. The dissenters relied on Rotenberry v. State,14 1 which is dis-
cussed above and which dealt with the defense of entrapment. In
Rotenberry, the defendant had requested that the jury be instructed
that the state must prove that the defendant was not entrapped beyond
a reasonable doubt. The trial court refused and instead merely gave the
standard jury instruction on entrapment and burden of proof.
Rotenberry was affirmed by the district court of appeal 42 but the issue
of the sufficiency of instructions was certified to the supreme court,
where it was approved as striking a delicate balance between "inform-
ing the jury on the law of entrapment and avoiding undue emphasis on
the state's burden of proof.' 43
E. Double Jeopardy. Double jeopardy is an issue mixed inextri-
cably with the issues of lesser included and multiple offenses, discussed
in Part II, above. Consequently, many cases, such as Houser v.
State,'4 which follows, could be placed under the heading of "double
jeopardy" or "lesser included and multiple offenses." In Houser v.
State, the court addressed the certified question of "whether a defend-
ant may be properly convicted of and sentenced for both DWI man-
slaughter and vehicular homicide for effecting a single death" without
constituting double jeopardy. 45 In answering that question in the nega-
tive, the court clarified the extent to which a defendant may be prose-
cuted for a death caused by his driving while intoxicated.
Houser had a blood alcohol level of 0.18% when the car he was
driving struck a concrete wall, killing a passenger. He was charged
with DWI manslaughter11 6 and vehicular homicide, 147 and convicted
and sentenced on both charges. The First District Court of Appeal af-
firmed the convictions and sentences,' 48 but certified the above question
as being of great public importance. The district court of appeal also
123 (Fla. 1985), and Yohn v. State, 450 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
141. 468 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1985).
142. 429 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
143. Rotenberry, 468 So. 2d at 975.
144. 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985).
145. Houser, 474 So. 2d at 1195.
146. In violation of FLA. STAT. § 316.1931(2) (1983).
147. In violation of FLA. STAT. § 782.071 (1983).
148. Houser v. State, 456 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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recognized that its decision was directly in conflict with the Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal's decision in Vela v. State.14 9
The supreme court rejected the lower court's two-fold rationale
that, first, convictions under both statutes did not violate double jeop-
ardy since each crime was separate from the other in that each "re-
quires proof of an element which the other does not"; and second, that
DWI manslaughter is merely an enhancement of the penalty for driv-
ing while intoxicated. 150 The supreme court stated that although under
the Blockburger test151 and its statutory equivalent 52 the crimes are
separate, these tests "are only tools of statutory interpretation which
cannot contravene the contrary interest of the legislature."5 3 The "as-
sumption underlying the Blockburger rule is that the legislature ordi-
narily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different
statutes."' 54 The court noted that Florida courts have determined in
many cases, including cases directly on point with Houser,55 that the
legislature did not intend to punish a single homicide under two differ-
ent statutes.
In rejecting the district court of appeal's rationale that DWI man-
slaughter is simply an enhanced penalty for driving while intoxicated,
the court simply stated that the death of a victim "raised DWI man-
slaughter beyond mere enhancement and places it squarely within the
scope of this state's regulation of homicide."' 56
In October, 1985, the court in State v. Gordon'57 reiterated its
decision in Houser by approving the Fifth District Court of Appeal's
decision vacating the DWI manslaughter conviction of the appellant,
who had also been convicted of second degree murder for the same
death. The supreme court simply relied on the rationale expressed in
Houser in upholding the district court of appeal's decision.
Gordon and Houser made clear that, absent an unambiguous spec-
ified legislative statement authorizing prosecution of a defendant for
149. 450 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
150. Houser, 474 So. 2d at 1196. See also FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4) (1983).
151. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
152. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4) (1983).
153. Houser, 474 So. 2d at 1196.
154. Id. at 1196, quoting Ball v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1668, 1672 (1985).
155. Houser, 474 So. 2d at 1197, citing Ubellis v. State, 384 So. 2d 1294 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), and Brown v. State, 371 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979), affid, 386 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1980).
156. Houser, 474 So. 2d at 1196.
157. 478 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1985).
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DWI manslaughter plus another homicide for a single death, such
charges are not permitted, Blockburger and Florida Statute section
775.021(4) notwithstanding.
F. Collateral Estoppel. In Green v. State, 58 the court was faced
with a certified question from the Third District Court of Appeal con-
cerning the defense of collateral estoppel. Green, who was on probation
for robbery, was charged with several crimes. Prior to trial on those
charges, a probation revocation hearing was held. The trial judge at
that hearing determined that the evidence against Green was insuffi-
cient to revoke his probation since the state had not proved the ele-
ments of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. At his subse-
quent trial on the charges, Green moved to dismiss, arguing that the
state was collaterally estopped from prosecuting him because of the re-
sult of the probation revocation hearing. The motion was denied and
Green was convicted; the district court of appeal upheld the convic-
tion, 9 but certified the collateral estoppel question to the supreme
court as one of great public importance.6 0
The supreme court, in a five to two decision, affirmed the district
court of appeal, thus upholding Green's conviction. Rather than ad-
dressing the case in collateral estoppel terms, the court broadened its
discussion to the issue of double jeopardy. The court reasoned that
since the probation revocation hearing was only to determine if Green's
probation for a prior offense had been violated, it was a deferred sen-
tencing proceeding, citing as authority two earlier opinions by the
court.'8 ' The court went on to say that Green had not been subjected to
conviction or punishment for his new criminal activities during the pro-
bation revocation hearing, so there was no double jeopardy bar to his
subsequent prosecution for those activities. As an analogy, the court
noted that a defendant properly may be prosecuted even though there
is a finding of no probable cause at a preliminary hearing. 6
Justice McDonald dissented in an opinion in which Justice Adkins
158. 463 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1985).
159. Green v. State, 450 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
160. Id. at 509: "When in a probation revocation proceeding, a trial judge finds
that the evidence is insufficient to prove the criminal offense asserted as the ground for
revocation, is the state collaterally estopped from trying the defendant for the same
criminal offense?"
161. Green, 463 So. 2d at 1140, citing State v. Payne, 404 So. 2d 1055 (Fla.
1981), and Delaney v. State, 190 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1966).
162. Green, 463 So. 2d at 1140, citing State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109 (Fla.
1968).
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concurred. Stating that collateral estoppel and double jeopardy are
"distinct legal concepts," Justice McDonald argued that the former
concept could be disposed of merely by finding that jeopardy did not
attach during the probation revocation hearing. He cited the United
States Supreme Court's definition and rule regarding collateral estop-
pel: "When an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a
valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between
the same parties in a future law suit."163 Since the issue litigated in the
criminal trial was exactly the same as that litigated in the earlier pro-
bation revocation hearing, during which the trial judge sitting as trier
of fact found Green not guilty, the dissent argued that collateral estop-
pel should have prevented the subsequent trial.164
It appears that the dissent had a better grasp of the law and the
distinction between double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. However,
had the court adopted the position of the defense, the practical applica-
tion of the rule would have created an extremely burdensome and risky
situation for the state when attempting to revoke a defendant's proba-
tion prior to trying him for his latest criminal conduct.
IV. Conclusion
The Florida Supreme Court devoted much of its work during 1985
toward clarifying the law regarding lesser included and multiple of-
fenses. It is apparent from a close reading of the court's opinions, how-
ever, that the law in this complicated area is still far from being clear
and will continue to occupy much of the court's time in future years.
Even while concurring, Justice Shaw, in two important decisions, 6 5 has
expressed serious concern regarding the underlying and fundamental
reasoning of the court in this area.
Most of the decisions during 1985 regarding substantive criminal
offenses and defenses were of a limited or narrow reach. However, in
the important area of entrapment the court took a giant step and spoke
with unusual clarity. In adding the threshold objective test, to be ap-
plied by the judge, to the "predisposition test" applied by the jury, the
court departed from the federal (and majority) rule, and adopted a dis-
163. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
164. Green, 463 So. 2d at 1140 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
165. State v. Enmund, 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1985), and Green v. State, 475 So.
2d 235 (Fla. 1985).
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Criminal Procedure and the Florida Supreme Court in
1985 - Watching the Pendulum Swing
By Bruce A. Zimet*
Introduction
In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court addressed numerous impor-
tant issues relating to criminal procedure. This article will review and
analyze significant 1985 Florida Supreme Court decisions. The purpose
of this review and analysis is not to merely catalogue cases, but to ex-
plore the rationale and direction of the supreme court.
A cursory review of the Florida Supreme Court in 1985 reveals a
significant number of criminal procedure opinions relating to cases in
which the death penalty was imposed. This phenomenon is no doubt
attributed to the supreme court's constitutionally mandated jurisdic-
tional boundaries which limit direct appeal to the supreme court to fi-
nal judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty.1 While the
Florida Constitution does not prohibit the Florida Supreme Court from
considering non-death penalty criminal procedure cases, as a practical
matter jurisdiction limitations restrict the volume of non-death penalty
cases. 2 The dominance of death penalty cases before the supreme court
* Bruce A. Zimet practices law in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, while teaching trial
practice as an adjunct Professor of Law at Nova University Law Center. Mr. Zimet
previously wis employed as an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida (1978-1983) during which time he was Chief Assistant United States
Attorney in the Northern Division of the Southern District of Florida. Mr. Zimet addi-
tionally has taught at the Department of Justice Trial Advocacy Institute as well as in
the Florida Bar Seminar for State Attorneys and Public Defenders. Mr. Zimet was an
Assistant Public Defender in Broward County, Florida (1976-1978) following his grad-
uation from the Washington College of Law, American University (1976) where he
was a member of the law review. His article, United States v. Hudson - Expunge-
ment in the District of Columbia, was published in the AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW
REVIEW (25 AM.U.L.REv. 263 (1975)).
1. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(1) provides that the Supreme Court: "Shall hear
appeals from judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty . .. .
2. The Florida Constitution does not impose any other mandatory jurisdiction
upon the supreme court for matters relating to criminal procedure other than direct
appeals from trial courts imposing the death penalty and decisions of the district courts
of appeal declaring invalid a state statute or a provision of the state constitution. FLA.
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has created certain interesting characteristics. Obviously nearly all of
the death penalty cases devote analysis to issues which arise during the
"sentencing" phase of trial. These issues are generally limited in scope
and application to the unique circumstances of the "mini-trial" of the
death penalty sentencing.3 Additionally, the death penalty cases have
confronted the supreme court with a significant number of claims con-
cerning the effective assistance of counsel as well as allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct. Conversely, the jurisdictional boundaries of
the Florida Supreme Court, with the resultant overflow of death pen-
alty cases and unique issues, has limited the quantity of supreme court
decisions relating to certain traditional areas of criminal procedure
such as search and seizure, wiretaps, grand jury or fifth amendment
issues.
Right to Jury Trial
While the right to a jury trial is a fundamental component of Flor-
ida criminal procedure,4 the precise scope of that right has remained
uncertain. In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court sought to provide more
accurate definition of the right to a jury trial. The vehicle for review
was the supreme court's review in Reed v. State.'
In Reed, the supreme court considered the question of whether an
accused in a criminal mischief prosecution maintains a right to a jury
trial under the Florida and United States Constitutions.6 Reed was
CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
All other basis for jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court for matters relating
to criminal procedure are discretionary. See, FLA. CONsT. art. V § 3(b)(1). The practi-
cal result of the jurisdictional limitations on the supreme court has been to make deci-
sions of the intermediate courts of appeal (the district courts of appeal in felony crimi-
nal cases) final decisions. See, Florida Courts of Appeal: Intermediate Courts Become
Final, 13 STETSON L.REv. 479 (1984).
3. The sentencing hearing is authorized by Rule 3.780 Fla.R.Cr.P.. This article
will not seek to specifically address opinions which discuss issues raised in the sentenc-
ing phase of trial. Such a review and analysis is best suited for individual and specified
analysis.
4. The right to a jury trial is contained in Article III, Section 2 and the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Additionally, the right to a jury trial is
contained in Article I, Sections 16 and 22 of the Florida Constitution.
5. 448 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
6. Reed had come before the court as a certified question of great public impor-
tance from the Fifth District Court of Appeal. Reed had been denied a jury trial in
county court. The circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, determined that Reed
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charged with violation of Section 806.12(2)(a) Florida Statute (1981),
which carried a maximum punishment of a term of incarceration of
sixty days and/or a fine of up to $500. The Reed court considered the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Baldwin v. New York,7 in
which that Court concluded that an offense carrying a maximum pen-
alty in excess of six months was a "serious crime" which mandated a
jury trial. Reed, however, did not construe Baldwin as requiring that an
offense of less than six months as necessarily constituting a petty of-
fense which by definition did not require a jury trial. Instead, Reed,
relying upon District of Columbia v. Colts,8 provided that the classifi-
cation of a crime as a serious crime (requiring a jury trial) or a petty
offense (triable summarily without a jury) depended primarily upon the
nature of the offense. The Florida Supreme Court in Reed further re-
lied upon its previous holding in Whirley v. State,9 in which four clas-
ses of serious crimes (requiring jury trials) were enumerated. Those
classes included crimes indictable at common law; crimes involving
moral turpitude; crimes that are malum in se; and crimes carrying a
penalty in excess of six months incarceration. Utilizing that analysis,
the Florida Supreme Court in Reed found malicious mischief to be
rooted in the common law as well as have been malum in se and re-
quiring a jury trial under both the United States and Florida
Constitutions.
Jury Selection
The Florida Supreme Court addressed several challenges to trial
court rulings relating to the competency of potential jurors. In these
cases the court was careful to follow its well-established precedent that
the competency of a challenged juror was a discretionary decision of
the trial court which would not be disturbed absent a showing of mani-
fest error.10 In Ross v. State,"' the court rejected a claim of reversible
error based upon the trial court's denial of a motion to strike a prospec-
tive juror for cause due to the prospective juror's belief that she had
was entitled to a jury trial. The Fifth District granted a writ of certioari quashing the
circuit court order and certifying the ultimate question.
7. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
8. 282 U.S. 63 (1980).
9. 450 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1984).
10. See Christopher v. State, 407 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
910 (1982); Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959).
11. 474 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1985).
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seen the prosecutor at a family reunion and the juror's uncertainty
whether the prosecutor was a distant relative of the juror's. The Florida
Supreme Court, in rejecting Ross' claim of error, reviewed Florida's
statutory provisions relating to challenge for cause based upon blood
relations between potential jurors and attorneys for parties. The court
in Ross concluded that the "abstract statements" made by the prospec-
tive juror failed to satisfy the statutory requirements that jurors may
be challenged for cause if the jurors are related within the third degree
to the attorneys of either party.1 2 Unfortunately, the opinion in Ross
does not discuss whether the prosecutor in question responded to the
statement of the prospective juror in order to provide the court with a
complete and accurate factual basis to determine the defendant's mo-
tion to challenge for cause. Additionally, the Ross opinion does not dis-
cuss whether Ross' counsel sought to further inquire of the juror con-
cerning her knowledge of the prosecutor. 13
In Mills v. State,4 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's determination of juror competency and found no error in the
trial court's denial of a motion to excuse a potential juror for cause.
The questioned Mills juror is described in the court's opinion as having
a "distant relationship" 15 with the murder victim's family and an "ac-
quaintance with Mills and his family."10 In applying the court for an
order to excuse the juror for cause, Mills' trial counsel had represented
to the court that he had "independent information" that the questioned
juror had voiced an opinion that Mills was guilty during a conversation
with Mills' brother-in-law. The questioned juror denied that he had ex-
pressed an opinion concerning Mills' guilt during a conversation with
Mills' brother-in-law. The juror additionally stated that he could be
fair and impartial. When the trial court provided Mills' counsel with an
opportunity to provide the court with evidence of the alleged statement
of the juror concerning Mills' guilt, the attorney merely "repeat[ed] his
12. FLA. STAT. § 913.03(9) (1983).
13. Since trial attorneys are themselves provided voir dire examination, Rule
3.300(b). Fla. R.Cr.P., it would seem dubious that Ross' counsel would not have sought
to further explore the question.
Further, Ross should not be read as precluding trial courts from granting motions
to exclude for cause in situations where the requirements of Sec. 913.03(9) are not
satisfied.
14. 462 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1985).
15. Id. at 1079.
16. Id.
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representations that the incident did occur.""7 The Mills court con-
cluded that the trial court properly concluded that the absence of evi-
dence to substantiate the claims of partiality did not negate the jurors'
insistence of imparitality. In reaching their decisions, the trial court
and supreme court implemented the criteria announced in Lusk v.
State,'1 and determined that the challenged juror could "lay aside any
bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence
presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court."19
In Stano v. State,20 the Florida Supreme Court considered the
scope within which the ability of a juror to implement the Lusk test
could be explored during voir dire. The issue in Stano was whether
trial counsel could ask a potential juror "how""1 they could "block...
out ' 2 2 pretrial publicity relating to the defendant's case and accord-
ingly provide the defendant a verdict based solely on the evidence
presented .2 The trial court sustained an objection to the inquiry as to
"how" the juror could block out the pretrial publicity in satisfying the
Lusk test. In affirming the prohibition imposed by the trial court, the
supreme court found no abuse of discretion. The court relied upon the
decision in Jones v. Stater,24 and stated that: "While 'counsel must
have an opportunity to ascertain latent or concealed prejudgments by
prospective jurors,' it is the trial court's responsibility to control unrea-
sonably repetitious and argumentative voir dire."25 Unfortunately, the
Stano case reflects the difficulty experienced by trial counsel in at-
17. Id.
18. 446 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 229 (1984).
19. 462 So. 2d at 1081. The Mills decision does not describe any reason why the
defendant's brother-in-law was not called by the defendant to testify as to the alleged
opinion of guilt expressed by the potential juror. Further, the Mills opinion is silent as
to any questions asked of the potential juror concerning his knowledge of any particular
facts concerning Mills and/or his background. This area is particularly significant con-
sidering the fact that Mills had four prior burglary convictions.
20. 473 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1985).
21. Id. at 1284.
22. Id. at 1285.
23. Unfortunately, the Stano opinion does not provide a specific description of
the pretrial publicity except the following generalization "numerous numbers of the
venire for the second trial had been exposed to publicity regarding Stano, the instant
crime, and the first trial." 473 So. 2d at 1285.
24. 378 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1114
(Fla. 1980).
25. 473 So. 2d at 1285 (quoting Jones v. State, 378 So. 2d 797-98 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1979).
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tempting to properly explore an area critical to his client's opportunity
to receive a fair trial. While it is difficult to understand how a question
such as "How can you block out pretrial publicity?" is "unreasonable
repetitious and argumentative,""6 it is obvious that the "how" question
is rather ineffective in achieving the ultimate goal of uncovering latent
or concealed prejudgments.
The question of whether the trial court erred in denying a motion
to excuse for cause two prospective jurors who were employed as cor-
rections officers in the state prison system was reviewed by the court in
State v. Williams.27 The Williams court concluded that no error had
occurred despite the fact that Williams had been charged with battery
of a corrections officer.28 In reaching its decision, the supreme court
quashed the decision of the First District Court of Appeal. 9 The dis-
trict court had relied upon its previous ruling in Irby v. State.30 In Irby
the court found an "appearance and a substantial probability of inher-
ent juror bias" when considering the ability of a corrections officer to
sit as a juror in a case involving a battery of a corrections officer at the
Union Correctional Institute. In Irby, as in Williams, the potential ju-
rors claimed that they could be fair and impartial jurors despite their
employment as a corrections officer. The Williams court concludes that
the Irby court "ignored" 31 the juror's protestations of fairness in reach-
ing its conclusion that the juror should be excused for cause. The court
in Williams held that application of the Lusk test was appropriate in
Williams and that the trial court was in the best position to determine
the actual basis of a juror.32
The person in the best position to determine this actual bias is the
trial judge. The trial judge hears and sees the prospective juror and
has the unique ability to make an assessment of the individual's
candor and the probable certainty of his answers to critical ques-
26. Id. at 1285.
27. 465 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 1985).
28. The corrections officer who was the victim in Williams was employed at the
Union Correctional Institute. The court's opinion is silent as to the location of employ-
ment of the two questioned jurors (corrections officers).
29. Williams v. State, 440 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
30. 436 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 447 So. 2d
888 (Fla. 1984).
31. 465 So. 2d at 1230.
32. Williams chose to argue in the Supreme Court that the Lusk test announced
by the Supreme Court was not applicable to the "unique" facts of Williams.
1006 [Vol. 10
113
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Criminal Procedure
tions presented to him.33
The result in Williams reflects the supreme court's basic reluctance to
disturb the findings of the trial court in deciding whether the trial court
denied motions to excuse jurors for cause. Unfortunately, the court has
implemented the Lusk test which essentially restricts the trial court
from excusing a juror for cause unless the court finds that the juror
lacked candor in expressing confidence in being able to implement the
Lusk test. The Lusk test is particularly troublesome when the trial
court considers the "candor" of law enforcement personnel who are
under obvious pressure to announce themselves fair in answer to the
question of whether they will sit as fair jurors in a trial. It seems un-
likely that any law enforcement officer would admit to being prejudiced
and even more unlikely that a trial judge will grant a motion to chal-
lenge for cause and thus (as required by Lusk) make a determination
that the official lacked candor.3 4
Defendant's Presence at Trial
The Florida Supreme Court was challenged by two unique ques-
tions concerning a defendant's right to be present at his trial. In Peede
v. State,35 the court considered for the first time whether a defendant
could knowingly and voluntarily waive his presence at a capital trial.
The court considered the question from the perspective of the United
States Supreme Court decisions of Taylor v. United States,"6 in which
a defendant's voluntary absence in a non-capital case operated as a
waiver of his right to be present during all phases of a trial,7 as well as
Drope v. Missouri,38 in which the question of whether a defendant may
waive his presence at a capital trial was specifically left open. The
Peede Court concluded that no valid distinction exists between defend-
ants in capital and non-capital offenses and therefore concluded that a
33. 465 So. 2d at 1231.
34. It seems clear that legislative limitations on the ability of law enforcement
officials to sit on juries is the only visible remedy to the Lusk test.
35. 474 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1985).
36. 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
37. The right of a defendant to be present at the stages of a trial where funda-
mental fairness might be thwarted by his absence derives from the confrontation clause
of the sixth amendment and the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1972).
38. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
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defendant could voluntarily waive his right to be present at a capital
trial just as a defendant could knowingly waive any other constitutional
right. 9 The Peede court recognized that its opinion might be in conflict
with the decision of Proffitt v. Wainwright,4" in which the Eleventh
Circuit found a defendant's presence at a capital trial to be non-waiv-
able. In light of Proffitt, the ultimate viability of Peede would appear
questionable. 41
Despite its ruling in Peede, the court held in Hooper v. State,42
that a trial court had not erred in refusing a request of a defendant to
waive his presence during the jury selection phase of a trial. The
Hooper holding, which ironically was announced on the same day as
Peede, concluded that Hooper's reason for absenting himself (fear that
his physical size might intimidate jurors in their voir dire responses)
did not outweigh what the court called "the ultimate need to be pre-
sent."'43 The Florida Supreme Court did not attempt to reconcile Peede
and Hooper.
Competency
A. Defendant's Competency
The Florida Supreme Court reversed two death sentence convic-
tions of first degree murder in 1985 due to a failure of a trial court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the competency of a crimi-
nal defendant. In Gibson v. State,44 the supreme court found a trial
court's determination of competency merely based upon review of past
medical reports and the trial court's personal observations to be insuffi-
cient. The Gibson court restated its holding in Christopher v. State,45
39. 474 So. 2d at 814. The Peede court looked toward the 1975 Amendment to
Rule 43, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure which abandoned any distinction between
capital and noncapital offenses relating to voluntary absence from criminal trials, as
well as Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(b) which similarly lacks a capital -
noncapital distinction.
40. 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 U.S. 508 (1983).
41. Peede sought to distinguish Proffitt in two respects. Initially, Peede con-
tended that the Proffitt court had not recognized the elimination of the distinction in
Rule 43 between capital and non-capital cases. Secondly, Peede noted that Proffitt had
alternatively concluded that no knowing or voluntary waiver had been satisfied.
42. 476 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1985).
43. Id. at 1256.
44. 474 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1985).
45. 416 So. 2d 450, 452 (Fla. 1982).
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which states the responsibility of the trial court to conduct a compe-
tency hearing "whenever it reasonably appears necessary, whether re-
quested or not." .The facts determined to require a hearing in Gibson
included an eight year history of court-ordered examination and peri-
odic hospitalization, as well as a prior determination of incompetency. 6
In Hill v. State,47 the court reversed a first degree murder convic-
tion in which the trial court refused to conduct an evidentiary hearing
to determine competency in which a defendant had been previously di-
agnosed to suffer from grand malepileptic seizures and mental retarda-
tion. Further, during a special education program for mentally handi-
capped children, the defendant had been observed to often times be
blamed for things he did not do, and when accused, often admitted
guilt. Additionally, the defendant's I.Q. was subsequently measured to
have been sixty-six which placed the defendant in the lowest one per-
cent in the general population. The supreme court in Hill specifically
rejected the procedure utilized by the trial court in which it determined
that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary. The trial court only al-
lowed the testimony of the defendant's attorney as well as an investiga-
tor for the defense. The trial court permitted submission of other testi-
mony by deposition. However, the trial court stated that it was not
going to review the depositions since the issue of competency was a
judgment determination for the trial lawyer. The supreme court re-
jected this obvious misapplication of the law.
In Trawick v. State,48 the Florida Supreme Court held that the
trial court did not err in failing to conduct a competency hearing
merely on the fact that the defendant appeared despondent and ambiv-
alent about his guilty plea to first degree murder. Trawick recognized
the obligation placed upon the trial court in Drope v. Missouri,4 9 to
conduct its own inquiry of a defendant's competency if irrational be-
havior or demeanor is displayed. However Trawick's contemplation of
suicide and despondency when viewed in the light of the trial court's
extensive colloquy prior to accepting Trawick's guilty plea were
deemed not to require further hearing.
46. Gibson, 474 So. 2d at 1183.
47. 473 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1985).
48. 473 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 1985).
49. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
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B. Physical Condition of Counsel
While appellate courts generally do not disturb trial courts' discre-
tionary determinations of motions for continuance, the Florida Su-
preme Court was confronted by a trial court's denial of a motion for
continuance based upon the health of defense counsel which the su-
preme court found compelled reversal of a first degree murder
conviction.
In Jackson v. State,50 the supreme court evaluated the unrefuted
record which included the defendant's attorney having suffered a head
injury prior to trial and having received medication for that injury
which resulted in episodes of dizziness and slurred speech. The court
concluded that these circumstances mandated reversal due to the trial
court's failure to grant the motion for continuance due to the inabililty
of the trial counsel to effectively represent his client.
Search and Seizure
Relatively few significant search and seizure issues were consid-
ered by the Florida Supreme Court in 1985. In Lara v. State,51 the
court concluded that an exception to the warrant requirement would be
rooted in exigent circumstances when law enforcement officers conduct
an immediate search of an area to determine the number and condition
of the victims or survivors, to see if the killer is still on the premises
and to preserve the crime scene.52 In State v. Dilyerd,3 the supreme
court implemented the holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Michigan v. Long,54 and found that reasonable suspicion that an unar-
rested person is dangerous supports a warrantless area search of the
passenger compartment of an automobile. As in Long, the Dilyerd
court reached its conclusion despite the fact that the unarrested indi-
vidual had been removed from the automobile prior in time to the
search.
Finally, in Roche v. State,55 the court found the statutory basis
supporting random searches of vehicles in furtherance of agricultural
regulations to be constitutional. The Roche decision was in direct con-
50. 464 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1985).
51. 464 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1985).
52. Id. at 1175.
53. 462 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1985).
54. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
55. 462 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1985).
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trast to the holding in Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Department of Agri-
culture and Consumer Services.56 In Lake Butler, the court found the
identical statute to be unconstitutional.
Statements
In Haliburton v. State,57 the Florida Supreme Court considered
the question of whether a defendant who has been advised of his Mi-
randa rights and agrees to answer questions must be advised by his
interrogators that an attorney retained on his behalf desires to speak to
him. The supreme court answered that question in the affirmative, find-
ing that a defendant must be advised that an attorney retained on his
behalf is trying to advise him even if said notification is during the
course of an interrogation. The court reiterated that the determination
of the need for counsel is the defendant's prerogative, citing State v.
Craig,58 and that once informed of the opportunity for advice, the de-
fendant may reject that opportunity. The court specifically rejected any
requirement for law enforcement officials to obey a telephone order of
an attorney to terminate questioning a defendant. 9 It would appear,
however, that the Haliburton opinion has been directly contradicted by
the subsequent United States Supreme Court decision in Moran v.
Burbine.60 In Burbine, the Supreme Court concluded that the failure to
advise a defendant of the efforts of an attorney who had been retained
by the defendant's sister without defendant's knowledge, to contact a
defendant did not deprive the defendant of his right to counsel or de-
feat defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights.
In State v. Inciarrano,61 the Florida Supreme Court confronted a
rather novel factual scenario in which a victim of a homicide had tape
recorded his own murder in his own office. The issue before the court
related to the admissibility of the tape recording which contained the
voice of Inciarrano conversing with the-victim "the sound of a gun be-
ing cocked, five shots being fired by Inciarrano, several groans by the
56. 551 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
57. 476 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1985).
58. 237 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1970).
59. The supreme court similarly found in Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796 (Fla.
1985) that an instruction by a public defender to police agents not to question a de-
fendant which is agreed to by the police does not amount to invocation of defendant's
right to counsel and does not compel suppression of a statement.
60. 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
61. 473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985).
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victim, the gushing of blood, and the victim falling from his chair to
the floor." 62 The supreme court determined that the Florida Communi-
cations Statute which requires consent to the interception of wire or
oral communications by all parties to the communications did not apply
to the murder tape and therefore suppression of the tape was not man-
dated. While the result announced in Inciarrano is not particularly dra-
matic, the rationale implemented to reach that result is potentially
quite significant. The court analyzed the Florida Communications Stat-
ute and determined that it applied only to communications in which an
individual "Exhibit[ed] an expectation of privacy under circumstances
reasonably justifying such an expectation."6 3
In Cave v. State," the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial
of a motion to suppress a defendant's statements. In Cave, the court
found that he had been fully advised of his Miranda rights and ac-
knowledged his rights. The defendant proceeded to initially proclaim
his innocence. At no time did he ask for counsel or exercise his right to
remain silent. The court found that the defendant's eventual statement
was proper since the law enforcement officials had no obligation to
equate protestation of innocence with implementation of constitutional
rights that require questioning to cease.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Episodes of prosecutorial misconduct were unfortunately not for-
eign to the cases considered by the 1985 Florida Supreme Court. The
court was confronted with a veritable laundry list of improper conduct
and tactics utilized in order to secure criminal convictions. These tac-
tics included use of false testimony, refreshing recollection with inad-
missible and factually inaccurate allegations of defendant's confessions,
withholding of Brady material, attacks on defense counsel, and com-
menting on a defendant's right to remain silent. Although the 1985
supreme court cited impropriety with a high level of disdain, it never-
theless found that misconduct rarely creates grounds for reversal of
criminal convictions. Instead, the supreme court, relying upon the
harmless error rule, generally viewed disciplinary actions against par-
ticular attorneys as the most appropriate remedy for improper
behavior.
62. Id. at 1274.
63. Id. at 1275.
64. 476 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1985).
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Despite obvious awareness of the legendary "golden rule" parame-
ters of closing arguments, prosecutors violated the prohibition against
arguing to the jury that they may well be victims of the defendant's
criminal behavior if they fail to convict him. In State v. Wheeler,65 the
Florida Supreme Court found the following argument to be violative of
the golden rule which mandated reversal:
Ladies and gentlemen, these officers were acting in nothing
but good faith. They know there are drugs out there. It's all over
the place. It's in the school yard, it's in the playground, it's in the
home - it doesn't matter whether you are rich or poor, the drugs
are out there. These officers know there is only one way to stop it
and that is to go after the dealer. Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Dale
Wheeler is one of these people. He is one of these dealers. He is
supplying the drugs that eventually get to the school yards and
eventually get to the school grounds and eventually get into your
own homes. He is one of the people who is supplying this. For him
and people just like him - [at this point defense counsel objected,
asked for a curative instruction, and moved for mistrial, all of
which was denied by the judge].6
Section 924.33, Florida Statutes (1983), codified and adopted the
"harmless error" rule for appeals of criminal convictions. In State v.
Murray,67 the supreme court applied the harmless error rule to
prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments. Consequently, the Mur-
ray court declined to apply its "supervisory power" unless the error was
not harmless. Section 924.33, Florida Statutes (1983) provides that:
No judgment shall be reversed unless the appellate court is of
the opinion, after an examination of all the appeal papers, that er-
ror was committed that injuriously affected the substantial rights
of the appellant. It shall not be presumed that error injuriously af-
fected the substantial rights of the appellant.
Despite the statute, Florida courts had traditionally concluded that
prosecutors' comments on defendants' failure to testify created revers-
ible error regardless of the harmless error statute. However, in State v.
Marshall,"' the court applied the harmless error rule to any comment
65. 468 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1985).
66. Id. at 981.
67. 443 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1984).
68. 476 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1985).
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which refers to any comment upon defendant's failure to testify.69 In
abandoning its per se reversal rule, the Marshall court referred to four
factors. Initially, the supreme court looked to court decisions which
have determined comments upon silence not to be fundamental error.70
Secondly, the Marshall court looked to the United States Supreme
Court decisions in Chapman v. California,7t and United States v. Has-
tings, 2 which found the harmless error rule to be consistent with the
federal constitution. Third, the harmless error rule was described as a
preferred method of promoting the administration of justice. Finally,
the Marshall court turned to the Florida legislative intent as encom-
passed within Section 924.33.
Consequently, as a result of Marshall, comments upon the failure
of a defendant to testify must be evaluated according to the harmless
error rule with the state having the burden of establishing the comment
to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 73
In Bertolotti v. State,4 the Florida Supreme Court criticized a
prosecutor's closing comments to a jury during a death sentence hear-
ing. In that argument, the prosecutor proceeded to comment on the
defendant's right to remain silent, violated the golden rule by inviting
the jury to imagine the victim's pain, terror and defenselessness, and
also asked them to send a message to the community at large. The
Bertolotti court concluded that since the penalty phase of a murder
trial only results in a nonbinding recommendation, misconduct must be
"egregious" and so outrageous so as to taint the validity of the recom-
mendation of the jury. The court did, however, launch into a stern
admonition of the prosecutor's conduct. The court restated its prescrip-
tion to remedy similar misconduct by professional sanction of the indi-
vidual attorney and not at the expense of the citizens by mistrial of
69. See David v. State, 369 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1979); Trafficante v. State, 92 So.
2d 811 (Fla. 1957); and Way v. State, 67 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1953).
70. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); Clark v. State, 363 So.
2d 331 (Fla. 1978).
71. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
72. 461 U.S. 499 (1983). In Hastings the Supreme Court set forth the issue to
be decided by the reviewing court "absent the prosecutor's allusion to the failure of the
defense to proffer evidence to rebut the testimony of the victim, it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty," 461 U.S. at
510-11.
73. 476 So. 2d at 153.
74. 476 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1985).
75. 476 So. 2d at 133.
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reversal and remand.7 6
Nondisclosure of Information
On several occasions in 1985, the Florida Supreme Court consid-
ered cases in which prosecutors failed to provide required information
to the defense. In Arrango v. State,7 the supreme court reversed a first
degree murder conviction due to the state's failure to disclose the exis-
tence of evidence which had been requested by the defense pursuant to
Brady v. Maryland.78 The Arrango court concluded that the evidence
in question had been (1) requested by the defense and suppressed by
the prosecution (2) favorable in character for the defendant and (3)
material to the outcome of the trial.79
In Brown v. State,80 the supreme court reviewed the trial court's
exclusion of certain evidence which the state had inadvertently not dis-
closed to the defense in discovery. The supreme court found that the
trial court properly conducted a Richardson hearing (as provided in
Richardson v. State81), and remedied the substantial discovery viola-
tion in a manner consistent with the seriousness of the breach.
Finally, in Francis v. Stater,82 the supreme court refused to grant
a new trial despite the fact that the prosecutor had failed to provide the
exact details of the reward to be provided a state witness for her testi-
mony. The court found the relevant facts of the witness' "deal" with
the state had been made known to the jury and thus the nondisclosed
facts did not deprive Francis of due process of law or a fair trial.
Jury Instructions
Parties and courts in Florida criminal cases are guided by stan-
dard jury instructions. While the Florida Supreme Court has approved
these standard jury instructions, the supreme court also requires the
trial court to individualize each case with appropriate instructions.8 3
76. State v. Murray, 443 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 1984).
77. 467 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1985).
78. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
79. 467 So. 2d at 694.
80. 473 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1985).
81. 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1985).
82. 473 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1985).
83. In re Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases,
431 So. 2d 594, 598, modified 431 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1981).
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Consequently, in Yohn v. State,4 the instruction relating to insanity
was deemed to be insufficient by the supreme court and thus requiring
reversal of a manslaughter conviction.
In Rotenberry v. State,85 the supreme court closely scrutinized the
standard entrapment instruction before deeming it sufficient.
Entrapment
In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court considered several cases relat-
ing to the issue of "entrapment." Specifically, in State v. Wheeler,86 the
supreme court defined the burden of proof to be carried by the prosecu-
tion and defense in entrapment cases. Wheeler defines the initial bur-
den of adducing any evidence of entrapment as being the defendant's.
The trial court is then responsible to determine the sufficiency of the
evidence of entrapment. If a sufficient level of evidence relating to en-
trapment has been established, the prosecution then bears the burden
of disproving entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt. The issue of
whether the prosecution has disproved entrapment beyond a reasonable
doubt is a jury question which must be preceeded by a proper jury
instruction. That jury instruction may not, however, include any ele-
ment describing the defendant's burden to adduce evidence.87 Wheeler
describes the level of evidence required to be adduced by the defendant
as "[E]vidence which suggests the possibility of entrapment ... "I'
The usual method the state uses to disprove entrapment is to prove
the predisposition of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Proving
predisposition may be accomplished in a variety of ways. The state may
show that the defendant had prior convictions or a reputation for en-
gaging in prior similar illicit acts or by showing the defendant's "ready
acquiescence" to commit the crime.89
In Cruz v. State,90 the supreme court considerd whether a "subjec-
tive" and "objective" entrapment doctrine could co-exist. The subjec-
tive entrapment doctrine focuses upon the predisposition of the defend-
ant.91 The determination of predisposition is normally a question for
84. 476 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1985).
85. 468 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1985).
86. 468 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1985).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1985).
91. Id.
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the jury to determine.9 2 However, in Cruz, the supreme court was con-
cerned that certain police conduct inducing crime was so egregious that
the predisposition of a defendant to commit a crime became irrelevant.
Cruz adopts an objective doctrine of entrapment to address such a cir-
cumstance.93 The determination of whether "objective entrapment" has
occurred is one to be decided by the court. In providing guidance to
courts, the Cruz court sets forth a threshhold test of an entrapment
defense. The court is required to first decide whether the questioned
police activity is directed at a specific ongoing criminal activity or is in
reality manufacturing crime. The second element of the test is directed
to determining whether law enforcement officers utilized means reason-
ably tailored to apprehend those involved in the ongoing criminal activ-
ity.94 Cruz described the first prong of its test in terms of a "but for"
analysis. The court must determine "but for" the police activity would
there have been a crime. The second prong of Cruz which evaluates
techniques utilized to induce an individual to participate in the criminal
activity. Cruz directs courts to two particular situations in which law
enforcement officers make knowing false representations designed to in-
duce the belief that the illegal conduct is not prohibited or by employ-
ing methods of persuasion or inducement which creates the substantial
risk that the offense will be committed by persons other than those
ready to commit said offense. 5
In State v. Glosson,98 the supreme court held that the due process
clause of the Florida Constitution (Article I, Section 9) requires dis-
missal of criminal charges where constitutional due process rights of a
defendant are violated by governmental misconduct regardless of the
defendant's predisposition. In Glosson, the supreme court found a con-
tingent fee agreement with an informant violated the Florida due pro-
cess clause when the agreement was conditional on cooperation and tes-
timony which was critical to a successful prosecution.
Effective Assistance of Counsel
The significant quantity of death penalty cases submitted to the
Florida Supreme Court has predictably led to numerous issues relating
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 465 So. 2d at 522.
95. Id.
96. 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985).
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to the effectiveness of trial and appellate counsel.
In Sireci v. State,97 the supreme court reiterated its reliance upon
the United States Supreme Court's two pronged test to determine a
post conviction challenge to effective assistance of counsel. That test as
set forth in Strickland v. Washington:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose results is reliable.98
In Sireci, the claimed error involved defense counsel's failure to cross-
examine a state witness. The Florida Supreme Court accepted the testi-
mony of Sireci's trial counsel that the failure to cross-examine was in-
tended to properly preserve a state discovery violation. Sireci found the
defense counsel's strategy to be reasonable within prevailing profes-
sional norms.
Numerous 1985 Florida Supreme Court cases discussed the issue
of effective assistance of appellate counsel. The right to effective assis-
tance of appellate counsel was restated in Wilson v. Wainwright.9" In
Wilson and in Dardin v. State,100 the criteria required to establish inef-
fective assistance of appellate counsel were stated:
Petitioner must show 1) specific errors or omissions which show
that appellate counsel's performance deviated from the norm or fell
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and 2)
the deficiency of that performance compromised the appellate pro-
cess to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the fairness
and correctness of the appellate result.101
Utilizing this test, the supreme court concluded that appellate counsel
was not ineffective in by failing to read appellate briefs of all poten-
tially relevant cases pending before the supreme court prior to prepara-
97. 469 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1985).
98. 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).
99. 474 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1985).
100. 475 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1985).
101. 474 So. 2d at 1166 (quoting Johnson v. Wainwright, 463 So. 2d 207 (Fla.
1985)).
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tion of his brief;102 failing to file as supplementary authority supreme
court authority coming after defendant's oral argument;10 3 failing to
raise nonfundamental issues relating to jury instructions in penalty
phase which had not been objected to in the trial court;104 and failing
to argue certain prosecutorial comments.105 In Jones v. Wainwright,"0 6
the supreme court found appellate counsel not to have been ineffective
for not arguing alleged improper prosecutorial argument which trial
counsel had not objected to. The Jones court concluded that
"[C]ounsel was not ineffective for not raising an issue which had no
chance of success on appeal."1' 07
While challenges relating to effectiveness of counsel were generally
unsuccessful, the supreme court in Wilson v. Wainwright,0 8 found ap-
pellate counsel to be ineffective. The elements of ineffectiveness cited in
Wilson included failure to brief issues relating to sufficiency of evidence
and propriety of death penalty, lack of preparation and zeal during oral
argument. Illustrative of appellate counsel's failure is the following
excerpt:
THE COURT: ...You don't consider [the legality of the sen-
tence] with any materiality or relevance in a case where . . . the
death penalty has been imposed, sir?
CONNER: Uh, those particular points about the aggravating and
mitigating circumstance, uh, I felt the prior decision of this court
were clear that with the aggravating circumstances as found by the
court, that and with no mitigating circumstances that it was, uh, in
an area where the court had already decided, unless something has
changed in the interim.
THE COURT: Well, let me ask a question. Do you feel that death
is the appropriate punishment if he is guilty.
CONNER: It's, it's quite possible, yes sir. Uh, there was sufficient
evidence in this case for the jury to find premeditation and they did
find premeditation.
Later in the argument, the discussion continued:
THE COURT: Would you agree that the evidence concerning the
102. 475 So. 2d at 214.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 476 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1985).
106. 473 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1985).
107. Id. at 1245.
108. 474 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1985).
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fact of his committing first degree murder in this instance was
pretty overwhelming?
CONNER: I would say that it was overwhelming.
THE COURT: May I ask you this please sir. Now, on the one
hand, if I'm reading it correctly, you're saying that there is no
question about the guilt and then your statement of the guilt there
that the death penalty is appropriate. Am I misunderstanding you?
CONNER: No, I don't - I don't think I meant to say that if
that's the way it came out.109
Conclusion
The 1985 session of the Florida Supreme Court provided several
opportunities for the court to address significant issues in the subject of
criminal procedure. The focus of the court was persuaded by the nature
of the cases which it was required to review. Nevertheless, the Florida
Supreme Court criminal procedure decisions illustrate the difficult re-
sponsibility which the court has assumed to balance the needs of soci-
ety with the rights of individuals.
109. Id. at 1164.
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I. Introduction
Twenty-one years ago Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed an ad-
visory committee to propose evidentiary rules for the federal courts,
thus beginning a movement which has worked a minor revolution in
substantive evidence law., Besides reforming federal law, the Federal
Rules of Evidence have been a model for evidentiary reform in many
states. Florida became one of the earliest states to adopt the federal
courts' lead and consider revising its substantive evidence law. 2 After
several unsuccessful attempts at reform, the Florida Legislature passed
the Florida Evidence Code in 1976. 3 However, the Evidence Code's ef-
fective date was delayed several times while possible conflicts between
the Florida Supreme Court and the Florida Legislature were resolved.4
1. Chief Justice Warren appointed the committee in March 1965. The Commit-
tee circulated a Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts and Magistrates in 1969. See 46 F.R.D. 161. After a Revised Draft
was circulated in 1971, the Supreme Court prescribed the Rules effective as of July 1,
1973. See 56 F.R.D. 183. However, Congress deferred the effective date until it ex-
pressly approved the Rules. Following Congressional action, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence became effective July 1, 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-595; 88 Stat. 1926 (1976).
2. Besides Florida, twenty-seven other states have adopted evidence Codes
modeled after the Federal Rules: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Ha-
waii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. The Federal
Rules were also the model for the Uniform Military Rules of Evidence and for Puerto
Rico's evidence Code.
For an article discussing the Federal Rules and Florida's substantive evidence law
before passage of the Florida Evidence Code, see Note, The Federal Rules of E'vidence
and Florida Evidence Law Compared, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 384 (1975).
3. See 1976 FLA. LAws 237. For a brief description of the Florida Law Revision
Council's attempts to pass earlier versions, see Ehrhardt, A Look at Florida's Proposed
Code of Evidence, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1974) and Note, supra note 2, at 385
n.8.
4. The Evidence Code originally was to have taken effect on July 1, 1977. How-
ever, 1977 FLA. LAWS 77 delayed the effective date until July 1, 1978. Subsequently
1978 FLA. LAWS 379 delayed the effective date until July 1, 1979. After this legislative
action, the Florida Supreme Court noted that article V, section 2(a) of the Florida
Constitution gave it the sole authority to "adopt rules for the practice and procedure in
all courts. . . ." Recognizing that portions of the evidence code may be procedural,
rather than substantive, the Court temporarily approved and adopted the evidence code
as originally enacted and amended by 1978 FLA. LAWS 379. See In re Florida Evidence
Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1979). Following the receipt of comments from the Flor-
ida Bar and Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers, the Florida Bar Board of Governors
expressed its general approval with the Evidence Code to the Florida Supreme Court.
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During the delay period, several amendments to the Code were passed,
but the original 1976 text is the same for most provisions.' The Florida
Evidence Code finally became effective on July 1, 1979, applying to all
crimes committed after that date and to all other proceedings pending
or brought after October 1, 1981.6
This article discusses the major Florida evidentiary case law devel-
opments which occurred during most of 1985. 7 During this period, the
Florida courts confronted a number of evidentiary issues.8 As with
most surveys, the authors do not discuss each decision. Some opinions
are so brief that attaching any real significance to them is impossible.
Other opinions merely restate settled evidence law with which most
readers would be well familiar. Those areas discussed have been so se-
lected for three reasons: (1) because a new evidentiary development has
occurred in the area, (2) because a particular case presents an excellent
example of a fundamental principle involved in a particular area, or (3)
because the sheer number of times that a particular area presents evi-
dentiary issues makes it an important one for practitioners and for the
courts. By way of inconclusiveness, the authors note the following evi-
dentiary areas not dealt with in this article generated decisions during
However, the Bar noted that provisions of § 90.103 concerning the Code's applicability
to civil actions could create problems and suggested changes therein. The Florida Su-
preme Court agreed clarification was needed but considered this a legislative responsi-
bility. See In re Florida Evidence Code, 376 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1979). The legislature
followed the court's suggestion and amended the Evidence Code once more to cure this
problem. See 1981 FLA. LAWS 93. The Florida Supreme Court approved and adopted
all aspects of the 1981 legislature changes. See In re Amendment of Florida Evidence
Code, 404 So. 743 (Fla. 1981).
5. Other than the provisions extending the Evidence Code's effective date, 1978
FLA. LAws 361 and 1981 FLA. LAWS 93 both amended substantive language in various
code sections.
For an article comparing the original 1976 Evidence Code before amendment with
both the Federal Rules of Evidence and pre-code Florida evidence law, see Hicks and
Matthews, Evidence, 31 U. MIAmi L. REV. 951 (1977).
For an excellent one volume work on present Florida evidence law, see C.
EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE (2d. ed. 1984).
6. See FLA. STAT. § 90.013(2) (1985).
7. This article discusses cases in 462 So. 2d through 476 So. 2d.
8. There were 154 reported cases during the survey period which dealt with evi-
dentiary issues. Most, but not all, of these issues involved various sections of the Flor-
ida Evidence Code.
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the survey period: offers to compromises;' guilty pleas;' 0 character evi-
dence;"1 competency of witness;12 dead man's statute;' 3 rape shield
law;"'4 academic privilege;' 5 informer's privilege;' 6 medical review com-
9. See FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (1985); H.R.J. Bar-B-Q, Inc. v. Shapiro, 463 So. 2d
403, 404 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (offer made to plaintiff upon being fired was not
a compromise since there was no "claim ... disputed as to validity or amount at the
time the offer was made"); Benoit, Inc. v. District Bd. of Trustees, 463 So. 2d 1260
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (§ 90.408 excludes all statements made in compromise
negotiations as well as the actual compromise offers themselves).
10. See FLA. STAT. § 90.410 (1985); Ellis v. State, 475 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (defendant's statements to a police officer made two months
after guilty plea, in effort to render substantial assistance in return for a reduced sen-
tence were not made in connection with plea negotiations or the plea itself when there
was "no showing that the guilty plea was part of any bargain with the state to accept
defendant's cooperation and thereupon recommend a reduction. .... ).
I!. See FLA. STAT.§ 90.404(l)(a); Von Carter v. State, 468 So. 2d 276, 278
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985), remanded on other grounds, 478 So. 2d 10 (1985),
rev'd on other grounds, 482 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (prosecutor's
reference to scar on defendant's neck during defendant's cross-examination for a bur-
glary- robbery allegedly committed with a knife was an "insinuation of bad character"
violating principle that a defendant must place his character in issue before the state
can attack it); Wolack v. State, 464 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review
denied, 476 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1985) (insufficient foundation for admission of reputation
evidence when knowledge of reputation was based solely on witness' official position as
a police officer).
12. See FLA. STAT. § 90.601, 90.604 (1985); State v. Barber, 465 So. 2d 264
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court should not have excluded witness' testimony
even though it believed he had perjured himself in two depositions concerning the crim-
inal charges, since the jury is the sole judge of witness' credibility); Howard Bros. v.
Sotuyo, 472 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (witness had adequate founda-
tion based on personal knowledge despite his lack of authority to fire employees to
testify about what police jobs an injured police officer-plaintiff could hold).
13. See FLA. STAT. § 90.102 (1985); Comodeca v. Comodeca, 464 So. 2d 662,
663 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (wife of a claimant against an estate is an "inter-
ested party" under the dead man's statute since she was "closely allied with her hus-
band . . . [and] would directly gain or lose from the resolution of the case").
For a general discussion of Florida's Dead Man Statute see Note, The Dead
Man's Statute Before and After The Florida Evidence Code - A Step in the Right
Direction, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 480 (1976).
14. See FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1985); Gonzalez v. State, 471 So. 2d 214 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (error in sexual battery case when defense was fabrication to
exclude victim's forged note which showed her prior fantasizing of sexual activity);
Kemp v. State, 464 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (defense properly ex-
cluded from asking about victim's virginity since this was irrelevant where its purpose
was to impeach her testimony that she was unfamilar about sexual relations and to
impeach her by showing she lied to the examining physician when asked if she had ever
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mittee privilege; 17 and the attorney-client privilege. 18 Likewise this arti-
had sex before the attack); Marr v. State, 463 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985), partially rev'd on other grounds, 470 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(en banc) review denied, 475 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1985) (no denial of defendant's Sixth
Amendment Right to Confrontation in precluding evidence of sexual relations between
victim and her boyfriend since defendant was able to show their close relationship by
other means and thus argue the victim was biased against him for having told authori-
ties of her boyfriend's alleged criminal activity).
However, both Marr and Kaplan v. State, 451 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) suggest that a complete exclusion of any evidence in reliance on § 794.022
showing the victim'sbias towards the defendant may violate the Confrontation Clause.
For a general discussion of potential constitutional problems with rape shield laws see
Tanford and Bocchino, Rape Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 544 (1980).
15. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Swilley, 462 So. 1188, 1195 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (court declared "there is no academic priviledge in Florida", citing Mar-
shall v. Anderson, 459 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) in partially overruling com-
pany's objection to request for production of documents).
16. See Aldazabal v. State, 471 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (con-
viction reversed when state failed to determine and provide defense with the address of
an informer who was a vital witness); State v. Carnegie, 472 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (mere defense assertion that informer is vital witness and
should be produced is not sufficient when no defense was specified and the informer
was not "the sole material witness to the events").
17. See former FLA. STAT. § 768.04(4) (1983), now FLA. STAT. § 768.40(5)
(1985); Mercy Hosp. v. Department of Professional Regulation, 467 So. 2d 1058 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (hospital per review committee records are not privileged from
subpoena by the Department conducting disciplinary investigation of two doctors);
HCA of Florida, Inc. v. Cooper, 475 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (even
though they are not explicitly protected by statutory language, a party must still show
exceptional need to justify production of medical review committee records).
18. See FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1985). Two opinions discussed when the state can
call defense counsel as witnesses in criminal cases. In Perez v. State, 474 So. 2d 398
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) review denied, 484 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1986), the court
found error in the state's listing of defense counsel as a witness, since the testimony
desired was available from other sources. The listing compelled the attorney to with-
draw and forced the defendant to accept a continuance beyond the speedy trial rule's
limits. The court reversed the defendant's conviction and ordered his discharge.
In State v. Schmidt, 474 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), defense coun-
sel successfully appealed from an order finding him in contempt for refusing to be a
witness. The attorney's client had been granted immunity in partial return for his testi-
mony in a first-degree murder trial. When the client was deposed, his counsel was not
present. At the deposition, the client testified about communications with counsel in
which the client had made a confession. Afterwards, the attorney was subpoenaed to
testify about the confession but claimed the lawyer-client privilege. The Fifth District
Court of Appeal found that the client had wanted counsel at the deposition but had
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cle does not discuss any statutory amendments passed in 1985.19
been persuaded to go ahead by assurances from the attorneys present that they would
protect his interests. This was obviously not done, since neither deposing counsel nor
the state's attorney had warned the client he could not limit his answers to the mere
fact that he had previously shown defense counsel a confession. Given these circum-
stances, the court refused to find a valid waiver occurred at the deposition and reversed
the contempt order.
On the civil side, the Florida Supreme Court decided two major cases involving
the attorney-client privilege. In City of North Miami v. Miami Herald Publishing, 468
So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1985), the court addressed the relation between the Florida Public
Records Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01 et seq. (1985) and section 90.502. The court found
that the lawyer-client privilege "does not exempt written communications between law-
yers and governmental clients from disclosure as public records." Id. at 220. However,
the court found FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(o) (1985) created a limited attorney work
product disclosure exception for any document which may qualify as a public record
"until the conclusion of the litigation or adversarial proceedings" for which the docu-
ment had been prepared. Similarly, in Neu v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 462 So.
2d 821 (Fla. 1985), the Florida Supreme Court rejected arguments that section 90.502
required an exception to Florida's Sunshine Law, FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1985), for a
meeting between a city council and its attorney to discuss pending litigation.
These last two decisions were not chosen for review since they have already been
thoroughly discussed in two articles. See Comment, Florida's Open Government Laws:
No Exceptions for Attorney-Client Communications, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 388
(1985); Smith, The Public Records Law and The Sunshine Law: No Attorney-Client
Privilege Per Se, and Limited Attorney Work Product Exception, 14 STETSON L. REV.
493 (1985).
19. The Florida legislature passed several bills which will affect evidentiary is-
sues in future cases. One made minor textual changes to clarify FLA. STAT. § 90.606,
relating to interpreters and translators and FLA. STAT. § 90.605(2) relating to what a
child must understand before being found competent to testify. See 1985 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv. 85-53, §§ 2, 3 (West).
Almost all the major legislative changes concerned evidence in child abuse cases.
The first recognized the privilege for confidential communications to clergy when deal-
ing with abuse cases concerning the elderly, disabled or children. See 1985 Fla. Sess.
Law. Serv. 85-28, §§ 1, 2 (West). The second provided for the use of video taped
testimony or testimony by closed circuit television in child abuse and child sex abuse
cases. See 1985 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 85-53, §§ 5, 6 (West). The third created a new
hearsay exception, FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1985), for out-of-court statements of chil-
dren eleven or younger reporting sexual abuse, provided the trial court does not find the
statements are untrustworthy. See 1985 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 85-53 § 4 (West).
FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1985) clearly attempts to avoid Confrontation Clause
problems. When the state actually calls the child as a witness, as well as admitting his
out-of-court statements under this provision, no constitutional question exists. However,
when a child is not a witness, for the out-of-court statements to be admissible under the
new exception, the child must be unavailable under FLA. STAT. § 90.804(1) and the
trial court must find that having the child testify would cause emotional or mental
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Before discussing cases dealing with specific evidence issues, a
brief statistical overview is in order. Probably to no one's surprise, the
majority of cases presenting evidentiary issues were criminal.20 How-
ever, a surprising number of both criminal and civil cases were reversed
for evidentiary error. 2' Whether this survey period included an unusu-
ally high number of reversals is impossible to say since no statistics are
available for prior years. Any explanation for the number of reversals
would be somewhat speculative. Florida trial courts may perhaps be too
lax in their evidence- rulings. Alternatively, the appellate courts may
harm. Furthermore, there must be some corroborating evidence that the abuse actually
occurred. The dual requirement of unavailability under § 90.804(1) and that testifying
would cause the child harm is somewhat puzzling. If the trial court finds a child un-
available under § 90.804(1) any confrontation problems should be solved. Similar state
hearsay exceptions require only unavailability and corroboration, see MINN. STAT. §
595.02(3) (1984).
While § 90.803(23) makes radical changes in Florida evidence law, child abuse
hearsay exceptions have been passed in at least eleven other states. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-411(3); ILL. ANN. STAT. CH.
37, para. 704-6(4)(c); (Smith-Hurd 1984) IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6 (1984); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 232.96(6) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1982); MINN. STAT. §
595.02(3) (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-411 (1983); VT. R. EVID. 803(24) (1985); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1982).
As can be expected, these new exceptions have received much recent attention
from commentators. For discussion of various state provisions dealing with new hearsay
exceptions in child abuse cases see Pierron, The New Kansas Law Regarding Admissi-
bility of Child-Victim Hearsay Statements, 52 J.B.A.K. 88 (1983); Skoler, New Hear-
say Exceptions for a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV.
I (1984). Some authors claim that the new hearsay exceptions are unconstitutional. See
e.g. Note, Confronting Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the
Sexual Abuse Hearsay Exception, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L.REv. 387 (1984) arguing that
Washington's law, which is similar to Florida's except that it only requires unavailabil-
ity and corroboration, is unconstitutional. State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197 (Wash. 1984)
(en banc), found the new hearsay exception did not violate a defendant's confrontation
rights.
For a recent article discussing the constitutional problems presented by both the
new child abuse hearsay exceptions and the use of closed circuit television or videotape
statements, see Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face-to-Face Confrontation:
Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19 (1985).
20. Of the 154 total cases, 98 or 64% were criminal, while 56 or 36% were civil.
21. Florida appellate courts found evidentiary error in 64 out of 154 cases or
42%. Criminal cases produced a lower percentage of reversals, 40 out of 98 or 41%,
than civil cases, 27 out of 56 or 43%. Since the forty reversals in the criminal cases
include five where the state secured reversals of trial court evidence errors on interlocu-
tory appeals, the percentage of cases where criminal defendants prevailed is even
smaller.
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possibly be stricter than those in other states. Most likely the reason
partially lies in the frequent use Florida appellate courts make of per
curiam affirmances. Appellate courts may often be writing opinions
only where necessary to instruct lower courts or where a new issue of
law demanding extensive consideration is presented.
In line with the statistical overview, it is important to recognize
that the number of reversals could have been even higher. Florida ap-
pellate courts, like those of most states, will not review and reverse trial
courts' rulings in certain situations worth noting. First, the appellate
courts realize they review cases on a cold record, removed from the
sometimes hectic fray of trial courts. Thus they regularly defer to trial
court evidence rulings, except when clear error had been committed.22
Second, trial counsel inaction often lead to procedural defaults when
objections to admission of evidence were not made timely. 3 In most
22. See Merchant v. State, 476 So. 2d 331, 332 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
"A trial court has wide discretion in. . . admission of evidence, and, unless an abuse
of discretion can be shown, its rulings should not be disturbed on appeal." Id.
23. FLA. STAT. § 90.104 (1985) provides in part that:
(1) A court may predicate error . . . on the basis of admitted or excluded
evidence when a substantial right of the party is adversely affected and:
(2) when the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection. . . ap-
pears on the record, stating the specific ground of objection ....
Florida appellate courts almost always refuse to consider evidentiary arguments
when trial counsel has not made a proper contemporaneous objection. This includes the
failure to object at all and the failure to object until after the questioned evidence has
been admitted. See S.C. v. State, 471 So. 2d 1326, 1328-29 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985) where the court refused to hear argument on one evidence issue since no objec-
tion to admission was ever made and likewise refused to hear arguments concerning a
witness' competency to testify since no objection was made about this until the close of
the state's case.
In Troedel v. State, 462 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1984), the Florida Supreme Court ex-
plained the contemporaneous objection rule's rationale while refusing to consider a de-
fense argument that neutron activation test results should not have been admitted to
help show the defendant had probably fired a gun used to kill two victims.
If appellant had objected . . . on the ground he now relies upon, the
trial court could have made a determination of whether there was an ade-
quate reason for excluding the evidence. The court could have inquired
into the questions of whether the precise quality or substance of the solu-
tion used should be a matter of predicate to the admissibility of the test by
reason of its effect on the test's reliability. . . . An appellate court is in a
weak position to rule on the legal issue of admissibility of scientific evi-
dence when because of the lack of an objection or motion below, there is
no unfolding of the factual basis upon which the legal question turns.
Id. at 396.
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instances, even previously made motions in limine would not suffice to
preserve the record for appeal, if there were no timely objection at
trial.2 4 Third, trial counsel also sometimes failed to preserve evidentiary
issues for review by not making adequate offers of proof. 25 However, if
the trial court has previously granted an opponent's motion in limine
excluding a party's desired proof, there is no necessity to attempt to
introduce it at trial to preserve the issue for appeal.26 Finally, applica-
tion of the harmless error rule prevented reversals in some cases even
when evidentiary error did occur.27
During this survey period, Florida courts also applied the contemporaneous objec-
tion rule to workmen's compensation proceedings, see Rinker Materials Corp. v. Hill,
471 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985); but refused to find that counsel's failure
to object to an improper calculation of points in a sentencing proceeding barred review
of the sentence. See Smith v. State, 475 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
For other cases citing the lack of a contemporaneous objection as a ground to
reject evidence arguments, see Barclay v. State, 470 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1985); Dougan v.
State, 470 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied sub nor. Dougan v. Florida, 106 S. Ct.
1499 (1986).
24. See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 476 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1985) (even though a motion
in limine to exclude prior crimes evidence had already been denied, failure to renew
objection to admission at trial waived the issue for appeal).
However, one recent case seems to have created a limited exception. In Fincke v.
Peoples, 476 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), just before jury selection the
trial court overruled a motion in limine to exclude certain deposition testimony. After
opening statements, one deposition was read and counsel objected to it. As expected,
the trial court overruled the objection. Since two other depositions had also been cov-
ered by the motion in limine, counsel asked that a continuing objection be recognized
to admission of these also. Since the trial court agreed to this procedure and had only a
short time before overruling what would have been the same objection by denying the
motion in limine, the record was adequately preserved for review.
25. FLA. STAT. § 90.104(1)(b) (1985), allows reversal for evidentiary error only
if substantial rights are affected and if "[w]hen the ruling is one excluding evidence,
• . . the evidence was made known to the court by offer of proof. ... "
Both lack of any offer of proof at all, see Connell v. Guardianship of Connell, 476
So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) and inadequate responses to an opponent's
objections come within this requirement. See Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32 (Fla.
1985) (since counsel only argued the relevancy of excluded evidence to the trial court,
an argument that the statements were against a declarant's penal interest could not be
raised on appeal).
26. See Bender v. State, 472 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
27. FLA. STAT. § 90.104(1) (1985) embodies the harmless error rule by its re-
quirement that error can only be found if "a substantial right of the party is adversely
affected." In cases of federal constitutional error, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
24 (1967) requires that an appellate court "be able to declare a belief that [the error]
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
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II. Judicial Notice
The Florida Evidence Code covers judicial notice both of facts and
of law.28 Usually cases involving the propriety of taking judicial notice
are very straightforward and uncomplicated. That situation prevailed
during this survey period.29
In the Interest of A.D.J. and D.L.J.,30 is worth noting since it
presents a good example of the proper limits of judicial notice and its
inadequacy to cure major defects in procedure and proof. The Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitation Services (HRS) filed dependency
petitions on two minor children claiming they had been physically,
mentally and sexually abused. At the initial hearing, both parents ap-
peared and waived their right to appointed counsel. The mother admit-
ted the children should be in HRS custody; but the father neither de-
nied nor admitted the petitions' allegations, nor did he give up the
children's custody. Despite this, the Duval County Circuit Court en-
tered a written order finding both parents stipulated to dependency.
Over one year later, HRS petitioned for permanent commitment of the
children to it for adoption, alleging that the mother consented to this
and that the father had sexually abused the children. The commitment
petitions were filed as new cases rather than as part of the dependency
proceedings.
At the commitment hearing, HRS asked the court to judicially
notice the two dependency cases. The father's counsel objected because
the files were not adequate evidence of abuse for commitment purposes
Besides the 64 cases reversed because of evidentiary error, there were 12 opinions
where the appellate courts found evidentiary error but held it was harmless.
28. See FLA. STAT., § 90.201-202 (1985).
29. See Hill v. State, 471 So. 2d 567 (1985), aft'd, 486 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (motion to strike appendix to brief on grounds it contained docu-
ments not in record granted; documents possibly could have been judicially noticed by
trial court but not proper for appellate court to do so); Rook v. Rook, 469 So. 2d 172
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (local guidelines which set child support for dependents
do not meet test for judicial notice and could not be considered part of the appellate
record).
Neither Hill nor Rook explain why the appellate court could not have taken judi-
cial notice of the matters involved. To that extent, they have little informational value.
At least one Florida decision has found that the appellate courts are not required to
take judicial notice of matters covered by § 90.202. See Hillsborough County Bd. of
Comm'rs v. Public Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 424 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
30. 466 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 475 So. 2d
693 (Fla. 1985).
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and because the abuse allegations had to be proved independently at
the commitment hearing. The circuit court overruled the objections and
noticed the files. Once this occurred, HRS argued all questions of
abuse had already been proven in the dependency proceedings, so that
only the issue of disposition was left. The father's counsel unsuccess-
fully argued that the father had been unrepresented at the dependency
adjudication so that the abuse must be proved before any disposition
consideration was proper. The circuit court found, in reliance on the
two judicially noticed files, that the abuse element needed for termina-
tion of parental rights had been proved by the parents' supposed
stipulations.
The district court of appeal first examined whether judicial notice
of the prior files was proper when the father had been unrepresented in
the dependency proceedings. While it recognized that a court can judi-
cially notice its own files, 31 such a procedure would have been unneces-
sary here if HRS had filed the commitment petitions as supplements to
the original dependency proceedings rather than as separate actions.
The filing procedure used required the circuit court to judicially notice
the other cases to show continuing jurisdiction over the children.
However, even a showing of continuing circuit court jurisdiction
was not enough to uphold the commitment action. This only demon-
strated the circuit court had authority to proceed; it did not demon-
strate that the father had abused the children. Apparently in judicially
noticing the prior files, the circuit court never specified what records or
exhibits from those cases it was making a part of the commitment pro-
ceedings. This being so, not all the records from the dependency cases,
especially the crucial one which would allegedly show the parents' stip-
ulation to the dependency petition, were before the appellate court.
Even after the record was ordered supplemented, the alleged stipulation
could not be found. The district court of appeal, therefore, could not
find the father had agreed in the dependency proceedings that he
abused the children. Since no independent proof of abuse was offered in
the commitment action, the circuit court's commitment order was re-
versed and the case remanded for a new evidentiary hearing in the
commitment issue.
While the same result may occur after the second commitment
hearing, the court of appeal's decision was certainly correct. Noticing
the mere existence of another judicial proceeding is different from judi-
31. See FLA. STAT. § 90.202(6) (1985).
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cially noticing documents allegedly introduced therein as proof. Had
the father signed a stipulation waiving counsel and stipulating to the
alleged abuse, it should be easy to produce. Even if no such statement
were signed, as long as the father had stated, somewhere on the record,
his agreement with the dependency petitions' allegations, that could ar-
guably have been introduced as an admission. Of course, if both the
dependency and commitment petitions had been filed under the same
number, there would have been no need to judicially notice the earlier
files in any respect. Failure to follow this simple procedure created a
major gap in proof which judicial notice could not cure.
III. Relevancy
A. In General
The Florida Evidence Code follows the Federal Rules in its ap-
proach to relevancy. The Code expresses the general desire that all rel-
evant evidence should be permitted "except as provided by law."3 2 Evi-
dence will be relevant if it has a tendency "to prove or disprove a
material fact."33 That the Evidence Code does not go beyond this brief
definition is not surprising. No category of information can be consid-
ered inherently relevant to all cases. What will be material or immate-
rial34 is not a function of substantive evidence law but rather of the
underlying claims and defenses in a particular trial. 35 Likewise,
whether certain information tends to prove a material fact depends
upon the strength or weakness of the logical connection between the
information and the matter it is being offered for. Since relevancy is a
function of logical deduction and substantive law, merely changing a
few facts can produce major results. As a result, cases discussing the
general relevancy of certain evidence are seldom of much precedential
32. FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (1985).
33. FLA. STAT. § 90.401 (1985).
34. F.R. Evid. 401, defining Relevant Evidence, does not use the words "material
fact" because of the ambiguity which the drafters felt was inherent in this term. See
F.R. Evid. 401 Advisory Comment. However, the same concept is expressed by F.R.
Evid. 401's language that the fact involved must be "of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action".
35. Evidence can even be admissible as to one issue but not as to another issue.
FLA. STAT. § 90.107 expressly recognizes the concept of limited admissibility. During
this survey period, Parsons v. Motor Homes of Am., Inc., 465 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) presented the unusual situation of a reversal because the trial
court expressly refused to admit evidence for only limited purposes.
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value. Only one general relevancy case decided during the survey pe-
riod is likely to be of much importance."6
In Pitts v. State,37 an ex-deputy sheriff was charged with vehicular
homicide arising from the operation of his patrol car while responding
to a fellow officer's call for back-up assistance. After receiving the call,
Pitts notified his central communications office that he was responding
but failed to mention he was operating "code one." This was office ter-
minology for proceeding with both lights flashing and the siren on. On
his way to the call, Pitts attempted to make a car proceeding in the
same direction yield. Since this was near the call's vicinity, Pitts had
turned the siren off as police academy training had directed. When the
car did not yield, Pitts tried to pass after checking for incoming traffic
but met a second car coming in the opposite direction. Although evi-
dence showed Pitts drove into a guardrail to avoid hitting this car, a
collision still occurred and the car's driver was killed. At trial, the de-
fense and state disputed how fast Pitts was driving when he tried to
pass. State experts estimated his speed at close to eighty miles per
hour, while the defense claimed it was between fifty-five and sixty. Evi-
dence also showed that the passing may have been attempted in a no-
passing zone with a fifty miles per hour speed limit.
Besides this evidence, the state called a captain in Pitts' office and
through him introduced the office manual requiring an officer deciding
to respond "code one" to inform the communications center of such.
The state cross-examined Pitts about whether he violated department
regulations by proceeding "code one" without telling anyone and ar-
gued on closing that his violation of the manual helped show Pitts
drove recklessly.38 Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that
36. For other cases discussing the general relevancy of evidence decided during
the survey period see Smith v. Telophase Nat. Cremation Soc'y, Inc., 471 So. 2d 163
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (evidence of defendant's past practices in cremating de-
ceased persons admissible on issue of whether conduct in the case was outrageous);
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Johnson, 466 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
(evidence that driver had not been cited for traffic violation following an accident
should have been inadmissible and inquiry about such should have been mistrial); Don-
ahue v. Albertson's, Inc., 473 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), (evidence that
two months after plaintiff had been injured by a door's improper closing the doorswitch
snapped because the door had been slammed into, was not so remote as to be irrelevant
when a defense expert claimed any impact on the switch, from door being mistakenly
slammed into, would be negligible).
37. 473 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 484 So. 2d 10
(Fla. 1986).
38. FLA. STAT. § 782.071 (1981) under which the defendant was charged with
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while a violation of the manual alone was not sufficient proof of reck-
lessness, "[Y]ou may consider this circumstance together with the
other circumstances in the evidence considering whether the vehicle of
the defendant was operating in a reckless manner."39
The district court of appeal reversed the conviction finding the
manual's admission was error for several reasons. The court found that
no evidence was ever introduced to help explain to the jury the man-
ual's purpose or the purpose of the "code one" reporting regulation.
Indeed the manual itself contained a preface stating it was "for inter-
nal use only, and does not enlarge an officer's civil or criminal liability
in any way."'40 Without any guidance, the jury could only speculate as
to what connection Pitts' reporting violation had with the charges.
Perhaps even more important to the court's decision was its finding
that introducing the manual could have contributed to an erroneous
decision by introducing a false standard. Florida case law recognizes
that evidence describing what is the standard practice or custom for
certain occupations is often introduced to help show whether someone
has breached the appropriate level of conduct for his profession, thus
possibly being negligent. However, in a criminal case the same evidence
is irrelevant when the question is not whether the party has been negli-
gent but has violated a higher standard of care. Here Pitts should have
been found not guilty if he was merely negligent. Pitts was charged
with a crime for violating a statutory standard of care, recklessness in
operating a motor vehicle, not for violating a department rule. Since
the state did not show a connection between the two, admission of Pitts'
non-reporting violation was reversible error.4
B. Similar Happenings and Circumstances in Civil Cases
No specific rule in either the Florida Code or Federal Rules of
vehicular homicide provided in part: "Vehicular homicide is the killing of a human
being by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to
cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another . .
39. 473 So. 2d at 1373.
40. Id.
41. The court rejected state arguments that since Pitts forgot- to follow the re-
porting procedure this demonstrated reckelessness.
Even if Pitts had been sued civilly for wrongful death, evidence of his non-report-
ing should not be admissible unless some showing is made that this was negligence
causing the other driver's death. This author believes such a causal connection is not
possible.
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Evidence governs the admissibility of other occurrences similar to the
event involved in the present civil litigation. The admissibility of similar
happenings evidence is treated as a subspecies of relevancy. However,
this type of evidence is offered so frequently in civil cases that courts
are often faced with questions in this area. Two basic questions arise in
dealing with similar happenings evidence in civil cases: (1) is what the
proponent claims the evidence shows relevant,42 and (2) has a sufficient
degree of similarity between the extraneous event and the one involved
in the litigation been established. 43 Unless both questions can be an-
swered affirmatively, trial judges are justified in excluding this type of
information.
Trial courts must be careful to allow proponents a fair chance to
establish the predicate similarity necessary or else reversal is merited.
Saunders v. Florida Keys Electric Co-op Association44 presents an ex-
ample of how hasty discovery rulings may later cause reversals because
they affect evidentiary trial rulings in this area. The plaintiff was in-
jured when the mast of his trailered sailboat hit an overhead power line
in a marina parking lot. During depositions, plaintiff learned that the
defense knew of other incidents where sailboat masts had hit overhead
power lines in nearby marinas. However, the trial court ruled any dis-
covery about the details of these incidents was irrelevant. At trial,
Saunders tried to prove the defendant knew the lines in his marina
42. Evidence of similar happenings appears to be most frequently used to prove
notice. However, the possible relevancy of similar happenings is limitless and purely
depends on the underlying substantive law.
An interesting use of similar happenings evidence recently occurred in Trees by
and Through Trees v. K-Mart, 467 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.) review denied,
479 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1985). The plaintiff filed a malicious prosecution/false arrest suit
claiming damages stemming from her shoplifting arrest and charge which the store
later dropped. To show no damages, the defense introduced evidence that the plaintiff
had previously been arrested for shoplifting and taken to a police station, like in the
instant case. Those charges were resolved by juvenile services counseling, and the plain-
tiff suffered no psychological injury from them. The trial court's ruling that the two
events were sufficiently similar for the defense to claim that Trees had likewise suffered
no emotional trauma from the K-Mart arrest was affirmed on appeal.
Similar happenings evidence in criminal cases is governed by Florida's Williams
Rule, FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1). For discussion of this area see infra text accompanying
notes 69-107.
43. For a recent case finding reversible error in the improper admission of evi-
dence because the two events dealt with dissimilar matters, see 3-M Corp. v. Brown,
475 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
44. 471 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 482 So. 2d 348
(Fla. 1986).
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presented a danger to people towing sailboats by introducing evidence
that the defendant knew about the nearby marina incidents. However,
the court sustained an objection that no showing was made that these
other accidents were similar to Saunders'. After a defense verdict,
plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeal found reversal merited for two reasons. The
early ban on discovery had been incorrect as evidence about how the
other accidents occurred was clearly relevant. "Evidence of similar in-
cidents at locations other than the place where the incident in question
occurred is relevant . . . for the purpose of showing the existence of a
danger or defect and notice or knowledge of." 45 When the trial court
subsequently rejected evidence of the other incidents, the error in its
discovery ruling became even more critical. In essence, the two rulings
unfairly put the plaintiff in an impossible position since he had been
unable to obtain the needed predicate trial evidence due to the earlier
incorrect discovery ruling.
Saunders demonstrates the use of similar happenings evidence to
show actual knowledge of a dangerous condition. However, actual
knowledge may not always be necessary in order for an injured party to
recover. In some instances, similar circumstances evidence will be rele-
vant to show constructive instead of actual notice. In Fazio v. Dania
Jai-Alai Palace, Inc.,4" plaintiff sued when she slipped on liquid in an
aisle at the defendant's premises. To prove defendant's constructive no-
tice of the aisle's condition, Fazio tried to call witnesses who would
have testified that the aisles were commonly littered with spilled drinks
and food. However, the trial court limited plaintiff's proof to evidence
of the aisle's condition the evening she slipped and fell. After a defense
verdict, the court of appeal reversed.
Fazio presents an interesting contrast to Saunders. Both plaintiffs
attempt to use events happening at other times to prove the notice ele-
ment of their negligence claims. In Saunders, the question involved
proving sufficient similarity between the two events. However, in Fazio,
there was no serious question about the similarity. All the occurrences
involved the same part of the same premises and were allegedly caused
by the same factor. Thus, Fazio had to be resolved on the issue
whether the other incidents at other times could ever be relevant to
show constructive notice. As the court of appeal noted, this question
was controlled by the underlying substantive law. In Florida, amuse-
45. Id. at 89.
46. 473 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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ment places, where large numbers of patrons congregate, are held to a
higher standard of care than other public places and must be kept in
"reasonably safe condition commensurate with the business con-
ducted. ' 47 Previous cases had allowed circumstantial proof to be of-
fered on the issue of notice and had not limited this to conditions on the
day of an accident, but extended it to similar conditions on the same
premises at other times.48 Thus, the plaintiffs excluded similar circum-
stance evidence should have been admitted to show "necessary or ongo-
ing problems, which could have resulted from operational negligence or
negligent maintenance."4 9
C. Habit Evidence
The concept of habit has been aptly described as "one's regular
response to a repeated situation. '50 Assuming someone has adopted a
regularized method of dealing with a particular situation, it is logical to
assume that the person followed this method on an occasion in question
unless there is strong proof showing otherwise. Habit evidence is admis-
sible in most jurisdictions, assuming sufficient evidence has been intro-
duced to prove such a habit actually existed.
Comparison of the Federal Rules of Evidence language with that
of the Florida Evidence Code would logically lead a reader to believe
that habit evidence is not admissible in Florida. Like Federal Rule of
Evidence 406,51 section 90.406 of the Florida Statutes52 specifically
provides for the admission of evidence concerning the routine practice
of an organization. However, unlike the Federal Rules, there is no men-
tion of habit evidence in section 90.406. Since the Evidence Code's
drafters expressly approved admission of routine organizational prac-
tices but did not do so with habit evidence, the statutory construction
47. Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 35 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1948).
48. See, e.g., Firth v. Marhoefer, 406 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Bennett v. Mattison, 382 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
49. 473 So. 2d at 1348.
50. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 195 at p. 575 (3d ed. 1984).
51. F.R. Evid. 406 states in part that: "Evidence of the habit of a person or of
the routine practice of an organization ... is relevant to prove that the conduct of the
person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or
routine practice."
52. FLA. STAT. § 90.406 states in part: "Evidence of the routine practice of an
organization ... is admissible to prove that the conduct of the organization on a par-
ticular occasion was in conformity with the routine practice."
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principle "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" would seem to have
eliminated habit as an admissible mode of proof in Florida.53 However,
despite the logic of such statutory construction, Florida courts have
consistently admitted habit evidence. 54 Decisions during this survey pe-
riod show the continuation of this policy. 55
Fincke v. Peeples56 is an important habit evidence case since it
discusses the foundational predicate. This was a medical malpractice
suit arising from the death of a seventeen year old boy following knee
53. At least one article commenting on the new Florida Evidence Code believed
the statutory ommission of any reference to habit evidence meant that such proof was
not admissible. See Hicks and Matthews, supra note 5, at 967.
54. The Law Revision Council note following § 90.406 specifically states that
"[t]his section is not applicable to the habit of an individual." Professor Ehrhardt
claims that any mention of habit was deleted because of the drafters' "feeling that it
should be left to the court to determine as a matter of circumstantial evidence whether
there was sufficient probative value to allow the admission of the habit evidence." C.
EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1984). From this he concludes that "[t]his
exclusion should not be interpreted as intention to prohibit the introduction of all habit
evidence." Id.
Examined closely, this is not a sufficent justification to conclude that habit evi-
dence should still be admissible. In every case, whether § 90.406 expressly mentioned
habit or not, the courts would have to decide "whether there was sufficient probative
value to allow the admission of the habit evidence." This language merely means that
courts will have to decide on a case-by-case basis whether a sufficient predicate to
prove habit has been shown. However, this should not be something surprising. Federal
Rule 406 allows habit evidence but leaves it up to the courts to decide whether the
evidence is logically relevant in individual cases and whether a sufficient predicate has
been established in an individual case.
Professor Ehrhardt offers a second and stronger justification why habit evidence is
still recognized in Florida despite § 90.406's language. Section 90.102 provides that the
Evidence Code "shall replace and supersede existing statutory or common law in con-
flict with its provisions." Since § 90.406 arguably does not directly conflict with pre-
code Florida cases allowing habit evidence, then its failure to expressly mention habit
should not matter. The weakness with this argument comes from the fact that pre-code
Florida law also admitted evidence of routine organization practice. Under Professor
Ehrhardt's second argument, § 90.406 becomes completely superfluous as it merely
codifies, either directly or indirectly, pre-code Florida evidence law. One questions why
the drafters bothered to take what would be such a purely meaningless act.
55. Only one case during the survey period discussed evidence of a routine prac-
tice of an organization, see Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Ocha, 472 So. 2d
1338 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review dismissed, 478 So. 2d 54 (Fla.
1985) (drivers' license examiner's testimony that she always required minor applicants
to secure signed parental consent form was sufficient to help prove the defendant had
signed such, even though a copy could not be found).
56. 476 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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surgery. After surgery, Thomas Peeples was taken by the surgeon and
the anesthesiologist to the hospital's recovery room. The factual issues
revolve around whether he was given proper care following his arrival.
Both the anesthesiologist and a recovery room nurse testified about the
proper procedures regarding the removal of an endotracheal tube which
had been used to help Peeples' breathing during the operation. The an-
esthesiologist testified that unless a patient was fighting the tube it
should not be removed. The danger in doing so is that the patient
might still be unconscious, unable to breathe on his own. Even when
the tube is removed, there is the danger a patient might react to the
anesthesia and stop breathing. To prevent this, a recovery room nurse is
supposed to monitor the patient's condition. At trial, the recovery room
nurse testified that the anesthesiologist removed the tube as soon as
Peeples entered the recovery room. Her testimony was partially corrob-
orated by the surgeon who momentarily left the recovery room after
arrival and returned to find Peeples had been extubated. Shortly there-
after, Peeples' heart stopped beating. Even when the tube was rein-
serted, Peeples never regained consciousness and died almost two weeks
later.
The plaintiffs attempted to introduce deposition testimony of the
recovery room nurse regarding other times when she felt the anesthesi-
ologist had extubated patients in the recovery room prematurely. The
nurse's deposition testimony also mentioned how she and other nurses
had talked about the anesthesiologist and how they felt patients were
being extubated too soon. Plaintiffs offered this evidence to show that
the anesthesiologist had a habit of prematurely extubating patients and
that the hospital was on notice of this. While upholding the verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs, the court of appeals rejected their position that
the nurse's deposition testimony, giving her opinion about the doctor's
habit, supplied a sufficient foundation to show that such a habit existed.
Fincke apparently limits proof of habit to testimony regarding a num-
ber of specific instances of conduct which the court finds have been
repeated sufficiently to arise to the level of a constant practice. Opin-
ions, whether or not a person has a particular habit without detailed
testimony based on concrete factual observances as to why the witness
has such a belief, will no longer be a sufficient foundation. Clearly, in
this case, the nurses involved in the recovery room could have seen the
doctor repeatedly extubate patients too early on many occasions, thus
rising to the level of habit evidence. However, without their testimony
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relating this, their opinions alone that this occurred were insufficient.57
Fincke and other cases during this survey period 8 show whether
Florida courts are interpreting section 90.406 correctly or not. The
courts have and will most likely continue to allow the introduction of
habit evidence. This being so, the Florida legislature should either
amend section 90.406 to expressly include habit evidence as an admissi-
ble mode of proof or amend section 90.406 to make it clear that only
routine practice of an organization, and not habit evidence, should be
admissible.
D. Subsequent Remedial Measures
Florida Statute section 90.407 follows the common law and Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence by prohibiting evidence of remedial conduct af-
ter an event to show an opponent's negligence or culpable conduct.
Generally, before applying this prohibition courts must find the action
taken was both (1) subsequent and remedial and (2) is being offered
for a forbidden purpose. Two widely debated issues involve the admissi-
bility of subsequent remedial measures when they are offered in a strict
liability case and when they were made by a third person, rather than a
party involved in the litigation. Two recent district court of appeal
cases take a pro-defendant approach to both these issues.59
1. Third-Party Action
Subsequent remedial measures are excluded for several reasons.
One is the public policy rationale that parties should be encouraged to
promptly take warranted safety measures without having to fear creat-
ing damaging evidence against themselves. Another reason claims that
57. This comes close to rejecting Professor Ehrhardt's position that "[h]abit may
be proved by opinion testimony from a witness with adequate knowledge." C.
EHRHARDT, supra note 5, § 406.1, at 158.
58. The only other case dealing with habit evidence during the survey period was
Hall v. Spencer, 472 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 479 So. 2d
118 (Fla. 1985) where the court recognized a party's right to introduce habit evidence
relating to past instances of a defendant's intoxication and driving.
59. Two other cases during the survey period briefly dealt with subsequent reme-
dial measures. However, the references to § 90.407 in both are so brief that the discus-
sions have little value. See Donahue v. Albertson's Inc., 472 So. 2d 482, 484 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); 3-M Corp. v. Brown, 475 So. 2d 994, 998 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
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when a party seeks safety measures after an accident, this should not
necessarily be construed as an admission of fault. The party could have
been completely without culpability in not acting sooner and is only
acting as a good citizen should, in now trying to prevent future harms.
From this second rationale, arguments have been made that when third
persons make subsequent remedial measures, rather than parties to the
action, the prohibitory ban against evidence of these is inapplicable."0
Despite this argument at least one district court of appeal appears to
have taken a per se ban against all evidence of subsequent measures
used to prove uncontraverted issues, no matter who made the repairs.
In Thursby v. Reynolds Metal Co.,61 a worker sued after his fin-
gers were injured in an aluminum can press the defendant designed.
Thursby alleged claims both in strict liability and negligence, arguing
that Reynolds had defectively designed and manufactured the machine.
The press used a piston to stretch aluminum pieces into a can. Occa-
sionally, the press jammed and had to be cleared of deformed cans
before continuing operations. Thursby's job was to do this. A door
guarded the area surrounding the piston. Inside was a limit switch
which stopped the machine while it was being cleared. However,
merely opening the guard door did not automatically do so. Proper pro-
cedure for clearing the machine required hitting two switches turning
off electrical power and oil to the press before opening the door and
hitting the limit switch. Thursby was injured when he forgot to turn off
the electrical switch before opening the guard door and hitting the limit
switch. Although the limit switch was activated, the piston still oper-
ated, injuring Thursby's hand. At trial, he presented proof that the
switch failed and that a defective design contributed to this. After a
defense verdict, Thursby claimed the trial court erroneously excluded
evidence that a fellow employee had examined the limit switch after
the accident and replaced it with another type the employee felt was
more reliable.
60. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 50, § 275, at 667, claiming that when a
third party makes the changes, "the policy ground for exclusion is no longer present."
Some courts allow third party changes and reject the argument these are implied ad-
missions. See, e.g., Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 454 P.2d 205, 210 (Wash. 1969) (evi-
dence that guard was installed the day after an accident admissible against manufac-
turer even though feasibility of design changes was not contested "since the
[manufacturer] did not make the changes . . . the fact such changes were made could
not conceivably raise . . . an inference ithe manufacturer] had admitted it was negli-
gent in not making the changes sooner").
61. 446 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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Prior Florida law case law seemed to support Thursby's position
that section 90.407 does not apply when a non-party makes the subse-
quent measures. In Hartman v. Opelika Machine and Welding Co.,6 2
the same district court of appeal had allowed in evidence that plaintiff's
employer, who was not a party in the litigation, had made remedial
changes after plaintiff was hurt. The First District Court of Appeal
seemed to be adopting a general position in "upholding the admission
of such evidence when the change is made by one not a party to the
action." 63 However, in Thursby, the same court limited Hartman to the
unusual factual circumstances presented there. In Hartman, the de-
fendant introduced the evidence to place blame on the third-party em-
ployer for the accident, while in Thursby, the plaintiff attempted to use
the subsequent measures evidence to place blame on the defendant, as
would be the case in most lawsuits. The First District found the evi-
dence was being used to show Reynolds' negligence or culpability and
must be excluded by section 90.407. Unfortunately, the reasoning in
Thursby is very confusing. The court found that under Hartman the
evidence must still be relevant, no matter who made the subsequent
remedial measures. Since neither feasibility nor any other issue except
lack of negligence or culpability was controverted in Thursby, the First
District found evidence of the switch's replacement was irrelevant. Yet,
feasibility of repair would always seem to be relevant in a strict liabil-
ity case. Under Thursby's analysis, the fact that a third party took the
remedial action is immaterial. If evidence is irrelevant, it should not
come in at all - no matter who did the actions involved. Unfortu-
nately, Thursby's analysis confuses the relevancy issue with the policy
analysis behind excluding evidence of subsequent measures. Such mea-
sures are only admissible when controverted, but the reason for this is
not a lack of relevancy but a public7 policy desire to promote repairs.
Once a third party takes the remedial action, the public policy dis-
solves, but the relevancy of the evidence remains. Surely feasibility was
relevant, and no good reasons seem to require this issue to be contro-
verted when a third person not a party to the litigation takes the reme-
dial action.64 Hopefully, other Florida courts will not follow Thursby.
62. 414 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), review denied, 426 So. 2d 27
(Fla. 1983).
63. 414 So. 2d at 1110.
64. The First District Court of Appeal further indicated its misunderstanding of
the policy behind excluding subsequent remedial actions by stating that the third-party
post-accident change could not "be attributed to Reynolds as an admission of pre-acci-
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2. Strict Liability Claims
Voynar v. Butler Manufacturing Co.,6 5 addressed the issue
whether section 90.407's subsequent remedial measure evidence should
apply to strict liability cases. A construction worker had stepped on an
unsecured roof panel which buckled underneath him causing the
worker to fall to his death. His widow sued the roof panel manufac-
turer in negligence and strict liability. After the fall, the manufacturer
took two steps which arguably could have prevented the death. First, it
attached warning flyers about where to walk on the panels to each bun-
dle of panels, rather than just having these in the instructions assembly
manual. Second, it changed the substance used to coat the panels for
shipping so that the new protective coating would begin evaporating
after exposure to air. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a
defense verdict, finding the evidence of these measures was properly
excluded. The court noted there is a split of authority about the admis-
sibility of subsequent measures.6 Although it acknowledged contrary
case law existed, Voynar held that evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is not admissible in strict liability actions, as it is not in negli-
gence claims, unless an issue like feasibility of change is contested6 7 or
dent culpability . . . " 466 So. 2d at 249. Of course it could not be an admission by
conduct since Reynolds did not make the changes. However, Thursby never offered it
as such - only as evidence of the feasibility of a safer design!
65. 463 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 475 So. 2d 696 (Fla.
1985).
66. See e.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P. 2d
1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974); Caprara v. Chrysler Co., 52 N.Y.S.2d 114, 417
N.E.2d 545 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1981); Sirutaov. Hesston Corporation, 232 Kan. 654, 659
P.2d 799 (1983); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Assoc., 552 F.2d 788 (8th
Cir. 1977) rejecting arguments that admission of subsequent measures evidence in
strict liability cases would discourage corrective measures; compare Cann v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981) cert. denied 456 U.S. 960 (1981), finding the
rationale behind excluding subsequent measures evidence in negligence claims is also
applicable to strict liability actions.
One completed study examining practical problems under the Federal Rules of
Evidence has concluded that the most significant issue concerning F.R. Evid. 407 is
"the application of the Rule to products liability actions, particularly when claims of
strict liability in tort (Restatement (second) of Torts § 402A) and breach of implied
warranty are alleged." See, Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
126 AMER. BAR Assoc. SECTION OF LITIGATION (1983). The study recommended the
exclusionary approach to this issue.
67. FLA. STAT. § 90.047 (1985), unlike Fed. R. Evid. 407, contains no second
sentence which provides examples of issues, other than proving negligence or culpable
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the evidence would impeach an opposing witness. The court believed
defendants would be discouraged from making improvements if the op-
posite view was taken. Whether the case was a negligence or strict lia-
bility claim was immaterial. Strict liability in Florida does not make
manufacturers absolute insurers but only requires they not put an un-
safe product out. When events occur which demonstrate how an al-
ready "safe" product can be made even safer, manufacturers should
not be discouraged from taking such action. The court felt that an op-
posite ruling would make evidence of subsequent changes admissions of
fault and discourage their implementation."8
E. Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts
Florida Statute section 90.404(2) codifies what is often called by
its pre-code name, the "Williams" Rule. 9 This section prohibits the
introduction in a criminal case of evidence concerning the defendant's
other bad acts or crimes when the sole purpose is to show propensity.
However, when there is another legitimate purpose for the evidence,
evidence of bad acts may be admissible.7 0 This section drew more at-
tention in reported cases during the survey period than any of the other
conduct, for which subsequent measures would be admissible providing these issues are
controverted. However, the Florida courts have consistently adopted the Federal Rules
approach in this area. See Voynar, 463 So. 2d at 411.
68. The court relied heavily on Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th 'Cir.
1980) for its position. The Fourth Circuit's approach was the one specifically recom-
mended by the A.B.A.'s Federal Rules of Evidence study. See supra note 66.
Although no Florida decision expressly disagrees with Voynar, given the amount
of tort litigation in Florida courts, the Florida Supreme Court should consider defini-
tively resolving this question soon.
69. See Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 849
(1959).
Surprisingly, other crimes evidence has generated little discussion among Florida
evidence writers. For one of the few articles discussing this area, See Comment, Prior
Crime Evidence Admissible Only When Relevant to Crime Charged, 2 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 197 (1974).
70. In such situations, FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b) requires the state to provide
the defense pre-trial notice of its intention to introduce other crimes evidence and pro-
vides for mandatory limiting instructions as to the evidence's purpose.
Like any other offerred information, other crimes evidence is always subject to
exclusion under the general provisions of FLA. STAT. § 90.403 that it may generate
"unfair prejudice" or cause "confusion of issues." As a practical matter, trial courts
are unlikely to use this provision to exclude other crimes evidence offerred for a non-
propensity purpose.
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relevancy rules. Not surprisingly, cases discussing other crimes evi-
dence also generated a high percentage of reversal. 1
Unfortunately, most Williams rule cases during this survey period
offer little significant discussion.7 2 Evidence of other crimes was found
erroneous when there was insufficient evidence to connect defendants
with the other crimes73 and when the other acts were not sufficiently
similar to be relevant to the crimes charged.7 4 However, several impor-
tant other crimes cases were decided during this time.
1. Williams Rule Errors Not State Caused
Brown v. State 5 presents an unusual fact situation which all pros-
ecutors should carefully note. The defendant, convicted of petty theft,
and another woman visited the victim's hotel room twice during one
day. Both times a second man was present. The second time the other
woman grabbed the victim's wallet and both women ran. The trial
judge granted a motion in limine preventing the victim from testifying
that on her first trip to the room, Brown had her arm around his friend
and it looked as if she were trying to get into the friend's pocket. On
cross-examination, defense counsel's questions forced the victim to ad-
mit that the woman who grabbed his wallet was not Brown. When
counsel then asked, "And, the only thing you saw that girl [Brown] do
was run?"170 the victim blurted out that he also saw her trying to get his
friend's wallet. Both the trial court and circuit court refused to find this
caused error since they believed the cross-examination had invited such
71. Five out of seventeen decisions found reversible error in admission of other
crimes evidence. A sixth found evidentiary error but also found it harmless.
Both the number of other crimes evidence opinions and the number of reversals
due to admission of other crimes evidence are apparently not unique to Florida. See
Imwinkelreid, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 12 Litigation 25, 67 (ABA Fall 1985).
72. In the following cases, treatment of Williams Rule issues is so summary that
one wonders why the courts even bothered to discuss the issue at all given the short
shrift it received. See Howard v. State, 471 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Ellis v. State, 475 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Lawson v. State, 470 So.
2d 109 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Medina v. State, 466 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1985).
73. See, e.g., Diaz v. State, 467 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (evi-
dence in a possession of more than 20 grams of marijuana case was insufficient to
connect defendant with marijuana found in his brother's car when there was no connec-
tion shown between the defendant and the car).
74. See McKinney v. State, 462 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
75. 472 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
76. Id. at 476.
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a response. The district court of appeal agreed with the trial court's
ruling that the evidence was inadmissible. However, it rejected the idea
that the doctrine of invited error precluded Brown from complaining
about the admission of the evidence. The court noted that when other
crimes evidence is relevant only to show propensity, the Florida Su-
preme Court has presumed the error harmful "because of the danger
that a jury will take the bad character of propensity to crime thus
demonstrated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged." Here the
error was clearly harmful since Brown's two previous trials for the
same offense produced hung juries. Accordingly, the district court re-
versed the conviction and remanded for future proceedings.
Brown, confined to its unusual circumstances, does make sense
even with the district court's cryptic opinion. As this was the third trial,
surely the victim-witness knew he was not supposed to bring this infor-
mation up. While reversing punishes the state for error it may not have
caused, making it bear this burden is fairer than having the defendant
do so. The state should have counseled the witness again before trial
about the court's ruling. Certainly after Brown, state attorneys will
have to be even more careful in preparing their witnesses so as to avoid
reversible error.
Unfortunately, Brown does not explain why the doctrine of invited
error did not apply.78 Thus, the opinion is not clear about what trial
courts should do in future similar situations. When witnesses blurt out
unexpected answers containing information about other crimes, which
is not properly relevant, is mistrial automatic? If the trial court had
immediately struck the evidence and given the jury proper instructions,
would mistrial still be merited?
Finklea v. State,7 9 while not factually identical to Brown, strongly
suggests that at least the First District Court of Appeal would adopt
the automatic mistrial position. Finklea and a co-defendant were
charged and tried jointly for robbing a Pensacola business. At trial, one
of the two victims could identify the co-defendant, but neither could
identify Finklea. The only testimony against Finklea came from his al-
77. Id. at 477 (citing Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1981)).
78. The district court of appeal's sole statement on this point was that: "The
circuit court in its appellate review was clearly in error in affirming on a notion of
invited error. The petitioner had every right to claim error in the unsolicited and previ-
ously prohibited testimony .... The petitioner's motion for mistrial should have been
granted." Id.
79. 471 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
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leged admission to a third state witness. On cross-examination, the co-
defendant's attorney tried to force this witness to admit he had lied in
earlier deposition testimony. However, the witness unexpectedly
claimed he and counsel were "talking about two different robberies" s0
in which the defendants had been involved. Finklea's counsel objected
to the remark and moved for mistrial. After the court denied the mo-
tion, Finklea's attorney did not request a cautionary instruction. On
appeal, the district court found the failure to request the instruction did
not waive review since "the introduction of a prior unrelated criminal
act is too prejudicial for the jury to disregard.""'- Even though the state
had no part in eliciting the testimony, this did not lessen its effect; thus,
reversal was required.
Like Brown, Finklea could be read as approving automatic mis-
trial or reversal whenever other crimes evidence is wrongfully intro-
duced. However, the First District may have intended to still use a
harmless error approach, stating that the evidence "was unfairly preju-
dicial. This is especially true in light of the scant evidence in this case
relating to Finklea."82 Unfortunately, like in Brown, the court's cryptic
opinion leaves some doubt which approach the district court meant to
adopt.83 Hopefully, the Florida courts will adopt a harmless error ap-
proach when Finklea and Brown issues arise in the future. Since Flor-
ida courts sometimes will not reverse based on the harmless error doc-
trine when the state erroneously introduces the other crimes evidence,
it would be illogical to take an opposite stand when a defendant or co-
defendant does so.
2. Nolle Prosses and Williams Rule Evidence
When the defendant has been previously acquitted of charges in-
volving other crimes, many courts follow the United States Supreme
80. Id. at 597.
81. Id.
82. Id. (Emphasis added).
83. See also Howard v. State, 471 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
which can be read as meaning that the Fifth District would approve a harmless error
approach when a witness blurts out inadmissible other crimes testimony.
Like Brown and Finklea, Howard is an extremely short opinion. After reading the
Williams Rule cases during this survey period, this author is of the firm opinion that
appellate courts should either write fully reasoned and thoroughly explained opinions in
this area or not bother writing them at all.
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Court's decision in Ashe v. Swensons4 and bar the state from using
evidence about the acquitted crime in subsequent trials relating to dif-
ferent but similar charges.8 5 In Ashe the Court found that after a de-
fendant was acquitted of robbing one player at a poker game, collateral
estoppel prevented the state from subsequently charging him with rob-
bing the other players. The Court's examination of the first trial's evi-
dence showed that the jury must have found that Ashe was not the
robber. As this "issue of ultimate fact" 6 was once determined in a final
judgment, collateral estoppel prevented it from being tried again. How-
ever, even those courts following Ashe have not excluded other crimes
evidence where the prior acquittal was not based on the same issue
which the state subsequently wishes to use the other crimes evidence to
prove.87 In State v. Perkins,"8 the Florida Supreme Court seemed to
adopt this approach. To help convict Perkins of attempted rape on a
child, the state introduced testimony from another child who claimed
that Perkins had tried to use the same method, entering the bedroom
late at night, to rape her. However, Perkins had been tried for and
acquitted of this previous attack. The Florida Supreme Court noted
Ashe only prohibits "the admission in a subsequent trial of evidence of
an acquitted collateral crime only when the prior verdict clearly de-
cided in the defendant's favor the issue for which an admission is
sought."8 9 Since the issue in both charges seemed to be identity, the
court found that once the defendant was acquitted of the prior charge
it was "fundamentally unfair"90 to allow the state to introduce other
crimes evidence concerning this charge in a subsequent proceeding. Do-
ing so would force the defendant to defend himself a second time
against the charge for which he has once been acquitted. However, the
court left open the question whether evidence of collateral crimes for
which acquittals had not been obtained could be used.
84. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
85. See, e.g., State v. Irons, 230 Kan. 138, 630 P.2d 1116 (1981).
86. 397 U.S. at 443.
87. For cases in which a prior acquittal did not prevent use of other crimes evi-
dence see Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547 (6th Cir. 1979) (rape charge, previous
rape acquittals on consent defense stemming from same factual claims admissible to
show pattern or plan); State v. Darling, 197 Kan. 471, 419 P.2d 386 (1966) (charge of
intent to procure abortion, previous acquittal on similar charge did not prevent admis-
sions since evidence admissible to sh6w intent).
88. 349 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1977).
89. Id. at 163.
90. Id.
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In Holland v. State,9 the Florida Supreme Court decided whether
evidence of a defendant's participation in a collateral offense which has
been nolle prossed could ever be admissible in a subsequent proceeding
on another charge. Holland was charged with the December 5, 1979,
armed robbery of a bank. His first conviction resulted in an acquittal
but was overturned because of error in the jury instructions.92 At Hol-
land's first trial the state introduced other crimes evidence through the
testimony of a bank employee who identified Holland as the person
who robbed her bank twelve days after the December 5th robbery. Fol-
lowing Holland's conviction, the state nolle prossed any charges relat-
ing to the December 17th robbery. After Holland's conviction was re-
versed, defense counsel moved to preclude state use of the crime's
evidence, because it had previously nolle prossed the charges relating to
the December 17th robbery. The trial court denied this motion and also
denied Holland's request to inform the jury that the collateral crime
charged had been nolle prossed. After his second conviction on the De-
cember 5th bank robbery charge, Holland appealed to the First District
Court of Appeal, which affirmed.93 However, the First District certified
the issue relating to the Williams Rule use of prior crimes for which
any charges have been nolle prossed as a question of great public im-
portance to the Florida Supreme Court.
The Florida Supreme Court refused to extend Perkins to the situa-
tion "where the defendant has been charged with the collateral offense
and subsequently had the charges dropped."94 Unlike a Perkins and
Ashe situation, the court felt that there was a major difference in using
other crimes evidence after a state nolle prosse as opposed to an acquit-
tal of prior charges. Since a nolle prosse does not necessarily mean that
the evidence of the other crime is weak or nonexisting, there is no fun-
damental unfairness when it is subsequently introduced against the de-
fendant in another trial. The Florida Supreme Court also felt that a
contrary ruling, given the procedural facts of Holland, would result in
an indefensible windfall to the defendant. During his first trial the De-
cember 17th charges were still pending. It was only after his first con-
viction that the state made the decision to drop these. Since his convic-
tion was overturned for reasons unrelated to the Williams Rule, a
decision now preventing the state from introducing evidence of the De-
91. 466 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1985).
92. Holland v. State, 400 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
93. Holland v. State, 432 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
94. 466 So. 2d at 207.
1050 [Vol. 10
157
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Evidence
cember 17th robbery would "unfairly prejudice the state's case."95
Holland is clearly a correctly decided case even apart from its un-
usual procedural circumstances. Other crimes evidence is commonly in-
troduced in criminal cases against the defendant even though the de-
fendant has not even been charged. Why the state should decide to
nolle pros a case often depends on matters unrelated to the strength of
the evidence. Holland provides a perfect example of this. After first
securing a conviction on the December 5th robbery, the state could rea-
sonably presume that Holland's sentence would not be extended by a
subsequent conviction on the December 17th robbery. Therefore, con-
sidering an expeditious use of prosecutorial and judicial resources, it is
difficult to fault the decision to drop the second prosecution. If Holland
had been decided differently, fear of reversals on appeal would man-
date that the state sometimes needlessly prosecute defendants for mul-
tiple charges even though it would not be in the overall public interest
to do so.
Certain language in the Florida Supreme Court's decision is troub-
ling however. The court notes that there is no indication that the state
dropped the charges because of matters involving how strong the evi-
dence was. Hopefully, the lower courts will not read this language to
mean that in subsequent cases involving the proposed admission of Wil-
liams Rule evidence relating to a nolle prossed charge, the defendant
has a right to inquire into the state's motive behind dropping the
charges. There are two good reasons for not doing so. First, this would
only introduce another issue and allow the defendant to perhaps divert
the jury's and the court's attention from the central issue of guilt or
innocence on the crime charged, rather than on a previous one. Sec-
ondly, assuming that the state did indeed drop the other crimes evi-
dence because proof of it was weak, then in most situations it would not
have been able to lay the correct factual predicate for the introduction
of other crimes evidence either.
The Florida Supreme Court never ruled expressly on Holland's
second point that assuming the other crime's evidence is admissible de-
spite the nolle prosse, then Holland should be allowed to testify that at
the time of his second trial he was not charged with the collateral of-
fense. Chief Justice Boyd, although concurring in the court's decision
that Perkins should not be extended to cover the situation involving
nolle prossed crimes, would have allowed the defendant to so testify.
95. Id. at 209.
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Justice Boyd felt that such a ruling was necessary because "the defend-
ant has a right to inform the jury of all the circumstances pertaining to
the evidence adduced against him."9 Fortunately, he was not able to
convince other members of the court on this point. If the court had
adopted Justice Boyd's reasoning, then the state may feel compelled to
offer explanations as to why defendants such as Holland were not
under charge for the other offenses. Once the state offered such rea-
sons, the defense would perhaps feel compelled to counter these reasons
or to cross examine the state about them. The jury might end up exam-
ining whether the decision to drop the other crimes charges was based
on a lack of evidence and whether that same lack of evidence could be
inferred over to the present case. Such a scenario would only introduce
collateral issues diverting the jury's attention from the central goal at
hand, the resolution of the criminal charges pending before it.
3. Miscellaneous Williams Rule Cases
The remainder of the cases discussing section 90.404(2) presented
rather standard issues. In all of them, the state used Williams Rule
evidence to prove such issues as intent 97 arid/or identity.98 Some of
these cases are not interesting enough to merit much discussion. The
others are briefly discussed below.
a. Identity
When other crimes evidence is used to prove identity, a multi-step
inferential process is used. First, there must be sufficient evidence to
connect the defendant with the other act or crime. Second, the other
crimes evidence must be unique. Third, the crime charged must also be
of the same unique character. From this, the inference drawn is that
the defendant is the one responsible for both unique acts or crimes.
When several crimes or attempted crimes are committed with an
unusual modus operandi, it is logical to infer the same individual is
96. Id. at 210.
97. See Phillips v. State, 476 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1985); Hyer v. State, 462 So. 2d
488 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Zarate v. State, 466 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Bricker v. State, 462 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Randolph
v. State, 463 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3533 (1985).
98. Smith v. State, 464 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Larkin v.
State, 474 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Wright v. State, 473 So. 2d
1277 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 870 (1986).
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involved each time. Smith v. State99 demonstrated the successful use of
other crimes evidence having an unusual modus operandi to prove
identity. Smith was charged for a first degree murder occurring by ar-
senic poisoning in 1975. At trial, the court admitted evidence of an
attempted arsenic poisoning murder which occurred in November,
1981. After conviction, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The
court noted that mere similarity between a collateral crime and one
charged is not enough to make the other crimes evidence admissible.
Rather, "there must be something so unique or particularly unusual
about the perpetrator or his modus operandi that it would tend to inde-
pendently establish that he committed the crime charged." 00 Smith
found arsenic poisoning to possess this unique quality. Unfortunately,
the court's opinion does not relate the circumstances connecting Smith
to both acts and what the evidence was, as to how the arsenic had been
given both times.10 1
An event like attempted arsenic poisoning almost has its own
stamp of uniqueness, perhaps explaining why the Smith court assumed
this without discussion. However, two quasi-ordinary events may be
shown to be so similar by the sheer number of common features they
share that inferring the same person was involved in both is perfectly
logical. In Larkin v. State,0 2 the defendant was charged with the gun-
point robbery of a Plantation pharmacy on August 12, 1983. The phar-
macist testified the robber came into the store, asked for something for
a sore throat and then drew a gun. The robber ordered that a "closed
for inventory" sign be put on the front door, after which he demanded
certain drugs be put in a garbage bag. He then took the watches and
wallets of the pharmacist and the pharmacist's father, took some
Timex watches from a display case, grabbed some Salem cigarettes and
99. 464 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
100. Id. at 1341.
101. Besides identity, the court found the other crimes evidence was also "rele-
vant to rebut appellant's defense that the victim committed suicide, and was introduced
to establish a pattern of criminality on the part of appellant." Id. How the evidence
rebutted a suicide defense is not explained. As to the notion that it established Smith's
"pattern of criminality", this may be another way of saying the evidence was admissi-
ble to prove identity through modus operandi. Arguably Smith may even be read as
not involving the use of other crimes evidence to prove identity but instead to prove a
common scheme or plan. Unfortunately, this case appears to be yet another example
where a court has so cryptically explained the reasons behind its decision and stated so
little facts that a clear understanding of the opinion is difficult.
102. 474 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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left. At trial, the state introduced evidence about the robbery of a
Deerfield Beach pharmacy after the Plantation robbery. The similari-
ties between the two robberies were numerous and striking. The Deer-
field Beach robber also ordered a "closed for inventory" sign be posted
on the door, demanded many of the same drugs, used a garbage bag to
carry the robbery proceeds, took the pharmacist's wallet and watches,
grabbed some Salem cigarettes and took additional Timex watches
from a display case. The pharmacist in the second robbery identified
Larkin as the perpetrator.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal correctly affirmed admission
of the Williams Rule evidence. Larkin had been linked to the other
crime; the other crime was of the same nature and close in time and
distance with the one charged. The method used by the robber in each
case, once the robbery actually began, was strikingly similar. Larkin
thus represents a classic use of other crimes evidence to show identity.
Indeed, a contrary decision would cast doubt on when other crimes evi-
dence could ever be so used. 103
b. Intent
Other crimes evidence was used to prove intent more than any
other issue. Like all use of other crimes evidence, this requires traveling
through a series of inferential steps. First, the defendant must be suffi-
ciently connected to the collateral crime evidence. Second, the two
events must be sufficiently similar so that the intent on both occasions
is logically the same. Third, the intent during the collateral crime must
be clearly demonstrated.
Bricker v. State'04 illustrates that where the intent during the col-
lateral act is not clear, Williams Rule evidence should not be admitted
to prove intent on another occasion. Otherwise, the jury would be faced
with evidence of two similar events where the intent both times is
equally ambiguous and, thus, not helpful. Bricker was a beauty salon
inspector, charged with bribery and receiving unauthorized compensa-
tion for official behavior. In fall 1982, Bricker told his supervisor he
103. Besides showing how other crimes may be used to prove identity, Larkin
and Smith are reminders that admissible other crimes evidence can occur either before
or after the act on trial. What is important is how strong a logical connection there is
between the collateral crime or act, the charge on trial and the proposition the other
crime evidence is being offered to prove at trial - not the time of the other act or
crime's commission.
104. 462 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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believed a salon owner had tried to bribe him. The supervisor advised
Bricker that unless he was actually given something nothing could be
done. A week later, Bricker went to a second salon where a discussion
of possible violation fines led the owner to believe Bricker was soliciting
a bribe and Bricker to believe the owner was attempting to offer him
one. At a second meeting between the two the owner actually gave
Bricker money. Unknown to the defendant, the owner had contacted
the state attorney's office after the first meeting and was wearing a
body wire the second time. Bricker was arrested with the money
outside the second salon. He told his supervisor he was trying to trap
the salon owner but was still fired and charged. At trial, the court ad-
mitted testimony from the first salon owner claiming Bricker tried to
solicit a bribe from him. After Bricker's conviction, the Third District
Court of Appeal reversed finding that while the crimes were similar
there was nothing "so unique or particularly unusual about the perpe-
trator or his modus operandi that it would tend to establish, indepen-
dently of an identification of him by the collateral crime victim, that he
committed the crime charged.' 0 5
In this author's view, the court correctly reversed but for the
wrong reasons. The Williams Rule evidence was not being offered to
prove identity, which is what the court's modus operandi discussion
really related to, but to prove intent. Certainly, the intent was at worst
ambiguous on both occasions. Indeed, a fair-minded person could even
say that with respect to the first salon, intent clearly was missing since
Bricker himself reported what he believed to be an attempted bribe.
After his supervisor's comments, his actions at the second salon could
be viewed as perfectly reasonable.
Randolph v. State'01 is the only other decision where the use of
other crimes evidence to prove intent received more than cursory atten-
tion. Randolph was charged with the first degree murder of a robbery
victim. At trial the state elicited testimony from Glinton, Randolph's
girlfriend, that she worked for Randolph as a prostitute and gave her
earnings to him. She testified that on the night of the homicide as she
was leaving a customer, Randolph ran up. and pushed her away. As she
left, Glinton heard Randolph warn her customer not to do anything.
Two gunshots followed. After the shooting, Randolph asked Glinton
about the victim and returned to the shooting scene after she told him
the victim had money. To prove intent, the state introduced evidence of
105. Id. at 559.
106. 463 So. 2d 186 (Fla.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3533 (1985) .
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another robbery two nights earlier. Randolph had robbed two victims
after Glinton had finished with them. On this earlier occasion he also
used a gun and was heard saying "he could have killed one of them
because he [the victim] didn't have any money.'101
While arguably his actions during the early crime do not reflect
his intent during the later homicide, since Randolph actually did not
shoot either victim, the Florida Supreme Court was probably correct in
admitting the other crimes evidence. Certainly, both incidents were
similar and Randolph participated in both. True, he did not shoot the
one earlier victim, but this may have been because the other victim on
that occasion did have money. During the later crime, Randolph appar-
ently had no idea the homicide victim had any money when he shot
him, or else why did Randolph find it necessary to ask Glinton about
this and return to the scene following her affirmative reply. Finally, the
mere fact that Randolph bothered to make the earlier statement during
the partially successful earlier robbery reflects his state of mind at that
time and that he had at least contemplated inflicting such "punish-
ment" should another potential victim be so unfortunate as to not have
any money.
IV. Privileges
A. Marital Communications Privilege
Florida, like many other states, recognizes a limited testimonial
privilege for the marital relationship. 10 8 Under Florida Statute section
107. Id. at 189.
108. Two marital privileges have been recognized in the United States. One is
the privilege for confidential marital communications, also called the husband-wife
communications privilege, which Florida evidence law recognizes. This privilege only
precludes one spouse from testifying about confidential communications between the
couple while they were married. The second is the spousal immunity or anti-marital
facts privilege. This "privilege" is actually a rule of competency since when applicable
it prevents one spouse from giving any testimony against the other spouse in a criminal
case, while the two are validly married. The holder of the spousal immunity privilege
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40 (1980), declaring that the witness-spouse rather than the defendant-spouse is the
appropriate holder of this privilege in federal criminal actions. For a critical review of
Trammel, see Lempert, The Right to Every Woman's Evidence, 66 IowA L. REv. 725
(1981).
For a general discussion of Florida's Marital Privilege before passage of the Flor-
ida Evidence Code, see Hipler, Confidential Communications: Developments in Flor-
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90.504 either spouse in a marriage has a privilege to refuse to disclose
and to prevent the other spouse from disclosing confidential communi-
cations between the two during their marriage. 1 9 The privilege's pur-
pose is to foster communication between the spouses and, to a certain
extent, to protect the marriage relationship itself. Thus, the marital
privilege, like other privileges, deprives the trier of fact of information
which is often probative and trustworthy in order to foster relationships
which the law deems worthy of protection."10 Certainly there is a con-
stant tension between the notion that a jury or judge should be allowed
to hear all relevant evidence before making a decision and the notion of
excluding information because it is privileged. Recognizing this tension,
Florida law recognizes that matters which may be otherwise considered
confidential can be waived. Florida Statute section 90.5073" provides
that a privilege will be considered waived in three separate situations:
(1) when the holder "voluntarily discloses""' the communications; (2)
when the holder "consents to disclosure of any significant part of the
matter;" 113 or (3) when the holder makes the communication in a situ-
ida's Marital Privilege, 51 FLA. B.J. 697 (1977).
109. FLA. STAT. § 90.504 (1985) states in part that: "(1) A spouse has a privi-
lege during and after the marital relationship to refuse to disclose, and to prevent an-
other from disclosing, communications which were intended to be made in confidence
between the spouses...
(2) the privilege may be claimed by either spouse ..
110. Since privileges work a disposition of evidence, Wigmore felt that four con-
ditions must be fulfilled before any valid privilege could be recognized:
(I) The communications must originate in a confidence that they would
not be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satis-
factory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered; and
(4) The injury that would insure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
8 WIGMORE, HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE § 2885 (3d ed.) (Emphasis in the original).
111. FLA. STAT. § 90.507 states in part that: "A person who has a privilege
against the disclosure of a confidential matter . . . waives the privilege if he, . . . vol-
untarily discloses or makes the communication when he does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, or consents to disclosure of, any significant part of the matter or
communication."
112. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 116-117 for discussion of this
language.
113. Id.
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ation where "he does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 1"4
Koon v. State"5 was the only husband-wife privilege case decided
in this survey period. Koon was charged and convicted of first-degree
murder for killing a government informant who implicated him in a
counterfeiting scheme. Koon and his nephew allegedly lured the in-
formant Dino to a private place where they beat him and then took him
to a secluded rock pit in the Everglades. At the pit, Koon allegedly
ordered Dino to walk away with him from the car. He then killed Dino
with a shotgun. At trial, Koon's wife was forced to testify against her
husband despite an assertion of the husband-wife privilege. Mrs. Koon
testified that on the night of the alleged murder, Koon had telephoned
her and admitted the crime. The state successfully convinced the trial
court that since Koon had also told his mother-in-law and his son about
killing Dino, this constituted a waiver under section 90.507. However,
on appeal the Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction finding
that both spouses intended the telephone call to be privileged and
"made the communications when they had a reasonable expectation of
privacy. ' 1a6
Like so many other opinions during this survey period, Koon's dis-
cussion of the evidentiary issues is extremely brief. However, careful
reflection shows that the Florida Supreme Court was clearly correct.
Although Koon's admissions to his mother-in-law and son may at first
blush seem to constitute waivers under section 90.507, they were not.
Privileges protect the content of the confidential communications -
not the underlying information communicated itself. While section
90.507 uses the words "voluntarily discloses" with respect to a privi-
lege's holder, the words apply to "the disclosure of a confidential mat-
ter or communication" and not to any information about the underly-
ing event itself. Since Koon did not tell his mother-in-law and his son
about the contents of the confidential phone call conversation with his
wife, the marital communication was never voluntarily disclosed. What
was voluntarily disclosed was the fact of the killing, not the fact Dino
had told his wife about the killing. Forcing the wife to relate the phone
114. Id. For an article discussing pre-code Florida law concerning this issue see
Comment, Husband-Wife Privileges - Testimony of Third Party Eavesdropper Con-
cerning Privileged Communication Admissible Where Privileged Party Knows or Has
Reason To Know of Eavesdropper's Presence, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 553 (1976).
115. 463 So. 2d 201 (Fla.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3511 (1985).
116. Id. at 204. Evidently the nephew was not present when Koon made the
telephone call to his wife since the court also found that "[n]o other party was present
at the time of the incriminating conversation between appellant and his wife" Id.
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conversation was error,117 although having the mother-in-law and son
testify about what Koon told them would not be.
B. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Florida Statute section 90.503 follows pre-code law by recognizing
a psychotherapist-patient privilege.11 The privilege prevents unwilling
disclosure of confidential communications between a patient, seeking
treatment or diagnosis, and a psychotherapist.11 9 Unlike other confiden-
tial communication privileges, this one extends beyond communications
between the parties and also covers records a psychotherapist would
make in the course of treatment and diagnosis. During this survey pe-
riod, section 90.503 generated more opinions than any other privilege.
While some were merely restatements of settled law,120 two important
cases were decided.
1. Child-Custody Cases and the Privilege
Section 90.503(4)(c) expressly provides that the privilege will not
be recognized "[f]or communications relevant to an issue of the mental
or emotional conditions of the patient in any proceeding in which he
relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense ... "
117. One pre-code case provides an example of what should still be considered
voluntary disclosure of a confidential matter. In Tibado v. Brees, 212 So. 2d 61 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968), one spouse testified in a deposition about a confidential com-
munication with his wife. Since there was no objection at the deposition to this testi-
mony, the court considered it waived. Brees is certainly a correct decision. Communica-
tive privileges exist not merely to prevent admission of certain confidential
communications but to prevent their disclosure. Failure to take prompt steps to prevent
disclosure should be considered a waiver.
118. See FLA. STAT. § 90.503(2) (1985).
119. FLA. STAT. § 90.503 protects not only treatment for what may be considered
standard mental or emotional problems but also for "alcoholism and other drug
addiction."
120. See Hall v. Spencer, 472 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 479 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1985) (§ 90.503 prevents disclosure of hospital records
concerning defendant-driver's alcohol treatment when driver does not plan to use his
mental or emotional condition as a defense in automobile collision lawsuit), Connell v.
Guardianship of Connell, 476 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court
erred in excluding deposition testimony of doctor in competency restoration proceeding,
since § 90.503(4)(c) provides exception to exclusion when there is "an issue of the
mental or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon
the condition as an element of his claim. .... ).
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This language is virtually identical to that in pre-code statutes gov-
erning the privilege. 21 Questions concerning this exclusionary language
seem to arise frequently in child custody proceedings. Since custody
awards are based on what is in the best interests of the child, an in-
quiry into the mental condition of one or both spouses may often ap-
pear needed. Depending upon the extent of such an inquiry, this could
lead to divulgence of medical records and communications with a
psychotherapist.
Pre-code Florida law rejected the position that merely asserting a
claim for child custody constitutes a waiver of the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege. In Roper v. Roper,'22 both parties sought custody in a
dissolution of marriage proceeding. The husband sought to depose the
wife's psychiatrist over his wife's objection. The Fourth District Court
of Appeal agreed that a patient's mental health "is a factor that the
Court can and should consider in determining the best interests of the
child."' 23 However, Roper refused to adopt the position that a spouse,
merely by seeking custody, waived any privilege claims to communica-
tions with a psychiatrist. The Fourth District admitted that "[t]he
wife's mental condition may become an issue in the case"124 but never
established any clear guidelines when this would result in the privi-
lege's waiver. The only concrete guidance Roper gave was that a
spouse's own introduction of communications with the psychiatrist to
prove mental condition would be construed a waiver. Since the wife
had not done so here, the husband had no right to depose her
psychiatrist. 12 5
Miraglia v. Miraglia'2 6 apparently exemplifies one of those rare
instances where a spouse's mental condition is not initially such an is-
sue that requesting custody automatically constitutes a waiver,' 27 but
121. See former FLA. STAT. §§ 90.424(3)(b) and 490.32(2)(b).
122. 336 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
123. Id. at 656.
124. Id.
125. Roper did suggest that the trial court under Fla. R.C.P. 3.160 could always
order an examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist to explore a spouse's mental
status.
126. 462 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
127. During this survey period, the Fourth District Court of Appeal summarily
re-affirmed its position that merely requesting custody does not waiver the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege. See Khairzdah v. Khairzdah, 464 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (quashing trial order denying protective order motion filed when husband
subpoenaed hospital record of wife's treatment during period prior to dissolution
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where subsequent circumstances during the dissolution proceeding
make a waiver necessary. There the trial court awarded custody to the
wife and refused to admit testimony from her psychiatrist concerning
her mental condition. After the final judgment, the wife attempted sui-
cide and custody was transferred to the father. However, one week
later, the trial court returned the children to the wife and denied the
father's petition for rehearing. One reason for awarding the wife cus-
tody was to "help her resolve admitted emotional problems."'1 28 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal found this an impermissible basis since
it would effectively put the mother's best interests over that of the chil-
dren. The Fourth District agreed that the court's initial decision ex-
cluding the wife's psychiatrist's testimony was correct. However, when
the wife subsequently attempted suicide, this made her mental health a
vital issue as to who should be awarded permanent custody. Thus, on
remand, the husband would be able to introduce the psychiatrist's testi-
mony over an assertion of privilege.
Miraglia is certainly a correct decision. If the wife's subsequent
suicide attempt did not put her mental condition in issue, it would be
difficult to see what would. However, why an event reflective of a
spouse's mental status which occurs subsequent to a custody request is
any more reflective than one which occurs before is puzzling. The
Roper-Miraglia line of cases demonstrate the need for an explicit ex-
ception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in custody cases. Even
Roper admitted mental status was important to inquire into in deter-
mining custody. Then why should such extremely relevant evidence be
excluded? Florida law refuses to recognize other confidential communi-
cations privileges where children may be concerned. 29 One argument
against such an exception may be that the parties would try to intro-
duce any and all evidence of mental or emotional treatment no matter
how far removed. However, trial courts consider remoteness in ruling
on the relevancy of all evidence, and there appears to be no reason why
such a consideration would not keep out the truly irrelevant psychiatric
data in custody proceedings any less than it would in other cases. If
Florida truly wants to make custody determinations in the best inter-
ests of the children, legislative action creating such an exception is
merited.
proceeding).
128. 462 So. 2d at 507.
129. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 415.52 (1985) discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 131-134.
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2. Communications Made Under Court Order Exception
Miraglia construed one exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. The privilege also does not apply to "communications made
in the course of a court-ordered examination of the mental or emotional
condition of the patient."'130 Such communications probably most often
occur when a defendant claims insanity and the court orders an
examination.
In Carson v. Jackson,13' parents brought a negligence and child
abuse action against a babysitter and her husband. The babysitter had
previously pled nolo contendere to a battery charge in a criminal case
unconnected with the parents' suit. She had been placed on probation
under the condition she would not babysit again until she was "ex-
amined and found fit by a psychologist."' 3 2 To comply with this, both
spouses saw a psychologist. As part of discovery, the plaintiffs sought to
either depose the psychologist or have his records produced. After the
trial court denied the defendants' motion for a protective order, they
appealed.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the babysitter's
privilege claim stating that it did "not believe that the petitioners' visit
to a psychologist under a plea agreement relating only to the continua-
tion of doing business constitutes a 'court-ordered examination' "1133
under the psychotherapist-patient privilege's exception. Unfortunately,
the court never stated why it adopted this belief. Possibly the court
meant to distinguish between court-ordered examinations which are di-
rectly necessary to secure information in a pending proceeding and
court-ordered examinations which are merely incidental in nature to a
court proceeding. Whatever its reasoning, the court should have ex-
plained its ruling in this part of Carson so that trial courts could be
given some guidance on this point.
However, even with the Fourth District's ruling on the psychother-
apist-patient issue, the babysitter-defendants still were a denied a pro-
tective order. Carson noted that Florida Statute section 415.512 ex-
pressly abrogates all statutory privileges except for attorney-client
communications in "any situation involving known or suspected child
abuse or neglect" and provides that a privilege claim is not a ground
130. See FLA. STAT. § 90.503(4)(b) (1985).
131. 466 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
132. Id. at 1190.
133. Id.
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for "failure to give evidence in any judicial proceeding relating to child
abuse or neglect. 1 34 The defendants urged that section 415.512 should
be construed to apply only to proceedings brought by the State Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services. They claimed that one
purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is to encourage individ-
uals in need of treatment to seek such and that applying section
415.512 to abrogate the privilege beyond a HRS proceeding would dis-
courage people from seeking voluntary treatment.
The Fourth District recognized the defendants' argument that sec-
tion 90.503's purpose was valid. However, the court assumed the legis-
lature had weighed the need to encourage individuals to voluntarily
seek treatment, versus the need to deter child abuse by permitting the
broad introduction of evidence in abuse related cases in civil lawsuits
for damages. Thus, the Fourth District found section 415.512 required
rejection of defendant's privilege claim.
In the author's view, the court was correct in its construction of
section 415.512. Besides this, factually the babysitters should not have
been given the benefit of a claim that an opposite construction was
needed to voluntarily encourage people to seek mental care. Here the
wife sought psychological help under a court order as a part of her
probation, so her visit for treatment was clearly not voluntary.
C. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Both the United States and Florida Constitutions recognize that
all individuals have a privilege against self-incrimination.1 35 Most dis-
cussions of these privileges occur in the context of addressing the ad-
missibility of confessions or incriminating statements in criminal cases,
an area beyond this article's scope. However, the courts have recog-
134. FLA. STAT. § 415.512 (1985) states in part:
Aborgation of privileged communications in cases involving child abuse or
neglect. - The privileged quality of communication between husband and
wife and between any professional person and his patient or client, and any
other privileged communication except that between attorney and client
shall . . . not apply to any situation involving known or suspected child
abuse or neglect and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report, ...
or failure to give evidence in any judicial proceeding relating to child
abuse or neglect.
135. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, and FLA. CONST. § 9, Declaration of Rights
(both providing in part that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.").
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nized that the privilege also extends to civil and administrative
proceedings.
Boedy v. Department of Public Reguldtion 86 recently afforded the
Florida Supreme Court an opportunity to revisit the privilege against
self-incrimination's applicabilty to professional regulatory proceedings.
The Department filed an administrative complaint against Boedy pur-
suant to the Medical Practice Act. 13 7 The complaint alleged Boedy suf-
fered from a mental or emotional condition making him "unable to
practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety"' 38 under Florida
law. Pursuant to its complaint the Department ordered Boedy to sub-
mit to a series of psychiatric examinations, the results of which would
be used to determine his fitness to continue practicing medicine. When
a Department hearing officer denied his claim that the examinations
would violate his privilege against self-incrimination, Boedy appealed to
the First District Court of Appeal"3 9 and then to the Florida Supreme
Court, both of which also rejected his privilege argument. Since the
supreme court relied heavily on the district court's opinion, a review of
both is necessary.
The First District Court of Appeal carefully phrased the issue as
whether the "privilege against compelled self-incrimination is applica-
ble in the circumstances of this case."40 The answer depended on
whether the practical effect of the proceedings could be considered pe-
nal in nature. The court acknowledged that the Florida courts had
found the privilege applicable to Florida Real Estate Commission pro-
ceedings investigating allegations of misconduct' 4 ' and to State Board
of Medical Examiners investigation of unprofessional conduct
claims. 4 ' In both cases, sanctions were sought for the unprofessional
136. 463 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1985).
137. FLA. STAT. § 4358.301-349 (1985).
138. FLA. STAT. § 458.331 (1)(s) (1981).
139. 444 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
140. Id. at 505 (Emphasis added).
141. See State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 281 So. 2d 487
(Fla. 1973). The misconduct allegations included the following: failure to maintain
trust funds in an escrow account; breach of trust and dishonesty in a business dealing;
failure to obtain a new registration certificate or otherwise tell the Commission about
an office address change; sharing offices with an attorney in violation of a Commission
Rule; and a general charge that Vining's past conduct showed he was so incompetent
and dishonest a client's money or property could not be trusted to him.
142. See Lester v. Department of Prof. and Occ. Regulations, 348 So. 2d 923
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (involving allegation of receiving kickbacks from a hos-
pital where the physician's patient had received services).
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conduct alleged. The First District contrasted these situations with that
in Boedy. The Department of Professional Regulation admittedly
sought to at least temporarily curtail the doctor's ability to practice
medicine, but this happened because his ability was impaired not be-
cause Boedy had engaged in professional misconduct meriting discipli-
nary action. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court has
held that the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated when
a proceeding is for the purpose of assessing a civil penalty rather than a
criminal one.143 Examining the factors the United States Supreme
Court used in Kennedy v. Mendora-Martinez 1 4  to determine whether a
penalty was criminal or civil in nature, the First District summarily
concluded that the Department's proceeding against Boedy did not seek
to impose a criminal penalty; thus, he had no privilege to refuse the
examinations. However, the court certified the question to the Florida
Supreme Court as one of great public importance.1 45
In a brief opinion, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Like the
First District, the supreme court found the specific section of the Medi-
cal Practice Act involved in Boedy "does not deal with an issue of guilt
or innocence. ' ' 146 No misconduct charges or the possibility of any pen-
143. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
144. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). The Court listed the factors as:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment, . . . whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned ..
Id. at 168-169.
145. The exact question certified was: "Whether the fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination applies to disciplinary proceedings initiated under
section 458.331(1)(s), Florida Statutes, to determine whether a physician is unable to
practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients as a result of a mental or
physical condition." Boedy, 444 So. 2d at 504.
146. 463 So. 2d at 217. The court relied on Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1970) where a defendant claiming insanity as a
defense refused to answer questions at a court ordered psychiatric evaluation. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination would not be vio-
lated by requiring a defendant to answer questions in a psychiatric interview since any
statements of the accused could only be properly used as evidence of mental status and
not for the factual truth of the statements themselves. Indeed, Parkin specified that the
state should only elicit the experts' opinion "as to sanity or insanity, and should not
inquire as to information concerning the alleged offense provided by a defendant during
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alty for misconduct were involved in a section 458.331(1)(s) proceed-
ing. Rather the sole issue is a doctor's fitness to practice medicine
"with reasonable skill and safety." The state clearly had a great inter-
est in certifying and making sure that persons engaging in a profes-
sional discipline are physically and mentally able to do so. Since there
is no absolute right to practice medicine free from any reasonable regu-
lation, Boedy could not refuse the ordered psychiatric evaluations and
continuing practicing. As long as the state did not seek to use anything
Boedy might say during the evaluations against him in later criminal
proceedings, there was no valid privilege claim. Since section
458.331(1)(s) prohibited such, this was not a bona fide issue.147 The
Florida Supreme Court thus found it "constitutionally permissible to
deny authority to practice medicine to a physician who asserts the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination if his claim has prevented full assess-
ment of his fitness and competence to practice. 11 48
V. Compulsory Process
In a criminal case, the United States and Florida constitutions
guarantee the accused the right to subpoena witnesses to testify for the
defendant. 49 The Compulsory Process Clause has been construed as
affording an accused the right to present a defense free from arbitrary
his interview ... " id. at 820.
The Florida Supreme Court found that the examination in Boedy like that in Par-
kin, was not related to "guilt-in-fact", 463 So. 2d at 217, but to the presence or ab-
sence of a mental condition. This author believes the analogy drawn to Parkin is both
strained and unnecessary. To claim that the Parkin examination was not related to
"guilt-in- fact" is sophistry. If Parkin was insane at the time she committed the alleged
criminal acts, she was not "guilty-in-fact" because she did not possess the requisite
mental status! At any rate, once the Florida Supreme Court found that Boedy's pro-
ceeding did not seek to impose a criminal penalty, there should have been no need to
even draw such an analogy.
147. FLA. STAT. § 458.331(1)(s) specifically stated that: "[I]n any proceeding
under this paragraph, neither the record of proceedings nor the orders entered by the
board shall be used against a physician in any other proceeding."
148. 463 So. 2d at 218.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states in part that: "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have the right ...to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor. . . ." FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 16, Declaration of Rights, states that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused. . .shall have the right to compulsory pro-
cess for witnesses. .. ."
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and unreasonable state evidentiary rules. 150 In State v. Montgomery,151
the Third District Court of Appeal resolved a conflict between an ac-
cused's right to present a defense and a proposed defense witness' legit-
imate claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. More specifi-
cally, the court decided whether a trial court can override the state's
objection to giving a witness use immunity.
Montgomery was charged with various offenses, including resisting
arrest, grand theft, and battery of a law enforcement officer. He
claimed that a person named Downey had been present, had seen the
incident giving rise to the charges and could give exculpatory informa-
tion. Downey refused to testify unless immunized. When the state did
not offer immunity, Montgomery asked the trial court to immunize
Downey anyway, which the court did over state objection.
The district court noted that Montgomery was a case of first im-
pression in Florida. The court found there were two kinds of defense
witness immunity - statutory and judicial. Statutory immunity is
"granted by the legislature to the executive branch through statute
which gives a prosecutor authority to confer immunity on a witness in
return for the witness' self-incriminating testimony.' 1 52 Traditionally,
the decision to confer this lies with the state. However, the district
court found that when prosecutorial misconduct interferes with a de-
fendant's constitutional rights to present a defense, statutory immunity
can be used as a remedy to avoid a court ordered acquittal. Thus, when
the prosecution so threatens a defense witness with possible criminal
charges that the witness invokes the privilege against self-incrimination
instead of testifying 53 or when the prosecution intentionally refuses to
grant immunity as a matter of trial strategy to keep exculpatory evi-
dence out,154 statutory immunity has been recognized as possible appro-
priate action. However, even so, the recognition of statutory immunity
does not make its use mandatory. Since the executive has the authority
150. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) holding that a state
statute prohibiting persons charged as accomplices from being witnesses for each other
violated a defendant's compulsory process rights since it "arbitrarily denied him the
right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testify-
ing to events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been
relevant and material to the defense." Id.
151. 467 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
152. Id. at 390.
153. See United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1976).
154. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir.
1980).
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to decide whether statutory immunity is appropriate, even in instances
of prosecutorial misconduct, the state still maintains that residual
power. If the state wishes to continue prosecution when its misconduct
has interfered with the defendant's constitutional right to call a wit-
ness, the state must grant the immunity or suffer dismissal. But the
state must decide which choice is appropriate, not the trial court.
Since a dismissal is such a drastic remedy, Montgomery found
that the defense has the burden of showing the state intentionally at-
tempted to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by interfering with the
right to call a witness. 155 Unfortunately for Montgomery, the record
did not reflect this. The district court refused to accept the position that
when the state declines to immunize a defense witness, the lack of any
present intention to prosecute the witness is per se evidence of miscon-
duct. Thus while the court recognized statutory immunity as a viable
remedy, this was not an appropriate occasion for it.
As an alternative to statutory immunity, Montgomery also argued
the theory that judicial immunity should exist whenever "the defendant
is prevented from presenting exculpatory evidence which is crucial to
his defense"' 56 despite the lack of prosecutorial misconduct. Under this
theory, judicial immunity is part of a court's inherent power to see that
a defendant's rights are fulfilled. Unlike statutory immunity which has
been favorably recognized by many courts and some commentators, 5 "
the district court found only the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit favorably recognized judicial immunity. 58 Since granting
immunity is a traditional executive decision, respect for the separation
of powers doctrine has driven many courts away from recognizing judi-
cial immunity. Furthermore, the time and information needed for a
155. "The defendant must be prepared to show that the government's decisions
were made with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process."
467 So. 2d at 391 (quoting United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
156., 467 So. 2d at 392-393.
157. See Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to
Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1266, 1280 (1978) concluding that the "right to
compulsory process guaranteed by the sixth amendment requires the State to grant use
immunity to defense witnesses when doing so would not create significant burdens for
the state;" Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 170 (1980)
arguing that "[o]nce the state makes immunity available to the prosecution it should
not be permitted arbitrarily to withhold it from the defense."
158. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913
(1979).
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court to intelligently assess when judicial immunity is appropriate
would lead to both "significant expenditures of judicial energy to the
detriment of the judicial process overall, and would risk jeopardizing
the impartiality of the judge at trial. ' 59
Against these two reasons for declining to recognize judicial im-
munity, Montgomery again sought to utilize a compulsory process
clause argument. However, the district court declined to, recognize
such. The clause gives defendants the right to subpoena witnesses and
have their testimony heard free from prosecutorial conduct which
would merit granting statutory immunity. However, "it does not carry
with it the additional right to displace a proper claim of privilege, in-
cluding the privilege against self-incrimination."'' 0 Thus, Montgomery
had no valid compulsory process clause claim to judicial immunity for
his witness. 6'
Ultimately, the district court found that only when there is suffi-
cient prosecutorial misconduct can a court become involved in an im-
munity decision. Even then the ultimate choice between dismissal or
immunity still remains with the state. 62
VI. Cross-Examination and Impeachment
Of the fourteen cases decided in late 1984 and 1985 that this sur-
vey will discuss that deal with cross-examination and impeachment, all
but one of them are criminal cases. The first four cases involve rever-
sals as a result of trial courts' improperly restricting the cross-examina-
tion by defendants of the main witnesses for the state.
A. Prior Conviction
Belton v. State'63 involved a reversal of a defendant's conviction
because "the trial court improperly limited cross-examination of the
159. 467 So. 2d at 394.
160. Id.
161. In so denying the claim, the district court noted a possible third policy rea-
son why judicial immunity should not be recognized. This is the fear that co-defendants
would intentionally try to create situations where they could utilize perjured testimony
to mutually help each other, under the protection of use immunity.
162. Montgomery specifically adopted the Third Circuit Court of Appeal's posi-
tion on statutory immunity. Counsel interested in seeing whether such immunity is
necessary should consult this circuit court's decisions as well as future Florida ones.
163. 475 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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State's principal witness . . . by precluding cross-examination with re-
spect to an out-of-state conviction."'" 4 The out-of-state conviction in
Belton was the crime of joy-riding which, while punishable by ninety
days imprisonment, was a crime considered in both Michigan and Flor-
ida to involve a dishonest act, and therefore a crime with which a wit-
ness could be impeached under section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes. 6 5
B. Bias
In Yolman v. State, 6' the Second District Court of Appeal re-
versed a trial court's ruling that had prohibited the defendant on cross-
examination from impeaching a state witness as to that witness' bias.
The appellate court held that "[ilt is not necessary for matters tending
to show bias or prejudice to have been within the scope of the direct
examination to be proper cross-examination."11 7 The appellate court
also found that the trial court's error in not permitting the defendant to
cross-examine the key state witness concerning that witness' bias or
prejudice "was not made harmless by related testimony of appellant's
husband, who was also co-defendant, and who had little credibility with
the jury."'1 8 Furthermore, had the defendant taken advantage of the
trial court's offer to permit the defendant to call the state's key witness
as defendant's witness, defendant "would have been wrongfully de-
prived of her concluding closing argument .... This deprivation alone
may have been reversible error."' 69
The Third District Court of Appeal held that it was error in Woo-
ten v. State17 0 not to permit a defendant to cross-examine a victim
about the victim's having hired an attorney in contemplation of filing a
civil suit against the defendant's employer.
A rare instance of an Anders' brief leading to a reversal of a
guilty verdict is Jackson v. Florida. 2 Jackson involved an appeal of a
theft conviction that resulted from the defendant's refusal to turn over
164. Id.
165. The Third District cited State v. Page, 449 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1984) for the
proposition that the crime was an act involving dishonesty.
166. 469 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
167. Id. at 843.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 844.
170. 464 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
171. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
172. 468 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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a customer's payments, for work done on the customer's car, to the
victim car repair shop. The defendant maintained that he was an inde-
pendent contractor paying rent to the car repair shop plus 50% of the
profits, while the owner of the car repair shop claimed that the defend-
ant was an employee who received a commission and did some indepen-
dent contracting. The trial court had refused to permit the defendant to
cross-examine the victim (the owner of the car repair shop and the
state's main witness) about the victim's having made romantic ad-
vances to the defendant's girlfriend. The defendant had also proffered
the testimony of another employee who would have testified that the
victim had made romantic advances to her as well and that the victim
had promised to "get even" with the defendant. Saying that this was
improper impeachment of the victim's character, the trial court had not
permitted the proffered testimony.173 However, the trial court was re-
versed as the proffered questions dealt with the victim's bias and "a
trial judge should allow the defendant to inquire of the witness via
cross-examination of the witness's bias."174
C. Permitted Restrictions on Cross-Examination
The next three cases deal with permissible limitations on defend-
ants' cross-examination of state witnesses.
1. Prior Consensual Sex Acts
Marr v. State 75 involved an appeal from a trial court's limiting
defendant's cross-examination of a rape victim's prior consensual sex-
ual acts. The victim in Marr claimed that the defendant had forced her
to undress and perform oral sex, but that after she bit the defendant's
penis and escaped, she did not notify anyone until, after receiving sev-
eral threatening phone calls and being assaulted outside of her home,
she contacted the police. The defendant sought to cross-examine the
victim about her prior consensual sexual acts with her boyfriend, but
was only permitted by the trial judge to elicit from both the victim and
the victim's boyfriend that their relationship was close and loving with-
173. Id. at 348.
174. Id. at 349. An interesting side note is that Jackson was a non-jury trial, so
the trial court heard all the excluded evidence as a proffer. The appellate court as-
sumed that: "[T]he trial court honored its own evidentiary ruling, and thus refused to
consider the proffered testimony. . . ." Id.
175. 470 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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out reference to any specific sexual acts. 176 The appellate court found
no error in the trial court's ruling but reversed the conviction on other
grounds.
2. Pending Charges
In Francis v. State,71 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a trial
court's having restricted the defendant's cross-examination of two state
witnesses against him. Francis involved the third first-degree murder
conviction and death sentence (the previous two had been reversed) of
the defendant for a 1975 murder. The trial court had prohibited the
defendant from cross-examining one witness regarding pending murder
charges against that witness. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's ruling that the witness' pending murder charge was irrele-
vant. The defendant had proffered neither what the witness' answers
would be to his proposed questions nor how those answers would be
relevant, other than to show that the witness had a bad character or a
propensity towards violence, neither of which is permissible. Further-
more, the state alleged that no deals had been made with that witness
and that witness had indeed later been convicted of the second degree
murder of her husband. 178
3. Witness' Job Performance
In affirming another first-degree murder conviction and death sen-
tence, the Florida Supreme Court in Rose v. State7 9 found no error in
the trial court's restricting defendant's cross-examination of a police
detective. The defendant "wanted to bring out the level of professional-
ism of Detective Luchan for the purpose of determining his credibil-
ity."' 80 However, since section 90.608 of the Florida Statutes does not
permit an attack on one's professionalism as a way of attacking credi-
bility, the Florida Supreme Court found no abuse of the trial court's
discretion in restricting the defendant's cross-examination.181
176. Id. at 705.
177. 473 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1985).
178. Id. at 674. One wonders if the result would have been the same had the
defendant proffered that the questioning would have shown that the witness' motive for
testifying might have been leniency in her own case.
179. 472 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1985).
180. Id. at 1157.
181. Id. at 1158.
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D. "Impeachment" of One's Own Witness
In two cases, appellate courts held that it was not impeachment
and therefore not improper for the state to bring out the weaknesses of
its own witnesses on direct examination, thereby weakening defendant's
subsequent cross-examination. Sloan v. State"8 2 involved an appeal
from a conviction of burglary and grand theft. During direct examina-
tion of its own witness, a co-perpetrator, the state elicited that its wit-
ness had given a prior inconsistent statement. The Second District
Court of Appeal held that this was not an attempt by the state to im-
peach its own witness, "but rather to bolster his credibility by revealing
his earlier inconsistent statements."1 83
Adopting a reasoning that is sounder than the dicta of a previously
decided Fourth District Court of Appeal case, 1 4 the Second District
Court of Appeal in Bell v. State'86 ruled consistently with Sloan, 8"
that it was permissible for the state on direct examination of its own
witness to bring out that the witness had previously lied under oath.
The appellate court found no merit to the defendant's contention that
the state was attempting to impeach its own witness.
In contrast to the well-reasoned Second District Court of Appeal
opinions in Sloan and Bell, a bad evidentiary ruling from Florida's
Fifth District Court of Appeal is Price v. State.8 7 Price involved a re-
trial of a defendant accused of a narcotics offense; the first trial had
ended in mistrial. During the retrial, a state witness testified that the
defendant had given her quaaludes, testimony that was inconsistent
with that witness' testimony at the first trial, during which the witness
testified that she had not received drugs from the defendant. Over de-
fendant's objection, the trial court permitted the prosecutor on direct
examination to let his witness explain the prior inconsistent testimony
and the reason for it - that the witness had been threatened by the
defendant. Reasoning that the prosecutor was trying to rehabilitate his
witness before that witness had been impeached and that this is tanta-
mount to attacking the credibility of one's own witness which is prohib-
ited by section 90.608, Florida Statutes, the appellate court in Price
reversed the defendant's conviction. An explanation for the Fifth Dis-
182. 472 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
183. Id. at 490.
184. Ryan v. State, 457 So. 2d 1084, 1092 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
185. 473 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
186. 472 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
187. 469 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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trict Court of Appeal's error here may be that the appellate court did
not understand that the prosecutor was not impeaching his own wit-
ness, but rather was attempting to bolster the credibility of that
witness.1 88
However, it is error for the prosecution to elicit on direct examina-
tion that the state's witness has never been convicted of a crime: the
witness must first be impeached by the defense. Such was the ruling of
Mohorn v. State.189 However in that case, the error was not reversible,
in light of "[t] he totality of the evidence against the defendant, includ-
ing her admission of guilt. ..."1,0
E. Opening the Door on Direct
In two cases, the state's otherwise impermissible questioning was
permitted because the defendant had opened the door on his direct ex-
amination. Jefferson v. State91 involved an appeal from a manslaugh-
ter conviction. The appellate court affirmed a trial court's ruling that
permitted the state to cross-examine the defendant on defendant's fail-
ure "to subpoena two competent and available witnesses where the de-
fendant's own presentation of testimony had indicated that these wit-
nesses could exonerate him."1 92
In affirming a conviction for sexual battery and burglary, the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal in Ashcraft v. State"'3 held that the trial
court properly allowed cross-examination of the defendant by the state
into the details of the defendant's prior crimes. During his direct exam-
ination, the defendant referred to his prior crimes and stated "that he
had never hurt anyone during those prior crimes." 94 Consequently, the
trial court permitted the state to cross-examine the defendant about a
prior rape conviction.
188. While it may be merely coincidental, one notes in passing that the Fifth
District Court of Appeal is the only one of Florida's appellate districts which does not
have a law school in its district. On the other hand, Stetson Law School is located
within the boundary of the Second District Court of Appeal, whose evidentiary rulings
in Sloan and Bell were correctly decided.
189. 462 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
190. Id. at 82.
191. 471 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
192. Id. at 182.
193. 465 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
194. Id. at 1375.
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F. Illegally Obtained Confessions
Where a confession has been ruled coerced and involuntary, that
confession may not be used to impeach a defendant who takes the
stand and tells a different story. Hawthorne v. State95 involved an ap-
peal from a manslaughter conviction, the defendant's third trial,1 98 in
which the trial court had permitted the state to impeach the defendant
on cross-examination by using the defendant's prior statement that had
been illegally obtained. The fact that the state did not refer to the pre-
viously suppressed statement did not save the impeachment attempt
since the state used information from the previously suppressed state-
ment to impeach the defendant.
1. The Civil Case
The one civil case involved two issues of improper impeachment
which the trial court permitted and one instance of permissible im-
peachment as to bias.
G. Sequestration Rule Violation
Del Monte Banana Co. v. Chacon197 was a suit by an employee
against shipowners for injuries which the employee said occurred in an
accident on one of defendant's ships. The defendant's main witness, the
captain of the ship, was required to wait outside of the courtroom dur-
ing testimony of the other witnesses. A woman friend of the captain
would watch some of the testimony in court and then come out and sit
by and talk to the captain. The appellate court ruled that the trial
court improperly permitted plaintiff's attorney to impeach the captain
(defendant's witness) regarding this supposed violation of the Seques-
tration Rule without a prior determination by the judge that the Rule
had been violated. The appellate court held that before cross-examina-
tion of a witness regarding a violation of the Sequestration Rule would
be permitted, the court must first make a determination that the Rule
had been violated. 98
The appellate court in Del Monte also held that it was improper to
195. 470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
196. The first trial had resulted in a conviction for murder in the first degree and
the second trial had ended in a conviction for murder in the second degree.
197. 466 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
198. Id. at 1171..
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permit cross-examination of the captain insinuating that the captain
had been fired because of plaintiff's injury, since there had been no
proof that the captain was fired, merely that the captain had left the
job with defendant for another job. "It is axiomatic that counsel cannot
ask questions of a witness that have no basis in fact and are merely
intended to insinuate the existence of facts to a jury."' 99
On the other hand, the appellate court approved the trial court's
having permitted the plaintiff to cross-examine the captain as to bias
and party alignment, specifically by inquiring into the fact that before
the trial, the captain had been rehired by defendant company as a mate
and promised a position as a captain as soon as that position opened up.
VII. Impeachment By Prior Inconsistent Statements
The nine cases which deal with impeachment by prior inconsistent
statements are all criminal cases. In a pair of cases, discussed above,
Sloan v. State and Bell v. State, the Second District Court of Appeal
permitted the state on direct to bring out and have the state witnesses
explain prior inconsistent statements, thereby stealing the thunder of
defendant's cross-examination of those witnesses. In Price v. State, crit-
icized above, the Fifth District Court of Appeal refused to permit the
state witness to explain during direct examination a prior inconsistent
statement.
Technically, neither Sloan nor Bell nor Price - the Fifth District
Court of Appeal notwithstanding - concern impeachment by prior in-
consistent statements.
In a case involving the question of what use can be made of a
witness who recants his testimony before trial, the First District Court
of Appeal in Austin v. State,00 severely restricted the prosecution's use
of a witness' unsworn prior statement that incriminated the defendant.
After reversing a robbery conviction on other grounds, the court in
Austin also addressed improper use of a witness' unsworn prior state-
ments. During the defense side of the case, the defense called a witness
who claimed to have been with the defendant and a state witness at a
time when the state witness claimed the defendant had made admis-
199. Id. at 1172. While the defendant didn't raise it as a ground for objection
either at trial or on appeal, the appellate court noted that had the captain actually been
fired, that might have been a prohibited line of inquiry as a subsequent remedial mea-
sure under FLA. STAT. § 90.407. Id. at 1173 n.5.
200. 461 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
1076 [Vol. 10
183
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Evidence
sions. The defense witness maintained that he did not hear the defend-
ant make any admissions.20 1 The defense to the robbery charge was
that the defendant had been in Georgia for about one week before the
robbery was committed in Jacksonville. On rebuttal, the prosecution
asked the court to call as a court witness the defense witness previously
mentioned. Since the defense witness claimed to have no memory of
just when he was with defendant on Jacksonville Beach, the court per-
mitted the prosecution to elicit from the defense witness that the de-
fense witness had previously told an assistant state attorney and an in-
vestigator that the defense witness and the defendant had been together
on Jacksonville Beach one day before the robbery. The appellate court
made the distinction between the witness who was hostile, which this
defense witness certainly was, and one who was adverse, distinguishing
between the witness whose testimony is not beneficial and the witness
who gives testimony that is prejudicial to the cause of the party calling
him. 20 2 In the instant case, the defense witness' testimony was not ad-
verse, even though the defense witness himself may have been hostile to
the state. Consequently, the appellate court ruled that the trial court
had erroneously permitted the prosecutor to get around section 90.608
of the Florida Statutes, which requires a showing of adversity before a
prior inconsistent statement can be used to impeach a witness. More-
over, the appellate court ruled that even had the prosecutor been per-
mitted to impeach the defense witness, the prior inconsistent statement
would only have come in for impeachment and not as substantive evi-
dence since the prior statement had not been under oath.203
A conviction for trafficking in cannabis was reversed in Williams
v. State2 0 4 because the trial court refused to permit defendant to im-
peach the state's main witness by a prior inconsistent statement. The
trial court had erroneously ruled that since the prior inconsistent state-
ment had been an oral statement, impeachment would not be permit-
ted. In reversing, the appellate court stated:
The prior inconsistent statement may be oral and unsworn and may
be drawn out on cross-examination of the witness himself and, if on
cross-examination the witness denies, or fails to remember, making
such a statement, the fact that the statement was made may be
201. Id. at 1382.
202. Id. at 1383.
203. Id.
204. 472 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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proved by another witness. 20 5
The appellate court would have permitted the introduction of extrinsic
evidence in the instant case even though the oral statement had been
made to defendant's attorney and defendant's attorney would have had
to become a witness in the case.206
After reading the quoted passage from Williams above, it comes
as no surprise that the Second District Court of Appeal's sister court in
Courtney v. State,20 7 reversed a conviction because of the trial court's
failure to permit extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of
a state's eyewitness. Courtney was an appeal of a murder conviction
and during the cross-examination by defendant of the state's only eye-
witness, the state's witness denied having told another person that the
state's witness had not seen the crime. The defense attorney sought to
lay the predicate for impeaching the state's witness but the prosecutor's
objection was sustained by the trial court. The defense attorney then
made a proffer of the testimony of three impeachment witnesses. The
proffer of the testimony of one of them, Adams, was that the state's
eyewitness had told Adams that the state's witness had seen nothing.208
In reversing the conviction, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's
decision to exclude extrinsic evidence by another impeachment witness
since the state's eyewitness had admitted having made that statement.
In Toranco v. State200 the court permitted the state to use a prior
inconsistent statement that had not been given to the defense during
discovery because that statement had been in a police report that was
furnished to the defendant. Delgado-Santos v. State21 reversed a first-
degree murder and armed robbery conviction because a prior inconsis-
tent statement, of an alleged accomplice, of the defendant made during
police interrogation was admitted as substantive evidence. The court
held that a police interrogation was not a "proceeding" under section
90.801(a) of the Florida Statutes, even though defendant had been
under oath and had been given his Miranda rights at the time he made
the statement.2 11 In reaching its decision, the appellate court looked to
205. Id. at 1352 (citing United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1976) and
FLA. STAT. § 90.614(23) (1983)).
206. Id. at 1352-53.
207. 476 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
208. Id. at 302.
209. 471 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
210. 471 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
211. Id. at 75-77.
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interpretations of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), including
the Congressional history reprinted in the U.S.C.A. found in the com-
ments after each section of the Evidence Code.21 2
Lastly, in affirming a conviction for first-degree murder and vacat-
ing a stay of execution, the Florida Supreme Court in Demps v.
State213 reaffirmed the general rule that evidence of prior consistent
statements, to bolster a witness' testimony, is inadmissible unless there
has been an attempt to attack that witness' credibility.214 Demps in-
volved a post-conviction hearing on the defendant's claim that the state
had interfered with a defense witness. Since the prosecutor declined to
cross-examine one of the defense witnesses at that hearing, the trial
court correctly prohibited the defense from calling other witnesses to
bolster his testimony.
VIII. Confrontation
The Confrontation Clause was invoked in 1985 as the grounds for
appeal in six Florida cases and one federal case which this survey will
discuss. In the federal case, Harris v. Wainwright,15 the Court of Ap-
peal for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the granting of habeas relief by a
district court to a defendant who had been convicted on hearsay evi-
dence. Harris had been convicted of attempted first-degree murder and
attempted robbery. The state contended that after demanding money
from and shooting the victim, Harris fled the scene of the crime in a
yellow Cadillac. The victim's son chased and rammed the Cadillac,
from which three men fled. 1 ' A photograph of Harris was identified by
the victim as that of the robber. At trial, rather than prove ownership
of the yellow Cadillac, the prosecutor asked the police officer if he re-
ceived any information concerning the ownership of the Cadillac and
what did the police officer do after receiving the information, to which
the officer replied that he made a photographic lineup.1 7 Since the sole
purpose of the officer's testimony was to tie the defendant to the rob-
212. In reaching its decision, the Third Distrct Court of Appeal in Delgado es-
chewed the Fifth District Court of Appeal's case by case analysis of Robinson v. State,
455 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) for a "bright line" test. It is difficult to
read Delgado without being persuaded by its reasoning.
213. 462 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1984).
214. Id. at 1075.
215. 760 F.2d 1148 (11th Cir. 1985).
216. Id. at 1149.
217. Id. at 1150.
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bery and attempted murder by means of defendant's connection with
the yellow Cadillac, the court of appeal affirmed the district court's
finding that the error was not harmless.2"8
Another attempted first-degree murder conviction was reversed in
Carrasco v. State.219 Carrasco and Edward Morales were accused of
shooting a man and stealing his car. Carrasco was tried separately
from Morales, but during Carrasco's trial, the police officer who had
taken Morales's confession, told the jury that the confession implicated
Carrasco.220 Finding a violation of Carrasco's sixth amendment right to
confront Morales, the district court of appeal reversed the conviction.221
Restricting a defendant's right to cross-examination resulted in re-
versals in two cases, Rivera v. State222 and Alvarez v. State.22 Rivera
involved an appeal from an aggravated assault conviction. The victims
alleged that while they were driving in a car, someone in Rivera's car
shouted obscenities and pointed a gun.224 While the victims had been
able to note the car's license number, neither one was very sure about
identifying Rivera from a photo lineup until the investigating police
officer pointed out Rivera's picture and said that he was the registered
owner of the car whose license plate they had recorded.225 During the
trial, the prosecutor asked neither the victim nor the police officer
about the photo lineup and the prosecutor successfuly objected to the
defendant's attempt to cross-examine both witnesses about the photo
lineup. This forced the defense to call both witnesses as defense wit-
nesses, thereby prohibiting the defense from impeaching these wit-
nesses by calling another witness to testify that the pointing out of the
defendant's photograph was not standard police procedure.226
Alvarez involved an appeal from a first-degree murder conviction
by a defendant whose conviction rested entirely on the testimony of two
witnesses, an accomplice and an accessory after the fact. The district
court of appeal reversed Alvarez's conviction because the trial court
218. Id. at 1153. Florida's Court of Appeal for the Third District had found in
Harris v. State, 414 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) that the error was
harmless.
219. 470 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
220. Id. at 860-61.
221. Id. at 861.
222. 462 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
223. 467 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
224. 462 So. 2d at 541.
225. Id. at 541-42.
226. Id. at 542.
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had refused to permit Alvarez on cross-examination of the accomplice
to bring out that the accomplice "had served less than eight months of
a thirty-two month sentence by virtue of an agreement with the state to
recommend an-'early parole' in return for 'telling the truth.' ",227 The
district court of appeal also ruled that the defendant should have been
able to cross-examine the accomplice, and accessory after the fact,
about their past convictions, even though those convictions had oc-
curred in Cuba and the defense attorney had no record of the convic-
tion and hence lacked the evidence necessary for impeachment. The
district court of appeal so ruled, even though the defense attorney had
no knowledge of the witnesses' prior convictions.228
On the other hand, a defendant's right to cross-examination was
held not to have been violated when his cross-examination of the main
state witness was limited in Mills v. State.2 9 Mills involved an appeal
from a first-degree murder conviction that arose out of a burglary of a
residence. Mills and an accomplice, Ashley, had entered the victim's
house at night and Mills had shot the victim with a shotgun. Mills'
attorney, the public defender, had previously represented Ashley at the
beginning of the case and in other unrelated charges. The public de-
fender withdrew from representation of Ashley once he became aware
that Ashley was involved in the burglary and murder. The trial court
restricted Mills' cross-examination of Ashley by not permitting Mills to
ask about statements Ashley had made to a public defender investiga-
tor and not permitting the use of those statements to impeach Ashley.
In finding that the attorney/client privilege claimed by Ashley was cor-
rectly used to bar the attempted impeachment, 230 Florida's Supreme
Court noted that Mills had been permitted to impeach Ashley with
several prior inconsistent statements and with Ashley's bargaining for
immunity in return for his testimony.3 Consequently, the supreme
court found no abridgement of Mills' right to confront his accuser.
A defendant's right to confront his accusers requires a reversal
where in an attempt to perpetuate a witness's testimony by taking a
pretrial deposition, the prosecution fails to notify the defendant and
produce the defendant at the deposition. In Brown v. State2 32 the Flor-
227. 467 So. 2d at 455-56.
228. Id. at 456.
229. 476 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1985).
230. Id. at 175-76.
231. Id. at 176.
232. 471 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1985).
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ida Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction for first-degree
felony murder because the state, while notifying the defense counsel of
its intention to take a deposition and perpetuate testimony of a witness,
failed to notify the defendant and also failed to produce the defendant,
who was in custody at the time, at the deposition. Brown's conviction
was reversed even though his lawyer failed to object at the trial to the
introduction of the deposition and only raised the lack of notice to the
defendant and defendant's absence from the deposition for the first
time on appeal.2 33
Important as the right to confront one's witnesses is, that right can
be waived, as was found by the defendant in Lara v. State.234 Lara
involved an appeal from a conviction of attempted robbery and second-
degree murder. The trial had been a non-jury trial and the defendant
agreed to stipulate that the testimony at the trial would be based on
the discovery taken by both parties prior to trial, thereby obviating the
necessity of calling witnesses. In affirming the conviction, the district
court of appeal held that there was no necessity for an affirmative
showing that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his
right to confront the witnesses against him.2" 5
IX. Testimony of Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, expe-
rience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an
opinion; however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied
to evidence at trial.236
A. Factual Basis Need Not Be Given
In eliciting an opinion from an expert, a party on direct examina-
tion need not establish the factual basis for that opinion.23 7 In City of
233. Id. at 7.
234. 475 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
235. Id. at 1341.
236. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1985).
237. FLA. STAT. § 90.705 (1985).
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Hialeah v. Weatherford,238 the appellate court affirmed a trial court's
permitting a physician to give his opinion that had paramedics ex-
amined the plaintiff's decedent, they would have found that the dece-
dent was having a heart attack and the decedent would not have died
from a heart attack the next day. The defendant city objected to the
opinion being given and failed to cross-examine the doctor as to the
basis for the opinion. In affirming, the appellate court cited to section
90.705 of the Florida Statutes and held:
[TIhe statute eliminates the requirement formerly placed on the
party calling an expert witness to present underlying data and fac-
tual support for expert testimony. Under current law, the burden of
challenging the sufficiency of the basis for the opinion rests with
the party against whom it is offered. 39
B. May Be Based on Inadmissible Evidence
Also, an expert's opinion may be based on inadmissible hearsay,
and that otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be made known to the
jury.240 The appellate court in Bendor v. State overturned a defendant's
attempted murder conviction because the trial court refused to permit
defendant's expert witness, a psychiatrist, from testifying about the re-
sults of a computerized brain scan upon which the expert relied in
reaching his diagnosis that the defendant suffered from organic brain
syndrome. This testimony went to the defendant's defense that he was
incapable of forming the necessary intent to commit the crime
charged. 241 The appellate court relied on section 90.704 of the Florida
Statutes in reaching its result.
C. Reasonable Certainty Not Necessary
It may not even be necessary for a medical expert to give his opin-
ion within the bounds of reasonable certainty either for that opinion to
be admitted or for a jury verdict to be based on that opinion. Brate v.
State24 2 was an appeal of a manslaughter conviction. The victim in
238. 466 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
239. Id. at 1129.
240. Bendor v. State, 472 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
241. Id. at 1371.
242. 469 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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Brate had died from abdominal bleeding. While there had been testi-
mony that the defendant had stomped the victim once in the chest or
abdomen, there was also testimony that before he was stomped, the
victim might have hit his chest against the dash board of a speeding
car that he was riding in. The medical examiner testified that the blow
to the victim's chest "would have been consistent with either a stomp
with a cowboy boot or a passenger's thrusting impact with the dash-
board of a vehicle . . . [and] that stomping a passenger who had sus-
tained an abdominal injury in a broadside collision probably would ma-
terially contribute to the cause of death. 2 43 The doctor "conceeded
that he could not state with reasonable medical certainty that a boot
stomp killed the decedent or materially contributed to his death."2 44
The appellate court affirmed the admission of the opinion testimony by
the trial court and the conviction even though the doctor "was unwill-
ing to testify within the bounds of reasonable certainty that such a
stomp actually caused or materially contributed to decedent's
death. 245 Reasoning that expert testimony "generally is deemed advi-
sory in nature and ordinarily not conclusive on the judgment of the
jury, ' 246 the appellate court cited to Baker v.. State,247 for the proposi-
tion that medical testimony advancing a reasonable theory of causation
would be sufficient to uphold the conviction where that testimony is
supplemented by other evidence.248 The supplemental other evidence in
Brate was eye witness testimony that the victim had been stomped once
by the defendant.2 49
In 1985, Florida appellate courts affirmed trial court rulings per-
mitting experts to testify to the identity of a victim through old dental
records, 250 the results of a neutron activation analysis to show a
probability that the defendant fired a gun, even though that test does
243. Id. at 792-93.
244. Id. at 793.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. 30 Fla. 41, 11 So. 492 (1892).
248. 469 So. 2d at 794.
249. While the Brate court appears to be correct in not finding a difficulty with
the doctor's inability to give an opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty
as to cause of death, and in permitting the doctor's testimony that the victim's injuries
were consistent with the boot stomp, on redirect examination, the doctor said his con-
clusion was "within the bounds of reasonable medical certainty." Id. at 793.
250. Stand v. State, 473 So. 2d 1282, 1287 (Fla. 1985).
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not conclusively establish whether a gun has been recently fired, 51 and
the number of assailants as well as their relative strength vis-a-vis the
victim based on strangulation marks.2 52 On the other hand, experts
were not permitted to testify about false confessions,2 53 the defects of a
model of a device other than the device implanted in plaintiff,254 testi-
mony resulting from hypnosis,255 polygraph answers, 56 thermogram re-
sults,257 the cause of brain damage,258 and testimony about the battered
woman syndrome.25 9
3-M Corp. v. Brown260 involved a suit against the manufacturer of
a mammary implant by a plaintiff who was injured as a result of the
implant's rupture. The appellate court found that the trial court erred
in permitting an expert to testify about the design defects of one model
of breast implant without any testimony that that model was similar to
a different model, the one actually implanted in plaintiff's breast.2 61
The appellate court also held that the plaintiff's medical expert "was
erroneously allowed to testify as to the "possibility" of future medical
treatment and complications. 262 This speculative type of testimony is
"not probative of . . .future damages. ' 263
D. Hypnosis
In affirming Theodore Bundy's conviction in Bundy v. State,26 , the
Florida Supreme Court held "that hypnotically refreshed testimony is
per se inadmissible in a criminal trial in this state, but hypnosis does
not render a witness incompentent to testify to those facts demonstra-
251. Mills v. State, 476 So. 2d 172, 176-7 (Fla. 1985).
252. Endress v. State, 462 So. 2d 872, 873 (Fla. 2d. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
253. Stand, 473 So. 2d at 1287.
254. 3-M Corp. v. Brown, 475 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
255. Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985).
256. Carter v. State, 474 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
257. Crawford v. Shivaskankar, 474 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
258. Executive Car and Truck Leasing, Inc. v. DeSerio, 468 So. 2d 1027 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
259. Hawthorne v. State, 470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
260. 475 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
261. Id. at 996.
262. Id. at 998.
263. Id. (citing Crosby v. Flemming and Sons, Inc., 447 So. 2d 347, 349 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
264. 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985).
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Lively recalled prior to hynopsis." 26 5 However, Bundy's conviction was
affirmed because the Florida Supreme Court found that totally apart
from the hynoptically refreshed testimony, the witness was able to tes-
tify to other facts that he recalled prior to the hynopsis.
288
The appellate court in Carter v. State 67 affirmed a trial court's
denial of the defendant's motion to compel production of a victim's an-
swers to a polygraph which the polygraph examiner felt were untrue.268
The defendant had been given a copy of the victim's statement to the
polygraph examiner, the questions asked and her answers. The appel-
late court found that to compel production of specific answers which
the polygraph examiner found untrue would not have aided the defense
as that information could not have been used in evidence.
Refusal to admit thermograms was upheld in Crawford v.
Shivashankar 9 Crawford claimed to have sustained injury to her
neck as a result of an automobile accident. Although their objective
findings were slight, four doctors testified that Crawford had suffered
some degree of permanent injury.270 The trial court refused to permit
Crawford to introduce thermogram photographs or to have a neurolo-
gist give his opinion that thermographic examination showed soft tissue
injury. Not only had Crawford not listed the "thermograms as proposed
evidence in her pre-trial statement, but she "had failed to show that
thermography was a well-established and reliable technique for de-
tecting soft tissue injury. "271 While the appellate court found that it
was error for the trial court to exclude the neurologist's opinion, the
appellate court found the error to be harmless as four other doctors had
testified that there was injury and that it was permanent, hence making
the neurologist's testimony cumulative. After examining the evidence
that Crawford elicited as to the reliability and acceptability of ther-
mography, the appellate court refused to find an abuse of discretion in
the trial court's exclusion of the thermography evidence based on the
facts of that case.272
It is not necessary for a clinical psychologist to be a medical doc-
tor in order to testify to the existence of organic brain damage. This
265. Id. at 18.
266. Id. at 19.
267. 474 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
268. Id. at 398.
269. 474 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
270. Id. at 874.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 875.
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was the holding of Executive Car and Truck Leasing, Inc. v.
DeSerio.17 Executive Car and Truck involved an appeal from a judg-
ment arising out of an automobile collision. DeSerio's neurosurgeon
testified that he could not detect any permanent organic brain damage
and so he referred DeSerio to a clinical psychologist for psychological
testing, something which he commonly does. The clinical psychologist
testified that he then gave DeSerio psychological tests commonly used
by psychologists to identify organic brain damage, and based on those
tests, it was his opinion that DeSerio had suffered organic brain dam-
age. Because neurosurgeons rely on psychological testing to detect
organic brain damage, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's "al-
lowing a clinical psychologist who is not a medical doctor to testify to
the existence of organic brain damage. 2 7 5 Noting that the Florida Su-
preme Court had previously held that medical testimony is not always
necessary to show causation between an occurrence and damages, 7 6
the appellate court found that allowing the clinical psychologist to tes-
tify that the automobile accident caused the organic brain damage was
harmless error. Consistent with Executive Car is G.LW. Southern
Valve Co. v. Smith,77 which cited Executive Car in support of its rul-
ing that a clinical psychologist who is not a medical doctor could not
testify "that because of the accident, plaintiff's brain would deteriorate
much more rapidly in the future. ... 2
E. Battered Woman Syndrome
Psychiatric testimony about the battered woman syndrome was
addressed in Terry v. State,279 Hawthorne v. State2 80 and Ward v.
State.281 Terry reversed the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony
as to the battered woman syndrome. The appellate court found that
specialized knowledge of an expert would aid the jury in understanding
the defense of self defense. The court noted that admission of the bat-
273. 468 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
274. Id. at 1028.
275. Id. at 1029.
276. Id. at 1030 (citing Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 107 So. 2d 609
(Fla. 1958)).
277. 471 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
278. Id. at 82.
279. 467 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
280. 470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
281. 470 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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tered woman syndrome testimony is based on a trial court determina-
tion that the "expert is qualified and the field is sufficiently developed
to support an expert opinion.' ' 8s Hawthorne v. State involved an ap-
peal from a manslaughter conviction.2 83 The appellate court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit defend-
ant's proffered expert, Dr. Lorraine Walker, from testifying that the
defendant was a battered woman. The trial court held three days of
hearings and decided it "is not convinced that she has knowledge neces-
sary to give such testimony . . . [and that the] depth of study in this
field had not yet reached the point where an expert witness can give
testimony with any degree of assurance that the state of the art will
support an expert opinion . ,,.s8 Hawthorne was reversed for other
reasons and the majority invited the defendant to again attempt to
qualify an expert in the battered woman syndrome. In a lengthy dissent
as to that part of the case, Judge Ervin argued for overturning the trial
court's refusal to permit Dr. Walker to testify as an expert. In af-
firming a second degree murder conviction, the appellate court in Ward
v. State 85 found that the defendant had not made a sufficient record
for appeal to permit the appellate court to review the question of ad-
missibility of the battered wife syndrome.2 86 After the first of two pro-
posed defense witnesses had been excluded, the defendant then decided
without any court ruling to not call the second witness who would have
testified to the battered wife syndrome. By failing to give the trial court
an opportunity to evaluate the qualifications of the second witness and
the syndrome, the defendant had precluded any possible action by the
appellate court.2 87
Finding that an expert opinion must be relevant to be admissible,
it must prove or tend to prove a fact in issue, the Florida Supreme
Court in Stano v. Florida288 affirmed a trial court's refusal to permit a
psychiatrist to testify that certain people confessed to crimes which
they did not commit, finding the proffered testimony to be irrelevant.
The Florida Supreme Court ruled this way even though the defendant
was also prepared to put on testimony of a police officer to whom the
282. 467 So. 2d at 765.
283. The defendant's previous conviction of first-degree murder had been re-
versed, as was her subsequent second-degree murder conviction.
284. Id. at 773.
285. 470 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
286. Id. at 101.
287. Id.
288. 473 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1985).
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defendant had confessed a murder which the defendant had not com-
mitted and even though the defendant's theory of defense was that the
defendant had killed someone other than the victim.289 What the su-
preme court found lacking was a proffer that the defendant's confession
in the instant case "was infirm or tainted. 290
X. Hearsay
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. 291
Out of court statements can be introduced for their truth under
one of the many exceptions to the general proscription of hearsay.
A. Admissions
Admissions, statements of one party offered against that party, are
one of the easiest exceptions to meet. In two of the six cases that fall
under direct admissions, S. C. v. State"2 and Adams v. School Board
of Brevard County,293 the admissions addressed were those of the par-
ties themselves. The case of S. C. involved an appeal from a circuit
court order adjudicating a child as dependent and placing the child in
foster care. Two other children had previously been taken away from
the parents of S. C. and the evidence issues involved the admissibility
of (1) the hearsay testimony of a woman to what S. C.'s father had
told her as the reason the two other children had been removed (a six-
year old girl suffering from venereal disease and a five-year old boy
from neglect) and (2) the father's testimony as the state's adverse wit-
ness as to the reason that the other two children had been taken away
from their parents. The district court of appeal found that the woman's
testimony, while hearsay, was an exception as an admission by the fa-
ther, whom the appellate court declared to be a party. 94 The father's
statements as an adverse witness were found not to be hearsay (why he
289. Id. at 1285-86.
290. Id. at 1286.
291. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c) (1985).
292. 471 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
293. 470 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
294. 471 So. 2d at 1328.
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was told the other children had been taken away) but rather informa-
tion based on his own personal knowledge.295
Adams involved the appeal by several students of their expulsion
from high school for using, possessing or selling controlled substances
or substances that are held out to be controlled substances. While hear-
say is admissible at administrative hearings, there must also be other
competent evidence. 29 6 Consequently, those students who made state-
ments to administrative deans had their expulsions affirmed, as those
statements were deemed to be admissions. 297
One can remain silent and by his silence be deemed to have
adopted the out-of-court statement of another, which out-of-court
statement is then admissible as an adoptive admission. Drake v.
State29 8 was an appeal from a conviction of attempted second-degree
murder, aggravated battery and armed robbery with a deadly weapon.
Drake was accused of stealing money from a church where his wife
worked and of hitting his wife on the head with a hammer. Even
though his wife had no memory of the incident, a police officer was
permitted to testify that while she was in the wife's hospital room, she
heard the wife say to the defendant, "You don't care for me at all. '2 99
The defendant said that he did care, to which his wife responded,
"Well, you certainly don't act like it." When the husband asked why
the wife said that, she replied "How would you like me to hit you on
your habit?"300 The police officer then testified that the defendant said
nothing and then left the hospital room. The police officer followed the
defendant into the hall and he looked back at her twice.301 The appel-
295. Id. A witness who testifies to what he has actually perceived is said to have
personal knowledge under § 90.604 of the Florida Statutes. While this may seem a
strange response to hearsay, examples include: one's name (perhaps hearsay if based on
what one's parents said but personal knowledge if based of one's observations of how
one is addressed by parents and others); one's physical condition (again, perhaps hear-
say if told by a doctor but personal knowledge if based on one's perception of pain
inside and maybe a protruding bone); etc.
In the instant case, the appellate court found that the father's statements were
"not a repetition of statements made to him by Connecticut authorities but [were] of
his personal knowledge of the reasons for the children's commitment." Id.
296. 470 So. 2d at 762. See also infra notes 335-46 which address the use of
hearsay at dependency, probation and forfeiture proceedings.
297. 470 So. 2d 762-63.
298. 476 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
299. Id. at 211.
300. Id. at 212.
301. Id.
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late court affirmed the admission of the wife's comment to her husband
and his silent response as an admission by silence.30 2 In the event that
the victim's words were not an accusation but were meaningless, the
appellate court conceded that the police officer's testimony would be
irrelevant and claimed that in that circumstance would also be
harmless. 303
Another example of a statement that would be admitted against a
party as an admission is a statement made by a servant or an employee
about a matter within the scope of the employment.304 Poitier v.
School Board of Broward County30 5 involved an appeal by a plaintiff
who failed to recover for injuries to her daughter when her daughter
slipped and fell on a wet floor in a school cafeteria. The appellate court
reversed the case based on the trial court's erroneous exclusion of the
mother's conversation with a school employee, a janitor, after the acci-
dent. The mother proffered that the janitor said that the janitors knew
they were supposed to put up ropes and signs when they cleaned an
area, but that they generally did not do so.308 The appellate court
found that the janitor's statement to the mother was an admission and
should have been introduced as an exception to hearsay since the
janitor was an employee of the school board and the janitor's statement
was about a matter within the scope of his duties.30 7
Statements of a co-conspirator can also be introduced against one
as one's own statements, and hence exceptions to hearsay. An example
is found in State v. Wilson,3"8 a petition for a writ of certiorari by the
state of a judge's denial of a pretrial motion to permit the state to use
statements of co-conspirators against the defendants. However, to pre-
serve for appeal a trial court's erroneous exclusion of testimony that
would fit under an admissions exception to the hearsay rule, one must
302. Id. at 215.
303. Id.
304. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(18)(d) (1985).
305. 475 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
306. Id. at 1275.
307. Id. While the appellate court reached the correct evidentiary result, its lan-
guage was rather sloppy, specifically in referring to the janitor's statement as "an ad-
mission against the interests of his employer." Id. The court seems to confuse "admis-
sions" (§ 90.803(18)) with "declarations against interest" (FLA. STAT. § 90.804). The
reason for this becomes apparent when one notes that the appellate court cited not to
the Florida Evidence Code but to case law. The Sponsors' Note to § 90.803(18) men-
tions that some courts tend to make this confusion.
308. 466 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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assert the ground for admissibility at trial.309
B. Spontaneous Statements and Excited Utterances
Statements made describing or explaining an event or condition
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immedi-
ately thereafter, as well as statements relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress or excitement
caused by the event or condition may be admitted in court as the ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule known as spontaneous statements and ex-
cited utterances. 310
The circumstantial guarantee of [a spontaneous statement] is that
when a spontaneous statement of narration is made simultaneously
with perception, the substantial contemporaneity of event and
statement negative the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misin-
terpretation. The theory of [an excited utterance] is simply that
when an excited utterance is made, the circumstances produce a
condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of re-
flection and produces utterance free of conscious fabrication. The
key element in both is spontaneity.311
An example of each is found in Preston v. State.3 12 Preston was an
appeal from a conviction of sexual battery. After having dinner and
drinks with her boyfriend, the victim went to a bar close to where her
boyfriend worked to wait for him. While waiting for her boyfriend, the
victim met and drank with the defendant. When her boyfriend didn't
come back for her, the victim left with the defendant who had offered
to take her to her home, stopping at the Elks Club where they had
more drinks. After the club closed, the defendant and the victim left
and the victim claimed that the defendant forced her to perform oral
sex on him in his van. When the van stopped at a traffic signal, the
victim ran to the nearest house and reported the incident.3 13 At trial, a
fourteen-year old boy testified to what the victim told him about the
incident without objection from the defense. The appellate court stated
309. Rezzarday v. West Fla. Hosp., 462 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
310. FLA. STAT. §§ 90.803(1) and (2), respectively.
311. Sponsors' Note to FLA. STAT. §§ 90.803(l) and (2).
312. 470 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
313. Id. at 836-37.
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that the victim's statements to the boy were admissible either as a
spontaneous statement or an excited utterance."1 4 However the defense
unsuccessfully objected to testimony by the victim's boyfriend and a
police officer as to what the victim told them about the incident. Be-
cause between one and two hours had elapsed since the incident and
the telling of the story, because the victim had left the bar with the
defendant "for several hours of drinking and 'partying', as described by
several witnesses, she had a possible reason to contrive a story or mis-
represent to her boyfriend," and because the victim appeared to be ner-
vous and upset, the appellate court reversed the conviction finding that
the statements were inadmissible hearsay as there had been time for
reflection and a motive to fabricate by the victim.3 15 The appellate
court was clear to point out that the statements were excluded because
of all of the factors of the case, taken together, rather than any single
factor.316
C. Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Conditions
An out-of-court statement may be an exception to the hearsay rule
if the statement regards the declarant's existing state of mind, emotion
or physical sensation, including a statement of intent, plan, motive, de-
sign, mental feeling which is offered to prove the declarant's state of
mind. 1 An example is found in Peede v. State,318 an appeal from a
murder conviction. Before going to meet the defendant, the victim told
her daughter that she was going to the airport to pick up the defend-
ant, and "that she was nervous and scared that she might be in danger,
that her daughter should call the police if she was not back by mid-
night, that she was afraid of being with the other people he had
314. Id. at 837.
315. Id.
316. The appellate court also found that the statements were not admissible as
prior consistent statements under § 90.801 (2)(b), as they were made after the existence
of a motive to fabricate.
In another case, Cox v. State, 473 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
statements made by a defendant's wife on learning that her husband had been in an
accident were admissible as excited utterances. The statements were made immediately
upon being notified of her husband's accident, "an occurrence startling enough to pro-
duce nervous excitement and render the utterances spontaneous and unreflecting." 473
So. 2d at 782 (cite omitted). As the statements were not given, nothing further can be
gleaned from Cox.
317. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(3) (1985).
318. 474 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1985).
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threatened to kill, and that he would kill them all on Easter." '319 The
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's having permitted the
daughter to testify to what the victim had told the daughter. In Peede,
the Florida Supreme Court found that the victim's mental state was at
issue regarding elements of the kidnapping which formed the basis of
the state's felony-murder theory, i.e. it was necessary for the state to
prove forcible abduction of the victim against her will. It is not appar-
ent why the Peede court felt it had to address the issue since it points
out that the testimony came in at trial without any hearsay
objection.320
D. Business Records
Records that are kept in the ordinary course of a business may be
admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule.32 1 However, the supplier of
the information in the business record must have a business duty to
supply the information, i.e. he must work for the business whose
records are sought to be introduced. 22 Computer printouts can be busi-
ness records, but before someone can testify to what was on a computer
printout, the foundation must be laid to admit the computer printout as
a business record.3 23
Where the business record is prepared solely in anticipation of liti-
gation, it lacks trustworthiness and may not be admitted as a business
record. 24 Stambor v. One Hundred Seventy-Second Collins Corp. in-
volved an appeal from a suit against a restaurant by a customer who
slipped and fell. The manager of the restaurant immediately filled out
319. Id. at 816.
320. Id.
321. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1985).
322. See Eicholz v. Pepo Petroleum Co., 475 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
323. Cofield v. State, 474 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Cofield
involved an appeal from a grand theft conviction. The appellate court held that the
state failed to adequately prove the value of the stolen equipment. The state witness
had no personal knowledge as to the value but used a computer printout prepared by
someone else that listed the cost of'each item stolen.
It is difficult to tell from the decision, but it doesn't appear that the state tried to
offer the computer print-out as evidence. Since the computer print-out was not offered
as a business record, it remained hearsay and the state witness could not use that rec-
ord to testify to the value of the goods stolen. Id.
324. See Stambor v. One Hundred Seventy-Second Collins Corp., 465 So. 2d
1296 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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an accident report stating that nothing was on the floor and forwarded
that report to the restaurant's insurance carrier in anticipation of litiga-
tion.325 The appellate court found the accident report to be inadmissible
as business record because of its lack of trustworthiness: the report was
made solely to help defend against an anticipated claim; the manager
had a business motive to fabricate and no business motive to be truth-
ful; accident reports have generally been considered "work product"
and therefore not discoverable because they are prepared solely for liti-
gation and have no business purpose. 26
E. Absence of Public Record or Entry
Another exception to the hearsay rule is the certification that a
diligent search failed to disclose a public record, when offered to prove
absence of the record that would have been made and preserved by a
public office or agency.3 27 An example of an absence of a public record
is found in Terranova v. State.3 28 Terranova was convicted of engaging
in the business of a contractor without being duly registered or certi-
fied. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's having admitted into
evidence a certificate of nonlicensure by the Construction Industry Li-
censing Board. 29
F. Unavailable Declarant
There are some circumstances where the unavailability of a de-
clarant will permit his declaration to be admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule. The test is two-pronged: the declarant must be unavaila-
ble - able to assert a privilege, refuses to testify, has suffered lack of
memory, illness or death prevents his attendance or the proponent can-
not procure his appearance - and the statement must be one of the
several recognized exceptions - former testimony subject to cross-ex-
amination, dying declaration, statement against interest or a statement
of personal or family history.330 Stano v. State33' involved an appeal
from a conviction of first-degree murder. The defendant's first trial had
325. Id. at 1297.
326. Id. at 1298.
327. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(10) (1985).
328. 474 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
329. Id. at 1208-9.
330. FLA. STAT. § 90.804 (1985).
331. 473 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1985).
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ended in a mistrial and the victim's parents refused to testify during
the second trial and were therefore unavailable under section
90.804(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes. Consequently, the court permit-
ted the state to read in the victim's parents' former testimony under
section 90.804(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Since the parents had said sanc-
tions would not induce them to testify and the defendant had the op-
portunity for a full cross-examination of the parents in the prior trial,
the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The Florida Su-
preme Court affirmed another first-degree murder conviction in Brown
v. State.3 3 2 Brown and two accomplices burglarized the home of an
eighty-one year old woman who was also raped and killed. One of
Brown's co-defendants testified against him and also stated that the
third man, Rickey, was the defendant's stepson. This testimony was
found to be an exception to hearsay as the stepson was unavailable at
the time of the trial (the police were still looking for him) and the
statement of the relationship was permitted by the second prong, a
statement of personal or family history, under section 90.804(2)(d) of
the Florida Statutes.3 1 Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens334 in-
volved an asbestos products liability action in which the plaintiff sought
to introduce depositions of two witnesses taken in other actions. Since
the defendant or its predecessor in interest had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses during their depositions in the prior actions and
since the witnesses had both since died, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court's permitting the plaintiff to read into evidence the deposi-
tions from the other lawsuits.3 5
G. Dependency, Probation and Forfeiture Proceedings
Lawyers must be attentive to hearsay problems in dependency pro-
ceedings, probation revocation hearings and forfeiture proceedings as
well as at trials. In reversing an order declaring children to be depen-
dent and placing the children in the custody of the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services, the appellate court in In re S.J.T.
and T.N.T.336 held that admission of numerous exhibits including case
summaries and observations of field workers and doctors who had vis-
332. 473 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1985).
333. Id. at 1264.
334. 463 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
335. Id. at 259-62.
336. 475 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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ited the family and observed the treatment of the children, the trial
court had erroneously admitted hearsay evidence. The appellate court
noted that in conducting adjudicatory hearings in dependency actions,
a judge is required to apply "the rules of evidence in use in civil
cases ... ."3
While hearsay evidence is admissible in a probation revocation
proceeding, 338 a probation revocation may not be premised solely on the
basis of hearsay evidence.339 Bass v. State3 40 involved an appeal from a
trial court's order revoking probation for failure to work diligently,
make restitution and pay a fine.341 Because Bass had admitted the vio-
lations, the appellate court found that the probation had not been re-
voked solely on hearsay evidence, but also on non-hearsay admis-
sions.342 Davis v. State343 also involved an appeal from a revocation of
probation. The appellate court ordered excised from the written order
of revocation the probationer's failure to pay the cost of supervision, as
the only evidence of that had been hearsay.3 " In reversing a trial
court's order forfeiting an automobile used in the commission of a
337. Id. at 953 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.408(2)(b)). The appellate court notes
that some of the evidence could have been introduced as a business records exception if
the proper foundation had been laid.
Another dependency case, In re A.D.J. and D.L.J., 466 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1985), found no reversable error in admitting hearsay statements and reports
as: "The record reflects that the trial judge was aware of appellant's several hearsay
objections and gave no probative effect to the inadmissible hearsay." Id. at 1162.
In Re A.D.J. and D.L.J. is a frustrating opinion to read because of its lack of
detail about the statements themselves and how the appellate court knew the trial
judge did not consider the statements. It was reversed for other reasons.
338. Cuciak v. State, 410 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1982).
339. Turner v. State, 293 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974) and Curry v.
State, 379 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
340. 473 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
341. Id. at 1368.
342. Id. at 1369 (The order revoking Bass's probation was reversed, however,
because the trial court failed to make a factual determination that Bass had an ability
to make restitution and pay the fine).
343. 474 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
344. Id. at 1246. The appellate court affirmed the violation as to the proba-
tioner's failure to file written reports but remanded to permit the trial court to recon-
sider whether the probation should be revoked solely for failure to file written reports.
Both the opinion of the appellate court and the concurring opinion specifically men-
tioned that the trial court was free to reach the same conclusion as before and revoke
the probation solely for the failure to file the required reports. Id. at 1247.
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crime, the appellate court in Doersam v. Brescher 45 held that "hearsay
evidence should not be admitted in a final hearing in forfeiture pro-
ceedings and, of course, such evidence may not form the basis for a
factfinder's decision that the property was utilized in the commission of
a crime. '3 46 In arriving at its decision, the Doersam court noted that
even in administrative hearings, hearsay evidence was not sufficient but
could only be used to supplement or explain other evidence.34 7
H. Prior Inconsistent & Consistent Statements
Out-of-court statements may be introduced for reasons other than
their truth, in which case they are not subject to the prohibition against
hearsay. One example is a trial Witness' prior consistent statement
which is offered to rebut a charge of improper influence, motive, or
recent fabrication.348 Parker v. State" 9 was an appeal from a convic-
tion of first-degree murder. Parker and two co-defendants had been
charged with robbing a convenience store and killing the convenience
store's clerk. The girlfriend of one of the co-defendants had spoken to
Parker when Parker was in jail and in answer to the girlfriend's ques-
tion of who had shot the convenience store clerk, Parker stated that he
had shot the clerk. The co-defendant's girlfriend then told her mother
and sister what Parker had told her. At the trial, not only was the
prosecutor permitted to introduce the testimony of the co-defendant's
girlfriend, but was also permitted to call the girlfriend's mother and
sister to show that the girlfriend's story was not a recent fabrication.
The Florida Supreme Court agreed with Parker that permitting the
girlfriend's sister and mother to testify was error because the girl-
friend's motive to testify (to keep her boyfriend out of the electric
chair) existed at the time the co-defendant's girlfriend had made the
statements to her mother and sister.38 0 However, the Florida Supreme
Court found that the error was harmless and affirmed the conviction.
Another example of an out-of-court statement, that is not coming
in for its truth, is a prior inconsistent statement3 50°1 Busch v. State35'
345. 468 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
346. Id. at 428.
347. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.58(1)(a) (1985)).
348. FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(b) (1985).
349. 476 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1985).
350. Id. at 137.
350.1 FLA. STAT. § 90.614.
351. 466 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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was an appeal from a conviction of attempted first-degree murder and
shooting into an occupied building. Busch admitted the shooting but
claimed that the weapon had accidentally discharged while he was in
his truck outside the building. A key state witness was Busch's female
companion of the evening who at trial testified that the firing of the
weapon had been intentional. When originally questioned about the in-
cident, Busch's female companion has stated that the weapon dis-
charged accidentally. At the trial the prosecutor brought out both the
prior inconsistent statement and the motivation for that statement, that
the witness was afraid of Busch.3 52 While the appellate court does not
appear to be sure whether the complained-of testimony was hearsay$5 3
or whether it was error to permit the testimony,35 4 the appellate court
decided that if the testimony were error, it was harmless. 355
Under certain circumstances, prior inconsistent statements are not
merely admissible, but may actually be accepted as substantive evi-
dence. 356 However, as the case of Moore v. State357 indicates, even as
substantive evidence, the prior inconsistent statement may not be suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction in the absence of competent corroborating
evidence. Moore involved an appeal from a conviction of second-degree
murder. Moore had been indicted by a Grand Jury for first-degree
murder based on the testimony of two witnesses who had identified
Moore as the murderer. Both witnesses later recanted their statements
352. Id. at 1077, 1079.
353. "While the testimony introduced was allegedly hearsay ... " Id. at 1079.
354. "While it may have been error to permit the allegedly hearsay testi-
mony. . . ." Id.
355. Id. From the opinion, it is not clear if the panel was bothered by what they
perceived as an attack on the defendant's character or by the witness' reason or basis
for her fear. The opinion does not contain the testimony to which the defendant ob-
jected. Even assuming that the witness had said she was afraid of the defendant be-
cause she had been told he was dangerous, that testimony would not be objectionable
as hearsay because it would not be coming in for its truth, but rather to show the
witness' basis for her fear. The distinction may be a fine one, but it is the job of appel-
late courts, no less than trial courts and evidence teachers, to make these distinctioins
until Florida chooses to permit hearsay evidence in its courts.
356. § 90.801(2)(a) states that:
A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the state-
ment is:
(a) Inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a
deposition. ..
357. 473 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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in depositions and Moore had successfully moved to dismiss the indict-
ments. An appellate court reinstated the indictment,358 a decision the
Florida Supreme Court approved3 59 holding that:
[U]nder section 90.801(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), the prior
inconsistent statement of a witness at a criminal trial, if given
under oath before a Grand Jury, is excluded from the definition of
hearsay and may be admitted into evidence not only for impeach-
ment purposes but also as substantive evidence on material issues
of fact.360
Before Moore was tried, both witnesses who had accused him
before the Grand Jury pled guilty to perjury. At trial, the witnesses
testified that their Grand Jury testimony had been false and that their
deposition testimony had been true. Nevertheless, the jury convicted
Moore of second-degree murder. The appellate court reversed the con-
viction, holding that: "[P]rior inconsistent statements standing alone do
not constitute sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. 361
In reversing the conviction, the appellate court distinguished Webb
v. State36 2 because "in Webb the State had introduced other cor-
roborating evidence in addition to the witness's recanted testimony." 363
XI. Photographs and Demonstrative Evidence
Seven of the eight cases dealing with photos or demonstrative evi-
dence that this survey will examine are criminal cases. The state's in-
troduction of photographs was either proper or, if erroneous, harmless
in six of those cases and the trial court's refusal to let the defendant
introduce photos and demonstrative evidence in the seventh case was
affirmed.
If a defendant is going to contend that the improper admission of
photographs contributed to his conviction, he must do so on direct ap-
peal and not in a motion for post-conviction relief.364 The "admission of
photographic evidence is within the trial court's discretion and ...a
358. State v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
359. Moore v. State, 452 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1984).
360. Id. at 562.
361. 473 So. 2d at 688.
362. 426 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
363. 473 So. 2d at 687.
364. Gentry v. State, 464 So. 2d 659, 661 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing
of clear abuse." 365 Even gruesome or inflammatory photographs maybe
admitted if they are relevant.366 Mills v. State3 67 involves an appeal
from a conviction of first degree murder. The state's main witness was
a co-defendant who claimed that Mills hit the victim on the back of the
head with a tire iron and then shot the victim with a shot gun.368 Mills
contended that it was error for the trial court to admit a photograph of
the victim's skull because the photograph was irrelevant to any dis-
puted issue, cumulative and prejudiced the jury. In affirming the con-
viction, the Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant's con-
tentions, and found the photograph relevant because it "helped
establish how long the victim had been dead . . . [and] explain the
lack of medical evidence that the victim had received a blow to the
skull by Mills, as [the co-defendant] had testified.3 69
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed three first degree
murder convictions and the trial court's admission of photographs that
the defendant contended were gruesome in Henderson v. State.37 0 Hen-
derson had been accused of binding, gagging, and killing three
hitchhikers. The Florida Supreme Court seemed peaked that the de-
fendant would challenge the introduction of the photographs,37 1 and
stated that the photographs of the victims' partially decomposed bodies
"were relevant to show the location of the victims' bodies, the amount
of time that had passed from when the victims were murdered to when
their bodies were found, and the manner in which they were clothed,
bound and gagged.372
Even where irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial photographs are er-
roneously admitted, if the error is harmless, a conviction will be af-
firmed. Little v. State,373 involved an appeal by two defendants of their
365. Duest v. State, 462 So. 2d 446, 449 (Fla. 1985).
366. Adams v. State, 412 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882
(1982); Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1022
(1981), cited in Mills v. State, 462 So. 2d 1075, 1080 (Fla. 1985) and Henderson v.
State, 463 So. 2d 196, 200 (Fla. 1985).
367. 462 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1985).
368. Id. at 1078.
369. Id. at 1080.
370. 463 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1985).
371. "Those whose work products are murdered human beings should expect to
be confronted by photographs of their accomplishments." Id. at 200.
372. Id.
373. 474 So. 2d 331 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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convictions for armed robbery. Based on a tip from a confidential in-
formant, the police went to an apartment expecting to find Little.
While in the apartment, they arrested Little's co-defendant and while
searching the apartment for Little they found photographs of Little and
his co-defendant posing with their guns pointed at the photographer, as
well .as a photograph of a bag with a gun protruding from it.174 The
appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding admission of the photo-
graphs harmless error even though none of the guns seen in the photo-
graphs were positively identified as those used in the robbery and, be-
cause the poses would suggest to the jury that the defendants were of
poor character, the photographs were thus unfairly prejudicial. 75 In
the words of the appellate court:
The trial judge erroneously admitted into evidence the photographs
seized during the search over the objections of the defendants. As
to their relevancy, there is no evidence as to where or when the
photographs were taken. They do not depict a prior similar act of
robbery. The record does not reveal that the association of appel-
lants was at issue and the photos were therefore not properly ad-
mitted as probative of that issue. Nor were any of the four guns
seen in the photographs positively identified as those used in the
robbery. Moreover, the prosecution had placed two guns into evi-
dence which it alleged were those used in the robbery. We also find
that the photographs were likely to be unfairly prejudicial to the
appellants because the poses would suggest to the jury that appel-
lants were of poor character. We conclude that the photos were
irrelevant, not material to any issue in controversy, and had a ten-
dency to be inflammatory and potentially confusing to the jury.
Notwithstanding the error committed in the admission of the
photographs, the convictions are affirmed, as we find that the error
was harmless.37 6
It is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to prohibit counsel
from showing demonstrative exhibits to the jury during closing argu-
ments if those exhibits were not introduced into evidence during the
trial.377 Walker v. State involved an appeal of a conviction of at-
tempted second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault.
During his cross examination of state witnesses, defense counsel had
374. Id. at 331.
375. Id. at 332.
376. Id.
377. Walker v. State, 473 So. 2d 694, 696 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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used a drawing, but he had not put that drawing in evidence in order to
"sandwich" the prosecution's closing argument. During the defense
closing, the prosecutor successfully objected to the defense counsel's use
of the drawing in argument to the jury. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court, finding no abuse of discretion in prohibiting defense
counsel from showing exhibits to the jury since those exhibits had not
been introduced into evidence .37
Relevant evidence may be inadmissible if its probative value is
substantially out-weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.37 9 In State v. Wright,380 the appellate court affirmed a trial
court's excluding defense evidence, including photographs and demon-
strative evidence, which "was of dubious probative value . . . .[and
whose] potential for confusion of issues and misleading the jury was
substantial."3 " Wright involved a defendant convicted of raping a four-
teen-year-old girl. The defense was that the defendant's penis was so
large as to make the rape unlikely if not impossible. The victim had
testified that she had been raped twice, each time over a twenty minute
period and that "the rapist moved rapidly up and down. .. "2 On
cross examination of the examining physician, the defendant brought
out that violent thrusting by a nine inch penis would be likely to cause
vaginal lacerations, which were not found in the victim. However, the
physician would not equate violent thrusting with rapid thrusting. The
defendant's girlfriend and wife both testified that intercourse with the
defendant was very painful and had been accompanied by bleeding.
Two other individuals were permitted to testify that the defendant's
penis was eight and one half inches long. However, the trial court re-
fused to permit one of the witnesses to testify that the circumference of
the defendant's penis was five and one half inches and refused to per-
mit the defendant to introduce photographs, a wooden model and to
display his penis to the jury.383 The appellate court affirmed the convic-
tion finding that "[tihe potential for confusion of issues and misleading
378. Id. The appellate court also affirmed the trial court's having permitted the
prosecutor to introduce photos of the defendant. The photos had been taped so that
numbers and dates were not visible, thereby permitting no inference that the defendant
had been arrested before. Id. at 698.
379. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1985).
380. 473 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
381. Id. at 270.
382. Id. at 269.
383. Id.
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the jury was substantial." 384
XII. Best Evidence
Except as otherwise provided by statute, an original writing, re-
cording, or photograph is required in order to prove the contents of
the writing, recording, or photograph.3 85
While the Florida Evidence Code has a Best Evidence Rule, one
requiring introduction of an original document under certain circum-
stances, the Florida Evidence Code liberally permits the admissibility
of duplicates8 6, which includes photocopies as well as carbon copies. 387
Two cases involving reversals of trial courts for failure to admit dupli-
cates were Gastroenterology Associates v. Matuson3 88 and Tillman v.
Smith.38 9 Gastroenterology Associates involved an appeal from an un-
successful suit by doctors against a patient who had not paid them. The
trial court refused to permit one of the doctors to prove the services
rendered either by oral testimony or by business records, reasoning that
the Best Evidence Rule required that original hospital records were the
only evidence that would be permitted. 390 In reversing the trial court,
the circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, ruled that since the
doctors' records contained photocopies of the originals, the records
should have been received as duplicates under section 90.953 of the
Florida Evidence Code.391 Moreover, the appellate court pointed out
that the doctor's records were his business records and would have been
admissible on that score alone, and the doctor's oral testimony should
384. Id. at 270. The opinion does not state whether the defense also included
identity. If it did, then the trial court's ruling excluding the evidence and the appellate
court's affirmance would appear to be erroneous.
If, on the other hand, the defense was not misidentification, but only that no pene-
tration or intercourse occurred, then the ruling is correct as the examining physician
found sperm in the victim's vagina, as well as engorged blood vessels - hence the
proffered evidence would be of questionable probative value and would likely lead to
confusion of the issues.
385. FLA. STAT. § 90.952 (1985).
386. FLA. STAT. § 90.953 (1985).
387. FLA. STAT. § 90.951 (4)(1985).
388. 9 Fla. Supp. 2d 94 (1 1th Cir. Ct. 1985).
389. 472 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
390. 9 Fla. Supp. 2d at 95.
391. Id. at 95-96.
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also have been be admissible.392 In Tillman, the trial court had refused
to accept into evidence a duplicate copy of an antenuptial agreement
under the theory that the antenuptial agreement was a document in-
volving the payment of money, and hence inadmissible under section
90.953 (1) of the Florida Statutes. In rejecting the trial court's ruling
excluding the antenuptial agreement, the appellate court's language
seems to hold that the only duplicates which are excluded under section
90.953 (1) of the Florida Statutes are negotiable instruments.393
XIII. Conclusion
Florida courts discussed so many different evidentiary issues dur-
ing this time that drawing any conclusions is difficult. In the criminal
procedure area, the Florida Supreme Court decided important cases
dealing with the Williams Rule, privilege against self-incrimination, re-
strictions on cross-examination of a witness about pending charges and
hypnotically related testimony. Also in criminal cases, the district
courts of appeal split over whether the state can "impeach" its own
witnesses on direct examination by exposing their weaknesses before
defense counsel has an opportunity to do so. Ideally the Florida Su-
preme Court will soon resolve this issue, if it has not done so before this
article's publication. 9 4
On the civil side, Florida District Courts of Appeal took a defense-
oriented, conservative approach to admission of subsequent remedial
measures evidence. Likewise, the Florida courts continue to take a re-
strictive position toward admission of psychotherapist-patient commu-
nications in child custody cases. Finally the admission of expert testi-
mony concerning thermograms was denied.
Judging various opinions to try to discern a general overall trend is
almost like comparing apples with oranges. However, both authors be-
lieve that Florida courts need to write better opinions when dealing
392. Id. at 96.
393. 472 So. 2d at 1354. Another opinion dealing with duplicates is E.F.K. Col-
lins Corp. v. S.M.M.G., Inc., 464 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985). The Col-
lins court does not report enough facts to permit a determination as to why a trial
court's admission of a copy of a sublease was erroneous.
394. On July 10, 1986, the Florida Supreme Court resolved the conflict in favor
of permitting a direct examiner to bring out his own witness' weakness. The Florida
Supreme Court correctly ruled that such questioning was not impeachment. See Bell v.
State, 491 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1986); Sloan v. State, 491 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1986); State v.
Price, 491 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1986).
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with evidentiary issues. Too often, courts stated the general principle of
law involved and jumped straight to a conclusion with little or no ex-
plicit factual analysis. Evidentiary questions are almost always "fact-
bound." Thus, for appellate opinions to have any real effect in this
area, they must present complete analysis of both the facts and the law.
At times this happened during the survey period, such as in the Third
District Court of Appeal's well-reasoned Compulsory Process Clause
decision. Our hope is that all future evidentiary opinions will be as
thorough.
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I. Introduction and Scope
This article considers the ethical directives contained in Florida's
New Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Florida Bar late in
1984. These Model Rules were recommended to the Florida Supreme
Court by the Florida Bar in November 1984 and after lengthly consid-
eration were promulgated by the court on July 17, 1986 to take effect
on January 1, 1987.1
This article considers all proposed rules contained in the final ver-
1. This article was written in March, 1986, and updated in August, 1986.
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sion of Florida's Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the Flor-
ida Supreme Court. Also discussed is the format of the new rules,
which represents a significant departure from Florida's former Code of
Professional Responsibility.2 Reference will be made to former Code
sections and a comparison between the Code and Rules will be offered
where helpful.
Among the most controversial rules discussed in detail in this arti-
cle are those relating to: confidentiality of information3 (one of the
most highly debated of the ABA Model and Florida rules); conflict of
interest;4 advertising and solicitation;5 and trial practice6 (especially
candor to the tribunal). The author will also discuss the various roles
filled by attorneys in the practice of law. To a lesser extent this article
will consider rules addressing pro bono service, client disability, case
control and the expediting of litigation.
II. Model Rules: A Brief History
In this century, the ethical conduct of lawyers has been regulated
by three sets of rules adopted by the American Bar Association and the
several states. The first set of rules, the Canons of Professional Ethics,7
were adopted in 1908 and remained in effect until 1970. In 1970, the
American Bar Association adopted the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.8 These regulations remained in effect until 1983. On
August 2, 1983, the American Bar Association adopted the most recent
set of regulations, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.9
In 1977, the American Bar Association began a review and evalu-
ation of the then-existent Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
The ABA's evaluating committee was chaired during most of its exis-
tence by Robert J. Kutak of Omaha, Nebraska, and is often referred to
2. FLORIDA'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1970) [hereinafter cited
as FLORIDA'S CODE].
3. FLORIDA'S RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-1.6 (1986) [hereinafter
cited as FLORIDA NEW RULES].
4. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rules 4-1.7, 4-1.8, 4-1.9 and 4-1.10 (1986).
5. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rules 4-7.1, 4-7.2, 4-7.3, 4-7.4 and 4-7.5 (1986).
6. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-3.3 (1986).
7. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908) [hereinafter cited as CANONS].
8. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1970) [hereinafter cited as
ABA MODEL CODE].
9. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter cited as ABA
MODEL RULES].
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as the Kutak Committee. The Kutak Committee proposed new guide-
lines for professional conduct. Many of the proposals were highly con-
troversial. For example, proposed were rules which mandated substan-
tial disclosure by an attorney if such disclosure were necessary to
prevent criminal conduct by a client. Disclosure was also proposed to
prevent the continuing consequences of past criminal conduct. A Kutak
Committee draft also required attorneys to perform mandatory pro
bono service.
This ABA committee determined that a new format for these pro-
fessional rules was necessary. The old Code, with its Ethical Considera-
tion (EC), Disciplinary Rule (DR) and Canon format, was relatively
inaccessible and often confusing to the practitioner. These controversial
proposals went through many redrafts before final consideration by the
American Bar Association. A draft of the rules even returned to the old
Code format in May 1981. However, the Restatement format was ulti-
mately adopted.
Passage of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct was not
easy. It required over a year and a half of vigorous debate at annual
and mid-year ABA meetings in San Francisco, New Orleans and At-
lanta before the final Model Rules of Professional Conduct were
adopted in 1984. The San Francisco debate considered only Rule 1.5
(Fees) in the time originally alloted for consideration of all rules. The
next mid-year meeting in New Orleans went into "overtime" each eve-
ning, debating the remaining sections of the Proposed Model Rules.
Almost no section of the Rules was too minor for debate. There was
wide-ranging input from state and local bar associations and lawyers
groups, and many alternative wordings were considered. In the end, a
"traditional" coalition was successful in deleting from the Proposed
Model Rules all rules considered too progressive or controversial. Fi-
nally, in August 1984, a consensus developed between the opposing fac-
tions and the interpretive comment sections were adopted almost with-
out debate at the annual meeting in Atlanta. Among the state
delegations voting against the Model Rules were Florida, California
and New York. Florida's delegation, led by Bar President Gerald Rich-
man, specifically rejected the rule limiting disclosure of a client's pro-
posed illegal activities.
A Florida Bar special committee had been tracking the develop-
ment of the Model Rules since mid-1980. This committee was there-
fore ready to offer its own proposal to the Board of Governors of the
Florida Bar less than a year after the adoption of the ABA's Model
Rules. This special study committee, chaired by attorney Steven Busey
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of Jacksonville, decided early in its deliberations to follow the ABA
Model Rules format and content whenever possible. The committee
felt that editing for its own sake would be detrimental to the potential
for uniformity of these Rules among the many states. The Board of
Governors of the Florida Bar reviewed the Rules presented to them,
approving the Model Rules with only a few changes and relatively lit-
tle debate. The Board then petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for
expeditious adoption of the Rules. The Florida Bar's formal petition
was presented to the Supreme Court for adoption on September 14,
1984. Oral argument took place on November 5, 1984. After lengthy
consideration the Florida Supreme Court adopted the proposed rules
package with several changes10 on July 17, 1986 with an effective date
of January 1, 1987.
In addition to adoption of the ABA Model Rules by the federal
courts and in Florida, versions of the Rules have also been adopted in
Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington and Virginia. Additionally,
most other states have study commissions or proposals for adoption
before their respective supreme courts at this time."
III. Format of the Model Rules
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct have abandoned the
traditional Code format of Canons, Ethical Considerations (aspira-
tional) and Disciplinary Rules (mandatory) in favor of a Restatement
format. This format provides a black letter rule mandating or prohibit-
ing attorney conduct. The black letter rule is followed by a non-binding
comment section intended to assist in interpretation of the rule. Follow-
ing each comment section is a Code comparison section in which cita-
tions to former Code sections are given. All rules with the exception of
pro bono service are mandatory. 2 The Model Rules also contain an
exceptionally accessible table of contents and a readily available com-
prehensive index.
10. The court altered the following rules originally proposed by the Florida Bar:
4-1.15(a); 4-3.6; and a major change to Rule 4-7.3 (solicitation).
11. The New York State Bar Association is the first state group to categorically
reject the new Rules.
12. Rule 4-6.1 states, "A lawyer should render public interest legal service"
(emphasis added).
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The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct are numbered 1.1
through 8.5, while the Florida Rules are numbered identically with the
addition of the prefix "4-" before each of the rules. Florida's draft of
the New Rules distinguished between differing American Bar Associa-
tion Model Rules and Florida Proposed Rules sections by "legislative"
underlining and strike through. Furthermore, the Florida rules include
an extensive table of contents and an available cross-reference table to
Code sections addressed by the Model Rules.
The Model Rules view the role of lawyer in a wider and more
varied manner than the "traditional" litigator model of the previous
Code and Canons of Professional Conduct. The lawyer is viewed as an
adviser, mediator, negotiator, evaluator, and an advocate. As an advisor
the attorney helps explain "the client's legal rights and obligations and
explains their practical implications."' 3 The more traditional advocate
model is discussed, as are other views of the attorney as negotiator and
the companion role of intermediary. 14 Finally, a lawyer is shown as act-
ing as an evaluator "examining a client's legal affairs" 15 and discussing
them (in a variety of ways) with the client and third parties."6
Almost all rules use the terms "shall or shall not" to define proper
conduct for attorneys. Only one rule, the pro bono rule,'7 is permissive.
Although the comments following each rule may use directive terms of
art (such as "shall" or "must"), they do not create black-letter law.
These terms of art are merely used to place special emphasis on partic-
ular commentary sections.
Finally, the Model Rules are only one source of guidance for the
practitioner. Consideration must be given to case law'8 and other rules
such as the Florida Rules of Evidence on lawyer-client privilege.' 9
IV. Preamble and Scope of the New Rules of Professional
Conduct
The Preamble and Scope provide a framework for understanding
the underlying philosophical policy of the proposed rules. In a sense,
13. FLORIDA NEW RULES Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities (1986).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-6.1 (1986).
18. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
19. FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1985).
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the Preamble is a statement to the public and the bar of the require-
ments and aspirations of the legal profession. The Preamble speaks to
the role of attorney as the client's representative in the legal system
and as a special "public citizen" responsible for the quality of justice.2 0
The Preamble then defines the various roles played by lawyers. The
requirement for maintaining a diligent and competent practice is also
discussed. The Preamble stresses that "[z]ealous advocacy is not incon-
sistent with justice."'21
The Scope section of the Rules is directed more to the needs of
lawyers than laypersons. It attempts to provide protection for the prac-
titioner by stating that although attorneys are bound to follow the rules
which direct them to act or refrain from acting, failure to follow these
rules should "not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any
presumption that a legal duty has been breached. 2 The Scope section
also directs the reader to other rules and principles of substantive law
which must be considered in determining "a framework for the ethical
practice of law."23
The Scope section is followed by a terminology section which de-
fines those terms used most often in the Model Rules.2 4 This terminol-
ogy section defines eleven words and their derivatives. For example, the
list includes the definitions of: lawyer, fraud or fraudulent, and reason-
able belief.
V. Article One: Lawyer-Client Relationship
Article One includes general rules considering the lawyer-client re-
lationship. These include basic guidance in practice areas such as: dili-
gence; communication with a client; competence; and the reasonable-
ness of fees charged.2 5 The controversial rule regarding confidentiality
of information26 is in this article, as are the several conflict of interest 27
rules. The remaining Article One rules consider a variety of specific
situations including the special problems of representing an organiza-
20. FLORIDA NEW RULES Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities (1986).
21. Id.
22. FLORIDA NEW RULES Scope (1986).
23. Id.
24. FLORIDA NEW RULES Terminology (1986).
25. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rules 4-1.1, 4-1.2, 4-1.3, 4-1.4 and 4-1.5 (1986).
26. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.6 (1986).
27. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rules 4-1.1, 4-1.7, 4-1.8, 4-1.9 and 4-1.10 (1986).
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tion, 28 and declining or terminating client representation.29
A. The Lawyer-Client Relationship (Rules 4-1.1, 4-1.2, 4-1.3)
A lawyer is required to be sufficiently competent in the area of law
in which his potential client requests representation."0 Diligence is re-
quired during this representation and the client must be informed of
case progress. 3 ' Ignoring these straightforward requirements gives rise
to a significant number of client complaints.32 It is unfortunately quite
easy to place a less interesting or less lucrative case on the back burner
while directing attention to more compelling issues. However, every cli-
ent is owed the attorney's zealous commitment to his or her case.
Clients should be informed and involved in all stages of their case.
It is the client whose property or liberty is in jeopardy and the client
who must make the ultimate policy decisions including case objec-
tives.33 For example, offers of a plea bargain or settlement should be
communicated quickly to a client. Many attorneys have found it benefi-
cial to send copies of all pleadings filed and other relevant material to
their clients to keep them informed of the progress of their case. How-
ever, these mailings are not a substitute for the in-person contact which
clients desire and demand.
The objectives of the representation are ultimately the client's de-
cision. However, a lawyer is obligated to provide advice and assistance
to the client in reaching that decision. It is not unusual for a client to
lack an understanding of the legal system. Clients often seek an attor-
ney's advice and direction on how best to handle the matter in question.
Despite this fact, ultimate decisions remain the province of the client.
The attorney may only properly determine the means used to imple-
ment those objectives.
In a very real sense, the ideal representation is a partnership be-
tween attorney and client with a mutual sharing of information and
goals by both parties. The attorney may, however, place limits on rep-
resentation if agreed to in advance. A lawyer may (although less so in
28. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.13 (1986).
29. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.16 (1986).
30. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.1 (1986).
31. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4(a) (1986).
32. From July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985 approximately 45% of all complaints to
the Florida Bar (2457 of 5514 total complaints) involved attorney neglect, relations
with clients, or personal behavior.
33. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.2 (1986).
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criminal than civil matters) limit the objectives or means to accomplish
those objectives if the lawyer regards certain actions as repugnant or
imprudent. This may include a too vigorous investigation of certain wit-
nesses or a determination of whether the client should testify. Typi-
cally, these are defendant's decisions. It is possible, however, for a
fully-informed defendant to waive these prerogatives when contracting
for representation.
The Rules further prohibit attorneys from assisting a client in
criminal or fraudulent conduct or in behavior not permitted by the
Rules of Professional Conduct.3 4 For example, a lawyer may not assist
a defendant in creating illegal tax shelters or in hiding a murder
weapon.
Finally, a practitioner is required to be competent in the area in
which he or she is providing representation. 35 This competence is diffi-
cult to define. A new lawyer may with study reach a satisfactory level
of competence while an experienced practitioner (due to inattention to
new legal developments) may be insufficiently qualified. A reasonable-
lawyer standard is used, requiring thoroughness in preparation and
willingness to spend the time necessary to be fully informed of the law,
procedure and facts relevant to the particulai case.
B. Communication with the Client (Rule 4-1.4)
Perhaps no action by an attorney leads to greater complaints about
the quality of representation than a failure in communication with a
client. Florida's Code of Professional Responsibility has no section
which is the direct counterpart of Rule 4-1.4,36 which requires that a
lawyer keep clients "reasonably informed" about their case.37 This rule
recognizes that a client needs to be able to intelligently participate in
his or her representation. This responsibility includes the duty to expe-
ditiously inform a client of a plea offer or settlement offer made in his
or her case. A lawyer is permitted to withhold information from the
client only if it is in the client's best interest; not included is withhold-
ing information to serve the lawyer's interest or convenience.38 The rule
34. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.2(d)(e) (1986).,
35. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.1 (1986).
36. Note however that Florida's Code addresses this issue to some extent. See
FLORIDA'S CODE DR 9-1.2(b), EC 7-8, EC 9-02 (1970).
37. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.4(a) (1986).
38. Id. at Rule 4-1.4 Comment.
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suggests that it might be appropriate for a lawyer to "withhold a psy-
chiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates
the disclosure would harm the client. 39
C. Fees (Rule 4-1.5)
The ABA's longest debate concerned this section of the Rules.40
Rule 4-1.5 is divided into three sections. The first considers the reason-
ableness of a fee; the second contingent fees; and the third referral
fees.4
Florida's New Rules require that lawyers "not enter into an agree-
ment for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee."'42 This is
a departure from the ABA approach which requires that "a lawyer's
fee shall be reasonable." 43 "Clearly excessive" was felt to be a more
understandable and absolute standard. The excessiveness of a fee is de-
termined by a reasonable-lawyer standard, that is, a lawyer of ordinary
prudence. This rule lists a variety of factors to assist in determining the
reasonableness of a fee. Among these factors are: the amount of work
involved; the novelty of the issue; the skill required of the lawyer to
perform this service; and the fees customarily charged for work of this
nature in the area. Also considered are: the amount in question in the
lawsuit; the results of the lawsuit; time limitations placed on the attor-
ney; and whether this case will prevent the lawyer from taking other
cases. Finally, this Model Rule considers how long the professional re-
lationship has existed 44 (the longer the relationship the more flexibil-
ity); the experience, reputation and capability of the attorney perform-
ing the service; and whether the agreement is for a fixed fee or a
contingent amount. The Model Rules encourage, but do not require,
that the fee agreement be memorialized in writing.45
Contingent fee agreements are permitted in all matters except
39. Id.
40. The ABA General Assembly meeting in San Francisco spent the time alloted
for review of all rules debating only Rule 1.5.
41. Referral fees were previously prohibited by FLORIDA'S CODE.
42. FLORIDA NEW RULE Rule 4-1.5 (1986) (emphasis added). See also Florida
Bar re Amendment to the Code of Professional Responsibility (contingent fees), 11
FLA. L. WEEKLY 294 (Fla. June 30, 1986), limiting contingency fees, now adopted as
part of the "rules" package.
43. ABA MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(a) (1983).
44. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.5(b)(6) (1986).
45. Id. at Rule 4-1.5(c).
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criminal law and domestic relations cases. 46 These prohibitions exist for
public policy reasons. There was substantial support during considera-
tion of the Florida Model Rules for allowing contingent fees in crimi-
nal cases. However, the Florida Bar's Criminal Law Section strenu-
ously opposed the use of contingency agreements in these cases and this
provision was deleted at the last minute from the final draft. The Flor-
ida Rules, unlike their ABA counterpart, require that contingent fee
agreements must be in writing, as must the closing statements which
distribute those fees. 47 The drafting committee felt that due to the
somewhat controversial nature of contingent fee agreements, and the
relative lack of sophistication of many clients entering into them, a re-
lationship in writing was necessary to clarify the attorney-client fee
relationship.
The New Rules accept what was often the standard, if unethical,
practice of giving referral fees. It has always been possible to divide a
fee between two or more lawyers not in the same firm. However, this
"fee-spliting" required that each attorney be paid according to his or
her amount of the work done on the case. Rule 4-1.5 now additionally
allows a division of the fee between lawyers (not in the same firm) if
the client consents in writing and the lawyers assume joint responsibil-
ity for the representation.4 While the amount of work done by each is
no longer a factor, the total fee must still be reasonable. However, sur-
prisingly, the lawyers need not disclose to the client the share that each
lawyer will receive.
Florida's New Rules continue to allow the acceptance of credit
cards but prohibit any additional fee for their use. Finally, the com-
ment section of 4-1.5 expresses the Florida Bar's long-standing policy
of encouraging the use of arbitration or mediation procedures if a fee
dispute should arise between attorney and client.
46. Id. at Rule 4-1.5(d)(3).
47. Id. at Rule 4-1.5(d)(1)(4) (1986).
Florida attorneys should also note that New Rule 4-1.5 requires that a Statement
of Client's Rights be given to prospective clients before they enter into a contingent fee
agreement. If a client believes that an attorney has charged an excessive or illegal fee,
the client is offered the opportunity to contact The Florida Bar via a telephone number
supplied with the Statement of Client's Rights.
The New Rules also mandate that each contingency fee contract contain two pro-
visions. The first provision acknowledges the client's receipt of the Statement of Cli-
ent's Rights. The second provision informs the client of his or her opportunity to cancel
the contract by written notification to the attorney within three business days.
48. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.5(e) (1986).
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D. Confidentiality (Rule 4-1.6)
Confidentiality was an area of major controversy during the Amer-
ican Bar Association debates as well as during Florida's Busey Com-
mittee meetings on this Model Rule. Early ABA drafts required dis-
closure of a client's planned criminal conduct or of criminal conduct
which had continuing consequences. However, the final draft adopted
by the American Bar Association strictly limited the disclosure of cli-
ent information. This requirement of confidentiality, one of the strong-
est themes of the American Bar Association Model Rules, is based
upon the belief of the American Bar Association's General Assembly
that confidentiality and resultant client trust is the cornerstone of the
Americal legal system.
Florida, joined by several other states, rejected this argument. In
fact, Florida's negative ABA General Assembly vote on the Model
Rules was based upon its rejection of this philosophy. Most of the
states which have adopted versions of the Model Rules (or which are
far along in the adoption process) have also rejected the ABA's position
with regard to the absolute supremacy of confidentiality.49
Florida's Code of Professional Responsibility requires disclosure
of a client's intent to commit any crime.5 0 The Model Rule for the
Florida Bar continues and expands this disclosure requirement. The
American Bar Association Rules only permit disclosure of criminal
conduct likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or when
necessary to collect an attorney's fee.51 Florida's version of the Rules
opted for mandatory disclosure to prevent the client from committing
any crime 52 or to prevent other acts which while no longer criminal
might result in death or substantial bodily harm to another." This sec-
ond required disclosure supplements Florida's long-standing disclosure
rule, adding mandatory disclosure of any act with continuing conse-
quences which might result in death or substantial bodily harm. 5
49. Of 17 states adopting a version of the Model Rules to date, a majority have
required or permitted more disclosure of the criminal plans of their clients.
50. FLORIDA'S CODE DR 4-101 (1970).
51. ABA MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(1)(2).
52. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.6(1) (1986).
53. Id. at Rule 4-1.6(b)(2).
54. The classic example of a past act with continuing consequences would be the
"girl in the box": the kidnapped heiress buried underground awaiting release upon pay-
ment of ransom. Another example of a past act with continuing consequences is a cor-
poration's past pollution of an aquifer which has the current consequence of polluting a
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"Permissive" disclosure is now allowed in several categories by
Florida's New Rules. A lawyer may reveal a client's confidences when
necessary to serve the client's interest,55 to assist the lawyer in respond-
ing to charges or claims arising from representation of the client,5 or
to assist one to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.51
When required to disclose the confidences of a client by a tribunal, a
lawyer may but is not required to exhaust all appellate remedies before
disclosure.58
It is important to note that the confidences covered by rule 4-1.6
expand the net of protected material beyond the lawyer-client privilege
of Florida Evidence Code section 90.502. 59 The Rules define confiden-
tiality as applying to all matters relating to the representation of a cli-
ent, whatever its source,60 and not just the confidences and secrets pro-
tected by Florida Statutes section 90.502.
E. Conflict of Interest (Rules 4-1.7, 4-1.8, 4-1.9)
In accepting a new client, a lawyer should always be aware of the
potential for conflict with a prior or existing. client, or with the attor-
ney's own interests. Courts exhibit a strong prejudice against even po-
tentially conflicting representation. The policy reason for this prejudice
is quite simple. Courts are most concerned about divided loyalty on the
part of an advocate or even the appearance of a divided loyalty. Practi-
tioners are well-advised to refuse a case (no matter how attractive) if a
conflict appears at the start of a case and to withdraw if a conflict
occurs during the case.6'
The "general" conflict rule is 4-1.7. This rule instructs an attorney
to avoid representation against the interest of one client on behalf of
another client even if the matter in question is unrelated. 2 Further-
more, an attorney may not represent a client if the attorney's interests
or responsibilities to another party will restrict the attorney's represen-
city's water system.
55. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.6(c)(1) (1986).
56. Id. at Rule 4-1.6(c)(4).
57. Id. at Rule 4-1.6(c)(5).
58. Id. at Rule 4-1.6(d).
59. FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1985).
60. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.6(a) (1986).
61. Id. at Rule 4-1.7 Comment: Conflicts in Litigation.
62. Id. at Rule 4-1.7(a).
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tation of that client.6 3 It should be noted that these are two distinctly
different situations. The first prohibition is more absolute. An attorney
is prohibited from taking sides against a client. The second involves an
attorney's professional judgment which may be limited by his interest
or responsibilities to another. In both instances, this rule permits a cli-
ent to consent to this potentially conflicting representation after consul-
tation.64 However, an attorney may not request the client to consent if
the attorney reasonably believes the potential conflict will adversely af-
fect his representation of the client.6 5 Case law in this area also directs
the practitioner to proceed with caution.6
Somewhat more subtle areas regarding the representation of a cli-
ent and the potential for conflict follow.
1. Third Party Interests (Rule 4-1.8(n)
An attorney may occassionally find his or her fee paid by a third
party to guarantee representation of a client. There is nothing inher-
ently unethical about such payment but it may be subject to scrutiny
by the courts if there is a suggestion of a divided loyalty.67 It is clear,
however, that the client's interest must guide the attorney, and not the
interest of the party who is paying for the client's representation.
Third-party payment is always subject to the following three provisos.
The client must always consent to the third-party payment;68 the attor-
ney's loyalty to the client may not be compromised by this payment;6 9
and the lawyer-client confidential relationship70 must always be
protected.
63. Id. at Rule 4-1.7(b).
64. Id. at Rule 4-1.7(b)(2).
65. Id. at Rule 4-1.7(a)(1).
66. See, e.g., Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc. 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976), a
civil case, or Holloway v. Arkansas 435 U.S. 475 (1978), a criminal case.
67. Prosecutors in a criminal case may also be interested in the name of the
party paying for the client's representation. This is especially true in illegal drug cases.
This topic, however, is beyond the scope of a chapter on legal ethics.
68. FLORIDA NEw RULES Rule 4-1.8(f)(1) (1986).
69. Id. at Rule 4-1.8(f)(2).
70. Id. at Rule 4-1.8(0(3).
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2. Guilty Pleas and Settlement Offers when Representing Two
Clients (Rule 4-1.8(g))
In the extraordinary event of permissible dual representation, the
case resolution will often be a plea bargain or settlement arrived at
between the defense attorney and the prosecutor, or the plaintiff's at-
torney and defense counsel. The Rules attempt to guarantee loyalty to
each individual client.7 1
An attorney is required to insure that each client's interests are
treated separately in plea or settlement agreements. Aggregate settle-
ment or plea agreements are not permitted, and neither is bargaining
one client's interest against the other. This bargaining would present a
clear conflict and the attorney should immediately attempt to withdraw
and seek new representation for each client. If, however, the agreement
is fair to both clients, it is possible to represent two (or more) clients if
each consents after full and complete consultation.
3. Attorney Family Relationships (Rule 4-1.7(d))
An area of growing concern is the potential for conflict when law-
yers on opposing sides are related to one another (for example, hus-
band/wife, parent/child). While a client may consent to this represen-
tation, it is probably the wisest course to transfer the case to another
member of the same law firm. This may be done despite imputed dis-
qualification,72 as this "in-firm" transfer is specifically permitted by the
rules.7 3 To clearly understand the policy reasons for this rule one need
only view the classic film Adam's Rib, in which Katherine Hepburn
portrays a defense attorney and Spencer Tracy portrays a prosecutor
who is her husband. A recent California case suggested that the same
exclusion might apply when opposing counsel were dating each other
over an extended period of time and they failed to disclose this fact to
the defendant.7 4
4. Media Rights (Rule 4-1.8(d))
In a high profile practice of law, particularly criminal law, the op-
71. Id. at Rule 4-1.8(g).
72. Id. at Rule 4-1.10.
73. Id. at Rule 4-1.7(d).
74. See People v. Jackson, 167 Cal. App. 3d 829, 213 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1985).
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portunity for the sale of media rights (books, TV, etc.) may arise. This
was true for the attorney who represented the "Son of Sam" killer in
New York as well as for the attorneys who have represented other no-
torious criminal defendants.7 5 At first, it may not appear obvious why
the sale of a "good story" is prohibited by the rules which regulate
conflict of interest. However, a confict between an attorney and a client
may arise from a media rights agreement. The attorney will now have
an interest in the outcome of the case (e.g., a plea agreement might
detract from the value of the book sales) and the attorney may no
longer have an undivided loyalty in representing his or her client. This
rule is absolute (the client may not waive its operation) and continues
until the conclusion of the representation of the client. Nothing in the
rule, however, seems to prohibit "subsequent" negotiation with the cli-
ent nor sale of the lawyer's own story regarding the case "after" repre-
sentation has ended.
5. Conflict of Interest: Former Client (Rule 4-1.9)
This rule, which has no direct counterpart in the Code, 6 prohibits
a lawyer from appearing against a former client in a "substantially re-
lated matter,"77 or when a new client's interest will be "materially ad-
verse"7 8 to a previous client's interest. However, a previous client is
permitted to consent to an attorney's appearance for a new client via a
full and informed disclosure of the possible conflicts.79 An attorney is
not prohibited from representing another party in a "wholly distinct
problem."80
The essence of the "conflict of interest" rule is noted in the com-
ment section, which declares that "subsequent representation can be
justly regarded as a changing of sides.""" Lastly, the rule prohibits an
attorney from using information gained by representing a former client
to the detriment of that client in a later action. 2 This information may
75. See, e.g., Conflict of Interests When Attorneys Acquire Rights to the Cli-
ent's Life Story, 6 J. LEGAL PROFESSION 299 (1981).
76. But see FLORIDA'S CODE DR 5-105c and EC 4-6 (1970).
77. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.9(a) (1986).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at Rule 4-1.9 Comment.
81. Id.
82. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.9(b) (1986).
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be used, however, when it has "become generally known.""3
6. Imputed Disqualification (Rule 4-1.10)
When a lawyer is prohibited from taking a case or continuing to
represent an individual by any disqualification under Rules 4-1.7, 4-1.8,
or 4-1.9, any other member of the lawyer's firm shall also be prohibited
from representing this individual. This is subject to the previously men-
tioned exception for familial relationships"4 and to some qualification
regarding the permissive client waiver of the disqualifying rules.85 Im-
puted disqualification operates quite strictly. An attorney is well-ad-
vised to consider the possibility of conflict as soon as possible when
establishing a new relationship or in continued representation of a cli-
ent. Failure to do so may result in significant damage to the rights of
the client as well as a frustrating loss of time and effort to the
practitioner.
7. Successive Government and Private Employment and the
Activities of Former Judge or Arbitrator (Rules 4-1.11 and
4-1.12)
These rules apply the general conflict principles mentioned in the
preceding sections to successive government and private employment
and the subsequent employment of a former judge or arbitrator. The
first rule (4-1.11) attempts to balance the right of former government
lawyers to seek meaningful employment after leaving government ser-
vice, with the right of the public to be protected from undue influence
on government lawyers with future plans for private employment. This
rule rather closely tracks the other conflict rules and is also quite simi-
lar to DR 9-101(b) of the Code. However, 4-1.11 contains a new provi-
sion which allows a government agency to waive a conflict where ap-
propriate and in the best interest of the government agency. While this
provision was subject to considerable debate, it was the belief of the
drafting committee that a government lawyer should be placed at no
greater disadvantage than lawyers in private practice experiencing a
conflict.
Rule 4-1.12 regarding the activities of a former judge or arbitrator
83. Id.
84. Id. at Rule 4-1.7(d).
85. Id. at Rule 4-1.7(a)(2) and 4-1.7(b)(2).
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is quite similar to Rule 4-1.11 and includes judges, judges pro-tempore,
referees, special masters, hearing officers and other quasi-judicial or
part-time judges.86 The rule prohibits a judge or adjudicative officer
from appearing in a matter in which they "participated personally and
substantially as a judge. ' 87 However, the rule permits representation
where all parties consent. A judge or adjudicative officer is also prohib-
ited from attempting to gain employment from those appearing before
the judge.88 This rule is quite similar to Code section DR 9-101(a).
However, it is considerably more comprehensive and allows representa-
tion if all clients consent. The Code does not allow the clients to con-
sent to an attorney's representation of them where the attorney handled
their matters as a judge.
F. The Organization as a Client (Rule 4-1.13)
This rule considers the relationship between an attorney and an
organization; for example, a corporation or government agency. The
rule defines the attorney's client as the organization;8 9 that is, the "en-
tity" itself is the client of the attorney rather than a specific individual.
The attorney works through the constituents of the corporation in pro-
ceeding with the entity's representation.9" Interestingly, the rule cur-
rently allows the attorney to represent the corporation and its individ-
ual constituents where there is no conflict between their interests.9 1
The body of this rule offers direction for an attorney on how best
to proceed when the organizational components are acting contrary to
law or contrary to the best interests of the organization itself.92 An
attorney is directed to proceed in a manner which will "minimize dis-
ruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information."'9 3
This rule offers a series of increasingly active alternatives which
culminate in permissive resignation if the organization refuses to cor-
rect its action.94
Nothing in this rule will limit or increase a lawyer's responsibili-
86. Id. at Rule 4-1.12 Comment.
87. Id. at Rule 4-1.12(a).
88. Id. at Rule 4-1.12(b).
89. Id. at Rule 4-1.13(a).
90. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
91. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.13(e) (1986).
92. Id. at Rule 4-1.13(b).
93. Id.
94. Id. at Rule 4-1.13(c).
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ties under rules such as 4-1.6, on Confidentiality, and 4-1.2(d), regard-
ing the use of a lawyer's services in a crime. This rule has no real
counterpart in the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for the
first time specifically addresses the special problems in the representa-
tion of an organization.
G. Clients with Disabilities (Rule 4-1.14)
An attorney should be especially sensitive to the problems of a cli-
ent suffering a "disability" such as mental illness or minority. The rules
suggest maintaining as normal a relationship as possible with the client
subject to the special needs of their disability.95 When necessary, a law-
yer is directed to seek professional evaluation and advice to adequately
assist in representing the client's rights.
The attorney involved in representing a juvenile, for example, must
be cognizant of the fact that while young people are often quite sophis-
ticated (even at a very tender age) and deserve thoughtful considera-
tion of their opinion, they may be unable to make all decisions regard-
ing their legal representation without assistance. The same is also true
of clients suffering from mental disease or retardation.
For this special client (in addition to the normal demands of repre-
sentation), the lawyer may become a de facto guardian. As much as
possible, the lawyer should follow the client's wishes, paying special at-
tention to the maintenance of full and detailed communication with his
client. Although the rules specifically suggest that an attorney seek
guidance from an appropriate diagnostician when the client's condition
requires,96 this raises the problem of disclosure of the client's condition
during the course of the representation. For example, in a criminal
case, a court so informed may commit a client who would otherwise go
free.
There are no absolute answers in this area. However, the criminal
practitioner is advised to be alert to the possibility that their client may
be suffering a disability which requires special attention and care.
H. Safekeeping of Property (Rule 4-1.15)
This rule, which is substantially similar to Florida's Code of Pro-
95. Id. at Rule 4-1.14.
96. Id. at Rule 4-1.14(b).
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fessional Responsibility 7 and was redrafted by Florida's Supreme
Court, discusses the lawyer's responsibility to keep in trust (in a sepa-
rate bank account or otherwise) clients' or third persons' funds and
property in the lawyer's possession. 8 The rules also require an attorney
to comply with the Bar's proposed rules regarding trust accounting pro-
cedure99 and requires strict adherence to the lawyer's fiduciary respon-
sibilities. While this rule appears obvious, violation of this rule and the
Bar's requirements for trust accounting is a common cause for attorney
discipline.
I. Withdrawal from the Case (Rule 4-1.16)
Declining or terminating representation of a client includes with-
drawal immediately before or during trial. A client has the right to fire
his or her lawyer at any time although the client remains responsible
for paying for the lawyer's fair services to that point. Likewise, a law-
yer may withdraw at any time during representation if the client de-
mands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or which vio-
lates the Rules of Professional Conduct or law.100 Of course, once a
notice of the appearance has been filed, withdrawal is contingent upon
the permission of the court. Said permission is unlikely to be granted
during a trial except for a very compelling reason. Compelling reasons
include an attorney's physical or mental inabiity to proceed.101 Even at
trial, however, a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client with
the court's permission if this can be accomplished without serious dam-
age to the client's position.0 2 Among the factors permitting this with-
drawal would be: the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate
a crime or fraud;10 3 the client insists upon pursuing an objective that
the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;10 4 the client fails to fulfill
an obligation to the lawyer; 0 5 the representation results in an unrea-
97. See FLORIDA'S CODE DR 9-102 (1970).
98. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-1.15(a) (1986). This rule suggests that funds
be kept in a separate bank account unless the client "specifically instructs, in writing"
that these funds be held "other than in a bank account."
99. Id. at Rule 4-1.15(d).
100. Id. at Rule 4-1.16(a).
101. Id. at Rule 4-1.16(a)(2).
102. Id. at Rule 4-1.16(b).
103. Id. at Rule 4-1.16(b)(2).
104. Id. at Rule 4-1.16(b)(3).
105. Id. at Rule 4-1.16(b)(4).
11271986]
234
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/15
Nova Law Journal
sonable financial burden on the lawyer; 10 6 or other good cause.107 Even
with good cause shown, when ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer
is required to continue representation. 108
An attorney is under no obligation to accept a paying client.109
Monetary considerations may affect this decision, but the creation of a
lawyer-client relationship should be a matter of choice for both parties.
Court-appointed attorneys are not always free to make such choices.110
Before agreeing to represent a client, an attorney should carefully con-
sider his or her decision. Attorneys may find themselves tied to the cli-
ent and unable to withdraw even if the client fails to show up for trial
or fails to meet the fee. Also, the Rules mandate a lawyer not represent
a client if that representation will require a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct or law, or if the lawyer is physically or mentally
unable to adequately represent the client.'
An attorney who is allowed to withdraw from representation is di-
rected to assist the client in minimizing any negative consequences re-
sulting from the withdrawal. 1 2 Finally, Florida's Proposed Rules direct
an attorney to return any unused portion of an advanced fee upon with-
drawal, less any earned or "reasonable, non-refundable fee" which was
originally agreed to by the parties. 1
VI. The Attorney as Counselor - Article Two
Article Two of the proposed Rules discusses the role of attorney as
counselor. The attorney-counselor may serve as advisor, 1 4 intermedi-
ary,' or evaluator for third persons. 116
106. Id. at Rule 4-1.16(b)(5).
107. Id. at Rule 4-1.16(b)(6).
108. Id. at Rule 4-1.16(c).
109. Neither the Code nor the Rules suggest accepting a paying client unless
both parties agree to the representation.
110. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-6.2 (1986).
111. Id. at Rule 4-1.16.
112. Id. at Rule 4-1.16(d).
113. Id. at Rule 4-1.16 Comment.
114. Id. at Rule 4-2.1.
115. Id. at Rule 4-2.2.
116. Id. at Rule 4-2.3.
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A. The Attorney as Advisor (Rule 4-2.1)
This rule recognizes that an attorney during the representation of
a client may offer advice which exceeds the scope of strictly legal rep-
resentation. "An attorney may refer not only to law but to other con-
siderations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that
may be relevant to the client's situation.""' The comment section to
this rule points out that advice which is limited to the law may be of
little value to a client when other factors may play a much greater role
in a client's decision-making. Moral and ethical advice may be very
important to a full and complete representation of a client. When the
advice which is required exceeds the attorney's experience, the com-
ment to 4-2.1 directs the attorney to suggest other professional help for
their client. This rule has no counterpart in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, but mirrors the reality of practice by recognizing that
there are many roles of the modern attorney beyond that of litigator.
B. The Attorney as Intermediary (Rule 4-2.2)
In many situations an attorney is called upon to represent "the
situation" and thereby represent two or more individuals with poten-
tially conflicting interests. This rule specifically excludes the attorney
acting as arbitrator or mediator and suggests the difficulty of represent-
ing parties of conflicting interests. However, there will be situations
where the attorney as intermediary will best solve the needs of the sev-
eral clients. For example, an attorney may be called upon to form a
business or arrange for the distribution of property in the settling of an
estate. In any event, an attorney must fully explain his or her role to
each client and receive their knowing consent.118 When forced to with-
draw, the intermediary must withdraw from representation of all cli-
ents. This is necessary even if only one client has brought an action for
the attorney's withdrawal. It is clear that an attorney must seek to
avoid the confidentiality and privilege conflicts which could arise should
he or she fail to withdraw.1 '
This rule also has no counterpart in the earlier Code, and, once
again, recognizes the new and varied roles filled by attorneys today.
117. Id. at Rule 4-2.1.
118. Id. at Rule 4-2.2(a)(1).
119. Id. at Rule 4-2.2(c).
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C. Evaluations for the Use of Third Parties (Rule 4-2.3)
This rule considers lawyer's activities such as opinion letters. Opin-
ion letters, while conducted for the attorney's client, will often be used
by a third party. If the attorney is limited in her ability to obtain infor-
mation for this evaluation, she is required to report any limitations for
the benefit of the third parties.120 Perhaps the most interesting question
posed by this rule remains unanswered by it; that is, what is the profes-
sional relationship between the attorney and the third-party client who
relies upon the attorney's opinion? The comment section to the rule
simply says "that legal question is beyond the scope of this rule. 121
This rule is new, and was not considered by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
VII. Trial Practice - Article Three
"A lawyer's responsibility as a representative of clients, and also to
the legal system and as a public citizen are usually harmonious. Vigor-
ous advocacy is not inconsistent with justice."' 22 Many of the proposed
rules arguably affect trial practice situations. 2 3 However, Article
Three speaks directly to the lawyer as an advocate, and includes sec-
tions on: trial publicity; 24 lawyers as witnesses;125 advocacy in
nonadjudicative proceedings; 26 fairness to opposing counsel and par-
ties; 27 meritorious claims or contentions; 28 expediting litigation;22 and
the central rule, 4-3.3, candor toward the tribunal. During the ABA
debate and the Florida adoption process, Rule 4-3.3 remained the bot-
tom-line limit on a lawyer's protection of the confidentiality of his cli-
ent and the minimum standard of his responsibility as an officer of the
court.
120. Id. at Rule 4-2.3(b).
121. Id. at Rule 4-2.3 Comment.
122. FLORIDA NEW RULES Preamble (1986).
123. See, e.g., FLORIDA NEW RULES Rules 4-1.2 and 4-1.3.
124. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-3.6 (1986).
125. Id. at Rule 4-3.7.
126. Id. at Rule 4-3.9.
127. Id. at Rule 4-3.4.
128. Id. at Rule 4-3.1.
129. Id. at Rule 4-3.2.
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A. Meritorious Claims and Contentions (Rule 4-3.1)
Rule 4-3.1 suggests that while a client has a right to the full bene-
fit of representation, an attorney is prohibited from abusing the legal
process. The benefit of any ambiguity and potential for change in the
law should always be given to one's client. However, action taken pri-
marily to harass, injure or embarrass the other party is prohibited by
the rule. 130
Rule 4-3.1 is similar to the Florida Code's DR 7-102 with some
difference in emphasis only. Rule 4-3.1 requires that the litigation not
be "frivolous" while the Code prohibited conduct designed "merely to
harass and maliciously injure another. 13 1
B. Expediting Litigation (Rule 4-3.2)
Rule 4-3.2 establishes the Rules' general policy "to expedite litiga-
tion." ' 32 However, this policy is limited by the requirement that an at-
torney's efforts must be consistent with the interest of the client. A
lawyer's convenience, or an attempt to frustrate the opposing parties'
rights, are not sufficient grounds for delay. Also, the fact that this delay
is typical in the jurisdiction, or that the client may realize financial
benefit from the delay, are not sufficient grounds for delaying litigation.
This is similar to the Code's DR section 7-102(a)(1), although the
phrase "legitimate interest of the client"1 33 is added to the Model Rule.
This rule requires an attorney to "make reasonable efforts to expe-
dite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. 13 4 A litigator
does not appear to be significantly affected by this rule. If delay is a
valid technique (which would serve the interests of the client), this rule
permits such delay. However, rules of procedure, constitutional rights
and court practices may require an attempt at an expeditious resolution
of a case. Nothing in the Rules makes it a violation of professional
conduct for criminal attorneys, acting in the best interests of their cli-
ents, to delay a case.
130. Id. at Rule 4-3.1 Comment.
131. FLORIDA'S CODE Rule 3.1 (1970).
132. FLORIDA NEw RULES Rule 4-3.2 (1986).
133. Id. at Rule 4-3.2 Comment.
134. Id. at Rule 4-3.2.
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C. Candor Toward the Tribunal (Rule 4-3.3)
This rule requires an attorney to disclose important information or
relevant law to a court, or to correct a false statement of the same
despite the requirement of confidentiality. 3 5 Although the past conduct
of a client is still protected, Florida's rule on attorney-client confidenti-
ality requires significantly more disclosure than the ABA Model Rule.
Both ABA and Florida confidentiality rules, however, are subject to the
mandate of 4-3.3 (ABA Rule 3.3) requiring disclosure to the
tribunal. 36
1. Legal Argument
A lawyer must always be scrupulously honest in presenting the law
to a court.' 37 This rule requires an advocate to disclose legal authority
in the controlling jurisdiction which is directly adverse to the position
of the client if it has not been disclosed by the opposing party. 3 8 This
is an area of considerable concern to the courts today.
2. False Evidence
Under no circumstance should a lawyer offer evidence which the
lawyer knows to be false even if the client insists.39 If false evidence
has been offered and is material, the lawyer must withdraw and/or cor-
rect this false evidence. x40 When the evidence has been offered by the
attorney's client, the client should be persuaded to withdraw that evi-
dence. If the client refuses, the attorney must take "reasonable reme-
dial measures."' 4 The rules recognize that this disclosure will severely
damage the lawyer-client relationship.' However, the comment says
the "alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court,
thereby subverting the truth finding process."' 4 3 The rule also points
135. Id. at Rule 4-3.3.
136. ABA MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(b) (1983) and FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-
3.3(b) (1986).
137. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-3.3(a)(1) (1986).
138. Id. at Rule 4-3.3(a)(3).
139. Id. at Rule 4-3.3 Comment.
140. Id. at Rule 4-3.3(a)(3).
141. Id. at Rule 4-3.3 Comment.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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out that if an attorney in a civil matter could not disclose false evidence
in every case, the lawyer could be made an unwilling party to fraud on
the court. It is interesting to note that the Rules recognize that the
obligation may be different for a criminal defendant but are unequivo-
cal in requiring disclosure in civil matters.""' In Nix v. Whiteside,145
the United States Supreme Court recently held that threatened disclos-
ure of a client's lies does not violate a criminal client's sixth amend-
ment rights.
In any event, if a civil client has offered false evidence to the court
and the client cannot be convinced to rectify the same, the Rules allow
an advocate to withdraw "if that would remedy the situation. ' 146 If the
withdrawal will not satisfactorily remedy the problem or cannot be ac-
complished, disclosure must be made.1 17
Rule 4-3.3(c) allows a lawyer to refuse to offer any testimony or
other proof which the lawyer believes is untrustworthy. This is true de-
spite the general policy of the Rules which require client control of
matters relating to representation.148
Finally, Rule 4-3.3(d) considers the advocate's special responsibili-
ties in an ex parte proceeding. A lawyer is held to have a duty to dis-
close all material facts known to the lawyer necessary for an informed
decision by the court.14 9 Disclosure is required even if the facts are
contrary to the position held by the lawyer's client. The protection of
the "unrepresented" other side from what may be a significant and un-
fair decision is the policy basis for this rule.
Rule 4-3.3 is substantially similar to Disciplinary Rule 7-102.
However, the rule clarifies the attorney's duty to rectify the use of per-
jured testimony or false evidence, and extends the professional judg-
ment of the lawyer in refusing to offer evidence reasonably believed to
be false.1 50
D. Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel (Rule 4-3.4)
This rule considers an attorney's obligation to the opposing party
144. Id.
145. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
146. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-3.3 Comment (1986).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at Rule 4-3.3(d).
150. The ex parte section is a new addition to the rule discussing candor to the
tribunal.
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and their lawyer in trial or immediately pre-trial and is directed to
"fair competition" with a goal of guaranteeing the effective functioning
of the adversary system.151 Prohibited are: the destruction of evidence;
hiding of witnesses; fabrication of evidence; failure to comply with dis-
covery; and attempts to use irrelevant or inadmissable evidence in trial.
Most of this rule calls for the judicious application of common sense.
For example, the rule states that a legally made discovery request must
be complied with 152 and that the fabrication of testimony is prohib-
ited.1 53 Although often ignored in practice, perhaps the most interesting
sections of this rule prohibit an attorney's use of evidence known to be
inadmissible.
An attorney is prohibited at trial from "allud[ing] to any matter
that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not
be supported by admissible evidence. ' 154 Thus, an attorney may not
properly use the traditional tactic of asking questions that are inadmis-
sible or irrelevant hoping the opposing party will not object. This rule
also prohibits an attorney from asking inadmissible questions simply for
the "effect" of the question.
An attorney is also prohibited from stating a "knowledge of facts
in issue" except when the attorney has been called as a witness. For
example, in closing argument an attorney is prohibited from guarantee-
ing the truthfulness of evidence which he or she has presented. An at-
torney is also prohibited from stating an opinion "as to the justness of a
cause" or commenting on the credibility of the witness or the culpabil-
ity of a civil litigant. 155
E. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal (Rule 4-3.5)
This rule restates the obvious: for the court system to function
properly, neither judge, jury, nor prospective juror should be improp-
erly influenced by an advocate. Of course, influence through the presen-
tation of evidence and the persuasive ability of an attorney is not pro-
hibited. Ex parte communications are prohibited during an official
proceeding. Contact with a juror after the case has ended is also pro-
151. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-3.4 (1986).
152. Id. at Rule 4-3.4(a).
153. Id. at Rule 4-3.4(b).
154. Id. at Rule 4-3.4(e).
155. Id. Rule 4-3.4 is essentially the same as DR 7-106(c)(1) - (c)(4).
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hibited unless such contact is initiated by the juror.156
This rule is substantially the same as Code Disciplinary Rules 7-
106, 7-108, and 7-110. The Busey Committee determined that DR 7-
1 10(b) was more practical than the ABA Model Rule 3.5(b). There-
fore, they included the complete text of DR 7-110(b) in Florida's Rule
4-3.5(b).
F. Trial Publicity (Rule 4-3.6)
The "trial publicity" rule, as redrafted by the Florida Supreme
Court, details permitted and prohibited conduct by an attorney, when
he or she is offering information to the media before and during trial.
This is a troubling area because the interests of free speech and a fair
trial conflict. This "trial publicity" rule deserves particular attention
because even a cursory review of much of the popular media suggests
that the dictates of this rule are rarely honored.15 7
Rule 4-3.6 generally prohibits any out-of-court statement which is
likely to be reported by the media and might "materially prejudice" a
trial.158 Lawyers are also prohibited by the Florida rule from aiding
another in making such a statement. 59 Examples of such statements
are those which: relate to the character, credibility or reputation of a
party;160 discuss results of any test or the nature of physical evidence
which might be presented at trial;161 or divulge information which
would be inadmissable at trial or prejudice an impartial trial. 6 2
The "trial publicity" rule does allow certain statements to be made
"without elaboration." 63 Statements which give general information
about the claim or defense; divulge publicly-recorded information; an-
nounce that an investigation is underway; or request assistance in ob-
156. FLORIDA NEw RULES Rule 4-3.5(c) (1986).
157. An almost daily review of local television or newspapers reveals attorney
comments on pending and in-trial cases contrary to the dictates of this rule.
158. FLORIDA NEw RULES Rule 4-3.6(a) (1986).
159. Id. The Florida Supreme Court specifically added the following proviso to
4-3.6(a): "[P]rosecutors and defense counsel shall exercise reasonable care to prevent
investigators, employees, or other persons assisting in or associated with a criminal case
from making extrajudicial statements that are prohibited under this rule." Very similar
wording had been considered but dropped by the drafting committee from Rule 4-3.8,
Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.
160. Id. at Rule 4-3.6(b)(1).
161. Id. at Rule 4-3.6(b)(3).
162. Id. at Rule 4-3.6(b)(5).
163. Id. at Rule 4-3.6(c).
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taining evidence and information, are allowed under this rule. 1 4
G. The Lawyer as Witness (Rule 4-3.7)
The bar and courts have been long concerned about the confusion
which results from an attorney serving as advocate and witness in the
same trial. Therefore, this rule was adopted to prohibit an attorney
from acting as an advocate in a trial where he or she is likely to be
called as a witness. This rule is subject to four exceptions in Florida's
New Rules.
Since disqualification of a lawyer is often brought by an opposing
party to obtain a tactical advantage, withdrawal will not be required
where it will "work a substantial hardship on the client." 165 However,
the court will consider the foreseeability of the lawyer's need to serve
as a witness in reaching its decision on disqualification.
To determine whether or not a potential for conflict exists, lawyers
should determine if their testimony relates to any of the three other
areas which do not require disqualification. These include: testimony on
an uncontested issue; testimony relating to the nature and value of the
legal services rendered in the case; and testimony having to do with a
matter of formality where it is unlikely that substantial evidence will be
offered in opposition.' 66
This rule generally tracks Florida's current Disciplinary Rules,
sections 5-101(b) and 5-102. The proposed rule, however, adds a sec-
tion which allows a lawyer who is required to act as a witness "to assist
in trial preparation."' 6 7 The Rules also do not require a firm to with-
draw from representation when one member of the firm will be called
as a witness. 6 s The Florida approach suggests that this is a tactical
rather than an ethical decision, and should not require withdrawal of
the whole firm.
H. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor (Rule 4-3.8)
This rule recognizes the special role of a prosecutor as spokesper-
son for justice, and discusses the special obligations imposed by this
164. Id. at Rule 4-3.6(c)(1) - (c)(7). Rule 4-3.6 is similar to Code DR 7-107.
165. FLORIDA NEw RULES Rule 4-3.7(a)(4) (1986).
166. Id. at Rule 4-3.7 Comment.
167. Id.
168. Id. at Rule 4-3.7(b).
1136 [Vol. 10
243
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Professional Responsibility
role.169 A prosecutor is directed to only bring criminal charges which
are supported by sufficient probable cause. 170 A prosecutor is also di-
rected to be especially sensitive to the very important constitutionally
protected pre-trial rights of an unrepresented criminal defendant. 17' Fi-
nally, a prosecutor is directed to provide the defense with evidence and
information which might "negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate
the offense"' 72 and at sentencing to disclose all mitigating information
which is not privileged. 173 This special role of the prosecutor in the
criminal justice system is in accord with prior code section DR 7-103.
I. Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings (Rule 4-3.9)
Although not strictly addressing a "trial situation," this rule ap-
plies the previously mentioned rules requiring honest and ethical con-
duct to representation before a legislative or administrative tribunal. In
administrative law practice, a lawyer may be subject to regulations and
procedures of an administrative tribunal. However, the Model Rules
may subject the attorney to a standard of conduct higher than that of
other non-lawyer advocates before the same tribunal. The comment
section to this rule suggests that "legislatures and administrative agen-
cies have a right to expect lawyers to deal with them as they deal with
the courts.' 7 4
VIII. Transactions with Persons Other than Clients - Article
Four
This article provides guidance for an attorney's dealing with per-
sons other than his or her client. These rules consider truthfulness in
statements to others;17 in communications with persons represented by
169. Rule 4-3.8 comment section cites to the ABA STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE relating to the Prosecution Function which have been adopted in Florida and
provide more guidance on the specific role of the prosecutor. Prosecutors are also di-
rected to Rule 4-3.3(d) regarding ex parte proceedings, Rule 4-8.4 regarding system-
atic abuse of prosecutorial discretion, and Rule 4-3.6(a) on extrajudicial statements.
170. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-3.8(a) (1986).
171. Id. at 4-3.8(b).
172. Id. at 4-3.8(c).
173. Id.
174. Id. at Rule 4-3.9 Comment.
175. Id. at Rule 4-4.1.
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attorneys;17 6 when dealing with those not represented by attorneys;
and with respect for the rights of third persons. 78 One should also con-
sider Rule 4-2.3 (Evaluation for Use by Third Persons) and Rule 4-3.4
(Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel) as relevant to material cov-
ered by this article.
A. Duty to the Opposing Party and to Third Persons (Rules 4-
3.4, 4-4.1, 4-4.2, 4-4.3, and 4-4.4)
Rule 4-3.4, previously considered as part of the "trial" rules, con-
tains substantial material which applies to pre-trial practice as well.
The adversary system requires "fair competition" between the parties
to work properly. Substantive law, procedural law and the New Rules
require that a lawyer not hide, destroy or fabricate evidence. This ap-
plies even where no formal case yet exists.
For example, assume a crazed killer appears at a lawyer's office
and drops a blood-stained knife on the lawyer's desk. No formal
charges exist (the murder has not been discovered); however, the de-
struction of the murder weapon is a violation of ethics and law. If a
potential action is reasonably foreseeable, lawyers are prohibited by the
New Rules from hiding, destroying or fabricating evidence. 7 The
Rules prohibit assisting others in doing that which an attorney is pro-
hibited from doing.'80 Therefore, advising a client to "get rid of the
knife" would also violate this rule.' 8'
Rule 4-3.4(b), (c) and (f) prohibits assisting perjury or discourag-
ing a witness from giving information to an adversary. A client and the
client's relatives, employees or other agents are excluded from the oper-
ation of the rule if they will not be hurt by withholding information.
The Rules also require respect for the rights of third persons.18 2
These rights should be honored whenever consistent with the role of the
advocate. Naturally clients' rights must supercede the rights of the
third person. However, an attorney should refrain from using tactics
which "have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or
176. Id. at Rule 4-4.2.
177. Id. at Rule 4-4.3.
178. Id. at Rule 4-4.4.
179. Id. at Rule 4-3.4(a).
180. Id.
181. Id. at Rule 4-3.4.
182. Id. at Rule 4-4.4.
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burden a third person."18 3 Furthermore, methods of obtaining evidence
which "violate the legal rights" of the third parties are also
prohibited.184
The rights of third parties also include the requirement for truth-
fulness to the third party and may include some limited disclosure.18 5
Attorneys are prohibited from making false statements of material law
or fact to third parties and are required to disclose material facts if it
will help a third party avoid becoming victimized by their client's ac-
tions. However, this disclosure requirement is subject to Rule 4-1.6.18"
This may be applicable to the situation where a lawyer's client proposes
a criminal activity and refuses the attorney's advice to refrain from
such action. 87
B. Communication with a Person Who is Represented by
Counsel (Rule 4-4.2)
This rule is substantially the same as Florida's prior Code sec-
tion.188 A lawyer is prohibited from communicating with a person
about the subject matter of an attorney representation. Communication
not regarding the subject matter of the representation is permitted.
Parties are allowed to communicate directly with each other, despite
the fact they are represented by counsel. Lastly, an attorney represent-
ing a client may consent to another attorney's communication with that
person.
C. Dealing with Unrepresented Persons (Rule 4-4.3)
Rule 4-4.3 cautions attorneys to refrain from dealing with unrep-
resented persons. 89 Attorneys are best advised to avoid contact with
unrepresented persons outside a formal, structured setting or a court-
room. However, if contact is initiated by an unrepresented person, the
Rules permit an attorney to speak with this person. The attorney is best
advised to hold this conversation in the presence of an independent wit-
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at Rule 4-4.1(b).
186. Id.
187. See FLORIDA NEW RULES Rules 4-1.6 and 4-4.1 (1986). Each requires dis-
closure to an intended victim.
188. See FLORIDA'S CODE DR 7-104(a)(1) (1970).
189. FLORIDA NEw RULES Rule 4-4.3 (1986).
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ness to protect all parties. The attorney should clearly explain that he
or she is not there to help the unrepresented person, and should also
explain all options available to that person.
IX. Law Firms and Associations - Article Five
This section of the Model Rules details the responsibilities of law
firms and subordinate attorneys. It clearly discusses the responsibility
of supervising lawyers, °90 subordinate lawyers,' 9' and non-lawyer assist-
ants. 192 This article also considers unauthorized practice of law, 9 3 a
lawyer's independence,194 and limitations on restriction of the right to
practice. 195
A. Law Firm and Government Office Responsibility for Profes-
sional Conduct (Rule 4-5.1)
This rule clarifies an individual attorney's responsibility for him-
self as well as those he supervises to comply with the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.'96 Every lawyer's responsibility extends to those super-
vised by the lawyer including secretaries, paralegals and clerks.
Ultimately the lawyer is responsible for the action of these "non-lawyer
assistants" if he or she has directed them to act or permits them to act
in violation of the Rules. The law firm partner or government office
supervisor is also responsible for ensuring that his or her office takes
reasonable steps to guarantee that all office staff observe the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Measures to ensure compliance can range from
informal support and guidance to structured seminars. Junior firm
members should be encouraged to raise ethical issues. Formal mecha-
nisms should be established within the workplace to promote this com-
pliance. Lawyers who are required to act in a supervisory capacity have
a greater obligation to ensure that the conduct of their subordinates
meets the standards of the Rules of Professional Conduct.97
Junior associates are not, however, relieved of their individual re-
190. Id. at Rule 4-5.1.
191. Id. at Rule 4-5.2.
192. Id. at Rule 4-5.3.
193. Id. at Rule 4-5.5.
194. Id. at Rule 4-5.4.
195. Id. at Rule 4-5.6.
196. Id. at Rule 4-5.1.
197. Id.
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sponsibility to follow the Rules of Professional Conduct. It is not an
excuse that a supervisor has directed the action of the junior lawyer,
unless the ethical issue in question is subject to a disagreement between
reasonable attorneys. 98
X. Public Service - Article Six
Article Six was one of the most controversial during the ABA and
Florida debate and adoption process. It discusses pro bono service,1 99
law reform,200 and legal service activities.20 1
A. Pro bono Service (Rules 4-6.1 and 4-6.2)
This is the only rule that is purely aspirational in nature, s02 but
does apply this pro bono "obligation" to civil and criminal matters.
Lawyers are encouraged to provide free legal services to those in need
who are unable to afford required legal assistance. Although the Flor-
ida public defender system has dealt with most indigent criminal repre-
sentation, the criminal practitioner is still required to observe this rule
by providing service to those in need of civil representation. The Flor-
ida Rules provide three ways to meet this suggested pro bono responsi-
bility: 1) free or reduced fee representation to those of limited means;
2) service without compensation in public interest activities that im-
prove the law, the legal system, and the legal profession; or 3) provision
of financial support to Legal Aid or similar organizations.
Several times in the past few years, proposals for mandatory pro
bono service have been considered and rejected by the Florida Supreme
Court and the Florida Bar. While such mandatory plans have been re-
jected, at least one voluntary bar association (Orange County) has in-
stituted a mandatory pro bono plan. This plan requires pro bono service
or a financial assessment to support the local legal services office, and
seems to operate most satisfactorily.
It is likely that the debate on mandatory pro bono service will con-
tinue in Florida. The Florida Bar's Special Commission on Access to
the Legal System recently proposed a change in Rule 4-6.1, suggesting
198. Id. at Rule 4-5.2.
199. Id. at Rule 4-6.1.
200. Id. at Rule 4-6.4.
201. Id. at Rule 4-6.3.
202. Id. at Rule 4-6.1.
19861 1141
248
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/15
Nova Law Journal
that the Bar make pro bono service mandatory. This change was re-
jected by the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar but will no doubt
resurface. Since attorneys have a monopoly on access to the legal sys-
tem, lively debate in this area is guaranteed for years to come.
In other states, courts have appointed attorneys (without fee or
with minimal compensation) to represent indigent clients in criminal
and civil matters. Such "involuntary servitude" has been gaining ac-
ceptance in many states.20 3 Given the substantial cost counties incur
when appointing special public defenders, this approach may also be a
matter for future consideration in criminal cases in Florida.
The Rules encourage the acceptance of these court appointments
and strongly discourage refusal or withdrawal except for "good
cause." 204 "Good cause" means that the representation would require a
violation of the rules of professional conduct; an unreasonable financial
burden will be placed upon the lawyer; or "the client or the cause is so
repugnant" 20 5 that the lawyer cannot adequately enter into this
relationship.
B. Membership in Legal Services Organizations (Rule 4-6.3)
This rule, which has no counterpart in the Code, encourages attor-
neys to participate in legal service organizations. However, an attorney
is warned that potential conflicts can arise from such activities. There-
fore, the attorney is directed to consider his or her obligations under
Rule 4-1.7.206
C. Law Reform Activity (Rule 4-6.4)
The "law reform activity" rule encourages attorneys to support
and participate in law reform activities. An attorney is encouraged to
do so even if the activities are contrary to the interests of the attorney's
client. A lawyer represents the client but is not married to the client's
cause. Denying lawyers participation in law reform activities would
deny society the input of those best trained in this area.20 7 If a lawyer
participates in law reform activities and his client will be materially
203. California, for example, has accepted the constitutionality of this "involun-
tary servitude."
204. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-6.2 (1986).
205. Id.
206. Id. at Rule 4-6.3(a).
207. Id. at Rule 4-6.4 Comment.
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affected by these activities, the client's relationship must be disclosed.
The client need not be identified, however.
XI. Information about Legal Services - Article Seven
Article Seven deals with the activities of a lawyer in communicat-
ing the availability of his or her services.2 08 Among the areas discussed
are attorney advertising,20 9 solicitation, 210 specialization,2 11 and law
firm names.212
A. Advertising (Rules 4-7.1, 4-7.2, 4-7.3)
State bars have reluctantly allowed advertising in response to the
mandates of the United States Supreme Court and state supreme
courts. Rules 4-7.1, 4-7.2, and 4-7.3 are an attempt to accomodate the
hesitancy of the bar to the directives of case law.
The New Florida Rules allow advertising in a wide variety of me-
dia, with "truthfulness" the only limitation on a lawyer's right to ad-
vertise. Advertising is permitted by Rule 4-7.2 in all public media in-
cluding telephone directories, legal directories, newspapers or other
periodicals, outdoor signs, radio, television or written communica-
tion. 2' 3 Florida's drafting committee was concerned about lawyers
abusing the right to advertise, but concluded that the right to commer-
cial speech was a superior interest. Considering the traditional reti-
cence of the profession to be involved in the "business world," the
drafting committee agreed that advertising helps serve the public's
need for information regarding the availability and cost of legal
services.
False or misleading advertising is defined in the rules as advertis-
ing which contains "a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or
omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not
misleading. '21 4 Advertising is also false or misleading if a lawyer's ad
creates an "unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can
208. Id. at Rule 4-4.1.
209. Id. at Rule 4-7.1.
210. Id. at Rule 4-7.3.
211. Id. at Rule 4-7.4.
212. Id. at Rule 4-7.5.
213. Id. at Rule 4-7.2(a).
214. Id. at Rule 4-7.1(a).
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achieve. '21 5 An attorney's advertisement should not compare "the law-
yer's services with other lawyers' services unless the comparison can be
factually substantiated. 218 Prohibited communications include adver-
tisements which discuss the results obtained on behalf of a particular
client, the lawyer's win/loss record, or client endorsements.2 17 Beyond
that, little regulation and little guidance is offered to an attorney re-
garding the content or format of an advertisement. Since "taste is a
highly subjective matter" 2118 advertisements should "comport with the
dignity of the profession."219
The comment to Rule 4-7.2 discourages the use of slogans; gim-
micks or other garish techniques; large electrical or neon signs; or other
extravagant media.120 Despite the specific addition of this commentary
section to Florida's rules (it does not exist in the Model Rules), it is
questionable if such guidance is more than aspirational at best.
For example, an Ohio Bar rule which prohibited most advertising
illustrations and cautioned against an attorney giving advice regarding
specific legal problems in their advertisements was recently overturned
by the United States Supreme Court in Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel.221 Zauderer, an Ohio attorney, used an illustration of a
Dalkon Shield in a newspaper advertisement which asked, "Did you
use this IUD? [This device is] . . . alleged to have caused [many inju-
ries]. Do not assume it is too late to take legal action against the
shield's manufacturer. 222
The Supreme Court held that this advertisement was protected
commercial speech, and the Ohio Bar could only prohibit false and
misleading advertisements. 223 Absent a showing on the part of the state
that the regulation prohibiting this advertisement served a substantial
governmental interest, the Court indicated it was inclined to allow all
advertisements meeting the standards of New Florida Rule 4-7.1.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court rejected an Iowa Su-
preme Court ruling which had prohibited television advertisements by
215. Id. at Rule 4-7.1(b).
216. Id. at Rule 4-7.1(c).
217. Id. at Rule 4-7.1 Comment.
218. Id. at Rule 4-7.2 Comment.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
222. Id. at 2271.
223. Id.
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lawyers, 224 thereby reaffirming the almost unlimited access to the pub-
lic by truthful attorneys.
Only a few additional restrictions are mandated by Rule 4-7.2(b)
and 4-7.2(d). A copy of an advertisement or written communication
must be kept for at least three years after it was last used, along with a
record of to whom it was sent and where. This "communication" by an
attorney also must include the name of at least one lawyer responsible
for its content. Florida's Rules Drafting Committee debated but aban-
doned the "laundry list format" of the Code's DR 2-101 in favor of a
more defensible general standard of truthfulness. The Committee cor-
rectly felt that In re R.M.J.225 and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 26
prohibited most specific limitations on advertising without a showing of
a commensurately compelling state interest.
The Florida Rules also permit lawyers to communicate their fields
of practice subject to restrictions contained in Rule 4-7.4. While law-
yers may not state they are specialists in a given field, they may state
those areas in which they choose to practice. Exceptions to this rule are
attorneys in patent and admiralty practice, and those lawyers who are
certified under Florida certification or designation plans.
Law firms in Florida continue to have the option of using trade
names or other professional titles. Trade names, however, must not be
misleading nor may lawyers state or imply that they practice in a part-
nership or other organization when that is not the fact.227
B. Solicitation (Rule 4-7.3)
Solicitation, the direct contact with prospective clients, is an area
more closely regulated by the courts than advertising. There is a long
history of prohibition of this conduct by the Florida and United States
Supreme Courts. However, the United States Supreme Court's decision
In re R.M.J., and the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Florida Bar
v. Schreiber,22 8 have begun to reshape this area of regulation. Schrei-
ber, a Dade County Commissioner and attorney, sent letters to interna-
tional trade companies explaining the availability of his firm for legal
224. See Humphrey v. Commission of Professional Conduct, 105 S. Ct. 2693
(1985). At time of publication the Iowa Supreme Court on rehearing has still strictly
limited such advertising.
225. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
226. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
227. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-7.5 (1986).
228. 407 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1981), vacated on reh'g, 420 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1982).
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services in immigration matters. In light of the Supreme Court's In re
R.M.J. ruling, the Florida court reluctantly allowed this relatively non-
intrusive solicitation subject to certain guidelines contained in direct-
mail rules issued by the court in January 1984.229
Florida's Rules continue the generalized prohibition against solici-
tation of new clients when a lawyer's profit motive is the primary rea-
son for this solicitation. Solicitation of this type is prohibited whether it
is made in person, by telephone or in writing.230 However, solicitation
for social causes or the public welfare (that is, without the primary
motive of financial reward) is still permitted by Rule 4-7.3 and by In re
Primus.
231
Now targeted direct-mail advertisements, which are often charac-
terized as solicitation, are permitted. However, direct-mail advertise-
ment must be marked "advertisement" on the envelope and at the top
of each page. Furthermore, the word "advertisement" must be in type
one size larger than the largest type232 in the communication.
Even this permitted "solicitation" is subject to the requirement of
truthfulness and must avoid "coercion, duress, fraud, over-reaching,
harrassment, intimidation or undue influence."2 Further, those known
to be represented in a specific matter may not be contacted nor may
those who do not wish to receive communications from the lawyer.2 34
The most unsupportable section of the committee draft solicitation
rule prohibited mail contact with those known to be in need of legal
services in a specific matter (e.g., direct-mail contact with the families
of airplane accident victims). A growing body of case law seems to
permit such conduct. For example, New York State's highest court re-
cently overruled a Bar rule (similar to Florida's) which prohibited
targeted direct mail.23 5 Responding to this the Florida Supreme Court
229. Id. Arguably, this alters the limitations required by FLA. STAT. § 877.02
(1985).
230. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-7.3(a) (1986).
231. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
232. The Florida Supreme Court redrafted 4-7.3(b)(1) to include larger type and
4-7.3(b)(2) to include the mailing of a copy of all written solicitations to staff counsel
at bar headquarters.
233. FLORIDA NEw RULES Rule 4-7.3(B)(2)(c).
234. Id. at Rule 4-7.3(B)(2)(a) and Rule 4-7.3(B)(2)(b).
235. See In re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40, 470 N.E.2d 838
(1984), on remand, 108 A.D.2d 1012, 485 N.Y.S.2d 399 (N.Y. App. Div.), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Committee on Professional Standards v. Von Wiegen, 105 S. Ct. 2701
(1985). See also Messing, The Latest Word on Solicitation, FLA. BAR J., May 1986, at
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wisely concluded that this targeted mailing could not be prohibited. In
its rewriting of this Rule the court proposed five rules236 regulating
such communication and said it would revisit this area if a pattern of
abuse is established.
The danger of "ambulance chasing," exemplified by Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Association,23 7 is the basis for the rules prohibiting so-
licitation. Ohralik, an Ohio attorney, solicited the parents of one of the
drivers injured in an automobile accident. The parents suggested that
whether an attorney would be hired would be the injured daughter's
decision. Ohralik approached the daughter at the hospital and offered
to represent her. She would not sign an agreement until conferring with
her parents.
The Ohio attorney then went back to the parents' home with a
tape recorder concealed under his raincoat. He examined the parents'
insurance policy and discovered that the daughter's passenger also
could benefit from the policy. Ohralik eventually got the daughter to
sign a contract with him, and an oral agreement with the daughter's
passenger to allow him to represent her as well.
Eventually, each of these parties discharged Ohralik and filed a
formal complaint against him with the Ohio Bar's Grievance Board.
The Board rejected the attorney's defense that his conduct was pro-
tected under the first and fourteenth amendments. The Supreme Court
of Ohio, as well as the United States Supreme Court, adopted the find-
ings of the Board.
This type of conduct by an attorney still invokes the Rules' strong-
est limits on a lawyer's right to communicate the availability of his or
her services. In this situation the possibility of undue influence, intimi-
dation and overreaching 238 is without limit, while public scrutiny or
regulation is almost impossible.
C. Communication of Fields of Practice (Rule 4-7.4)
This rule allows attorneys to communicate to the public the areas
of law in which they do and do not practice. However, it prohibits at-
torneys from stating that they are specialists except for a few limited
17.
236. See FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-7.3(b)(2)a-e (1986).
237. 436 U.S. 477 (1978).
238. Id. at 464.
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areas such as patent practice; 3 9 admiralty; 40 certification,2 41 as set
forth in Article 21 of the integration rule and Article 14 of the by-laws
of the Florida Bar; and designation. 42 The rule specifically rejects the
Code prohibition of communication regarding limitation of practice2 43
but is essentially similar in other respects.
D. Firm Names and Letterheads (Rule 4-7.5)
This rule allows the use of trade names which are not mislead-
ing,244 and requires truthful and complete communication in the use of
trade names and in the printing of a letterhead for a firm.
XII. Integrity of the Profession - Article Eight
Article Eight rules mandate respect for and obligation to the legal
profession and the courts. For example, Rule 4-8.2, Judicial and Legal
Officials, directs a lawyer not to make a statement which he or she
knows to be false or "with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge. '2 45 Lawyers are
encouraged by the commentary to this rule to defend judges in courts
when they have been unjustly criticized, but are allowed to express
honest and candid opinions on such matters to contribute to improving
the administration of justice. 46
Lawyers are directed by Rule 4-8.3 to report a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct on the part of a court, and to report the
professional misconduct of opposing counsel that "raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer. "247
Rule 4-8.4 is a catch-all, requiring conduct similar to earlier "of-
ficer and a gentleman" standards. This includes the prohibition of con-
duct that is "prejudicial to the administration of justice."'24 8
239. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-7.4(a) (1986).
240. Id. at Rule 4-7.4(b).
241. Id. at Rule 4-7.4(c).
242. Id. at Rule 4-7.4(d).
243. See FLORIDA'S CODE DR 2-105 (1970).
244. FLORIDA NEW RULES Rule 4-7.5(a) (1986).
245. Id. at Rule 4-8.2(c).
246. Id. at Rule 4-8.2 Comment.
247. Id. at Rule 4-8.3(a).
248. Id. at Rule 4-8.3.
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A. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters (Rule 4-8.1)
This rule requires applicants to the Bar and admitted attorneys to
be completely candid in their relationship with the Florida Board of
Bar Examiners. The rule further requires that an attorney or applicant
respond to any request for information from the Board of Bar Examin-
ers or the Florida Bar and to correct any misunderstanding which may
have occurred in the matter.249
B. Judicial and Legal Officials (Rule 4-8.2)
This is a judicial protection rule requiring lawyers to be moderate
in their public evaluation of judges and encouraging them to defend
"judges and courts which have unjustly been criticized. '250
C. Professional Misconduct (Rules 4-8.3, 4-8.4)
The Florida Rules (4-8.3, 4-8.4) regarding misconduct are so gen-
eral and so obvious as to require only a brief listing. Rule 4-8.4 prohib-
its a lawyer from attempting to violate or from violating any other rule,
or helping or encouraging another to do so; from committing a crime of
moral turpitude; from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation, or conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice; from stating or implying an ability to improperly influ-
ence a government agency or official; or from assisting a judge in vio-
lating the code of judicial conduct.
Of greater interest and sophistication, however, are the Rule 4-8.3
requirements for reporting the misconduct of others. Lawyers are obli-
gated to maintain the high standards (theirs and others) of the profes-
sion. There is a strong bias in America in favor of loyalty to one's fel-
lows. The rule requiring reporting professional misconduct for this
reason does not require reporting every violation of the rules. Only vio-
lations that "raise a substantial question as to ... [a] lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer"2 51 must be reported. The same is
true of reporting judicial misconduct. Failure to report "substantial"
misconduct is a clear violation of the rules.252
It is important to note that Rule 4-8.3(c) does not permit disclos-
249. Id. at Rule 4-8.1(b).
250. Id. at Rule 4-8.2 Comment.
251. Id. at Rule 4-8.3(a).
252. Id. at Rule 4-8.3(b).
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ure of information protected by confidentiality.25 A lawyer represent-
ing another attorney accused of professional misconduct, therefore, is
under no obligation to report the nature of their discussions. More typi-
cally, a lawyer obtains information regarding another lawyer's miscon-
duct from a client. Under these circumstances, a client should be en-
couraged to allow disclosure of this misconduct unless it would
significantly injure the client's interest.2 54
D. The Jurisdiction of the New Rules (Rule 4-8.5)
This rule applies the new rules to attorneys admitted in Florida
but practicing elsewhere. Rule 4-8.5, which has no counterpart in the
Code, suggests that where the rules of the attorneys in two jurisdictions
are in disagreement the "principles of conflict of laws may apply. ' 2 55
XIII. Summary
It is somewhat exceptional for a law review's annual law survey to
include a full section on Rules of Professional Conduct. In the post-
Watergate years, ethical conduct has taken on a new importance for
the Bar. There is an increased awareness in law schools and in practice
of the need for attention to ethical concerns.
The Florida Code of Professional Responsibility is a rather inac-
cessible reference source. However, the New Rules of Professional
Conduct are accessible to all practitioners and contain a comprehensive
table of contents and an even more extensive index. These Rules may
be consulted for easy guidance in all major ethical areas. For more
complex questions, there exist published formal opinions of the Florida
Bar. These formal opinions are available from the Bar, law schools and
most county law libraries. The opinions provide guidance on a wide
range of topics relating to professional conduct.
The practitioner (especially the new attorney) is encouraged to
discuss matters of ethical concern with partners or other senior attor-
neys. This discussion leads to an improved awareness on the part of all
members of the Bar of the importance of ethical issues. Further guid-
ance may be obtained by calling one of Florida's law schools and
speaking with faculty members responsible for the Professional Ethics
253. Id. at Rule 4-8.3(c).
254. Id. at Rule 4-8.3 Comment.
255. Id. at Rule 4-8.5.
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programs at that institution.
For more formal guidance, the nearest Florida Bar office may be
consulted. These offices are most helpful in providing informal, over-
the-telephone opinions on ethical concerns. Opinions are also available
from the Florida Bar Ethics Counsel in Tallahassee at 1-800-235-8619.
The Tallahassee office will upon request provide a written ethical opin-
ion. Especially controversial areas may be referred to the Florida Bar
Professional Ethics Committee, which drafts and approves the previ-
ously mentioned formal opinions.
Case law is evolving rapidly in this area. This is especially so in
the areas of advertising, solicitation and client truthfulness. The practi-
tioner may wish to consult the ABA/BNA Lawyers Manual on Profes-
sional Conduct, which is available at most law libraries.
The Rules of Professional Conduct are minimum guideposts for
the practitioner. An awareness of ethical concerns and open discussion
of ethical issues will help guarantee the continued high standard of pro-
fessional conduct in Florida.
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Of Alligators and Hotel Beds: A Review of Florida
Supreme Court Decisions on Taxation for 1985
Richard Gershon*
I. Introduction
While most states impose taxes on the personal income of their
residents as a means of generating revenue,' individuals residing in
Florida enjoy a life without the burdens of state income taxation.
However, the Florida Constitution and legislature do provide the state,
county and local governments with useful revenue generating devices in
the form of such taxes as ad valorem taxes,3 convention development
taxes,4 and sales taxes.5 The Supreme Court of Florida must often de-
termine whether or not the taxes authorized by the Florida legislature
are valid both facially6 and as applied to a given taxpayer.7
* Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University, LL.M. in Taxation, University
of Florida; J.D., University of Tennessee.
1. E.g., ALA. CODE § 40-18-21 (1975).
2. The Constitution of the State of Florida prohibits the state from levying a tax
upon the income of natural persons. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(b).
3. FLA. STAT. § 200.01 (1985).
4. FLA. STAT. § 212.057 (1985).
5. FLA. STAT. § 212.05 (1983). The sales tax is a tax on the exercise of the
privilege of engaging in the business of selling tangible property at retail in Florida.
6. E.g., DeLand v. Florida Pub. Service Co., 119 Fla. 804, 161 So. 735 (1935),
in which a tax of ten cents for every sale of electricity in a city, which could not be
passed on to the consumer, was declared to be an unconstitutional confiscation of
property.
7. E.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 311 (Fla.
1984), in which the court upheld a tax imposed on aviation fuel but not on fuel used by
railroads. Eastern claimed that such a tax was discriminatory, and was therefore inva-
lid. The court disagreed stating that "a statute that discriminates in favor of a certain
class is not arbitrary if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction or
difference in state policy." Id. at 315. See also, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 455 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1984) citing the principle that no state may impose a
tax which discriminates against interstate commerce by providing a direct commercial
advantage to local business. In that case, Delta challenged Florida Statute § 220.189
(1983), which granted a corporate tax credit against the Florida fuel tax; the credit
was only available to Florida-based carriers, which gave such carriers a direct commer-
cial advantage.
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In 1985, the Supreme Court of Florida heard five key cases deal-
ing with taxation. This article will discuss those cases and their impact
on Florida taxpayers.
Sales Tax: Campus Communications, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue8
While the University of Florida's football program languished
under the watchful eye of the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion,9 the Florida Department of Revenue (D.O.R.) subjected the Uni-
versity's student run newspaper, known as The Alligator,0 to equally
painful scrutiny.
In general, the Florida statutes provide that newspapers are ex-
empt from sale taxes." However, the D.O.R. is delegated the authority
to make, prescribe and publish reasonable rules and regulations con-
cerning what types of publications qualify as newspapers for the pur-
poses of the sales tax exemption.' 2 Pursuant to that delegated author-
ity, the D.O.R. adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.08,
the relevant portions of which are:
12-A-1.08 Newspapers, Magazines and Periodicals.
(I) Receipts from the sale of newspapers are exempt...
(3) In order to constitute a newspaper, the publication must
contain at least the following elements:
(a) It must be published at stated short intervals (usually
daily or weekly).
(b) It must not, when successive issues are published, consti-
tute a book.
(c) It must be intended for circulation among the general
public.
(d) It must have entered or qualified to be admitted and en-
tered as second class mail matter at a post office in the county
where published.
8. 473 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 1985).
9. In 1985, the Florida Gators were placed on probation, which precluded them
from participating in post-season bowl games, and denied them a share of the South-
eastern Conference championship.
10. The paper's official name is The Independent Florida Alligator. The Alliga-
tor is not under the control of the University of Florida; instead, it has been indepen-
dently operated since the 1970's.
11. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(6) (Supp. 1986).
12. FLA. STAT. § 212.17(6) (1971).
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(e) It must contain matters of general interest and reports of
current events.
(4) To qualify for exemption as a newspaper, a publication
must be sold and not given to the reader free of charge. So-called
newspapers which are given away for advertising and public rela-
tions purposes are taxable.
Because The Alligator has no second class mailing permit, and is
given to readers free of charge, it fails to meet the definition of a
"newspaper" as set forth in Rule 12A-1.08 3(d) & (4)."S Thus, the
D.O.R. assessed sales taxes against the publisher of The Alligator,
Campus Communications, Inc. The D.O.R. reasoned that a taxable
sale occurred when Campus Communications purchased the newspaper
with the intent to give the paper away rather than sell it. Campus
Communications sought review of the D.O.R.'s decision within the
D.O.R. itself, but to no avail. However, the trial judge in the Circuit
Court granted Campus Communications' motion for summary judg-
ment. The D.O.R. in turn appealed the trial court's decision to the
First District Court of Appeal.
The district court had previously held Rule 12A-1.08 to be valid,14
and thus rejected The Alligator's argument that the rule was an inva-
lid exercise of delegated legislative authority.' 5 However, the court was
not certain that the Rule could be validly applied to tax a school news-
paper like The Alligator, especially if such a publication was clearly a
newspaper despite its failure to meet the criteria of the rule. Because of
the district court's uncertainty on this issue, it certified the following
question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
Is Rule 12A-1.08, Fla. Admin. Code, which requires taxation of all
publications which are not sold but are given away, unconstitu-
13. Because a second-class mailing permit is available only to newspapers with a
paid circulation, the primary "flaw" with The Alligator was the fact that it was a
publication with free circulation. The postal regulations concerning second-class mail-
ing were invalidated by a federal district in The Enterprise, Inc. v. Bolger, 582 F.
Supp. 228 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). In that case, the court held that discrimination between
paid and free-distribution newspapers was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the
first amendment protection of free speech and the fifth amendment equal protection
clause.
14. North Am. Publications, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 434 So. 2d 954
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 449 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1984).
15. Department of Revenue v. Campus Communications, Inc., 454 So. 2d 30
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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tional as applied to The Alligator and similarly situated school
publications?"'
The supreme court's answer to the question was yes."7 It held that
The Alligator was indeed a newspaper within the meaning of the stat-
ute, 8 and should, thus, be exempt from sales tax. The court's decision
discussed the need to differentiate between shoppers and newspapers, in
that the main purpose of a shopper is the widespread distribution of
advertising and not news.' The court stated that Rule 12A-1.08 could
be a valid tool in distinguishing between shoppers and newspapers but,
that as it is now written, the rule creates an irrebuttable presumption
that a free publication cannot be a newspaper, as a matter of law, even
if such publication is factually a newspaper within the plain meaning of
the Florida statutes.2 0 It is this irrebuttable presumption which renders
the rule void as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority."1
Therefore, the sales tax imposed upon The Alligator was im-
proper, as the publication factually qualified as a newspaper for the
purpose of the tax exemption. The supreme court's ruling forced the
D.O.R. to amend 12A-1.08 to include some way for publications dis-
tributed free-of-charge to rebut the presumption that they are advertis-
ing circulars rather than newspapers. The court's decision is perfectly
16. 454 So. 2d at 31.
17. 473 So. 2d at 1295.
18. The court relied on the common sense of definition of newspaper, stating that
the statutes "had reference to the natural, plain and ordinary significance of the word
newspaper - the understanding of the word newspaper in general and common us-
age." Gasson v. Gay, 49 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. 1950). The court also looked to other
jurisdictions for support in its finding. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
decision of Greenfield Town Crier, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 385 Mass. 692,
433 N.E.2d 898 (1982). The Massachusetts court -in Town Crier held that "[Tihe fact
that a newspaper is not a 'publication' until it is published does not support the conclu-
sion that a paper, which is a 'newspaper' upon publication is anything less than a
'newspaper' before publication." 385 Mass. at 695-696, 433 N.E.2d at 900.
19. Green v. Home News Publishing Co., 90 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1956). The Alliga-
tor was a student run publication, used to train student journalists. It had a wide range
of news stories and a relatively low percentage devoted to advertisements (under 55%
during the period for which tax was assessed, well below the national average of 63%).
20. See supra note 18.
21. A rule which enlarges, modifies or contravenes statutory provisions consti-
tutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. State Dep't of Business Reg-
ulation v. Salvation Limited, Inc., 452 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Thus,
when the administrative body, the D.O.R., created a rule which taxed a newspaper,
The Alligator, it unconstitutionally used its delegated rule-making authority.
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reasonable. It would defy logic to hold that a publication sold for a
penny could be a newspaper, while one given away free could not, as a
matter of law. The question of whether a publication is indeed a news-
paper is essentially a question of fact, not of law.
Hotel Bed Tax: Golden Nugget Group v. Metropolitan Dade
County.2
Section 212.057 of the Florida Statutes (1983), known as the
"Convention Development Tax" Act authorizes certain counties to levy
a three percent (3%) bed tax on payments made to rent, lease or use
any living quarters or accomodations for a period of thirty (30) days or
less. The Act only applies to counties which have adopted home rule
under the Florida Constitution of 1885,23 as preserved by the Constitu-
tion of 1968.24 While Dade, Hillsborough and Monroe Counties qualify
for home rule, only Dade county has adopted a home-rule charter.
Thus, only Dade County could utilize the "Convention Development
Tax".
The purpose of the Act is to provide counties with funds to im-
prove the largest existing publicly owned convention center in the
county's most populous municipality. Dade County, eagerly seeking to
take advantage of a revenue making opportunity, enacted ordinance 83-
91, which "implemented the tax and provided for the collection, distri-
bution and application of the revenues. '"25
Naturally, hotel and motel operators in Dade County were not
pleased with the prospects of an additional tax on their customers.
Therefore, they filed suit seeking a determination that the Act, and the
Dade County Ordinance enacted pursuant to the Act, were invalid and
unconstitutional. The trial court agreed that the Act was invalid, be-
cause it included no mechanism for tax collection and by implication
provided that the revenues would be segregated and paid to municipali-
ties in contravention of Florida Statutes.2 The court also held that the
ordinance was invalid because it authorized the collection of tax by the
Dade County Tax Collector which caused a conflict with section
22. 464 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1985).
23. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 10, 11 and 24 (1885).
24. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) (1968); see FLA. STAT. § 125.011(1) (1985).
25. FLA. STAT. § 212.057 (1983).
26. FLA. STAT. § 212.230 (1983).
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212.18, Florida Statutes (1983).27
Dade County appealed the trial court's decision to the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal. 8 The district court did not agree with the trial
court's conclusion concerning the validity of the Act "because the stat-
ute was expressly made a part of chapter 212, which includes a com-
prehensive scheme for the collection, administration, and enforcement
of all taxes imposed by the chapter. ' 29 However, the district court re-
fused to allow Dade County to assess the "bed tax" stating that the tax
must, instead, be collected by the State Department of Revenue, and
paid to the state treasurer.30 The state treasurer would then return the
revenues to Dade County when the county was ready to make appropri-
ations for improvements on the largest publicly owned convention
center in Miami."1
While the district court held Dade County's ordinance to be inva-
lid, its decision was, in effect, a victory for the county over the hotel
owners. The district court held that the Act itself was constitutional
and was an appropriate means to enhance the tourist trade 2 in three
tourist oriented counties. The defect found by the court of appeal con-
cerned only the technical means for collecting the tax. Thus, the hotel
and motel owners sought review by the Florida Supreme Court, in the
hope that the supreme court might find the bed tax itself to be
unconstitutional.
Unfortunately (?) for the hotel owners, the supreme court was in
total agreement with the Third District Court of Appeal."3 Further-
more, in the interim, the legislature had amended section 212.057 to
27. Section 212.18 of the Florida Statutes (1983) requires that the state be the
collector of the convention development tax. More specifically, § 212.18(2) states that
"the department shall administer and enforce the assessment and collection of the
taxes, interest and penalties imposed by this chapter." The convention development tax,
which falls under § 212.057, is clearly within chapter 213 of the Florida Statutes.
There is, therefore, no authority which provides for collection of the tax by the Dade
County Appraiser.
28. Metropolitan Dade County v. Golden Nugget Group, 448 So. 2d 515 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
29. Id. at 518.
30. Id. at 519.
31. Miami is the largest city in Dade County. The Act requires that the funds be
used to develop the convention center in the largest city of the home-rule county in
question. FLA. STAT. § 213.057 (1985).
32. 448 So. 2d at 520.
33. 464 So. 2d at 535, 537.
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require the D.O.R. to collect the bed tax.34 Thus, anyone renting, leas-
ing or using accomodations for less than thirty days in Dade County
can expect to pay a three percent bed tax. Interestingly enough, if the
revenues generated by the bed tax are used properly, Dade County's
attraction as a convention center will be enhanced, which will in turn
enhance the business of the hotel owners in Dade County. It is possible
that, at least in terms of long-range potential, the best thing that could
have happened to Dade County hotel operators was that they lost this
case.
Ad Valorem Tax on Household Goods of Nonresidents:
Golding v. Herzog.35
Tangible personal property36 is subject to an ad valorem tax in
Florida. However, this ad valorem tax is not applied to personal effects
used for the creature comforts of the owner, rather than for commer-
cial purposes.37 Thus, personal clothing and household furnishings are
all exempt from ad valorem taxation.,3  The Department of Revenue
has not actually contested that exemption as applied to Florida
residents.39
On the other hand, the D.O.R. has promulgated an administrative
rule' 0 which states in part that household goods and personal effects
which belong to nonresidents are subject to ad valorem taxation.4 1 The
D.O.R., an ever vigilant watchdog of constitutional rights, reasoned
that the legislature could not constitutionally exempt household goods
34. See 1984 FLA. LAWS 84-67; FLA. STAT. § 212.057 (1985).
35. 467 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1985).
36. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(11) (1985) establishes the definition of "personal prop-
erty." The statute distinguishes between household goods and tangible personal prop-
erty. Household goods are defined as "wearing apparel, furniture, appliances, and other
items ordinarily found in the home and used for the comfort of the owner and his
family." The statute provides further that household goods are not held for commercial
use or resale. § 192.001(11)(a).
Tangible personal property means "all goods, and chattels, and other articles of
value capable of manual possession and whose chief value is intrinsic to the article
itself." Household goods are expressly excluded from this definition. § 192.001(1 1)(d).
37. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(11)(a), (d) (1985).
38. Department of Revenue v. Markham, 381 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
39. 467 So. 2d at 981.
40. FLA. ADMIN. CODE rule 12D-7.02.
41. Id.
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and personal property from ad valorem taxation, since the Florida Con-
stitution provides for a means of taxing "all property. '42 Such enlight-
ened thinking gave rise to an administrative rule which provides that
household goods and personal effects belonging to persons not making
their permanent home in Florida are not exempt from ad valorem taxa-
tion, even though no such tax is imposed upon Florida residents.43 Pre-
sumably, Florida residents were allowed the exemption, not because of
any constitutional provision, but because the D.O.R. decided that the
administration of an ad valorem tax on household goods of Florida resi-
dents would be a revenue loser due to the excessive administrative costs
from such an effort.4
Interestingly enough, the First District Court of Appeal in the case
of Department of Revenue v. Markham,45 had already determined that
household goods should be exempt from ad valorem taxation irrespec-
tive of the nonresident status of their owner. Unfortunately, the Florida
Supreme Court quashed the Markham decision on the ground that
"the lawsuit was improperly commenced by one who lacked legal
standing. '46 The supreme court's refusal to accept Markham left open
the possibility that ad valorem taxes would be applied against nonresi-
dents, which is exactly what happened in Collier County.
The Collier County tax appraiser assessed an ad valorem tax
against the household property of Peter W. Herzog, a Missouri resi-
dents, even though the assets taxed were not used for commercial pur-
poses. Herzog contested the tax at trial, but the trial court approved
the tax, granting summary judgment to the appraiser. The taxpayer
appealed the trial court's decision to the Second District Court of
Appeal.
The district court determined that, even though Markham had
been quashed because of a defect in standing, the reasoning used by the
First District in its Markham decision was perfectly sound.47 In Mark-
42. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (1968) provides: "By general law regulations shall
be prescribed which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad valorem
taxation."
43. The D.O.R. cited Article VII, section 3(b) of the Florida Constitution for the
proposition that the "household goods" exclusion only applied to heads of families re-
siding in Florida." The exclusion can be limited by the state, but in no even can the
exclusion be less than one thousand dollars.
44. 467 So. 2d at 983.
45. 381 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
46. Department of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1981).
47. 437 So. 2d at 227.
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ham, the First District Court of Appeal extensively discussed the his-
tory of taxation of household goods in Florida noting that "when sec-
tion 200.01, Florida Statutes (1965), was amended by the legislature in
1967 to exclude household goods and personal effects used for the com-
fort of the owner and for non-commercial purposes from the definition
of 'tangible personal property,' such goods and effects were effectively
eliminated from the operation of the taxing statutes, regardless of resi-
dency of the owner."'48 Following the reasoning set forth in Markham,
the Second District Court of Appeal held that Herzog's personal effects
in Florida are not subject to ad valorem taxation. 9
After rendering its decision in favor of Herzog, the district court
certified the question of whether or not household goods and personal
effects are subject to ad valorem taxation in Florida.50 The supreme
court accepted jurisdiction over the matter, believing the issue to be of
great public importance.51
The supreme court's decision on the certified question was not sur-
prising. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that all
personal effect property is exempt from ad valorem taxation.5 2 The su-
preme court's willingness to adopt the rationale of the First District in
Markham,3 even though Markham was quashed, indicates that the
court was hoping that a case like Herzog, in which the taxpayer had
proper standing, would arise, and the issue of ad valorem taxes on
household goods would be resolved. Clearly, after Herzog, all non-com-
mercial household property is exempt from ad valorem taxation.
Taxpayer Standing: North Broward Hospital District v.
Fornes54
To some extent, every taxpayer has a stake in every governmental
action. After all, taxpayers ultimately pay the bills. However, the fact
that a person is a taxpayer, in and of itself, is generally not enough to
give that taxpayer standing to challenge the government's action in a
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 226.
51. 467 So. 2d at 981. The supreme court accepted jurisdiction under article V,
section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.
52. 467 So. 2d at 982.
53. Id.
54. 476 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1985).
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court of law.55 In fact, most courts have held that a taxpayer must
show some special injury, distinct from other taxpayers, in order to
have standing.56 The only exception to the special injury requirement is
where the taxpayer raises a constitutional challenge to the exercise of
governmental taxing and spending powers. 57
Therefore, when Sharon Fornes, a taxpayer, sued the North Brow-
ard Hospital District, a special taxing district, and alleged that the Dis-
trict acted illegally in awarding construction contracts not to the lowest
bidder, but instead to favored companies, the question of taxpayer
standing was raised. Ms. Fornes contended that she did not need to
show any special damages in order to bring her suit, and that the fact
that her taxes would be higher because of the district's actions should
be sufficient to give her standing."8 The trial court disagreed with
Fornes, and dismissed her suit because she lacked standing.
However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's decision, and held that Fornes did, indeed, have standing to sue
to prevent the illegal expenditure of public funds. 59 Yet, the district
court decided that the issue was of great public importance and there-
fore merited certification to the Supreme Court of Florida.60
The supreme court quashed the district court's decision, holding
that a mere increase in taxes does not confer standing upon a taxpayer
to challenge a governmental expenditure.6" The court emphasized that
"in the event an official threatens an unlawful act, the public by its
representatives must institute proceedings to prevent it, unless a private
person can show a damage peculiar to his individual interests in which
case equity will grant him succor."62 Furthermore, the court stated that
55. E.g., Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Joachim, 146 Fla. 50, 200 So. 238 (1941),
holding that a mere increase in taxes does not confer standing upon a taxpayer to
challenge a governmental expenditure.
56. E.g., Richman v. Whitehurst, 73 Fla. 152, 74 So. 205 (1916), holding that a
private person must show some special damages in order to sue a public official who
threatens an unlawful act. See also, McFarland v. Atkins, 594 P.2d 758 (Okla. 1978),
and Application of Biester, 487 Pa. 438, 409 A.2d 848 (1979).
57. Department of Admin. v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972).
58. Fornes pointed to the fact that the district was granting contracts for bids
higher than necessary. She contended that the additional cost of the contracts would
cause increased taxes to cover the costs of the contracts.
59. Fornes v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 455 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
60. Id. at 586.
61. 476 So. 2d at 154.
62. Id. at 155.
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Fornes had not raised a constitutional issue upon which to base her
claim of standing."3
While the court justified its decision by pointing to the importance
of allowing state and county governments to exercise lawfully their tax-
ing and spending authority without undue hinderance,"4 it is important
to note Justice Ehrlich's dissent in this case."' The justice discussed
several prior Florida decisions which allowed taxpayers to have stand-
ing upon a showing that a governmental agency had improvidently used
public funds.," Such allegations constitute special injury to all taxpay-
ers. 7 Otherwise, the justice argued, governmental agencies which ig-
nored or violated the law would be insulated from accountability to the
citizens whose trust they violate.6
Justice Ehrlich's argument should be noted by the court in future
questions concerning taxpayer standing, as it is, in this writer's opinion,
the better position for two basic reasons. First, the supreme court
stated that its aim was to protect the "lawful application"6' 9 of the tax-
ing and spending powers of state and county governments from being
unduly hampered. In the Fornes case, on the other hand, a taxpayer
was contesting an arguably unlawful application of the Hospital Dis-
trict's spending powers. Secondly, the supreme court majority opinion
stated that public officers should bring suit against other public officials
who act improvidently. Public servants often do not act against other
public servants, which would leave taxpayers as a whole without any
63. Id.
64. Id. at 156.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Peck v. Spencer, 26 Fla. 23, 7 So. 642 (1890); Chamberlain v. City
of Tampa, 40 Fla. 74, 23 So. 572 (1898); Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963
(1912).
67. While the cases cited by Justice Ehrlich in note 66, supra, are all of older
vintage, it should be noted that several states have allowed taxpayer standing without a
showing of damages peculiar to a particular taxpayer. For example, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has held that the right of a taxpayer to maintain an action in the
courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds cannot be denied; a taxpayer, suing
only as a taxpayer, has standing to challenge administrative action which is unlawful.
McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. 1977). The Georgia and Nebraska Supreme
Courts have also allowed taxpayers standing solely on the basis that they were taxpay-
ers. Brock v. Hall County, 239 Ga. 160, 236 S.E.2d 90 (1977); Cunningham v. Exxon,
202 Neb. 563, 276 N.W.2d 213 (1979).
68. 476 So. 2d at 156.
69. id. (citing Paul v. Blake, 376 So. 2d 256, 259-260 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979)).
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recourse. Thus, the supreme court's opinion in Fornes, in holding that a
taxpayer must show special injury other than an illegal act by a gov-
ernmental unit, in order to have standing, is much too broad. There
have to be circumstances in which a private citizen can force a public
agency into accountability, and Fornes should have been such a case. 70
Enforcement and Review: Redford v. Department of Revenue 1
Another question resolved by the Florida Supreme Court in 1985
was whether of not the Department of Revenue has the authority to
overrule or challenge decisions of a County Property Appraiser or
Property Appraisal Adjustment Board.7 2 Generally, the County Prop-
erty Appraiser (appraiser) is allowed to appeal decisions of the Prop-
erty Adjustment Board (board). 3 However, in Redford the appraiser
refused to appeal the board's decision, so the Department of Revenue
(D.O.R.) chose to bring an action itself.
Basically, the facts of Redford are quite simple. When the D.O.R.
reviewed the appraiser's assessment roles for 1979,74 it decided that
some twenty-five leaseholds in Miami International Airport should not
be exempt from real property taxes. In order for such leaseholds to be
exempt, they must be used for some governmental, municipal or public
purpose.7 5 The D.O.R. determined that the leaseholds, while on Dade
County property,7 were used for commercial, rather than governmen-
70. One of the major problems with the Fornes decision is that it is hard to
imagine a taxpayer who would be able to show the special injury required by the court.
After all, Ms. Fornes lived in the North Broward Hospital District. Clearly, her tax
burden was more specifically affected than a taxpayer living in other parts of Broward
County, or other parts of Florida. It is unfortunate that Florida views taxpayer stand-
ing on a plane equal to that of the United States federal government, which has con-
sistently dismissed taxpayer suits for lack of showing special injury. See, e.g., Public
Citizen, Inc. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Florida does not need to pro
tect itself from taxpayer suits to the same extent that the federal government does
While some protection is needed, the Court in Fornes seems to have completely ovel
looked the need to protect private citizens from the impropriety of public officials.
71. 478 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1985).
72. Id., at 810.
73. FLA. STAT. §§ 193.122(2) and 194.032(6) (1985).
74. This review was conducted in accordance with FLA. STAT. § 193.144 (198:
75. FLA. STAT. §§ 196.012(5) and 196.199(2) (1985).
76. Certain leaseholds on property owned by a county are exempt under F
STAT. §§ 125.019 and 159.15 (1985). Dade County owns the Miami Internatic
Airport.
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tal purposes. The appraiser agreed with the D.O.R.'s determination,
and forwarded assessment rolls to the board. The board, however, re-
fused to accept the D.O.R.'s position, and continued to treat the lease-
holds as tax-exempt. The D.O.R. asked the appraiser to appeal the
board's decision, but the appraiser did not make an appeal. Thus, the
D.O.R. was forced to file its own suit in the circuit court.
The circuit court granted the D.O.R.'s motion for summary judg-
ment, and held that the leaseholds were not tax-exempt. On appeal, the
District Court of Appeal for the Third District agreed that the lease-
holds should be placed on the tax rolls, but vacated the trial court's
conclusion that the leaseholds were not tax exempt, since the actual
taxpayers were not present to litigate their claims.7 The district court,
instead, granted the affected taxpayers sixty days to challenge the
D.O.R.'s assessment.
At the supreme court, the board argued that only taxpayers or the
appraiser should be allowed to challenge a decision by the board.7 8 The
court rejected this argument on three grounds. First, the appraiser had
statutory authority 9 to appeal the D.O.R.'s initial decision that the
property was taxable, but he chose, instead, to agree with the D.O.R.,
and therefore should have appealed the board's decision when the
D.O.R. requested such an appeal. Secondly, the board acted without
authority when it chose to defy both the D.O.R. and the appraiser.80
Finally, the D.O.R. has statutory authority8 to "bring actions at law or
equity to enforce any lawful order, rule, regulation or decision . ..
lawfully made under the authority of the tax laws." '82
As to the merits of the D.O.R.'s assessment, the supreme court,
like the district court, refused to make a determination about the ac-
tual status of the leaseholds until the taxpayers were actually before
the court.83 The court was mildly upset with the D.O.R. for failing to
include the appropriate taxpayers in its suit; suing the taxpayers would
have been much more efficient as all parties would have been before the
court at one time, allowing for a resolution of the merits of the case as
77. Redford v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
78. 478 So. 2d at 811.
79. FLA. STAT. § 196.098 (1983).
80. 478 So. 2d 808, 811.
81. FLA. STAT. § 195.092 (1983).
82. 478 So. 2d at 811.
83. Id.
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well as its procedural propriety.84
All in all, the supreme court rendered the correct decision in a
case which was rather poorly handled by all parties involved. It should
be noted that, for all practical purposes, the Redford scenario can only
arise in a situation in which the appraiser changes his position mid-
stream and refuses to appeal a board decision which is pro-taxpayer.
85
Conclusion
In conclusion the Florida Supreme Court's 1985 decisions on taxa-
tion can be generally be characterized as logical and well-reasoned.
However, the court should revisit its determination in Fornes86 that no
taxpayer can ever have standing absent a showing of special injury, or
some constitutional claim. The court must adopt a policy which allows
taxpayers to have standing in situations where a denial of taxpayer
standing would totally insulate governmental units from having to ac-
count for their allegedly illegal activities.
84. The court stated "[p]arenthetically, we add that it would have been prefera-
ble from the standpoint of judicial economy for the department to have included the
affected taxpayers in its suit. This would have permitted the circuit court to reach a
judgment on the merits which would have bound all interested parties." Id.
85. After all, taxpayers themselves will appeal a decision disfavorable to them.
The Department of Revenue, on the other hand, would never appeal a decision in its
favor. The Redford case can only arise when the property appraiser refuses to appeal a
decision in favor of a taxpayer, after he has previously adopted the D.O.R.'s position.
86. The court should look to the progressive standards of taxpayer standing
which have been established by various other states. See supra note 67.
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I. Introduction
Throughout the law there are powerful forces which are resistant
to change. The need for continuity and stability, the need to be able to
plan one's actions with some assurance as to the outcome of proposed
courses of conduct, argue for the status quo. These forces are at work
* Associate Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law.
B.A., 1973, Goddard College; J.D., 1977, University of California, Davis; LL.M., 1979,
Temple University. The author wishes to thank his research assistant, Robert D. In-
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in the area of torts (partly because of the need to insure against loss),
but these stabilizing forces are weaker than in some other areas of law.
In general, people do not plan accidents (which makes up a large part
of modern tort law) and the judicial response to them has tended to be
somewhat fluid. Change seems to come more easily in the tort field
than in others as society wrestles with human interactions gone wrong,
which demand resolution.
At times it may still be debated whether there is tort law (sug-
gesting a coherent body of law with some unifying principle) or
whether there is merely the law of torts (a disparate group of actions
lumped together for convenience as much as for any other reason).'
While this debate is not a wholly useful one, it does suggest a percep-
tion that torts seems to change, often very quickly, and at times in
seemingly contradictory directions. To some degree, this perception is
correct. Courts are confronted daily with new situations and questions
in a context where they are less constrained by precedent and history
than they might be when dealing with a question arising in some other
area of law. We see in any study of torts, the attempt to react to a
changing world, and the attempt to balance competing interests follow-
ing situations of unplanned and unexpected tragedy resulting in often
horrible injury to the lives and limbs of people.
In one year no court is able to examine all or even most aspects of
an area as broad and diverse as torts. Yet, many different issues are
addressed each year. The Florida Supreme Court, for example, ex-
amined issues as varied as the duty not to cause emotional distress and
the meaning of a statute concerning injuries caused by dogs. Thus, a
survey such as this, taking, as it were, a cross section of current issues,
may prove valuable not only for the practitioner who wishes to be
aware of the latest developments, but also for those attempting to chart
the future course of the law of torts in Florida.
II. Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress
The "new" tort2 of intentional infliction of emotional distress was
1. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 3-4 (5th ed.
1984).
2. "It is time to recognize that the courts have created a new tort. It appears, in
one disguise or another, in more than a hundred decisions, the greater number of them
within the last two decades." Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A
New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939). Leading "early" cases such as Wilkinson v.
Downton, 2 Q.B. 57, 66 L.J.Q.B. 493 (1897), in which defendant falsely told plaintiff
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well-established in Florida before this year. Every district court of ap-
peal, except the Second District, had recognized it.3 Yet, although giv-
that her husband had been in a terrible accident and was lying injured in the road,
pointed the way. But, as late as 1934, the RESTATEMENT continued to reject any protec-
tion for intentionally - caused emotional distress, with the exception of that caused by
assault, false imprisonment or that caused by a common carrier to its passengers, in
recognition of the special responsibility of such carriers toward their passengers. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1948 Supp.).
3. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sheehan, 373 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), in which an employee of a credit company, in an effort to locate the plain-
tiff, called plaintiff's mother, represented herself as an employee of a hospital and
stated that plaintiffs children had been involved in a serious accident. The mother
supplied plaintiffs address and communicated the content of the call to plaintiff. This
resulted in a frantic seven-hour attempt by phone to hospitals and police to locate his
supposedly injured children until he finally confirmed that the information was false.
The jury awarded both compensatory and punitive damages and the district court of
appeals affirmed, holding, "[W]e conclude that there is in Florida no bar to an inde-
pendent action for intentional infliction of severe mental distress when the conduct al-
leged is beyond all bounds of decency . . . [A]s stated, Ford Motor Credit's conduct
falls within that description." Id. at 960. The court certified the issue to the Florida
Supreme Court, but certiorari was dismissed.
In Dominguez v. Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y of the United States, 438 So. 2d
58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), an employee of defendant insurance company falsely
represented to plaintiff that plaintiffs eye doctor had stated in a letter that plaintiffs
eyes were in good condition and that plaintiff was not any longer disabled. Building
upon this lie, the employee told plaintiff that he was no longer covered under the insur-
ance policy and attempted to have plaintiff sign a paper to that effect. The court of
appeals held that an action could be maintained on those facts. Id. at 61. It then re-
versed the order of the trial court dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action. Id. at 64.
In Scheur v. Wille, 385 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), where a
funeral home, knowing that the deceased was Jewish, nevertheless embalmed the body,
the court of appeals acknowledged the existence of the action, and reversed a summary
judgment which had been entered by the trial court in favor of the funeral home, re-
manding the case. Id. at 1078.
In Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 328 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), in
which plaintiff was terminated from her employment after being required to take poly-
graph tests in regard to thefts which had taken place, the court acknowledged the exis-
tence of the action while concluding that the particular facts did not demonstrate out-
rageous conduct as required. Id. at 153.
By contrast, in Gmeur v. Garner, 426 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(per curiam) (rehearing partly granted and partly denied 1983), in which plaintiff, an
employee of Hillsborough Community College, complained of alleged sexually offensive
remarks and propositions from the college president, the court held that the tort was
not recognized in Florida. Id. at 973. On motion for rehearing, the court granted the
motion to the extent of certifying the question to the Florida Supreme Court a a matter
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ing hints that it would recognize the tort,4 the issue was not finally
decided by the Florida Supreme Court until this year,5 when Metropol-
itan Life Insurance Co. v. McCarson6 was decided.'
In McCarson, a group insurance policy had been issued by the
defendant which covered the employees of the plaintiff's paint and body
shop and the plaintiff's wife. Sometime later it was discovered that the
wife had Alzheimer's disease. The defendant first claimed the disease
was a preexisting condition for which no payment was due. After a
lawsuit by McCarson, however, the defendant was found to be in
breach of contract and was ordered to continue payments under the
policy. Eventually, the plaintiff's wife needed full-time nursing care.
of great public importance, but otherwise denied it. Id. at 975.
4. See, e.g., Slocum v., Food Fair Stores of Fla., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958). The
court noted a "strong current of opinion in support of such recognition [of the tort],"
id. at 397, and carefully distinguished a supposed precedent against recovery, Mann v.
Roosevelt Shops, Inc., 41 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1949), as a case dealing only with "an
action in defamation for injury to reputation as opposed to peace of mind." Id. The
court then declined to address this particular question, because the facts as presented
would not have met the requirements that the conduct be likely to cause severe emo-
tional distress. Id.
In Slocum, a shopper in a food store asked the price of an item and was told by an
employee in essence that he would not help her because she smelled. The conduct,
although insulting and rude was, essentially, no more than "vulgarities obviously in-
tended as meaningless abusive expressions." Id. at 398. The court noted that this action
would hold only if the conduct or words are "calculated to cause 'severe emotional
distress' to a person of ordinary sensibilities, in the absence of special knowledge or
notice." Id. Thus, it did not have to decide whether the tort would be recognized upon
properly pleaded facts.
5. "We have skirted that issue [recognition of the tort] in previous cases, finding
it not to be directly before the Court." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467
So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985). Besides Slocum, see supra note 4, the court cited two
other cases in which the issue had been "skirted". They are: Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45
So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950) (en banc), in which the Florida Supreme Court recognized an
action for emotional distress based upon the "tortious interference with rights involving
dead human bodies," and La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla.
1964), in which mental suffering was held to be a proper element of damages caused
by the malicious killing of the plaintiff's dog in his presence. Both of these cases stand
for no more than that a malicious act which interferes with some other legally-pro-
tected interest of the plaintiff permits recovery for the proximately caused mental suf-
fering of the plaintiff as well. Neither can be read to decide whether recovery is al-
lowed when the only interest of the plaintiff involved is the interest in freedom from
intentionally-caused mental distress.
6. 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985).
7. Jurisdiction existed due to conflict among the circuits. FLA. CONST. art. V. §
3(b)(3).
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The defendant was liable for such care until the wife became entitled
to Medicare. The defendant requested proof that the wife was not eligi-
ble for Medicare but received no answer. The defendant thereupon
stopped its payments. The full-time nursing care had to be discontin-
ued.8 Plaintiff 1 sued once again, but during the pendency of the litiga-
tion, his wife had to be taken from her home and placed in a nursing
home. Her condition deteriorated and she died of a heart attack a few
months later.
The plaintiff won at trial. 10 The trial court upheld all but the
award for the wife's emotional distress while living.1 The Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeals upheld the award based upon intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress and did not reach the issues raised concerning
breach of contract and bad faith.' 2
The Florida Supreme Court held that the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress was recognized in Florida,' 3 and expressly
disapproved Gmeur v. Garner,'4 which had held the opposite. The court
gave neither reason nor analysis for its decision.' 5 The supreme court
may have been relying on the reasoning of the Fourth District Court of
Appeals, which basically argued, first, that the very cases cited later by
the supreme court as having "skirted the issue""' had actually "implic-
8. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985).
9. The action was brought by Mr. and Mrs. McCarson. After Mrs. McCarson's
death, Mr. McCarson was substituted in as Mrs. McCarson's personal representative.
A wrongful death count was added in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 429 So.
2d 1287, 89 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
10.
At trial the jury awarded damages for breach of contract, intentional
infliction of emotional distress to Mrs. McCarson while she was alive, and
wrongful death, but declined to make a punitive damage award. After trial
the court awarded appellees attorney's fees for the breach of contract re-
covery and set aside the award for damages suffered by Mrs. McCarson
while living. These post-trial actions are also at issue in this appeal.
Id. at 1289-90.
11. 467 So. 2d at 277.
12. 429 So. 2d at 1290.
13. 467 So. 2d at 278.
14. 426 So. 2d 9723 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
15. The opinion cites the "thorough discussion and analysis of the Fourth Dis-
trict below," Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985),
but notes only that this analysis "shows that four of the five district courts of appeal
have recognized the tort," which is hardly a reason sufficient in itself for deciding the
issue in that way. Id.
16. Id. at 277.
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itly approved an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
upon sufficient facts."'1 7 Finally, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
noted that "there is a need for the recognition of such an action to
control intentionally harmful conduct which would otherwise go unpun-
ished, and which, in cause and effect, can hardly be distinguished from
other intentional torts such as assault."'"
It may well be that the supreme court felt no extensive discussion
of the reasons for its decision was necessary due to the wide acceptance
of the emotional distress doctrine throughout Florida and the nation.' 9
It also seems probable that earlier cases such as Slocum2° had strongly
suggested an implicit recognition of the action. Interestingly, the su-
preme court could have chosen to duck the issue of recognition of the
tort just as it did in Slocum because, as in Slocum, the facts in McCar-
son were held not to meet the requirements for the emotional distress
action.2' The supreme court even noted the requirement that the act of
a defendant must be "extreme and outrageous."22 In McCarson, how-
17. 429 So. 2d 1287, 1290 (1983). The Fourth District also relied on dicta from
a previous supreme court case, Gilliam v. Stewart, 231 So. 2d 593 (1974). Although
the case actually dealt with negligently caused emotional distress, and the certified
question was whether the impact rule should be abolished, the supreme court focused
its major attention on the fact that the Fourth District Court of Appeals had openly
"overruled" decisions of the Florida Supreme Court. In Gilliam, the impact rule was
upheld and the opinion is a restrained reprimand of the Fourth District Court. Perhaps
for this reason, Gilliam is not cited in the supreme court's opinion in McCarson.
18. Id. at 1291.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1964) states:
Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability
for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it,
for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is
subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress,
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at
the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or (b) to
any such person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily
harm.
20. Supra note 4.
21. 467 So. 2d 277, 279 (Fla. 1985). A later case, in which a cause of action was
stated, and which was affirmed by the supreme court on the authority of Metropolitan
Life, was Crawford and Co. v. Dominguez, 467 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1985).
22. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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ever, the defendant company had a right under the policy to demand
proof that Mrs. McCarson was not eligible for Medicare. Defendant
did no more than it had a legal right to do and the means used were
reasonable. Thus, the court felt the acts were "privileged under the
circumstances. 23
What is clear from this case is that the action for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress as outlined in the Restatement2 4 has been
formally adopted in Florida. Although this result is not startling, when
read in conjunction with other cases decided this year 25 which ex-
panded recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress, it can be
seen that the push to gain recognition for the right to be free from
tortiously-caused emotional distress has moved forward significantly in
Florida during 1985.
III. Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress
The question "duty" asks, in essence, is whether the defendant was
under any legal obligation to take care for the safety of the plaintiff.2 6
When affirmative acts by a defendant are involved, it is often safe to
say that a duty will be owed by a defendant to a plaintiff when the
defendant "as a reasonable person, [would] foresee that his conduct
will involve an unreasonable risk of harm to . . . [the plaintiff] ...
[The defendant] is then under a duty to [the plaintiff] to exercise the
care of a reasonable person as to what he does or does not do."27
Theoretically, it should not matter whether a defendant creates
foreseeable risks of physical or mental harm to the plaintiff. If any type
of harm is foreseeable, a duty of due care would arise. However, al-
though any foreseeable harm could create this duty, physical and
23. McCarson, 467 So. 2d at 279. The supreme court went on to discuss the
breach of contract and bad faith issues, but they are beyond the scope of this article.
24. See supra note 19.
25. See infra notes 27-56 and accompanying text.
26. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 53 at 356
(5th ed. 1984).
27. Id. at 358. The notion of duty arising because of foreseeability of harm
(which can also be understood as a duty arising out of the relationship between plaintiff
and defendant) probably got its start in Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883), and
can also be recognized in cases such as Donoghue v. Stevenson, App. Cas. 562 (H.L.
1932), and the well known Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928), in
which no injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable from the act of defendant in shoving
another passenger at the other end of the platform, and therefore no duty was owed to
the plaintiff as to that act.
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mental harms have always been treated differently. For a variety of
reasons, courts have been unwilling to handle mental harms as they do
physical harms, and have, instead, limited the duty owed in relation to
foreseeable mental harms with special rules and restrictions.28 The rule
in Florida had been that there could be no recovery for emotional dis-
tress injuries (mental harms) unless the plaintiff suffered some physical
impact from defendant's conduct. 9 Thus, if defendant's negligently-
driven automobile careened toward plaintiff, stopping one foot from
him, causing plaintiff to have a heart attack from fright, there could be
no recovery, since there was no physical impact. Many jurisdictions al-
lowed recovery in these circumstances under the more liberal zone-of-
danger rule in which a plaintiff within the zone of physical risk from
defendant's negligent conduct could recover when that conduct caused
emotional distress and resulting physical injuries, even absent any phys-
ical impact upon the plaintiff.80 Under a zone-of-danger theory, it also
becomes possible to recover damages for emotional distress and result-
ing physical injuries from observing physical injuries to another as long
as the plaintiff was in the zone of danger.3' It should be noted, how-
ever, that the distance from the accident becomes crucial. Unless the
plaintiff is close enough to be within the zone of danger, recovery will
still be denied.
28. Absent an assault, there was no recovery until recently even for intentionally-
caused emotional distress. Florida did not finally adopt the tort until last year. See
supra notes 2 to 26 and accompanying text. Early influential cases also refused recov-
ery for negligently-caused emotional distress. For example, Spade v. Lynn and B.R.
Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) refused compensation for emotional harm and
the physical injuries which that harm caused when defendant forced another passenger
off its tram. The court seemed to feel that such distress would only be suffered by
overly sensitive plaintiffs and did not warrant compensation. Spade was not finally
overruled until 1978 in the case of Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass.
1978).
29. In Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974), the supreme court reaf-
firmed the rule that no recovery could be had for negligently-caused emotional distress,
even when the distress produced physical injuries as well, absent physical impact. A
thorough dissent by Justice Adkins analyzed the history of the impact rule and the
trend away from it.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965).
31. The classic situation would be the mother watching her child at play. The
defendant's negligently-driven car crashes into the child. The mother suffers a heart
attack caused by emotional distress. Under the impact rule, the mother would be de-
nied recovery. Under the zone-of-danger rule, the plaintiff might recover or might not
depending on whether the plaintiff was standing close enough to the accident to be
within the zone of physical danger. A matter of a few feet could make the difference.
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In another context, this author has examined the various reasons
which have been proposed to explain why recovery for emotional dis-
tress should be limited.32 When the various reasons are analyzed, what
emerges is a fear that the scope of liability will be so sweeping that the
doctrine will get out of control. It is a concern about the inability to set
realistic limits to emotional distress recovery that initially led courts to
refuse any recovery at all.
As time went by, various limiting rules were devised. The impact
rule and the zone-of-danger rule were two of these. There is a similar
rule in effect in many, but not all, jurisdictions that no recovery will be
permitted for emotional distress unless that distress produced physical
injuries or symptoms. Essentially, any such line or limit is arbitrary. By
that is meant that it is hard to defend any rule falling short of normal
foreseeability as sensible in and of itself. What must be recognized,
however, is that these lines are drawn as alternatives to complete denial
of the claim by courts which are worried about keeping some reasona-
ble control over the possible spread in the scope of litigation. Histori-
cally, the lines have been drawn, little by little, in the direction of al-
lowing more meritorious plaintiffs to recover. The line has been drawn
ever nearer to that which would be allowed if normal foreseeability
principles were permitted to operate.
Thus, even though each rule is arbitrary in a sense, each must be
viewed not as the end, but rather as only an intermediate stop along the
way. As a court gains experience with a particular rule and finds that
runaway liability is not the result, it relaxes the rule still further. It is
possible that emotional or mental injury eventually will be treated no
differently than physical injury. If this is the case, it will happen, in
most jurisdictions, incrementally.
The impact rule is about dead and the zone-of-danger rule is
under attack. While England seems ready to take the leap of faith to
pure foreseeability, 33 no American jurisdiction has gone quite that far.
32. Joseph, Dillon's Other Leg: The Extension of the Doctrine Which Permits
Bystander Recovery for Emotional Trauma and Physical Injuries to Actions Based on
Strict Liability in Tort, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 1 (1979). Many reasons have been used by
courts to explain the "no recovery" result, including lack of precedent for the extension
(a weak reason which is no longer applied as more and more jurisdictions abandon the
older rule), floodgates of litigation (that the courts will be swamped with claims),
problems of proof (that mental upset is hard to recognize or measure), fraud (that
courts will not be able to tell real from feigned claims), and that duty is lacking (an
argument that such injuries are not actually foreseeable).
33. In McLoughlin v. O'Brian, 2 All E.R. 298 (1982), the English House of
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Rather, the next wave toward foreseeability in the United States was
begun by the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg.34 In Dillon,
the California Supreme Court considered injuries caused by defend-
ant's negligent driving. Defendant hit Erin Lee Dillon who died. Ac-
tions were also brought by Erin's sister and her mother who claimed
they were near the scene of the accident, witnessed it, and suffered
emotional distress, shock, and related injuries. The trial court granted a
judgment for the defendant on the pleadings of the mother's action be-
cause she was not within the zone of danger and so could have had no
fear for her own safety. The sister's action was allowed to continue
because her location was close enough to raise an issue of fact as to
whether she was within the zone of danger.3" Rejecting such incongru-
ous results, and overruling its own prior decision in Amaya v. Home
Ice, Fuel and Supply Co.,36 the California Supreme Court abolished
the zone-of-danger limitation.
While purporting to adopt a foreseeability approach, the rule of
Dillon falls short of that, because it created and applied specific re-
quirements for testing foreseeability instead of permitting a case-by-
case determination of that issue. While speaking of the three require-
ments of Dillon as mere "factors," it has been pointed out that they
have generally been applied as absolute requirements or elements, and
that the absence of any one of them has generally resulted in a "no
duty" rule being applied.3 7 The three factors articulated by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court were:
1. Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as
contrasted with one who was a distance away from it.
2. Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of
the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from
others after its occurrence.
3. Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as con-
trasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only
a distant relationship. 38
Lords, while considering various factors which might limit recovery in particular cases,
adopted a foreseeability approach as the test in emotional distress cases.
34. 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
35. Id. at 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
36. 59 Cal.2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
37. See Joseph, supra note 32, at 22-26.
38. 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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Interestingly, as time passed, just what was discussed above came
to pass. The California Court modified Dillon to permit recovery in
some cases even when no physical injuries resulted from the emotional
distress.3" Further, later courts adopting the Dillon approach fashioned
control devices broader than the three factors in Dillon. For example,
in Dziokonski v. Babineau,40 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts essentially adopted the Dillon rule in bystander emotional distress
cases, but phrased their rule more broadly to include the situation of a
plaintiff who did not actually witness the accident but arrived on the
scene while the injured person was still present.4 '
Within this context of change, this year the Florida Supreme
Court considered the impact rule in two cases: Champion v. Gray42 and
Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Division.41 Champion involved an allega-
tion that
Karen Champion, the child of Joyce and Walton Champion, was
walking near a roadway when a car driven by a drunk driver left
the road, struck the child and killed her. Immediately after the ac-
cident, Karen's mother, Joyce, came to the scene and discovered
the body of her child. Overcome with shock and grief at the sight
of and death of her daughter, Joyce collapsed and died.44
Because there was no impact on the mother, the trial court had no
choice but to dismiss the action and the court of appeals had no choice
but to affirm. The appellate court took the opportunity to thoroughly
review the issue and urged that the impact rule be abolished. 45 Al-
though noting that the issue of bystander recovery went beyond mere
abolition of the impact rule, since the mother was not in the zone of
39. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
40. 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978).
41.
With these considerations in mind, we conclude that the allegations
concerning a parent who sustains substantial physical harm as a result of
severe mental distress over some peril or harm to his minor child caused by
the defendant's negligence state a claim for which relief might be granted,
where the parent either witnesses the accident or soon comes on the scene
while the child is still there.
Id. at 1302.
42. 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985).
43. 468 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1985).
44. Champion v. Gray, 420 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
45. Id. at 350.
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danger and clearly suffered her injury only because she was affected by
seeing her dead child, the court analyzed the justice of the claim as
well as of the trend started by the California Supreme Court in Dillon.
The appellate court urged the adoption of the Dillon rule."6 The ques-
tion was certified to the Florida Supreme Court.4 "
Rethinking its earlier decisions, such as Gilliam, the Florida Su-
preme Court, while not ignoring the concern about fraud and limitless
claims, nevertheless stated:
We now conclude, however, that the price of death or significant
discernible physical injury, when caused by psychological trauma
resulting from a negligent injury imposed upon a close family
member within the sensory perception of the physically injured per-
son, is too great a harm to require direct physical contact before a
cause of action exists.48
The court stressed the narrowness of the decision, specifically not-
ing that a total foreseeability approach (such as that adopted in Mc-
Loughlin v. O'Brian4 8- 1) was too broad and not what the court had in
mind. The court quoted at length from Dillon, including its three fac-
tors, and, in particular, stressed that emotional harm alone could not be
compensated without "a causally connected clearly discernible physical
impairment [which] must accompany or occur within a short time of
the psychic injury. ' '49
Interestingly, while purporting to be very narrow, the case is actu-
ally broader than Dillon was on its facts and continues to demonstrate
how courts become familiar with emotional distress recoveries, feel
more comfortable with them, and then expand them ever closer to the
full extent of recovery granted to physical injuries alone. For example,
the Florida Supreme Court jumped right from the impact rule to Dil-
lon without feeling the need to stop for a few years at the zone-of-
danger halfway house. Clearly, the experience of other states with the
zone-of-danger rule and with the Dillon rule left the court secure
46. Id. at 354.
47. The certified question was: "Should Florida abrogate the 'impact rule' and
allow recovery for the physical consequences resulting from mental or emotional stress
caused by the defendant's negligence in the absence of physical impact upon the plain-
tiff?" Id.
48. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 18-19.
48.1 2 All E.R. 298 (1982).
49. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 18-19.
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enough that the power of Dillon could contain the doctrine and that no
more restrictive rule was necessary. Additionally, the court stated that
the rule would be applied where the plaintiff either saw, heard, or "ar-
rives on the scene while the injured party is still there."50 While this
makes good sense, it is really the Dziokonski extension of Dillon and
cannot be characterized as a narrow rule. Finally, the court intimated
that it might be prepared to go even further, stating:
The English case of McLoughlin v. O'Brian, 2 All E.R. 298
(1982), adopting a pure foreseeability rule, allowed recovery when
a parent suffered psychic injury upon seeing her child in the hospi-
tal shortly following an accident. We do not say whether or not we
would or would not recognize a claim under such circumstances,
but, if so, we would think that this scenario reaches the outer limits
of the required involvement in the event.5 1
The court held that "a claim exist[ed] for damages flowing from a
significant discernible physical injury when such injury is caused by
psychic trauma resulting from negligent injury imposed on another
who, because of his relationship to the injured party and his involve-
ment in the event causing the injury, is foreseeably injured. 52
Contrasted with the facts of Champion, are those of Brown v.
Cadillac Motor Car Division,53 in which plaintiff Brown struck and
killed his mother who had just exited from the car Brown was driving.
Defendant, Cadillac, was found to be at fault because of a defective
design of the accelerator pedal. Brown did not allege any physical inju-
ries or trauma. Rather, he suffered only psychological upset alone. The
court made it clear that no such recovery could be had:
We hold that such psychological trauma must cause a demonstra-
50. Id. at 20.
51. Id. [Emphasis added]. Importantly, the court explicitly acknowledged that
the adopted rule was, essentially, just a control devide for the doctrine. "We recognize
that any limitation is somewhat arbitrary, but in our view it is necessary to curb the
potential of fraudulent claims, and to place some boundaries on the indefinable and
unmeasurable psychic claims." Id. Once this is acknowledged, the potential for future
modifications and expansions should be obvious.
52. Id. The court also emphasized in a footnote: "We reiterate that a claim for
psychic trauma unaccompanied by discernible bodily injury, when caused by injuries to
another and not otherwise specifically provided for by statute, remain nonexistent." Id.
at 20 n.4.
53. 468 So. 2d at 903.
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ble physical injury such as death, paralysis, muscular impairment,
or similar objectively discernible physical impairment before a
cause of action may exist. We hold that there is no cause of action
for psychological trauma alone when resulting from simple
negligence.
54
It seems that the supreme court is firm, for the moment at least, in
holding the line of recovery at physical consequences of negligently-
caused emotional distress (a line at first held firmly and later aban-
doned in California). The importance of the decisions, however, is not
that they do not go the whole way, but rather, how very far they do go.
In one step, the Florida Supreme Court has moved into the growing
group of courts charting the future for emotional distress recovery in
this country. 55 The eventual limit of the growth of this doctrine remains
to be seen. 56
54. Id. at 904. [Footnote omitted].
55. Recently, a number of jurisdictions have adopted some variant of the Dillon
rule including Nebraska: James v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109 (1985); Wis-
consin: Garrett v. City of New Berlin, 122 Wis. 2d 223, 362 N.W.2d 137 (1985); Ohio:
Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 753 (1983); Montana: Versland v.
Caron Transp., 671 P.2d 583 (Mont. 1983); Maine: Culbert v. Sampson's Supermar-
kets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Iowa: Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa
1981); and New Jersey: Portee v. Jafee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980). This does
not include cases decided before 1980 adopting the same approach in jurisdictions such
as New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Texas, Rhode Island, Arizona, Pennsylvania (plu-
rality), Michigan, Hawaii, and, of course, California which started it all. For a some-
what less enthusiastic view of the doctrine and of Champion v. Gray, see Richmond,
Life After Champion: Defending Against Claims of Emotional Distress Stemming
From Injuries to Third Parties, 4 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 43 (1985). Professor Richmond
states, "The truly heartening thing about Champion is the willingness of the Court to
keep a tight rein on an amorphous and highly questionable cause of action." Id. at 46.
56. The Florida Supreme Court granted a rehearing limited to the question of
whether the cause of action was a derivative one or, by contrast, a separate cause of
action. The court stated that the action "is a direct and distinct claim," Champion v.
Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 22 (Fla. 1985), but also stated, "We do not discuss the possible
effects of the minor's comparative negligence or of contribution because there is no
issue of those factors in this case." Id.
If the action is derivative, then it would seem that any defense which could be
raised against the primary plaintiff can also be raised against the bystander suffering
emotional distress. This seems to be the correct solution to this question. If the Florida
Supreme Court sticks strictly to the view that the action is a separate one and not
derivative, then, analytically, this result is not compelled. The fact that the primary
plaintiff may, himself, have been negligent would not affect the fact that the defend-
ant's act was negligent to the plaintiff-bystander suffering foreseeable emotional dis-
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IV. Premises Liability
A child's fall from monkey bars in a municipal park reached the
Florida Supreme Court in City of Miami v. Ameller.57 The issue was
whether an allegation that the monkey bars were placed over hard-
packed earth stated a cause of action when no allegation was made that
the monkey bars themselves were defective in any way.5 8 The Third
District Court of Appeals ruled in a brief per curiam opinion that a
cause of action was stated,59 while acknowledging a conflict with an
earlier case from the First District, Alegre v. Shurkey.60
There were earlier cases denying recovery. In Hillman v. Greater
Miami Hebrew Academy,61 the supreme court held that no cause of
action was stated because the complaint did not allege that the monkey
bars contained a latent defect nor was the danger one that a young
child would not notice.6 2 In addition, there was nothing to indicate that
the presence of adult supervision would have prevented the accident.63
The court in Hillman expressed concern that the complaint amounted
to an attempt to make the defendant an insurer of the child's safety."
Later, in Alegre, the First District panel split on the issue. The
allegation in Alegre was, as it was in Ameller, that the hard nature of
the packed surface under the monkey bars and the failure to provide a
softer surface constituted negligence. 5 The majority in Alegre felt
bound by Hillman,6" and quoted extensively from that case.67 Judge
Ervin, concurring in part and dissenting in part argued that if Hillman
meant that a complaint was deficient for failing to allege that the de-
fect would not be noticed by the plaintiff because of the child's youth,
tress, and it would be presumed that the bystander could recover the total value of his
or her emotional distress and resulting physical injuries from the defendant.
57. 472 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1985).
58. Id.
59. Ameller v. City of Miami, 447 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(per curiam).
60. 396 So. 2d 247 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
61. 72 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1954).
62. Id. at 669.
63. Id. In Hillman, the allegation was that the monkey bars extended over the
trunk of a tree upon which the child fell. Apparently the monkey bars were of the type
approved for playground use. Id.
64. Id.
65. Alegre, 396 So. 2d at 248.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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then an opportunity could be provided to permit the complaint in Al-
legre to be amended to include such an allegation. 8 If, on the other
hand, Hillman intended to require an allegation that the monkey bars
contained a latent defect, the case should not be considered controlling.
The basic point was that the latent defect rule was, essentially, a duty
limitation in the nature of the assumption-of-risk defense, and that the
defense and any parallel duty limitation ought to be treated as an issue
of the negligence of the child under Florida's comparative- negligence
rule which had not been adopted when Hillman was decided.6 9 The
Third District Court of Appeal in Ameller specifically adopted the rea-
soning of Judge Ervin in his Hillman dissent, thus setting the stage for
review.70
The supreme court managed to uphold both the result reached by
the Third District and the reasoning of the majority opinion in Al-
legre.71 The general reasoning in the Allegre majority opinion was re-
affirmed as to private defendants, however, the supreme court stated
"[w]e see no reason, however, why Hillman and Allegre should protect
a municipality or other public agency from liability for the negligent
operation of playground equipment."7 2 The court noted that the com-
plaint alleged the defendant violated both its own standards for such
equipment as well as those of the playground industry. 73 This was suffi-
cient to state a cause of action.
V. The Duty of Parents to Control the Acts of Their
Children
It is hornbook law that parents are not liable for the torts of their
children merely by virtue of the parent-child relationship.74 By the
68. Id. at 249. It was noted by Judge Ervin that "a child of tender years may be
incapable of comprehending a patent risk and that a greater degree of care may be
owed to the invitee-child by the business owner than to an adult of normal intelli-
gence." Id.
69. Id. at 249-50.
70. Ameller, 447 So. 2d at 1014.
71. City of Miami v. Ameller, 472 So. 2d at 728.
72. Id.
73. Id. "Public safety and welfare demand that a public agency be responsible
for making its own standards at the very least." Id. at 729. The court stressed that its
decision did not have the effect of making the city an insurer because the duty owed
was only that the city "maintain its parks in a condition reasonably safe for public
use." Id.
74. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 123 (5th
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same token, parents may become liable for unreasonable failure to su-
pervise their children.75
In Florida, the leading case interpreting this doctrine was Gissen
v. Goodwill,7 6 which essentially required parental knowledge that the
child had a habit of doing the particular type of conduct before liability
could attach. 77 Allegations in the second amended complaint that the
parents knew that their minor child "[had] dangerous tendencies and
propensities of a mischievous and wanton disposition,' '7 and even that
the parents had knowledge of other anti-social acts directed at third
parties and property,79 were not sufficient to state a cause of action
when there was no prior history of acts such as the one which injured
the plaintiff."
In Snow v. Nelson,"l the Florida Supreme Court reviewed and re-
tained the Gissen decision,8 2 and upheld the district court which had
affirmed the order of the trial court directing a verdict for the defend-
ed. 1984).
75. One of four exceptions to the "no liability" rule is "[w]here he [the parent]
fails to exercise parental control over his minor child, although he knows or in the
exercise of care should have known that injury to another is a profitable consequences."
Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1955). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
76. 80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955).
77. Id. at 705.
78. Id. at 702.
79. Id.
80.
It is nowhere claimed that the child here involved had a propensity to
swing or slam doors at the hazard of persons using such doors. The deed of
a child, the enactment of which results in harm to another and which is
unrelated to any previous act or acts of the child, cannot be laid at the
door of the parents simply because the child happened to be born theirs.
However, a wrongful act by an infant which climaxes a course of conduct
involving similar acts may lead to the parents' accountability.
Id. at 705.
81. 475 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam).
82.
In Gissen we read the exception narrowly, holding that the cause of
action must allege that the child had a habit of engaging in a particular
act or course of conduct which led to the plaintiff's injury. Consequently,
because there was no allegation that the child in Gissen had a habit of
swinging or slamming the doors to the hazard of persons using such doors,
we affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
Id. at 226.
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ant.83 The court rejected the contention that injustice was caused by
adhering to such a narrow rule.84
VI. Loss of Parental Consortium
Actions for loss of consortium are based on the notion that due to
the relationship between two persons, tortious injury to one results in
the loss of various "services" owed by the injured party to the other. It
is the action to recover for the loss of these services that is labeled an
action for loss of consortium.85 It was held early on that such an action
would lie on behalf of the husband when the wife was injured, but it
was not until 1950 that it began to be recognized that services were
mutually owed between spouses and that an action by the wife for lack
of consortium would lie when it was the husband who was injured. 88
Although historically a parent had a right to the services of his or
her children, there has been less than full support for a consortium
action on the part of a parent for loss of a child's intangible services. 87
This may be because many felt that a monetary award for the loss of
the society, companionship, and affection of the child would do little to
remedy the loss. Similarly, the notion of a child's suit for loss of paren-
tal consortium was not well-received generally until 1980, when a few
courts began to recognize it.88 In Florida, a limited right for a child's
action of loss of consortium had been recognized in Florida's wrongful
83. Id.
84. Id. Justice Ehrlich concurred specially. While agreeing that the facts in
Snow did not warrant recovery because the injury occurred to one child by another
when both were playing together, a situation in which such injuries are likely to hap-
pen, Justice Ehrlich argued that the rule in Gissen was too narrow. He stated:
I would hope that, were Gissen before us today, we would construe
that exception to the general rule of parental non-liability to encompass
Gissen's facts. Where parents have actual or constructive notice of their
offspring's propensity to commit a general class of malicious acts, the
child's creativity in developing new ways to bring about injury should not
absolve parents from the duty to attend to and discipline the child.
Id. at 227 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
85. See generally W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS,§ 125 (5th
ed. 1984).
86. Id. The drive to recognize a wife's action for loss of consortium was begun
with Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
852 (1950).
87. See supra note 85.
88. Id.
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death act. 9 In Zorzos v. Rosen,90 the Florida Supreme Court consid-
ered whether to extend the action by judicial decision to situations in
which the parent was injured but not killed by the acts of the
defendant.
The positions pro and con for such an action have been well ar-
gued in Florida. In Clark v. Suncoast Hospital, Inc.,91 the Second Dis-
trict rejected children's claims for loss of consortium after the perma-
nent injury to their father from a cardiac arrest during surgery,
allegedly caused by defendant's negligence.92 The reasons suggested by
the court to justify its denial of the action were several: The court sug-
gested no precedent existed for this action and that it generally was
rejected by other courts considering the question. It also pointed out
that there was a danger of overlapping claims and double recovery. It
was noted that many administrative difficulties existed, including
problems of apportionment, the possibility of fraudulent claims, and the
uncertainty of how to value the damage. It was also noted that insur-
ance rates could be affected by a recognition of the action.93
Many of the reasons above do not attack the basic fairness of such
an action. In fact, the court itself in Clark noted, "If the claims as-
serted by plaintiffs were properly circumscribed, there could be merit
to their position from a policy standpoint." 94 However, the court con-
cluded that the legislature was the appropriate body to address the
89. "(3) Minor children of the decedent may also recover for loss of the dece-
dent's companionship, instruction and guidance and for mental pain and suffering from
the date of injury." FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1983).
90. 467 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1985).
91. 338 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
92. Id. at 1118.
93. Id. at 1118-19. It was also suggested that there was no claim which could be
enforced by the child for the services of the parent. It should be remembered that the
child does generally have a right to financial support from the parents and that child
neglect is generally criminalized. These factors might be sufficient to suggest a concep-
tual basis for a parental consortium action by the child.
94. Id. at 1119.
Plaintiffs make a forceful argument that as children of a disabled fa-
ther, they will not only suffer a loss of the funds that their father ordina-
rily would have provided for their food, shelter, and health; but likewise,
the loss of love, moral training, example and guidance they would other-
wise receive. And while plaintiffs concede that their father is the appropri-
ate claimant to recover for loss of income which would be used to pay for
their basic requirements of life, they argue that to deny them the right to
recover their own intangible losses is a manifest injustice.
Id. at 1118.
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problem. 95
By contrast, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Rosen v.
Zorzos96 rejected the concept that the legislature was the proper body
to make the decision, stating, "The cause of action for loss of consor-
tium is a creation of the common law and its continued development is
properly within judicial authority and responsibility."97 Additionally,
this court noted that some limited authority recognizing the action now
exists. 8 The court found it anomalous that a child would have a con-
sortium action if the parent died, but not if the parent were seriously
injured. It discussed a pattern where courts allowed consortium actions,
in most cases, with only this latter situation left unredressed.99 It was
noted that "[t]he majority of legal commentators support the recogni-
tion of an independent cause of action for parental consortium." 100 Fi-
nally, it was suggested that recognition of the action would help effec-
tuate the policy of the Florida Constitution that "[t]he courts shall be
open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be ad-
ministered without sale, denial or delay."' 0'1
The Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision of the court of
appeals and specifically approved the opinion in Suncoast Hospital in-
stead." 2 The supreme court agreed that the legislature was the proper
body to consider the doctrine and to engage in the delicate process of
constructing limits for the doctrine if it were to be adopted. Finally, the
court raised the possibility that lack of legislative action to extend the
doctrine may have represented the legislature's will on the issue.103
95. Id. at 1119.
96. 449 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
97. Id. at 361. [Footnote omitted]. The court also noted several controversial
policy expansions of the law which had been made in Florida by judicial decision, in-
cluding the recognition of a wife's right to sue for loss of the husband's consortium, and
the adoption of comparative negligence. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 362-63. The court continued, "To suggest that the disparate treat-
menty between the parent and the child with respect to their right to each other's
companionship is historically based, and, consequently, should be perpetuated, is unper-
suasive in light of the growing recognition of children's rights." Id. at 363. [Footnote
omitted].
100. Id. at 363 n.8.
101. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 21.
102. 467 So. 2d at 307.
103. Id.
In addition, we are influenced by the fact that the legislature has rec-
ognized a child's loss of parental consortium in a wrongful death action
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Justice Ehrlich, in dissent, refused to be moved by legislative inac-
tion, noting that the change of the wrongful death statute was a fo-
cused one and limited to that area. No attempt had been made to en-
gage in a general or complete revision of the entire tort system.10 4
Rather, Justice Ehrlich argued that, in passing the Wrongful Death
Act with a parental consortium provision, the legislature had, in effect,
established the public policy of Florida to be in favor of such recovery,
thus opening the door for further judicial action.105 Concluding, Justice
Ehrlich argued, "There is no longer any reason to subscribe to the fic-
tion that a minor child has not sustained any recoverable monetary
damage resulting from the personal injury of a parent. . . It is a prin-
ciple whose time has long since arrived. 10
VII. Punitive Damages
The Florida Supreme Court had several opportunities to consider
issues relating to punitive damages during the past year. In Como Oil
Co. v. O'Loughlin,107 the issue was whether gross negligence was suffi-
cient to support an award of punitive damages. The court addressed the
issue only the year before in White Construction Co. v. Dupont,"'B
where it held that gross negligence was not sufficient and that the
proper standard was wanton and willful misconduct equivalent to that
necessary for criminal manslaughter. 0 9 In the face of this, however,
but has not created a companion action for such loss when the parent is
injured but not killed. Although this omission may be only an oversight, it
strongly suggests that the legislature has deliberately chosen not to create
such a cause of action.
Id.
104. Id. at 307-08 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
I therefore can draw no inference from the fact that the legislature
addressed a narrow segment of tort law by enacting the new death statute,
and did not attempt an overall revision of this area of the law. This was
nothing more and nothing less than the legislative process in action.
Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 308. (Justice Adkins also concurred in the dissent).
107. 466 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam).
108. 455 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1984).
109. Id. at 1028.
The character of negligence necessary to sustain an award of punitive
damages must be of a "gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless dis-
regard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous
effects, or there is that entire want of care which would raise the presump-
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the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's entry of a
directed verdict for defendant on the issue of punitive damages because
the district court of appeal found that there was gross negligence. 110
The supreme court quashed the decision of the district court of appeal
because of its use of the incorrect standard."'
In Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Robinson,"2 plaintiff bought mer-
chandise at a Winn-Dixie store. When he returned to the store and
purchased additional merchandise, an employee of the store errone-
ously concluded that the original items were stolen. Plaintiff was ar-
rested and the items taken from his car and put back on the shelf. He
was charged with petit theft, charges which were eventually dropped.
Plaintiff filed suit for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and
conversion. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded $200,000 in
compensatory damages and $750,000 in punitive damages. The trial
court granted a motion for a directed verdict in favor of Winn-Dixie on
the punitive damage issue and, alternatively, granted remittitur or a
new trial." 3 The district court of appeal reversed the directed verdict
as well as the order for remittitur or a new trial. 1 4
The Florida Supreme Court agreed that granting the directed ver-
dict had been improper. 1 5 The trial court granted it based upon an
tion of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which shows wanton-
ness or recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard of the safety and wel-
fare of the public, or that reckless indifference to the rights of others which
is equivalent to an intentional violation of them.
455 So. 2d at 1029 (1984) (quoting Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16, 20 n.12 (Fla.
1959) (citations omitted)).
110.
We find that there was an adequate basis for the jury to determine
that Como's driver was guilty of gross negligence and that such was attrib-
utable to Como Oil because of Como's failure to oversee and maintain its
equipment and failure to train and equip its driver, particularly when han-
dling a hazardous substance.
O'Loughlin v. Como Oil Co., 434 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
111. 466 So. 2d at 1062. The court also reviewed the evidence and decided that
it could not be viewed as amounting to the required wanton and willful conduct. Justice
Shaw, joined by Justice Ehrlich concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that
the evidence presented sufficient indications of wanton and willful conduct on the part
of the defendant, itself, to preclude a directed verdict on the punitive damages issue.
Id. at 1063.
112. 472 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1985).
113. Id. at 723.
114. Id. at 724.
115. Id.
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earlier case, Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith,"'6 which held
that an employer was not vicariously liable for punitive damages based
upon the acts of the employee unless the employer was also at fault in
some way.""7 But the supreme court held that the holding in Mercury
Motors Express did not apply when "the suit was tried on the theory
of the direct liability of Winn-Dixie, and the jury, by special verdict,
decided that Winn-Dixie should be held directly liable for punitive
damages.""" 8 The court disagreed, however, with the action of the dis-
trict court of appeal in reversing the trial court's order granting remit-
titur or, in the alternative, a new trial. The supreme court noted "that
it is proper for the trial court to issue an order for new trial or remitti-
tur when the manifest weight of the evidence shows that the amount of
punitive damages assessed is out of all reasonable proportion to the
malice, outrage, or wantonness of the tortious conduct."' a 9 The correct
standard for the review of the trial court's decision is "a clear showing
of abuse of discretion.' 20 The district court of appeal made no such
finding, but merely stated that "it was not convinced that the punitive
116. 393 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1981).
117.
Before an employer may be held vicariously liable for punitive dam-
ages under the doctrine of respondeat at superior, there must be some fault
on his part .... Although the misconduct of the employee, upon which
the vicarious liability of the employer for punitive damages is based, must
be willful and wanton, it is not necessary that the fault of the employer,
independent of his employee's conduct, also be willful and wanton. It is
sufficient that the plaintiff allege and prove some fault on the part of the
employer which foreseeably contributed to the plaintiff's injury to make
him vicariously liable for punitive damages.
Id. at 549.
118. 472 So. 2d at 724. Previously the court had held in Bankers Multiple Line
Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1985), that Mercury Motors also did not apply
"where the agent primarily causing the imposition of punitive damages was the manag-
ing agent or primary owner of the corporation." Id.
Because the directed verdict was improper, the alternative order for
remittitur or new trial must be considered. In this regard, we disagree with
the district court's disapproval of the trial court's entry of the alternative
orders entered in the present case. We find that it is preferable for the
court to rule on a motion for new trial at the same time it grants a defend-
ant's motion for directed verdict in the event that the appellate court
reverses the directed verdict.
Id.
119. 472 So. 2d at 725.
120. Id.
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damages assessed by the jury were unreasonable."'1 21 This suggests that
reasonable minds could differ about the reasonableness of the award
which is not a sufficient ground for overturning the trial court's
decision. 22
In Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cotton,123 the supreme court held
that when the theory upon which defendant was held liable for punitive
damages was not mentioned in the pleadings and was not raised until
the charge conference and after all of the evidence had been heard, and
where no motion was made to conform the pleadings to what had been
proved, the theory, although correct, could not be the basis of
liability. 124
In Bankers Multiple Line Insurance Co. v. Farish,26 the supreme
court noted that the trial court is generally in the best position to evalu-
ate the impact of a particular jury instruction and agreed with the trial
court that "the charges given the jury did not adequately apprise it
that awarding punitive damages is discretionary."1 26
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 463 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1985).
124. The theory was that defendant was "a possessor of property who fails to
control the actions of its servant on the property, [and so is liable] even though the
servant is acting outside the course and scope of his employment." Id. at 1128.
The defense attorney repeatedly objected to both the charge and the
special interrogatory on the verdict which allowed finding Tamiami liable
for Crosby's actions outside the scope of his employment. No motion was
ever made to conform the pleadings to the evidence, nor were the pleadings
ever amended to include this theory. In short, Tamiami was sandbagged. It
proceeded to trial on notice that it had to defend against charges of tor-
tious interference with a business relationship for actions attributable to it
on theories of conspiracy or agency. It won verdicts absolving it of liability
on both theories. It was found liable on a theory it never had an opportu-
nity to rebut at trial. While the theory itself is the law of the state, the
procedural requirements of due process will not allow it to be raised in this
manner.
Id.
125. 464 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1985).
126. Id. at 532. The instruction given was not the standard one. The charge was,
"the greater the defendant's wealth, the greater it [sic] must be, the punitive damages
assessed, in order to get his attention regardless of the amount of compensatory dam-
ages awarded to the plaintiff." Id. at 533. Although punitive and compensatory dam-
ages do not have to bear any particular relation to each other, neither is the wealth of
the defendant alone the mark by which punitive damages are judged.
In Lassiter [v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.
2d 622 (Fla. 1976)], we did not intend to abandon the required relation-
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VIII. Interspousal Tort Immunity
Immunities protect status. In essence, the raising of an immunity
says, "I can't be sued, even though I acted wrongfully and even though
my fault caused your injury, because of who or what I am." When
understood in this light, immunities ought to be generally disfavored
and permitted only when society will clearly benefit from their use. In
recent times, immunities have been narrowed or discarded. The tradi-
tional immunity of the sovereign, for example, has been partly waived
through legislation or court decisions in many jurisdictions. 127 Simi-
larly, charitable immunity has waned.112 It is probably safe to say that
interspousal tort immunity, which prevents one spouse from suing the
other, is in a state of declining health. Yet, this year, the Florida Su-
preme Court gave it a shot in the arm by upholding it. The case was
Snowten v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.' 29
Snowten involved the negligent use of an automobile by the wife.
The husband was struck by the auto and seriously injured. The hus-
band sued his wife and the insurance company. The company moved
for summary judgment, which was granted. The judgment was affirmed
on appeal, but the First District Court of Appeals certified the issue to
the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance.130
The immunity of husband and wife is a common law creation, 311
ship between the amont of punishment and the nature, extent, and enor-
mity of the wrong and all of the circumstances in relation to the tort. The
net worth of a defendant is one factor to be considered, but so are the
circumstances and the degree of wantonness or culpability. . . . The in-
struction as given did not apprise the jury of that fact. We deem it error to
fail to do so.
Id.
127. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1985), and Molitor v.
Kaneland Comm. Unit Dist. #302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). "Although one
or two states seem to have retained something like a total sovereign immunity, the
great majority have now considered to at least some liability for torts, in all cases
retaining the immunity at least to the extent of basic policy or discretionary decisions."
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 1044 (5th ed. 1984).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1979), W. PROSSER & W. KEE-
TON. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 133 (5th ed. 1984).
129. 475 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1985).
130. The question certified was, "Is the doctrine of interspousal immunity
waived, to the extent of available liability insurance, when the action is for a negligent
tort?" Id. at 1212.
131. See generally McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L.
REv. 303 (1959); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L.
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and although it was adopted in Florida's "reception statute,"'13 2 such a
statute would not necessarily be understood as denying to the courts of
the state the power to develop the common law through subsequent
decisions. 133 The Florida Supreme Court seemed to acknowledge that it
had the power to abolish or limit the immunity if it had chosen to do
so.13 The court stressed, however, that the common law enacted by the
reception statute would not be abrogated by judicial action without a
compelling need to do so, and then only when "the reason for the law
no longer exsit[ed]."'I
The court cited three main reasons which have traditionally been
advanced for the doctrine: 36 1) The legal unity of husband and wife;
2) Avoidance of marital disharmony; and 3) Avoidance of fraudulent
and collusive claims. In the modern world, one would expect the first of
these reasons to be rejected out of hand. The legal unity of husband
and wife grew at a time when the persona of the wife was almost to-
tally submerged into that of her husband. She could neither sue nor be
sued in her own name and she could not enter into contracts.13 7 Thus,
the conceptual notion of a suit by one spouse against the other would
appear impossible because it would be as if a plaintiff were suing him-
self. 3 8 Surely, this doctrine of "unity" and the conceptual framework
REV. 1030 (1930).
132. Florida Statutes section 2.01 states:
The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a
local nature, with the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, down to the 4th
day of July, 1776, are declared to be of force in this state; provided the
said statutes and common law be not inconsistent with the constitution and
laws of the United States and the acts of the Legislature of this state.
FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1985).
133. See, e.g., Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974), Flores v. Flores, 84
N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973).
134. "[P]etitioner asserts that this court should use its power to abrogate the
doctrine." 475 So. 2d at 1212. The court then considered the policy basis for the
immunity.
135. Id. at 1213.
136. Id. at 1212.
137. Historically, the merger of husband and wife and the need for "family har-
mony" and order resulted in some legal recognition of a right of "family discipline"
vested in the husband. "He might administer to his wife 'moderate correction,' and
'restrain' her by 'domestic chastisement'. . . . The altered position and independent
legal status of married women in modern society has done away with any such disci-
pline." W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 27 (5th ed.
1984).
138. See generally W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
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upon which it was based has been discredited. Similarly, any legal rule
which flows from so tainted a source ought also to be suspect. Surpris-
ingly, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the unity argument still
makes sense. To support that view, the court quoted from respondent's
argument to the effect that marriage relationships are different from
other relationships and create some "special circumstances" which
must be taken into account. 139
It is, of course, true, that marriage is a very special relationship of
love, trust, and mutual financial interest. This alone, however, does not
suggest that those who enter into it should give up rights to bodily se-
curity and compensation for injuries suffered that any unmarried per-
son has. In fact, it might well be seen as a sort of "marriage penalty,"
in which the natural grief and remorse which one spouse would feel
upon injuring another is compounded by the realization that there will
be no compensation whatsoever for the injuries in most cases.
It is likely that the first reason to justify this doctrine, the legal
unity of husband and wife, is not really the reason upon which the case
was decided, or, at least, that it is meant only as an introduction to the
other two; i.e., that because of the special relationship of marriage, it
should be saved from the strains which a lawsuit would entail, or that it
might be the breeding ground for fraudulent claims. As the supreme
court saw it, those who would abolish interspousal tort immunity are
caught on the horns of a dilemma; either the suit will disrupt family
harmony (and so should not be allowed) or the suit will not disrupt
family harmony because the claim is fraudulent. 140 No third alternative
seemed to suggest itself to the court. This avoidance of marital dishar-
mony is the court's second reason for advancing the doctrine.
One is led to wonder whether a legitimate suit is necessarily going
to lead to marital disharmony, especially in a day and age when most
TORTS § 122 (5th ed. 1984); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
139.
The notion that a woman's legal existence-is suspended during mar-
riage, or at least is merged with that of her husband's to the extent that
she cannot control her own property or contractual relationships certainly
has no place in today's world. That does not mean that married persons
are no different than other individuals. The intimacy of the relationship, its
mutual financial interests, and societal significance create special circum-
stances which are not, cannot, and should not be ignored by our legal
system.
475 So. 2d at 1212 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 7).
140. Id. (quoting Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (1979)).
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people are insured.' 41 Even if the suit is technically "spouse v. spouse"
as the court suggested,"4" it is not hard to imagine that the spouses will
understand that the real issue is whether the family unit will recover
from the insurance company for its loss. 43 In fact, in light of insur-
ance, one might well argue that family harmony will be greater in a
situation where the family is compensated for the losses it has suffered.
A severely-injured spouse, perhaps out of work due to the injury, incur-
ring massive doctor bills, will affect the ability of the family to take
care of itself. The strains which this will inevitably cause might be less-
ened if proper compensation was to be forthcoming.
Finally, then, there is the issue of fraud. Will fraud inevitably oc-
cur and go undiscovered in so great a degree that the immunity is nec-
essary to prevent it? Although fear of fraud has often kept courts from
permitting certain actions (actions for emotional distress are a good
example), as courts became convinced that the action itself was valid,
they have rejected fear of fraud as a sufficient reason, standing alone,
to deny claims which are valid.' 44
Although fraud is always possible, and is more probable when
those involved in an alleged accident have a close and confidential rela-
tionship, there are many types of such relationships and courts, in gen-
eral, do not seem unable to tell true from false claims. Florida itself,
for example, seems to feel that such problems can be overcome when a
child sues a parent. 45 In recent years, in fact, a number of courts have
141. It should be noted that a possible intermediate position, also rejected by the
court in this case but accepted in 1982 when the issue was the continuing viability of
the parental immunity, is that the immunity is waived when there is insurance and then
only up to the limits of the insurance policy.
142. 475 So. 2d at 1212.
143. It must be conceded that this realization will exist. Without it, the argu-
ment that collusive suits are likely would make no sense.
144. In Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), the California
Supreme Court stated:
[T]he interest of meritorious plaintiffs should prevail over alleged ad-
ministrative difficulties. "[T]he fact that there may be greater opportunity
for fraud or collusion in one class of cases than another does not warrant
courts of law in closing the door to all cases of that class. Courts must
depend upon the efficiency of the judicial processes to ferret out the meri-
torious from the fraudulent in particular cases."
Id. (citing Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 431, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955)).
145. In Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982), the Florida Supreme Court
abrogated the parent-child immunity to the level of insurance coverage if any. "We
recognize that the possibility of fraud exists in every lawsuit but reject the contention
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abolished or modified the interspousal tort immunity doctrine even in
the face of a concern about fraud.146 It is truly tragic to deny admit-
tedly real claims because of worry about other hypothetical ones which
may be feigned. It is, in any case, to be presumed that the insurance
companies will be diligent in ferreting out any attempted fraud in this
as well as in other areas.
It seems that the policy reasons for the doctrine are weak at best.
Indeed, it might be said that the reasons for the doctrine no longer
exist. Although it can be argued that there is no compelling need to
change the doctrine, it could be argued that there is a compelling need
to prevent a situation in which legitimate plaintiffs who have suffered
real and serious injuries continue to go uncompensated, with all of the
problems which this may cause to the individuals and to society, be-
cause of the continued application of a doctrine which has ceased to
have any reason for being.
The real basis for the decision, then, seems to be that the court felt
a principle settled at the time of the reception statute should usually be
changed by legislation or not at all. This was the position taken in
Raisen v. Raisen,47 and it is consistent with Ard, since the court in
that case noted that parent-child immunity "did not have its origin in
the common law of England as did interspousal immunity."' 48 This is a
valid position although it has not always convinced other courts. 49
The legislature appears to have begun a process which the court
was unwilling to undertake. Recently a partial abrogation of the immu-
nity has been passed.150 Yet, it is to be hoped that the process will
continue and that a complete elimination of that immunity will be
forthcoming. Even if the court feels unable to take the step itself, it
would help if the Court would acknowledge that the reasons for the
that such possibility still forms a valid justification for denying a child compensation
for injuries negligently inflicted by the parent when the immunity is waived by the
presence of insurance." Id. at 1069.
146. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962).
147. 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979).
148. Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 1982).
149. See, e.g., Ebert v. Ebert, 232 Kan. 502, 656 P.2d 766 (1983), Boblitz v.
Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983), and Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753
(Tenn. 1983).
150. FLA. STAT. § 741.235 (1985) provides: "The common law doctrine of inter-
spousal tort immunity is hereby abrogated with regard to the intentional tort of bat-
tery, and the ability of a person to sue another person for the intentional tort of battery
shall not be affected by any marital relationship between the persons."
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immunity have now ceased. As long as the court continues to hold to
the view that the interspousal tort immunity makes logical sense, this
can only serve to slow the drive for reform in the legislature.
IX. Sovereign Immunity
Historically, a sovereign could not be sued without his consent.
The doctrine grew first from the personal immunity of the king and
was taken over as an incident of national sovereignty to protect the
governmental entity from suit without its consent.'51 In a federal sys-
tem where individual states retain much of their sovereign character,
the immunity of the sovereign applies to them as well.' 52
The Florida Constitution provides that the immunity may be
waived by the legislature. 153 The legislature has from time to time pro-
vided for broad waivers of sovereign immunity by statute. The Florida
Supreme Court was called upon to decide a number of cases involving
sovereign immunity during 1985.
The attempt of a young girl and her parents to obtain compensa-
tion for injuries received by the child in a 1980 bus accident eventually
required the supreme court to review a complex relationship between
several statutes and constitutional provisions in Hess v. Metropolitan
Dade County. 54 Recovery for the injuries was governed by the state
statute providing for, and regulating, the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity. 55 In relevant part, the statute provided for "caps" on liability, but
also provided that a judgment for more than the statutory "caps" could
be obtained and could be paid if legislation was passed so directing. 56
151. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
§ 3-4 (5th ed. 1984).
152. Id.
153. "Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against the state
as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating." FLA. CONST. art. x, § 13
(1968).
154. 467 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1985).
155. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1981). FLA. STAT. § 768.30 (1981) stated: "Section
768.28 shall take effect on July 1, 1974 for the executive departments of the state and
on January 1, 1975 for all other agencies and subdivisions of the state, and shall apply
only to incidents occurring on or after those dates."
156. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1981) provides in part:
Neither the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to pay
a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the sum of
$100,000 or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof, which, when to-
taled with all other claims or judgments paid by the state or its agencies or
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In a suit against Dade County, judgments significantly over the
statutory caps were obtained and payments up to the caps were made.
The Florida Legislature then passed a bill directing Dade County to
pay the excess of the judgments.15 Payment was demanded, but was
refused by Dade County, after which the action to require payment
was commenced.15 The county argued that the act of the legislature
was unconstitutional because it violated the home rule charter for Dade
County in that the legislation was not general but was "a local act
relating only to Dade County and constitutes the precise evil sought to
be avoided by Dade County's Home Rule Amendment. 11 59
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the leg-
islature's action. It did this primarily by analyzing the relationship be-
tween the Dade Home Rule Charter and the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity contained in section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes. The particular
act requiring payment of the particular claim was seen as "merely an
implementation of the general law authorizing waiver of sovereign im-
subdivisions arising out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the
sum of $200,000. However, a judgment or judgments may be claimed and
rendered in excess of these amounts and may be settled and paid pursuant
to this act up to $100,000 or $200,000, as the case may be, and that por-
tion of the judgment that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the
Legislature, but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of the
Legislature. The limitations of liability set forth in this subsection shall
apply to the state and its agencies and subdivisions whether or not the
state or its agencies or subdivisions possessed sovereign immunity prior to
July 1, 1974.
157. 467 So. 2d at 298. See also 1983 Fla. Laws 393. The bill was styled: "An
act relating to Dade County; authorizing and directing the county to compensate Mi-
chele Hess, a minor, and Don Hess and Connie Tippett, her parents, for damages suf-
fered as a result of the negligence of the county; providing an effective date." The act
recounted the facts of the case in a preamble, enacted a statement that the preamble
was true, and then directed payment in specific amounts.
158. In a brief per curiam opinion, the appellate court ruled that it did not have
the power to issue a writ of mandamus as requested as "there are other adequate reme-
dies available to the petitioner." Hess v. Metropolitan Dade County, 447 So. 2d 267
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983). Therefore, the court did not reach the merits of the case.
The supreme court held that mandamus was an appropriate remedy and that "the dis-
trict court was not precluded from exercising its discretion to address the merits ..
467 So. 2d at 298.
159. 467 So. 2d at 299. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11 (1885), the Dade County
Home Rule Charter, remained in effect by virtue of article VIII, § 6(e), of the Consti-
tution of 1968.
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munity."'16 Thus, the court seemed to conclude that as long as the sov-
ereign immunity waiver provision was constitutional and did not con-
flict with the Dade Home Rule Charter, any specific implementing act
passed under the waiver would also be constitutional. No separate anal-
ysis of the relationship between the particular claims act authorizing
payment in the Hess case and the Dade Home Rule Charter was
thought to be necessary.
The waiver of sovereign immunity contained in section 768.28 of
the Florida Statutes, after providing for the waiver and for the statu-
tory caps, states that "that portion of the judgment that exceeds these
amounts may be reported to the Legislature, but may be paid in part or
in whole only by further act of the Legislature."'' Several sections of
the Dade County Home Rule Charter state that "[n]othing in this sec-
tion shall be construed to limit or restrict the power of the Legislature
to enact general laws which shall relate to Dade County and any other
one or more counties of the state of Florida.1' 11 2
There is no doubt that section 768.28 is a general law and applies
to all counties equally. It would not, therefore, violate the provisions of
the Dade Home Rule Charter. The legislature is empowered to pass
acts requiring the payment of the excess of judgments over the statu-
tory cap. Yet, the form such an act may or must take is not spelled out.
One can imagine several different approaches which could be taken
which would not implicate the Dade Home Rule Charter at all. For
example, one could imagine the legislature could establish a statewide
fund and pay excess claims out of it rather than to direct specific local
entities to pay specific claims. Further, in light of being made aware of
the hardships caused by certain classes of injuries, say bus accidents,
the legislature could respond by exempting all bus accidents from the
cap and ordering that all such claims, from whatever county, be paid.
Section 768.28 could, therefore, be implemented through general legis-
lation which would pose no conflict with the Home Rule Charter. Thus,
there is no necessary conflict between the section and the Home Rule
provision.
When, by contrast, the legislature exercises its power to regulate
sovereign immunity by passing an act relating only to Dade County,
the act is, arguably, not a general law. The unconstitutional act, if any,
160. 467 So. 2d at 300.
161. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1968).
162. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11 of the Constitution of 1885 is continued in
effect due to article VIII, § 6(e) of the Constitution of 1968.
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would be the passage of the specific claims bill or section 768.28 as
applied, and, thus, the issue would not be the constitutionality of the
section on its face. The question might be seen, in essence, to be
whether the legislature has the power by general law to grant itself the
power to pass local laws when such power has been withdrawn by the
State Constitution in a home rule bill? This suggests a need to analyze
the claim bill's relation to the Home Rule Charter, not merely the rela-
tion of section 768.28 to that charter.163
Other questions conerning the administration of the sovereign im-
munity waiver were tested in Gerard v. Department of Transporta-
163. Chief Justice Boyd dissented, arguing that the claims bill in the Hess case,
1983 Fla. Laws 393, was unconstitutional because it violated the Dade Home Rule
Charter. He relied, in his brief opinion, on Dickinson v. Board of Pub. Instruction of
Dade County, 217 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1968), in which it was stated, inter alia, that a
similar claims bill "was a local law. . . ." Id. at 554. The majority discounted Dickin-
son because it was decided before § 768.28, the waiver of sovereign immunity, was
passed. However, if used for the limited purpose of characterizing the nature of a legis-
lative act which affects only one county as local rather than general, this does not seem
to matter. Surely an act which is local does not become general merely because the
legislature purports to grant to itself the right to pass such acts. This would appear to
take deference to the legislature too far.
In Dickinson, the supreme court stated that the claims act "was a local law be-
cause it affected only Dade County and made an appropriation out of specific funds
due to the schools of that county only." Id. By this definition, the claims bill in the
Hess case was also local and not general and so violated the Dade Home Rule Charter.
The majority noted that the claims act was "an integral part of the scheme established
by the legisisture for waiver of sovereign immunity which we have said should apply
equally, and not in a disparate manner, to all constitutionally authorized entities." 467
So. 2d at 300. The court's citation following the quote, to Cauley v. City of Jackson-
ville, 403 So. 2d 379 (1981), also reminds us of the following quote from that case that
"section 768.28 also furthers the philosophy of Florida's present constitution that all
local governmental entities be treated equally." Id. at 385. Upholding specific claims
bills which affect only one county tends to lead to counties being treated unequally. But
even if this quote suggests that all should be treated equally in that they are subject to
such claims bills, it could be argued that the general policy of the Constitution conflicts
with the specific policy of the Dade Home Rule provision. In Dickinson the policy was
said to be this:
[T]hat in matters which affect only Dade County, and which are not
the subject of specific constitutional provisions or valid general acts per-
taining to Dade County and at least one other county, the electors of Dade
County may "govern themselves autonomously and differently than the
people of other counties of the state."
Dickinson v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Dade County, 217 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1968)
(quoting in part, S and J Transp., Inc. v. Gordon, 176 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1965). (Empha-
sis added)).
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tion.16 4 The case involved litigation which grew out of injuries and
death caused by the fall of a tree limb. A negligence action was
brought against the municipality and the Department of Transporta-
tion, which then had the action against it transferred to another
county. The municipality settled the case and its insurer paid over one-
half million dollars.16 5
The Department of Transportation then sought and obtained a
summary judgment on the ground that the statutory caps on the waiver
of sovereign immunity had been exhausted, that, therefore, if a judg-
ment were obtained, the department would pay nothing anyway, and
that the sole purpose for the suit was to establish a basis for a request
to the legislature that it authorize additional payment through a claims
bill.1 6
The district court of appeals held, and the Florida Supreme Court
agreed, that the "per incident" cap upon the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity applied "regardless of whether the source of payment is a single
governmental entity or multiple governmental entities,"111 and that
funds received from insurance companies applied toward the "cap"
amount.168 The appeals court went on to conclude, however, that the
action against the Department of Transportation could not be brought
at all since no money would be paid under it and it would be, in es-
sence, nothing more than a device to prepare the way for a request to
the legislature for an act authorizing payment. 6 9
The supreme court disagreed. While noting that obtaining a judg-
ment against the Department of Transportation was not required
before legislative relief could be requested, by the same token, the
courts retained jurisdiction over such actions whether or not the statu-
tory cap amounts had been previously paid by others. Thus, the cases
could be filed in the courts.
164. 472 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1985).
165. Id. at 1171.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1172.
168. Id.
169. "We therefore conclude that an excess judgment is statutorily permitted
only when accompanying a claim which is otherwise authorized by section 768.28."
Gerard v. Department of Transp., 455 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
The appellate court certified, as a question of great public importance, the question of
"[w]hether satisfaction of a claim by payment of the statutory amount specified in
section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes, precludes a further claim, in excess of the specified
statutory amount?" Id.
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We therefore hold that Gerard is entitled to proceed in the trial
court against the Department of Transportation. We note, however,
that he assumes certain risks if he elects to proceed. A costly trial
may result in a judgment of no liability against the Department
and the assessment of court costs. It is also possible that a trial
may result in a judgment for less than the settlement amount. In
that event, Gerard would not be able to seek a claims bill. Even if
he is able to obtain a judgment against the Department of Trans-
portation on excess of the settlement amount and goes to the legis-
lature to seek a claims bill with the judgment in hand, this does not
mean that the liability of the Department has been conclusively
established. The legislature will still conduct its own independent
hearing to determine whether public funds should be expended,
much like a non-jury trial. After all this, the legislature, in its dis-
cretion may still decline to grant him relief,170
The bulk of the cases dealing with sovereign immunity which
came before the supreme court raised the issue of whether certain con-
duct was or was not actionable. That is, whether the conduct fell within
the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. The court had become
committed to a case-by-case determination of the issue when it decided
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County.171
In Commercial Carrier, the supreme court analyzed the scope of
the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity and determined that despite
the lack of any specific provision in the statute, it would still be read as
continuing immunity for "discretionary governmental functions. 172
The court distinguished between those activities requiring policy mak-
ing or "planning" and those which were deemed to be "operational."' 73
The court approved a "preliminary test" which had been proposed in a
Washington state case,'7 4 but acknowledged that a case-by-case ap-
170. 472 So. 2d at 1173.
171. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
172. Id. at 1022.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1019 (quoting Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67
Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965)).
Whatever the suitable characterization or label might be, it would ap-
pear that any determination of a line of demarcation between truly discre-
tionary and other executive and administrative processes, so far as suscep-
tibility to potential sovereign tort liability is concerned, would necessitate a
posing of at least the following four preliminary questions: (1) Does the
challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic govern-
mental policy, program, or objective? (2) Is the questioned act, omission,
12011986]
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proach would have to be utilized.17 5
The scope of the immunity waiver was tested when the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeals certified to the Florida Supreme Court the ques-
tion: "May prisoner classifications ever give rise to tort liability, and, if
so, under what circumstances? '176 The case was brought by Smith who
was shot by one Prince during a robbery. Prince was an escaped pris-
oner with a history of violent crime and escape from jail. In 1976, one
Reddish, an employee with the Department of Corrections (DOC) had
had Prince's classification changed to minimum custody status and had
arranged for Prince's transfer to a minimum custody situation from
which Prince escaped. While on the loose, Prince shot Smith.177
or decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy,
program, or objective as opposed to one which would not change the course
or direction of the policy, program, or objective? (3) Does the act, omis-
sion, or decision require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment,
and expertise on the part of the governmental agency involved? (4) Does
the governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitutional, stat-
utory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged act, omis-
sion, or decision? If these preliminary questions can be clearly and un-
equivocally answered in the affirmative, then the challenged act, omission,
or decision can, with a reasonable degree of assurance, be classified as a
discretionary governmental process and non-tortious, regardless of its un-
wisdom. If, however, one or more of the questions call for or suggest a
negative answer, then further inquiry may well become necessary, depend-
ing upon the facts and circumstances involved.
Id.
175. 371 So. 2d at 1022.
So we, too, hold that although section 768.28 evinces the intent of our
legislature to waive sovereign immunity on a broad basis, nevertheless, cer-
tain "discretionary" governmental functions remain immune from tort lia-
bility. This is so because certain functions of coordinate branches of gov-
ernment may not be subjected to scrutiny by judge or jury as to the
wisdom of their performance. In order to identify those functions, we
adopt the analysis of Johnson v. State, supra, which distinguishes between
the "planning" and "operational" levels of decision-making by governmen-
tal agencies. In pursuance of this case-by-case method of proceeding, we
commend utilization of the preliminary test iterated in Evangelical United
Brethren Church v. State, supra, as a useful tool for analysis.
Id.
176. Smith v. Department of Corrections of Fla., 432 So. 2d 1338, 1343 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (as corrected on denial of rehearing).
177. Id. at 1339. The court of appeal held "that there is no sovereign immunity
when an inmate is negligently given preferential treatment and placed in inadequately
supervised confinement." Id. at 1340.
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The supreme court in Reddish v. Smith178 answered this certified
question in the negative. "The administrative process in question is an
inherent feature of the essential governmental role assigned to the De-
partment of Corrections.'1 9 Thus, the action against the DOC for
wrongful classification of Prince and the action against Reddish "to the
extent based upon negligent performance of duties within the scope of
employment . . . are precluded by sovereign immunity." 180 The court
also articulated a second basis for its decision. The waiver of sovereign
immunity essentially makes the state and its sub-divisions liable as a
private person would be. It was not intended to create new causes of
action in tort. To the extent that there is no analogy to the private
sector from the particular act by the government at issue, immunity is
not waived. Since, "the decision to transfer a prisoner from one correc-
tional facility to another is an inherently governmental function not
arising out of an activity normally engaged in by private persons...
the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply."181'
Can the decision not to arrest a suspect give rise to tort liability or
are such decisions protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity?
This question was raised by a number of cases, the principal one being
Everton v. Willard.18 2 In Everton, a sheriff's deputy stopped an auto
after it made an illegal turn. Although the driver admitted that he had
178. 468 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1985).
179. Id. at 931. The court reasoned that all four of the questions in the prelimi-
nary test of Evangelical United Brethren Church would be answered in the affirmative.
FLA. STAT. § 944.012(6) (1977) contained statements of legislative intent setting out
the policy considerations involving the classification of prisoners. The particular admin-
istrative processes were authorized by FLA. STAT. § 945.06 (1977).
180. 468 So. 2d at 931.
181. Id. at 932. The court also considered allegations of bad faith which sug-
gested that Reddish had actually exceeded his authority but found the allegations with-
out sufficient allegations of fact to state a cause of action. Further, even if the claims
had been specific, the Court, in dicta, stated that it would have found that the causal
link between the acts of transfer and the later escape and shooting was not foreseeable
as a matter of law. Id. at 933. In a later case, Ursin v. Law Enforcement Ins. Co., 469
So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 1985), in which a "mentally disordered sex offender" was improperly
made a trustee, after which the inmate escaped and committed another crime, the su-
preme court, following the decision in Reddish, held in a two-paragraph opinion that
sovereign immunity prevented the action. Id. In dissent, Justice Shaw observed: "If
holding the government entity liable for negligence would 'chill' this type of govern-
ment discretion, as the majority fears, I express a strong belief that this is precisely
what the people and the legislature intended when they waived sovereign immunity."
Id. at 1382-83 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
182. 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985).
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been drinking, the officer merely gave the driver a ticket and allowed
him to go on his way. A few minutes later, the driver was involved in
an auto accident which caused serious injury and death to occupants in
the other car. Plaintiffs alleged that the failure of the officer to take the
driver into custody for intoxication was a proximate cause of the acci-
dent.18 3 The supreme court held that the actions of the officer in decid-
ing whether or not to arrest the driver was protected by sovereign
immunity. 84
The court felt that the enforcement of the criminal laws, the police
function, was one of which the essence was discretion. Further,
whatever duty can be said to grow out of the police function was not
one which traditionally gave rise to tort duties absent some undertaking
to protect a particular person.' 8 5 The immunity was analogized to that
afforded to prosecutors and judges and spoke of in very broad terms.
The court stated, "the basic principle involved concerns the liability of
all governmental bodies and their taxpayers for the negligent failure of
their law enforcement officers to protect their citizens from every type
of criminal offense.' 1 86
183. Everton v. Willard, 426 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
184.
[We] hold that the decision of whether to enforce the law by making
an arrest is a basic judgmental or discretionary governmental function that
is immune from suit, regardless of whether the decision is made by the
officer on the street, by his sergeant, lieutenant or captain, or by the sheriff
or chief of police.
468 So. 2d at 937.
185. Id. at 938. Among other sources, the court cited the ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 1-4.1 (2d ed. 1980), which states: "The nature of the
responsibilities currently placed upon the police require that the police exercise a great
deal of discretion - a situation that has long existed but is not always recognizable."
The court disapproved Huhn v. Dixie Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1984), which had held, on similar facts, that a police officer who stops an intoxicated
driver does not have discretion to refuse to enforce the law as no legitimate policy of
government could be furthered by such a decision. "Although the police officer had
some discretion in how he would handle the matter, his duty was plain (and opera-
tional) - he could not turn this drunken driver loose on the street." Id. at 76.
186. 468 So. 2d at 938. However, the court stated: "We note as we did in Tria-
non that this is a narrow decision of making an arrest under the police power of a
governmental entity. It does not have the broad ramifications attributed to it by the
dissent, nor does it recede from Commercial Carrier." Id. at 939.
Several other cases were decided with brief opinions on the authority of Everton.
In Duvall v. City of Cape Coral, 468 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1985), a driver was apprehended
after driving on the wrong side of the road.
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In dissenting opinions, Justice Ehrlich and Justice Shaw drew a
distinction, inter alia, between issues of the allocation of police re-
sources (for example, a suit alleging negligence in failing to provide
adequate police protection), and issues merely of the requirements for
dealing with a law violator once actually apprehended. While immunity
would shield the former, the dissenters argued that no immunity could
be invoked in the latter situation.1 87 Justice Shaw argued more broadly
that the entire approach to sovereign immunity questions, the standards
set down in Common Carrier, were flawed and had to be altered. He
argued, in essence, that the waiver statute, when combined with the
"open court" policy in the constitution, 188 creates a broad waiver to
sovereign immunity and required the state courts to hear the actions.
He argued that Common Carrier was based upon the notion that cer-
tain decisions of other branches of government were beyond the power
of courts to review and the class of such cases was small, 189 not encom-
passing decisions of the type raised in Everton.190 The justice pointed
out that no discretionary exemption from the sovereign immunity
waiver appeared in the statute. 91 Justice Shaw's basic point was that
The police apprehended McNally, whose estimated blood alcohol
count of .34 placed him between a stupor and a coma. McNally was not
arrested or placed in custody, but was turned over to a cab company to be
driven home. Through a series of errors in judgment and execution on the
part of both the police and the cab company, McNally was permitted to
return to his car and drive away despite the timely efforts of onlookers to
summon the police in order to reapprehend him. About four minutes after
driving away McNally crashed into another car, killing two people and
horribly injuring two others.
Id. at 962. The facts are from the dissent by Justice Shaw. Rodriguez v. City of Cape
Coral, 468 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1985) and City of Daytona Beach v. Huhn, 468 So. 2d 963
(Fla. 1983), also found the actions of officers in not taking intoxicated people into cus-
tody to be immune from suit on the authority of Everton.
187. 468 So. 2d at 939 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting) and 468 So. 2d at 940 (Shaw, J.,
dissenting).
188. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21. Also cited was FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1, which
establishes that the judicial power is vested in specified courts.
189. "The exception we carved out in Commercial Carrier can only be applica-
ble to non-justiciable political questions which the courts are unable to answer: should
a law be enacted, should a legislative bill be vetoed." 468 So. 2d at 946 (Shaw, J.,
dissenting).
190. "The decision to release or not release a drunk driver is not a political deci-
sion. The issues presented by this case are justiciable in a court.of law applying tradi-
tional tort principles." Id. at 947.
191. The conflict between the approach taken by federal, California, and
Massachusetts courts, on the one hand, and this Court, on the other hand,
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the court had effectively castrated the sovereign immunity waiver1 92
and thwarted the intent of the legislature. 193 His obvious frustration
appeared to be based not on any one case, but rather on the pattern of
decisions exemplified by cases such as Everton, Reddish, and Trianon
Park Condominium Association v. City of Hialeah,94 which were all
decided the same day.19 5
Trianon Park Condominium Association involved negligent in-
spections of condominium units during their construction. It was al-
leged that the damage to the unit was caused by the defects which
would have been discovered during a reasonable inspection by the city
inspectors. 96 The appellate court held that the city could be liable to
the condominium unit owners for the damage caused by the negligent
is striking. The former courts are statutorily mandated to recognize an
exception for discretionary functions, yet they interpret discretion narrowly
and obtain results which are legally defensible. By contrast, we have no
mandate to exempt discretionary functions, yet we judicially create such
an exemption and read it so broadly as to be indefensible on any discern-
ible ground.
Id. at 949.
192.
After today a plaintiff suing a government tortfeasor will have to
overcome a formidable series of hurdles which effectively restore full sover-
eign immunity to the state and its political subdivisions. First, there is the
four-part Evangelical Brethren test which is ambiguous enough to produce
whatever answer is desired. If the wrong answer is produced, i.e., that the
government is not immune, then the plaintiff must pass the discretionary
action test of Commercial Carrier, which has been so broadly interpreted
as to include a dog catcher knowingly releasing a vicious pit bulldog on the
public as a discretionary activity. In the extremely unlikely event the
plaintiff's action survives these tests, the government by virtue of today's
opinions is in a position to administer the coup de grace; there is no liabil-
ity where the injurious action is performed under the police powers of the
state. If that is not enough, the plaintiff will also discover that governmen-
tal functions are also immune, as are all functions not performed by pri-
vate persons.
Id. at 941-42.
193. "Given the sweep of discretionary activities and police power actions, I sug-
gest that there is very little, if anything, left in the way of government action on which
a tort victim could sue." 468 So. 2d at 942.
194. 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985).
195. April 4, 1985.
196. 468 So. 2d at 914.
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inspections but certified the question to the supreme court. The ques-
tion reads:
Whether under section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975), as con-
strued in Commercial Carrier Corporation v. Indian River County,
371 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 1979), a municipality retains its sovereign
immunity from a suit predicating liability solely upon the allegedly
negligent inspection of building, where that municipality played no
part in the actual construction of the building.197
The Florida Supreme Court, however, restated the question as follows:
"Whether a governmental entity may be liable in tort to individual
property owners for the negligent actions of its building inspectors in
enforcing provisioins of a building code enacted pursuant to the police
powers vested in that governmental entity." 198
Not surprisingly, the court answered the question "no," making
several points which it elaborated at length in its opinion. The points
were:
199
1) The sovereign immunity waiver statute was not intended to create
any new cause of action, but only to remove a bar which otherwise
would have presented suit upon an already existing recognized tort
action.
2) No duty was owed at common law to individuals in regard to the
police power of the state.
3) The adoption of the building code did not create a statutory duty
to individuals.
4) Unless there is a violation of "constitutional or statutory rights,"
the doctrine of separation of powers prevents interference in govern-
mental discretionary functions of government. °0
5) Discretionary acts which are "inherent in the act of governing"
retain immunity.20 1
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See also 468 So. 2d at 914-15.
200. See also Id. at 918.
201. Id. The court also noted:
[I]n rejecting the general duty/special duty dichotomy contained in
Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, [we] did not discuss or consider conduct
for which there would have been no underlying common law duty upon
which to establish tort liability in the absence of sovereign immunity.
Rather, we were dealing with a narrow factual situation in which there
was a clear common law duty absent sovereign immunity. We expressly
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The court restricted use of the four-part test in Evangelical Breth-
ren (which assists in distinguishing between the discretionary/planning
and the merely operational levels of governmental activity, a distinction
made in the Johnson case and adopted by the Florida Court) to situa-
tions in which, absent sovereign immunity, there would be "an underly-
ing common law or statutory duty of care.20 2 Despite this, the court
characterized its decision as "narrow" and stated:
We caution trial and appellate courts who apply this decision that
our holding does not have the broad ramifications characterized by
the dissents, nor does it recede from Commercial Carrier. This de-
cision addresses only the narrow issue of exercising basic discre-
tionary judgments in the enforcement of the police power, public
safety functions by a state, county, or municipal governmental
entity.203
In dissent, Justice Enrlich characterized the decision as one which
"further eroded the legislature's unequivocal waiver of sovereign immu-
nity and further reduced the rights of citizens of this state to be recom-
pensed for injury caused by negligent performance of statutorily man-
dated duties. 20 4
recognized that there were areas of governmental activity where "orthodox
tort liability stops and the act of governing begins.
Id. (quoting Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 371 So. 2d at 1018).
202. 468 So. 2d at 919. The Evangelical Brethren test "need not be applied in
situations where no common law or statutory duty of care exists for a private person
because there clearly is no governmental liability under those circumstances." Id.
203. Id. The court noted four kinds of governmental functions: "(I) legislative,
permitting, licensing and executive officer functions; (II) enforcement of laws and the
protection of the public safety; (III) capital improvements and property control opera-
tions; and (IV) providing professional, educational, and general services for the health
and welfare of the citizens." Id. at 919. Other cases decided on the authority of Tria-
non Park were; Department of Business Regulation v. Bryan, 474 So. 2d 807 (Fla.
1985) (per curiam) (negligent inspection of an elevator); and Johnson v. Collier
County, 474 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam) (negligent inspection of a construc-
tion site).
204. 468 So. 2d at 923 (Ehrlich, J. dissenting). Justice Ehrlich raised the inter-
esting point that the net effect of the immunization of the governmental entities, com-
bined with the establishing of an immunity for the individual employees, an action
which was available prior to the enactment of FLA. STAT. § 968.28(9), could very well
render the latter statutory provision unconstitutional in that it deprived access to the
courts in violation of article I, § 21 of the Florida Constitution, which provides that:
"The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay."
1208 [Vol. 10
314
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/15
Torts
If sovereign immunity protects officers deciding whether or not to
arrest, and building inspectors in the course of their duties, it would
come as no surprise to find that the failure of a city to enforce an ordi-
nance is also immunized since it involves questions of enforcement pri-
orities and the allocation of resources. The Florida Supreme Court so
held in Carter v. City of Stuart,05 in which an ordinance requiring the
impoundment of dangerous dogs was not enforced against a pit bull
which had bitten in the past.2 6 Somewhat surprisingly in light of the
Justice Shaw also dissented with an opinion in which he charged that the majority
had improperly mixed the issue of sovereign immunity with that of duty under tradi-
tional tort law. He agreed with Justice Ehrlich that by undertaking to conduct building
inspections, a duty arose to conduct them reasonably, and a duty was owed to those
who purchased units which were certified as complying with code requirements when,
in fact, they did not. Id. at 926. He stated:
I differ from him in two basic respects. First, I am persuaded that the
legislative waiver of sovereign immunity is comprehensive: neither opera-
tional nor planning functions are immune from suit. Government entities
are subject to suit on planning level functions just as private persons are.
The separation of powers doctrine can only bar suit on nonjusticiable polit-
ical questions. To hold otherwise is to frustrate the constitutional and stat-
utory provisions waiving sovereign immunity. Second, the operational/
planning test is a failed instrument as demonstrated by the progeny of
Commercial Carrier. The simple truth is that planning alone will very
rarely if ever injure anyone and for that reason is extremely unlikely to
become the subject of a tort suit. However, when the planning becomes
operational, it is properly the subject of a suit if the elements of a tort can
be proven. The attempts to distinguish between planning and operational
functions is an elaborate but irrelevant artifact when the legislature has
completely waived sovereign immunity. If a governmental entity 'plans' a
tort and carries it out, thus injuring someone, the entity should be subject
to suit just as a private person would be under the same circumstances.
468 So. 2d at 928 n.4 (Shaw, J. dissenting). (Justice Adkins concurred in the dissent-
ing opinions of Justices Ehrlich and Shaw).
205. 468 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1985).
206. Carter v. City of Stuart, 433 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The
opinion of Chief Judge Letts is noteworthy for its expressed frustration with the at-
tempt to apply the test set down by the supreme court.
As to the overall question of what constitutes "planning" and what is
"operational," it is our view that the Florida case law is in disarray. In-
deed, the only way out of the impasse at the District Court level is to
certify each and every case to the Supreme Court, on its particular facts,
and let our superiors show us the way until the law is clarified or Commer-
cial Carrier is receded from.
Id. at 670. Although the decisions reported here might help to clarify the situation
somewhat, the extent to which they will do so is not entirely clear. In Carter, for exam-
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above cases, the supreme court held that a city could be held liable and
that sovereign immunity did not bar an action for the city's failure to
warn the public about a known hazard on its beaches. The case was
Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach.2 7
Plaintiff was run over by an automobile while sunbathing on the
beach. A charter provision made the part of the beach within the city
limits a public highway and authorized the city to regulate traffic.
Plaintiff argued that this gave rise to a duty to do so and to warn those
using the beach for non-traffic purposes that such traffic might be on
the beach. Breaches of these duties was alleged to have been a proxi-
mate cause of the accident.20 8 The trial court dismissed the complaint
and the appellate court affirmed.20 1 The appellate court reasoned that
decisions about how much and what sort of resources to use for traffic
regulation, and whether or not (or how) to limit beach vehicular traffic
were seen as issues of policy not subject to second guessing in tort
litigation.
The fact that the City has the power to curtail or regulate traffic
on the beach cannot and should not make it liable in tort when the
determination of when and how to exercise that power is a matter
of governmental discretion, at least not under the facts presented
here. It is not a tort for government to govern.210
pie, responding to the argument that once the dog was observed there was no longer
discretion about what action to take, the court stated:
There may be some compelling circumstances, where there is no room
for the exercise of discretion, which mandate action because it is clear that
a government's failure to act has caused a breach of duty. Where, if ever,
such a situation exists will have to await another claim on another
occasion.
468 So. 2d at 957. Such an interesting and provocative statement without any guidance
as to its meaning, would seemingly insure a new round of certified questions in a wide
variety of situations.
207. 471 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1983) (The case originally appeared at 8 FLA. L.
WEEKLY 79 (1983), the revised version appeared at 10 FLA. L. WEEKLY 348 (1985)).
208. Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach, 412 So. 2d 875, 876 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
209. Id. at 877.
210. Id. at 878. The court cited to Wong v. City of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla.
1970), in which the city was not liable for failing to have police present at a demon-
stration which got out of hand and became a riot. The case was approved in Commer-
cial Carrier. It is worth noting that the appellate court carefully reviewed the facts and
the supreme court tests. It concluded that the act was essentially one of discretion and
governmental policy. It tested its view under the four part test in Evangelical United
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In its revised opinion, the supreme court stated the issue to be this:
Whether a complaint that alleges that the City of Daytona Beach
allowed a known hazardous condition to exist on the beach without
warning the public invited to use the beach for recreational pur-
poses of that known hazardous condition, states a cause of action
able to withstand a motion to dismiss. We hold that it does.211
The court suggested that the key was the allegation of a dangerous
condition which was known to the city and for which no proper warn-
ing was given.21 2 The court also noted that it was not addressing the
issue of whether there was, in fact, a breach of duty, considering the
possible apparent nature of the danger. The only issue addressed was
whether the complaint stated a cause of action or was barred by sover-
eign immunity.2 13 The result in this case is particularly interesting in
light of Everton, supra, in which the driver of the car was apprehended
for an illegal u-turn and where, "[the deputy] knew, by his own obser-
vations and by . . . [the driver's] own admissions, that . . . [the
driver] had been drinking to some extent,"214 and in which the driver
was allowed to go on his way shortly after which he was involved in an
accident in which third parties were injured and killed.2 5
It would seem, after Ralph, that if the complaint had stated that
the officer knew the driver was intoxicated, then releasing him would
be the creation of a known hazard for which a duty to warn would
arise. Since there would be no effective way to warn in such a case,
Brethren Church. Yet, the supreme court concluded it had arrived, through this pro-
cess, at the wrong answer.
211. 471 So. 2d at 1.
212. Id. at 2. The court cited with approval Department of Transp. v. Neilson,
419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982), which deemed failure to warn of a known danger to be
"operational." The court also cited City of St. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So. 2d 1082,
1083 (Fla. 1982), stating:
We hold that when a governmental entity creates a known dangerous
condition, which is not readily apparent to persons who could be injured by
the condition, a duty at the operational level arises to warn the public of,
or protect the public from, the known danger. The failure to fulfill this
operational-level duty is, therefore, a basis for an action against the gov-
ernmental entity.
471 So. 2d at 2 (citing Collom, 419 So. 2d at 1083).
213. 471 So. 2d at 3.
214. Everton v. Willard, 426 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
approved, Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985).
215. 468 So. 2d at 937.
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other effective action would have to be taken which, for all practical
purposes, would require the arrest of the driver for intoxication. Hence,
the allegation of the officer would convert the issue from one dealing
with discretion to make arrests to one dealing with failure to warn or
act in relation to known hazards created by a defendant's acts.
There is no doubt that the net effect of the above decisions has
been to limit the scope of the immunity waiver statute and to continue
immunity for a broad range of discretionary, political and policy deci-
sions of government. It is not clear that the broad scope of this continu-
ing immunity was intended by the legislature since no such exception
appears in the statute. Further, decisions such as Everton and Ralph
are likely to cause continuing confusion among lower courts and to lead
to ingenious attempts on the part of plaintiffs' counsel to somehow
plead cases as ones dealing with failure to warn of known hazards. It is
likely that the supreme court will have to continue to guide the devel-
opment of this area of law closely for some time to come.
X. Statutes of Limitation and Repose
Celotex Corporation v. Copeland,216 the case in which the issue of
market share liability was considered,2 17 also reviewed the question of
whether the statute of limitations had run, thus barring the action. The
applicable limitation period was four years.218 In general, the period
would run from the time that plaintiff discovered, or a reasonable per-
son in plaintiff's position would have discovered, the facts which would
trigger a cause of action." 9
216. 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985).
217. See infra notes 263 to 266 and accompanying text.
218. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3) (1981), which was deemed to be the applicable limi-
tation statute provided that a number of actions had to be brought "within four years."
Subsection (e) provided that the four year limitation would apply to "[a]n action for
injury to a person founded on the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal
property that is not permanently incorporated in an improvement to real property, in-
cluding fixtures." Id.
219. FLA. STAT. § 95.031 (1981) provided: "Except as provided in subsection (2)
and in § 95.051 [concerning tolling of the statutes] and elsewhere in these statutes, the
time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from
the time the cause of action accrues."
Subsection (2) provided:
Actions for products liability and fraud under § 95.11(3) must be be-
gun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running
from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered
1212 [Vol. 10
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The facts showed that the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos in the
course of his employment as a boilermaker from 1942 until 1975.
Plaintiff became aware that there were potential health risks from as-
bestos exposure as early as 1958, but had no physical symptoms of any
trouble until the late 1960's. The symptoms grew worse in 1972 and
continued to do so. Plaintiff retired in 1975 and was finally diagnosed
as having asbestosis in 1978. Suit was brought in 1979.220
Defendants moved for summary judgment which was granted by
the circuit court on the ground that the applicable statute of limitations
had run. 2 ' The appellate court reversed, holding:
Where, as here, the claimed injury in a products liability action is
a so-called "creeping disease," like asbestosis, acquired over a pe-
riod of years as a result of long-term occupational exposure to inju-
rious substances, such as asbestos dust, the courts have held that
the action accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations "only
when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifest
themselves [to the claimant]." '222
Because the issue of just when the effects manifested themselves
was one of fact and was in dispute, it was improper for the circuit court
to grant a summary judgment on the issue.2 23 The supreme court
agreed with the decision and the reasoning of the district court of
appeals. 2 4
The statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case was con-
sidered in Moore v. Morris.225 The petitioner (the action was com-
menced by her parents on her behalf) was born in 1973. At the time of
the birth some problems developed and a Caesarean section was per-
or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead
of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in § 95.11(3), but in any
event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to
its original purchaser or within 12 years after the date of the commission
of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the defect in the product or the
fraud was or should have been discovered.
Id.
220. Copeland v. Amstrong Cork Co., 447 So. 2d 922, 924-25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
221. Id. at 925.
222. Id. at 926 (quoting in part Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949)).
223. 447 So. 2d at 926-28.
224. 471 So. 2d at 539.
225. 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1985).
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formed. The father noticed that the baby appeared to be blue and that
oxygen was used. The baby then had to be transferred to Jackson Me-
morial Hospital's infant emergency unit. There was some thought that
the baby would not live, and emergency surgery had to be performed to
help her breathing.22
The district court of appeals confirmed that the applicable statute
of limitations was two years227 and that it had begun to run at the birth
since there was notice of the injury at that time. Since the suit had not
been commenced until 1978, the action could not be brought. The ap-
pellate court therefore affirmed the summary judgment which the trial
court had entered.228
The Florida Supreme Court quashed the appellate court's decision
and remanded the case, holding that a summary judgment was not ap-
propriate.220 Although the father could see that there were problems,
the court said:
There is nothing about these facts which leads conclusively
and inescapably to only one conclusion - that there was negli-
gence or injury caused by negligence. To the contrary, these facts
are totally consistent with a serious or life threatening situation
which arose through natural causes during an operation. Serious
medical circumstances arise daily in the practice of medicine and
226. Moore v. Morris, 429 So. 2d 1209, 1209-10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
227. The applicable statute at that time was FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (6), which
provided:
WITHIN TWO YEARS - [An action to recover damages for inju-
ries to the person arising from any medical, dental, optometric, chiro-
podial, or chiropractic treatment or surgical operation, the cause of action
in such cases not to be deemed to have accrued until the plaintiff discovers,
or through the use of reasonable care should have discovered, the injury.
228. 429 So. 2d at 1210. In dissent, Chief Justice Schwartz noted that although
the child's parents knew there was something wrong at the time, they did not appear to
know that there was any permanent injury to her until years later. As the Chief Judge
stated:
I very strongly dissent from the conclusion, inherent in the summary
judgment below and its affirmance here, that one is obligated as a matter
of law to bring an action before there is a clear indication that damages
have even been sustained. Such a holding will require the bringing of pro-
tective actions in every case in which a supposed medical misadventure
may have occurred, on the off chance that an injury will subsequently
manifest itself.
Id. at 1210 (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
229. 475 So. 2d at 667.
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because they are so common in human experience, they cannot,
without more, be deemed to impute notice of ne~ligence or injury
caused by negligence. 230
Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.231 involved an equal protection chal-
lenge to the state's statute of repose in product liability actions. The
statute required, in addition to the restrictions imposed by the statute
of limitations, that any products action had to be brought no later than
twelve years after delivery of the product to the first purchaser.2 32 The
product which injured the plaintiff was a pressbrake machine which
was delivered to the first purchaser in November 1966. The injury to
the plaintiff occurred in April 1977. Suit was filed in November 1980.
This was within the statute of limitations period, but after the time
permitted by the statute of repose. The trial court entered a summary
judgment and the appellate court affirmed. 3
Earlier, in Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons,234 the supreme
230. Id. at 668. In Taddiken v. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 478 So. 2d
1058 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam), the certified question was:
Whether a claim against the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund
arises at the time of the alleged medical malpractice, rather than when
judgment is entered against the tortfeasor, and is governed by the two year
statute of limitations provided by section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes
(1977), so that the Fund must be made or joined as a party defendant
within two years after the malpractice action accrues?
Id.
The court answered the question "yes," holding that "the Fund is in privity with
its participating health care providers and is subject to the same two-year statute of
limitations period." Id. at 572. Three other cases, Robison v. Florida Patient's Com-
pensation Fund, 478 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1985); Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v.
Isabella, 478 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1985); and Haftel v. Florida Patient's Compensation
Fund, 478 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1985), were affirmed on the authority of Taddiken, in per
curiam opinions.
231. 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985).
232. FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1979) provided:
Actions for products liability and fraud under § 95.11(3) must be be-
gun within the period proscribed in this chapter, with the period running
from the time the facts give rise to the cause of action were discovered or
should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of
running from any date prescribed elsewhere in § 95.11(3), but in any event
within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its
original purchaser or within 12 years after the date the defect in the prod-
uct or the fraud was or should have been discovered.
233. Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 458 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
234. 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
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court had considered an analogous statute of repose dealing with de-
fects in improvements to real property," 5 and held that when the stat-
ute had the effect of barring an action before it accrued, it was uncon-
stitutional in that it violated the provision in the state constitution
assuring the right of access to courts.2 36 The reasoning was extended to
the products liability statute of repose in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers
Manufacturing Co.237 By contrast, when the repose statute had the ef-
fect of shortening the existing time for bringing the action, but not of
barring the action altogether, it had been upheld.3 8
235. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (1975).
236. 369 So. 2d at 575. The Florida Constitution provides: "The courts shall be
open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial or delay." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
237. 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980) (per curiam). The per curiam opinion in its
entirety stated:
This cause is before the Court on appeal from a judgment of the Cir-
cuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County.
The judgment passed upon the validity of a state law. The notice of appeal
was filed January 12, 1979. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.
Const. (1972).
The Circuit court held that this product liability action was barred by
the statute of limitations, section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1975). We re-
verse on the authority of Overland Construction Company v. Sirmons, 369
So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979), and hold that, as applied to this case, section
95.031 denies access to courts under article I, section 21, Florida Constitu-
tion. See also Purk v. Federal Press Co., 387 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1980);
Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 357 So. 2d 4012 (Fla. 1978).
It is so ordered.
Id. Justice McDonald dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Overton and Alder-
man, arguing that while a 12-year statute of repose might not be reasonable when
improvements to real property were involved, it was when dealing with products. Jus-
tice McDonald suggested that the limitation was a reasonable compromise between
alternative policies, one that recognized the need to compensate consumers for injuries
from dangerous products and one which sought to avoid excessive and endless liability
on manufacturers. "I perceive a rational and legitimate basis for the legislature to take
this action, particularly in view of the relatively recent developments in expanding
the liability of manufacturers." Battilla, 392 So. 2d at 875.
238. In Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1978), plaintiff
was injured by a pneumatic message conveyor system. The work was done in 1961, the
injury occurred in 1972, and under the subsequently passed statute of repose with a
special grace period applicable to actions which would otherwise have been barred by
the passage of the act, the action had to be brought by January 1, 1976. The supreme
court rejected the argument that the effect of this change - i.e., that plaintiff had
about seven months less time to sue than under the statute of limitations alone -
violated the state constitution. The court affirmed the summary judgment. Id. at 403.
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In Pullum, the plaintiff conceded that the statute of repose itself
was unconstitutional, but argued that after Battilla, the application of
the statute amounted to a violation of equal protection. 23 9 "Pullman
argues that the statute now irrationally applies to a very limited class
of persons, i.e., those persons injured during a time period of eight to
twelve years after delivery of the completed product to its original
purchaser.
240
In Purk v. Federal Press Co., 387 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1980), a products liability
action, the product which was injured was first sold in 1961. The injury took place in
1973. The statute of repose took effect in 1975, and under its grace period, the right to
sue for an action otherwise barred under the new statute was extended until January 1,
1976. The action was brought on April 13, 1976. The supreme court contrasted Bauld
with Overland Constr. Co., and held that access to the courts was not denied. Purk,
387 So. 2d at 356-357. The repose statute was also upheld against an equal protection
challenge. Id. at 357-58.
239.
He pointed out that if the accident had occurred twelve years or more
after delivery of the machine, the statute of repose would not have barred
his action, and he would have had, pursuant to Section 95.11(3), four
years from the accident date within which to file his suit . . . . The results
of the interplay among the regular four-year limitations statute, the
twelve-year statute of repose and the holding in Overland are: (1) that a
person who sustains an injury at any time within eight years from the
product's initial delivery date will have four years from the date of injury
within which to file suit; (2) that a person injured twelve years or more
after the delivery date will also have four years from the date of injury to
sue because Overland would preclude the operation of the twelve-year stat-
ute; provided, however, that such person might not have as many as four
years to bring the action where his injury occurred prior to January 1,
1975, the effective date of Chapter 74-382, Laws of Florida (the law creat-
ing Section 95.031), and where he would be required to file suit by Janu-
ary 1, 1976, by virtue of the one-year savings clause provided for by Chap-
ter 74-382, section 36; and (3) that those persons injured during the time
frame of eight to twelve years after delivery date will be governed by a
limitations period of something less than four years, such period depending
upon the point, during that time frame, when the injury occurs (i.e., if the
injury occurs nine years after delivery, the party would have three years to
sue; if the date of injury was 10 years after delivery, suit would have to be
brought within two years; etc.). Pullum complains that he is denied equal
protection because he had only one and a half years from his injury within
which to file suit, whereas a person injured by the same machine approxi-
mately two and one half years later (at least 12 years after delivery) would
have, by virtue of the holding in Overland, four years within which to file.
Pullum, 458 So. 2d at 1138.
240. 476 So. 2d at 659.
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In the face of this challenge, the supreme court reconsidered its
decision in Battilla, and "receded" from it, holding that the repose
statute is not violative of the Florida Constitution. The court stated:
"[I]n enacting this statute of repose, [the legislature] reasonably de-
cided that perpetual liability places an undue burden on manufacturers,
and it decided that twelve years from the date of sale is a reasonable
time for exposure to liability for manufacturing of a product."241 Since
the supreme court had "receded from" 242 the case which had, allegedly,
created the problem, the basis of the equal protection argument was
gone. Granting the summary judgment was, therefore, upheld.243
XI. Causation: Market Share Liability
As a general proposition, it is fair to assert that plaintiff must
241. Id. The supreme court approved the result of the district court of appeal
only. That court had found no violation of equal protection on the authority of Purk.
The court noted that Justice McDonald, who had dissented in Battilla, had correctly
analyzed the different considerations involved in a statute of repose for improvements
to real property as contrasted with those applicable to a statute of repose dealing with
manufactured goods. Id. at 659-60.
242. The court stated that it had "reconsidered" Battilla, twice that it had "re-
ceded" from Battilla, and "held" that section "95.031(2) is not unconstitutionally vio-
lative of article I, § 21 of the Florida Constitution." 476 So. 2d at 659. The court also
dropped this interesting footnote:
Pullman also refers to Diamond v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc., 397
So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981), as being in accord with Battilla. In Diamond, we
held that the operation of section 95.031(2) operated to bar a course of
action before it accrued and thereby denied the aggrieved plaintiff access
to the courts. But Diamond presents an entirely different factual context
than existed in either Battilla or the present case where the product first
inflicted injury many years after its sale. In Diamond, the defective prod-
uct, a drug known as diethylstilbestrol produced by Squibb was ingested
during plaintiff's pregnancy shortly after purchase of the drug between
1955-56. The drug's effects, however, did not become manifest until after
plaintiff daughter reached puberty. Under these circumstances, if the stat-
ute applied, plaintiff's claim would have been barred even though the in-
jury caused by the product did not become evident until over twelve years
after the product had been ingested. The legislature, no doubt, did not
contemplate the application of this statute to the facts in Diamond. Were
it applicable, there certainly would have been a denial of access to the
courts.
Id.
243. 476 So. 2d at 660.
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prove that defendant's act caused him harm.2 44 Even so, the realities of
the world mean that factual situations arise in which the possibility of
causation is high, but proof is difficult or impossible. Such situations
have resulted at times in modifications of the basic causation doctrine.
In the area of products liability, the most controversial modification of
causation recently took place in California in Sindell v. Abbott Labora-
tories.245 This doctrine, called "market share liability," was considered
recently in Florida.
The facts of Sindell were tragic. A number of different companies
manufactured and sold a drug called diethylstilbestrol (DES). The
drug was approved on an experimental basis although these companies
allegedly sold it on an unlimited basis. The drug was administered to
pregnant women to help prevent miscarriages. It allegedly continued to
be marketed despite the fact that the companies "knew or should have
known that it was a carcinogenic substance, that there was a grave
danger after varying periods of latency it would cause cancerous and
pre-cancerous growths in the daughters of the mothers who took it, and
that it was ineffective to prevent miscarriage." 246 The drug was manu-
factured by all of the companies from a single government-approved
formula. Plaintiff (and those similarly situated, who were "DES daugh-
ters") had no way of knowing or proving exactly which company's
product her mother had taken so many years before, prior to her own
birth, yet her injury was real, caused by the DES which her mother
had taken.247
There are several possible solutions to the causation problem posed
by these facts. One is that plaintiff loses and collects nothing since she
is unable to prove exactly which company manufactured the actual
244. While the statement is accurate as a general principle in negligence and
strict liability actions for damage to persons and property, a reference to the historical
right of action for libel per se without proof of actual harm will serve as a necessary
reminder that even such a basic principle may not be universal in the law of torts.
245. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980).
246. Id. at 594, 607 P.2d at 925-926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133-134. It was alleged
that the companies negligently failed to test the drug and "the tests performed by
others, upon which they relied, indicated that it was not safe or effective." Id. at 594,
607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
247. See 26 Cal. 3d at 594-5, 607 P.2d at 925-926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133-134.
DES was sold under many different names and was often prescribed generically by
doctors. It was given to as many as three million pregnant women. See 26 Cal. 3d at
597, 607 P.2d at 927, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
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doses of DES which her mother consumed. Under the basic causation
rule, this would have been the result.248 Generally, a plaintiff should
not recover from a defendant unless she can show that the defendant
caused the harm about which she complains. In most cases where cau-
sation cannot be proven, it is either because the defendant did nothing
wrong at all or did nothing wrong with respect to the plaintiff. Defend-
ant is, in essence, a stranger to the injury. In Sindell, by contrast, it
was clear that all of the defendants were negligent in manufacturing
and marketing DES despite the evidence of danger. The negligence of
each was alleged to be identical. Additionally, by marketing the drug
so that it was mere happenstance which company's product was actu-
ally consumed by the mother, each company was arguably negligent to
the plaintiff. In such a situation, a result where plaintiff takes nothing
and defendant pays nothing is not palatable. Perhaps for this reason,
the Calfornia Supreme Court was moved to consider various theories
under which the plaintiff might recover.
One possible approach would be to hold all of the defendants
jointly and severally liable under a concert-of-action theory. The basis
for this would be a finding that the defendants acted together to com-
mit the tort and that was each active participant would, therefore, be-
come liable for the acts of each member of the group.2 49 This approach
is quite harsh. If each defendant is part of a common tortious plan,
then it would not matter whether a particular defendant could prove
that he did not manufacture the doses which were consumed. "All
those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tor-
tious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or re-
quest, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer's acts done
for their benefit, are equally liable. ' 250 Without actual evidence that
248.
We begin with the proposition that, as a general rule, the imposition of
liability depends upon a showing by the plaintiff that his or her injuries
were caused by the act of the defendant or by an instrumentality under the
defendant's control. The rule applies whether the injury resulted from an
accidental event (e.g., Shunk v. Bosworth, 334 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1964))
or from the use of a defective product (e.g., Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62
F.R.D. 22, 29-30 (D. Minn. 1973); Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal.
App. 3d 868, 873-875, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978)). See also HURSH AND
BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2d 125 (1974).
26 Cal. 3d at 597-98, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
249. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977).
250. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 46 (5th ed.
1220 [Vol. 10
326
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/15
Torts
there was such a common plan, it would not be appropriate to apply
the concert-of-action theory to the facts of Sindell.
Another approach is to hold the entire industry jointly and sever-
ally under a theory of "enterprise liability." This doctrine, which the
court noted had been proposed in a federal district court decision,251
suggests that defendants who act independently can become liable as a
group when an industry standard, to which they all independently ad-
here, is negligent.
. The court reasoned as follows: there was evidence that defend-
ants, acting independently, had adhered to an industry-wide stan-
dard with regard to the safety features of blasting caps, that they
had in effect delegated some functions of safety investigation and
design, such as labelling, to their trade association, and that there
was industry-wide cooperation in the manufacture and design of
blasting caps. In these circumstances, the evidence supported a
conclusion that all the defendants jointly controlled the risk. Thus,
if plaintiffs could establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the caps were manufactured by one of the defendants, the burden
of proof as to causation would shift to all the defendants.15 2
The Sindell court rejected this theory on the facts. In the blasting
cap case, there was a small number of manufacturers, while over two
hundred companies were involved with DES. In the prior case, there
was evidence of delegation of safety measures to a trade association,
but no such evidence existed in Sindell.253
Another approach used in these cases is sometimes called "alterna-
tive liability." When multiple defendants have all been independently
negligent to the plaintiff and are all joined as party defendants, but
when it is impossible for plaintiff to determine which of the defendants
actually caused the injury, the burden of proof as to causation will be
shifted to each defendant. If a defendant can carry the burden and
show that he was not the cause of the injury, then that defendant is out
of the case. Any defendants who are unable to meet the burden are
1984). [Footnotes omitted].
251. Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
252. 26 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 607 P.2d at 934, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
253. It was not held to be significant that all of the manufacturers of DES used
the same formula because this was the government approved formula which manufac-
turers were required to use. 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
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held jointly and severally liable. This doctrine was created by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Summers v. Tice,254 and was adopted by the
Restatement.2 55
In Summers, all of the possible people who could have injured the
plaintiff were joined as defendants in the action. In Sindell, by con-
trast, only some of the DES manufacturers were joined. Thus, although
arguably each of the joined defendants had been independently negli-
gent toward the plaintiff, the actual manufacturer of the DES which
plaintiff's mother took might not have been among those joined in the
suit. Balancing the factual differences between Sindell and Summers
against a basic notion of fairness that "as between an innocent plaintiff
and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the in-
jury,"2 56 the court applied the principles of Summers but in a modified
form. The court held that:
1) Where the defendants, although acting independently, made
an identical drug (and so were negligent in the same way to
consumers and others affected, including in this case the
daughters of consumers; and
2) Where plaintiff had managed to join defendants who collec-
tively accounted for a "substantial share" of the total DES
market, but less than all such defendants; then
3) The burden of proof on causation is shifted to the defendants
and all defendants will be held liable for the injuries, except
those who can prove that they did not manufacture the DES
which was taken by plaintiff's mother; however
4) Joint and several liability would not be applied. Rather, each
'defendant will be held liable only for a percentage of the dam-
age equal to the percentage of the market in DES which the
defendant had.25
Besides the general fairness issue raised by the court, it also sug-
254. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). In Summers, two different defendants,
acting independently, negligently fired guns in plaintiff's direction, but it was impossi-
ble for plaintiff to determine which shot or shots injured him.
255. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (3) (1964).
256. 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
257. Id. at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46. Plaintiff al-
leged that six or seven companies were responsible for 90% of the DES market. With-
out adopting any particular percentage necessary to meet the "substantial" share of the
market requirement, the court noted that if these manufacturers could be joined in the
suit, the chance that the manufacturer which had actually made the particular DES
taken by plaintiff was absent would be only 10%.
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gested that the doctrine was necessary to protect consumers in an in-
creasingly complex society, 258 and that the defendants were in the best
position to discover the problems and to insure against them.259
Sindell received mixed reviews,260 and the eventual reception of
258.
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in sci-
ence and technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and
which cannot be traced to any specific producer. The response of the courts
can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those
injured by such products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing
needs.
Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
259. "These considerations are particularly significant where medication is in-
volved, for the consumer is virtually helpless to protect himself from serious, sometimes
permanent, sometimes fatal, injuries caused by deleterious drugs." Id. at 611, 607 P.2d
at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court discounted defendant's arguments.
Most of their arguments, however, are based upon the assumption
that one manufacturer would be held responsible for the products of an-
other or for those of all other manufacturers if plaintiff ultimately prevails.
But under the rule we adopt, each manufacturer's liability for an injury
would be approximately equivalent to the damages caused by the DES it
manufactured.
Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146. (Footnote omitted).
260. See, e.g., Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305
(1980) (adopting the market share approach); Namm v. Charles E. Frosst and Co.,
178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981) (rejecting it); Ryan v. Eli Lilly and Co.,
514 F. Supp. 1004 (D. S.C. 1981) (rejecting market share both because plaintiff failed
to allege that defendants comprised a substantial share of the market, and also because
the theory would be against the public policy of South Carolina that plaintiff prove
causation); Mizell v. Eli Lilly and Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D. S.C. 1981) (refusing to
apply market share under choice of law principles even though California was the place
of the wrong, and following Ryan on the issue of South Carolina's public policy); and
Payton v. Abbot Labs., 366 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 190 (Mass. 1982). The Pay-
ton court said:
[W]e are unable to give a definitive answer on this record whether the
manufacturers of DES named as defendants (who probably supplied some
of the DES ingested by the mothers of the plaintiffs) can or cannot be held
liable to the members of the plaintiff's class when neither the plaintiffs nor
the defendants can identify which manufacturers' DES was ingested by
the mothers of the plaintiffs. We have indicated, however, the view that we
might permit recovery from those defendants shown to be negligent to the
extent of their participation in the DES market, even though the plaintiffs
cannot identify the particular source of DES which their mothers ingested.
Id.
See also Tidler v. Eli Lilly and Co., 95 F.R.D. 332 (D.C. 1982) (refusing to re-
quire defendants to answer interrogatories about their market shares, and deeming the
1986] 1223
329
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
the doctrine in DES litigation is still somewhat in doubt. Consideration
of the doctrine has also begun in the context of litigation over injuries
received due to long-term exposure to asbestos. The reception in this
context has been decidedly chilly.261 Difficulties arise because of the
theory a "radical departure from the body of products liability law"). Id. at 336. See
also Pipon v. Burroughs-Wellcome Co., 532 F. Supp. 637 (D.N.J. 1982) (rejecting the
doctrine); Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593, 599- 600 (M.D. Fla.
1982) ("This Court finds no indication in the decisions of the courts of this state that
they would follow Sindell in departing from the fundamental requirement of causation)
(footnote omitted); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 107 (1984) (rejecting Sindell, but fashioning its own
requirements which would also not require plaintiff to prove that defendant made the
precise doses which the mother consumed, and permitting action either in negligence or
strict liability); and Zafft v. Eli Lilly, 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (rejecting
the doctrine).
"The market share liability theory is a dangerous step towards just such a conver-
sion [of the tort system into one purely of compensation and eliminating the element of
resolution of disputes between individuals], and courts in the future should reject it as a
method of imposing liability in civil cases." Fischer, Products Liability - An Analysis
of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1662 (1981). "Market share liabil-
ity may well create more injustices than it eliminates, because it is the first doctrine to
completely divorce liability from responsibility." Comment, Market Share Liability for
Defective Products: An Il-Advised Remedy for the Problem of Identification, 76 Nw.
U.L. REV. 300, 330 (1981). "The market share approach not only provides compensa-
tion to victims of DES, but may promote deterrence of similar occurrences in the fu-
ture. The significane of Sindell may be the court's demonstrated willingness to use
probability to resolve causation problems when inequity would result from the mechan-
ical application of traditional doctrine." Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to
the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668, 680 (1981).
261. See, e.g., Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 191
(S.D. Georgia, Brunswick Division 1982). The court rejected market share in general
but also noted its particular non- applicabillity to cases dealing with asbestos exposure
because "asbestos products are not fungible commodities. The injuries caused by asbes-
tos exposure are not restricted to asbestos products - other products, such as ciga-
rettes, may have caused or contributed to the injury. Additionally, products containing
asbestos are not uniformly harmful - many products contain different degrees of as-
bestos." [Footnote omitted]. See also In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152
(N.D. Ca. 1982), which rejected market share partly because it appeared that plaintiff
would be able to identify which defendant(s) caused the injury. The court also rejected
the theory because:
Where asbestos is the product in question, numerous factors would
make it exceedingly difficult to ascertain an accurate division of liability
along market share lines. For example, unlike DES, which is a fungible
commodity, asbestos fibers are of several varieties, each used in varying
quantities by defendants in their products, and each differing in its harm-
ful effects. Second, defining the relevant product and geographic markets
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many different kinds of products which incorporate asbestos, each with
varying levels of danger to the plaintiff.26 2 This is a problem which does
not exist in DES litigation.
It is within the context of the continuing debate about this contro-
versial doctrine that the Florida Supreme Court considered market
share for the first time in Colotex Corp. v. Copeland.26 3 The case was
brought by "a former asbestos worker, who contracted asbestosis and
asbestos-related cancer, and his wife, against sixteen manufacturers of
asbestos products. 264 The court of appeals essentially adopted the mar-
would be an extremely complex task due to the numerous uses to which
asbestos is put, and to the fact that some of the products to which the
plaintiffs were exposed were undoubtedly purchased out of state sometime
prior to the plaintiff's exposure. A third factor contributing to the difficulty
in calculating market shares is the fact that some plaintiffs were exposed
to asbestos over a period of many years, during which time some defend-
ants began or discontinued making asbestos products.
Id. at 1158.
See also Hannon v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 567 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Louisiana,
1983); Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1598 (1984). The Thompson court stated: "We see little pur-
pose in discussing in detail the potential applicability of these theories to Mr. Thomp-
son's case; writing in diversity, we write on the wind." But see Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (E.D. Texas 1981), where the court
stated: "In summary, the Court holds that the Erie- indicators support a conclusion
that the Texas court would adopt some form of Sindell liability in the asbestos-related
cases." The application of market share was not challenged on appeal but the case was
reversed on other grounds in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th
Cir. 1982).
262. Comment, An Examination of Recurring Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 46
ALB. L. REV. 1307, 1327-28 (1982).
263. 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985). The case involved review of two decisions. The
first was Copeland v. Celotex Corp., 447 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984), in
which plaintiff sued sixteen corporations involved in the manufacture/distribution of
asbestos insulation products. Plaintiff alleged that he could identify some but not all of
the products, and he further alleged that determining the brand name of various prod-
ucts became virtually impossible once the products were removed from their original
packaging. The second case was Copeland v. Armstrong Cork Co., 417 So. 2d 922
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
264. 471 So. 2d at 534.
The facts of this cause are as follows. Copeland worked from 1942
until 1975 as a boilermaker. During this time he was exposed to various
asbestos products while employed in from 50 to 100 different jobs. Cope-
land became aware of the possible health hazards of asbestos dust in 1958
or 1959, but he did not suffer any physical problems until the late 1960's,
and he was not conclusively diagnosed as having asbestosis until 1978.
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ket share approach and, in a separate order, certified the question to
the Florida Supreme Court.165 The Florida Supreme Court reviewed
the Sindell decision, as well as the approach to the problem adopted by
the court of appeals, and decided not to decide the issue. Although it
answered the certified question in the negative and quashed the appel-
late court decision in Celotex, it stated that "[o]ur holding is based
principally upon the fact that Copeland was able to identify many of
the manufacturers of the products to which he was exposed."2 66
The Florida Supreme Court noted the differences between the
facts in DES and asbestos cases. Because there was a single formula
for DES, the risk to a plaintiff was the same for each defendant. In the
asbestos cases, by contrast, there were differences in the degree of
risk.2 7 Additionally, the administrative aspects of the market share
Id. The couple filed suit in 1979 against sixteen companies, on negligence, warranty,
and strict liability theories. Plaintiffs were able to identify some but not all of the
defendants as those which had supplied various asbestos products with which plaintiff
had come in contact during his work. Id. at 534-35.
265. The certified question was "[w]hether market share liability as announced
in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories ... should be adopted in Florida." [Citation omit-
ted]. The court of appeals noted that the modification of alternate liability made good
sense in cases of cancer where even a single exposure to asbestos would be enough to
trigger the disease but where it would be impossible to know which of the defendants'
fiber had been the one which plaintiff inhaled. In the case of asbestosis, however, where
the cause of the disease is exposure over a long period of time to all of the products, the
better approach was to consider the problem as one of apportionment of damages under
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B, which states:
Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to
bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to
limit his liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment
among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each
such actor.
The court modified the section to apply market share principles to the apportionment.
Copeland v. Celotex Corp., 447 So. 2d 908, 916 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
266. 471 So. 2d at 537.
267.
This divergence is caused by a combination of factors, including: the
specific type of asbestos fiber incorporated into the product; the physical
properties of the product itself; and the percentage of asbestos used in the
product. There are six different asbestos silicates used in industrial appli-
cations and each presents a distinct degree of toxicity in accordance with
the shape and aerodynamics of the individual fibers. Further, it has been
established that the geographical origin of the mineral can affect the sub-
stance's harmful effects. A product's toxicity is also related to whether the
product is in the form of a solid block or a loosely packed insulating blan-
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doctrine, while perhaps not easy to define in any case, appeared to the
court to be particularly difficult in the asbestos context.268 While
clearly concerned about problems which the doctrine could entail, the
court declined to take a final position on it, stating:
While we recognize the clearly established majority view on
this issue [against adoption of the doctrine] ...we do not find it
necessary to accept or reject the market theory approach; rather,
we find that, since Copeland has identified several of the named
defendants as having manufactured the products that caused his
injury, this case neither requires nor justifies the major policy
changes necessary to adopt the market share theory in Florida.269
While the issue of market share can still be considered an open
one, it seems unlikely that the court will adopt it in the asbestos con-
text. On the other hand, many of the court's reasons against the doc-
trine would not apply to a DES case where all of the defendants pro-
duced identical products and so exposed plaintiff to the same risk. In
such a case, the market share doctrine could have more appeal.
XII. The Seat Belt Defense
The Florida Supreme Court adopted the "seat belt defense" in In-
surance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis7 ° The court considered
possible ways to treat the failure to use an available operational seat
belt (negligence per se, contributory negligence, and mitigation of dam-
ages) and adopted the position that, unless failure to use the belt actu-
ally caused the accident, it should be considered in the mitigation of
damages.2 7 1 The court stated that defendant had:
ket and to the amount of dust a product generates.
471 So. 2d at 538.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 539.
270. 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
271.
If there is competent evidence to prove that the failure to use an available
and operational seat belt produced or contributed substantially to produc-
ing at least a portion of plaintiff's damages, then the jury should be per-
mitted to consider this factor, along with all other facts in evidence, in
deciding whether the damages for which defendant may otherwise be lia-
ble should be reduced. Nonuse of an available seat belt, however, should
not be considered by the triers of fact in resolving the issue of liability
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The burden of pleading and proving that the plaintiff did not
use an available and operational seat belt, that the plaintiff's fail-
ure to use the seat belt was unreasonable under the circumstances,
and that there was a causal relationship between the injuries sus-
tained by the plaintiff and plaintiff's failure to buckle up.z27
The meaning of Pasakarnis2" was tested in Volkswagen of
unless it has been alleged and proved that such nonuse was a proximate
cause of the accident.
Id. at 454. [Footnote omitted].
272. Id. [Emphasis added]. In The Florida Bar Standard Jury Instructions Civil
85-1, 475 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam), the supreme court granted permission
to publish a number of revisions and additions to the FLORIDA STANDARD JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS (Civil), including an instruction regarding seat belts. The permission to
publish the instructions, which came as a report from the Supreme Court Committee
on Standard Jury Instructions (Civil), does not indicate any decision by the court that
the instructions correctly state the law. Permission to publish only indicates "the good
faith attempt of the committee to express an accurate statement in the designated ar-
eas." Id. at 683. The new instruction relating to seat belts is as follows:
6.14 Failure To Use Seat Belt
An additional question for your determination on the defense is
whether some or all of (claimant's) damages were caused by [his] [her]
failure to use a seat belt.
The issues for your determination on this question are whether the
greater weight of the evidence shows [that the automobile occupied by
(claimant) was equipped with an available and fully operational seat beltJ
that (claimant) did not use the seat belt, that a reasonably careful person
would have done so under the circumstances, and that (claimant's) failure
to use the seat belt produced or contributed substantially to producing the
damages sustained by claimant.
If the greater weight of evidence does not support (defendant) on each
of these issues, then your verdict on this question should be for (claimant).
If the greater weight of the evidence supports (defendant) on these issues,
you should determine what percentage of (claimant's) total damages were
caused by [his] [her] failure to use the seat belt.
Id. (The comment, notes, model charges and special verdict forms were also included
but are omitted here.)
As this article goes to press, SB 210, a bill which would require seat belt use
(subject to a $20 fine for failure to comply) is pending in the Florida legislature. As-
suming the passage of this bill, some will argue that failure to wear a seat belt should
be considered negligence per se. This author, however, believes that even if this bill
passes, the approach taken by the supreme court is the correct one. When a wrongful
act by the plaintiff does not cause the accident itself but does contribute to the injuries,
the best approach to the situation is to treat the conduct as one mitigating damage.
273. The doctrine was applied in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lafferty, 451 So. 2d 446
(Fla. 1984), decided the same day as Pasakarnis.
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America v. Long.2 74 In that case, defendant failed to specifically plead
the seat belt defense but did generally plead the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff as the proximate cause of the accident and the
injuries. The question was whether this was sufficient,2 75 and the Flor-
ida Supreme Court held that it was not. "The record clearly reflects
that the seat belt issue was not specifically asserted as a defense either
in the pleadings or by pretrial motions. We reject the argument by
Volkswagen that an allegation of comparative negligence includes the
seat belt defense. '276
XIII. Injury From Contaminated Food
It is clear that one who consumes contaminated food and suffers
injury thereby may recover against the manufacturer of the food prod-
uct.277 Doyle v. Pillsbury Co. 278 considered the issue of whether the
274. 476 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1985).
275. The key portion of the defendant's answer alleged in part that "Plaintiffs
... so carelessly and negligently conducted themselves in the operation of the motor
vehicle ... as to proximately cause or contribute to the accident and injuries com-
plained of." Id. at 1268.
276. Id. at 1269. The district court of appeals had based its decision in the case
on pre-Pasakarnis authority which rejected any use of the "seat belt defense" at all.
Thus, the supreme court upheld the result only of the lower court decision. Id. The
decision was consistent with an earlier decision by the supreme court, Protective Casu-
alty Ins. Co. v. Killane, 459 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1984), in which the court agreed that
the issue could not be raised at trial when it had not been mentioned in the pleadings
or in the pretrial stipulation. The trial judge had ordered that all issues be included in
the stipulation whether they were issues of law or of fact. Id. at 1038.
277. An implied warranty action was recognized in favor of a non- purchaser
member of the household of the purchaser against the manufacturer of an unwhole-
some food product which the plaintiff partially consumed, in Blanton v. Cudahy Pack-
ing Co., 19 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1944); against retailers in Sencer v. Carl's Markets, Inc.,
45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950) (en banc), and against restaurants in Cliett v. Lauderdale
Biltmore Corp., 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949).
In Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc. v. Macurda, 93 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1957), a breach
of warranty action was allowed against the retailer for nausea, vomiting, diarrhea and
related injuries caused by ingesting a portion of canned spinach only to discover worms
and worm pieces in the remainder. The court discussed the question of whether worms
made the spinach "deleterious, unwholesome or unfit for human consumption," as
follows:
Admittedly we are no connoisseurs of cuisine that qualifies us to view
as delicacies some foodstuffs that might be indigestible by others. To cer-
tain tribes of American Indians we understand that such creatures as
worms, grasshoppers, snails and the like are acceptable as delicious mor-
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food must actually be ingested in order for recovery to be permitted.
Doyle involved a can of peas contaminated with an insect. Upon
opening the can, the plaintiff saw an insect floating in it. This startled
plaintiff, who "jumped back in alarm, fell over a chair and suffered
physical injuries." '279 The courts below considered the issue one of lack
of "impact." The trial court granted a summary judgment and the ap-
pellate court affirmed on that basis.2 °0 The appellate court used the
case, however, to add its voice to others who were questioning the con-
tinued validity of the impact rule in Florida.28'
The Florida Supreme Court declined to see the issue as one of
"impact" and saw it, instead, as one of foreseeability. When part of the
unwholesome food is consumed, the illness of the consumer is foresee-
able. Merely observing such food is not generally as traumatic, and so
the requisite foreseeability necessary to hold the defendant liable is
lacking. For this reason, the court felt the granting of summary judg-
ment to the defendants was proper. 282
sels of food. We are told that canned Mexican worms grace the shelves of
many delicatessens and in certain swank social levels, which few of us ever
reach, it is said that roasted snails are available with the trays of hors
d'ouvres at pre-dinner cocktail parties. However, for the masses who have
moved ahead of the Indians but who perhaps have not yet reached the
"snail set," such invertebrates as worms and snails are generally frowned
upon as totally unwholesome and unfit for human consumption. Indeed
they are in a class with roaches, mice, flies and other nauseous intruders
that the cases indicate have at times found their way into bottles, cans or
other foodstuff containers.
Id. at 861.
278. 476 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1985).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. The question certified as one of great public importance was: "Should Flor-
ida abrogate the 'impact rule' and allow recovery for physical injuries caused by a
defendant's negligence in the absence of physical impact upon the plaintiff?" Id. See
the discussion of the partial abrogation of the impact rule, supra text accompanying
notes 26 through 56.
282. 476 So. 2d at 1271. While noting in a footnote that "the impact rule itself
is a convenient means of determining foreseeabillity," the court, while approving the
affirmance of the summary judgment, "quash[ed] that portion [of the district court
opinion] applying the impact rule to the circumstances of this case." Id. at 1272.
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XIV. Defamation
Mid-Florida Television Corp. v. Boyles283 considered the status of
the libel per se action and of pleading libel per se in light of the United
States Supreme Court decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.284 In
Florida:
Words [are] actionable per se [if] their injurious character is a
fact of common notoriety, established by the general consent of
men, and the courts consequently take judicial notice of it. Words
amounting to a libel per se necessarily import damage and malice
in legal contemplation, so these elements need not be pleaded or
proved, as they are conclusively presumed as a matter of law in
such cases. 28
5
Common law defamation action by private plaintiffs against media
defendants seemed to be altered when the United States Supreme
Court balanced the traditional right to protect oneself against being
defamed with the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the first
amendment. In Gertz, the Court held on the facts that liability without
fault was not permissible under the first amendment, 286 and that
neither presumed nor punitive damages were constitutional unless
plaintiff could show malice as that term was defined by New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.281 7
283. 467 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1985).
284. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
285. Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 236 (Fla. 1933). "But words or publica-
tions actionable only per quod are those whose injurious effect must be established by
due allegation and proof." Id.
286. "We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." 418 U.S. at 347
[Footnote omitted].
287. 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1963) (" 'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 418 U.S. at 349).
"It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury." Id. Gertz also
states, "We also find no justification for allowing awards of punitive damages. . . . In
short, the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding
standard than that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are
sufficient to compensate him for actual injury." Id. at 350.
Recently, in Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct.
2939 (1985), the Supreme Court narrowed the presumed application of Gertz. Dun and
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In light of Gertz, what is the effect of pleading negligence and
actual damage, as required by that case?288 Also, what is the effect of
characterizing the action, in the pleadings, as one which was "defama-
tory per se . . . libel per se, and slander per se"? 2 9 The district court
of appeal held that Gertz had not abolished the libel per se section but
had merely altered the pleading requirements for the action. It stated
that "[a] distinction still remains between libel per se and libel per
quod: the necessity in the latter action for pleading and proving the
innuendo.
'290
The Florida Supreme Court stated that as long as the complaint
satisfied the Gertz requirements, there was nothing wrong with charac-
terizing the action as one of libel per se, and that the term "remains a
useful shorthand for giving a media defendant notice that the plaintiff
is relying upon the words sued upon as facially defamatory and there-
fore actionable without resort to innuendo. 291
XV. Interference With Business Relationships
The Florida Supreme Court considered the pleading requirements
for tortious interference with a business relationship in its review of the
First District Court of Appeal decision in Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v.
Cotton.292 Plaintiff essentially alleged that defendants engaged in a
smear campaign against plaintiff's taxi cabs, designed to steer business
Bradstreet involved the publication of credit reports by Dun and Bradstreet to five
subscribers. The Supreme Court upheld an award of presumed and punitive damages
absent proof of actual malice. The plurality opinion by Justice Powell, joined by Jus-
tices Rehnquiust and O'Connor stated: "[W]e conclude that permitting recovery of
presumed a punitive damages in defamation cases absent a showing of 'actual malice'
does not violate the First Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve
matters of public concern." Id. at 2943. In separate opinions, Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White concurred in the judgment and in the limitation of Gertz to matters of
public concern. Both, however, would go further and overrule Gertz entirely. Id. at
2943 and 2946.
288. Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 431 So. 2d 627, 634 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1983). These allegations were included in count one. Count four incorporated
count one by reference and also alleged "New York Times" malice. Id.
289. Boyles, 431 So. 2d at 632 (Fla. 1983).
290. Id. at 633. "'Innuendo' simply means that facts extrensic to those published
must be known in order to inflict an injury." Id.
291. 467 So. 2d at 283. Justice Ehrlich, concurring specially, wisely argued that
the term was not useful and would tend to confuse parties and courts alike. Id.
292. 432 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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away from the plaintiff. The campaign included sabotage, verbal har-
assment, speaking ill of plaintiff to prospective customers, and as-
sault.29 3 Plaintiff's income allegedly dropped substantially and eventu-
ally the plaintiff filed suit.294 There was a jury verdict for plaintiff.29 5
Defendants appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the case for tortious in-
terference with a business relationship could not be made out without a
showing that they acted to obtain a business advantage over the plain-
tiff.29 ' The appellate court rejected defendant's position, stating the
four elements necessary to make out the prima facie case: "1) the exis-
tence of a business relationship not necessarily evidenced by an en-
forceable contract; 2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the
defendant; 3) an intentional and unjustified interference with that rela-
tionship by the defendant; and 4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of
the breach of the relationship. ' '297
The supreme court agreed, stating: "We approve that portion of
the decision of the district court and, to the extent they conflict, disap-
prove the decisions of the Third District Court of Appeal in Hales, 98
John B. Reid and Associates, Inc.299 and Berenson.
30 0
293. Id. at 150.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 151.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Hales v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 342 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 1978).
299. John B. Reid and Assoc's v. Jimenez, 181 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1965).
300. Berenson v. World Jail-Alai, Inc., 374 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (quoting Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cotton, 463 So. 2d, 1126, 1127 (Fla.
1985) (per curiam)). The court quoted with approval the four factors listed in the
appellate court opinion.
It may well be that most such cases will involve proof that the defend-
ant's motive was to secure a business advantage and, thus, that the inter-
ference was intentional. However, we see no logical reason why one who
damages another in his business relationships should escape liability be-
cause his motive is malice rather than greed.
Id. at 1128. "This issue is controlled by our decision in Dade Enterprises [Inc. v.
Wometco Theatres, Inc., 119 Fla. 70, 160 So. 209 (1935)] which does not require that
the plaintiff in such suit establish that the defendant interfered with the business rela-
tionship in order to secure a business advantage." Id. at 1127-28.
In The Florida Bar Standard Jury Instructions Civil 85-1, 475 So. 2d 682, 689-91
(Fla. 1985), two new jury instructions were approved for publication.
MI 7.1 Interference With A Contract Not Terminable At Will
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XVI. Strict Liability for Damage by Dogs
Florida provides by statute that "[o]wners of dogs shall be liable
The issue(s) for your determination on the claim of (claimant)
against (defendant) are whether (defendant) interfered with a contract be-
tween (claimant) and (name) and did so intentionally; and, if so, whether
such interference caused damage to (claimant).
A person interferes with a contract between two [or more] persons if
he induces or otherwise causes one of them to breach or refuse to perform
the contract.
Intentional interference with another person's contract is improper.
Interference is intentional if the person interfering knows of the contract
with which he is interfering, knows he is interfering, and desires to inter-
fere or knows that interference is substantially certain to occur as a result
of his actions.
If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim of
(claimant) then your verdict should be for (defendant). However, if the
greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim of (claimant),
then your verdict should be for (claimant) and against (defendant).
"Greater weight of the evidence" means the more persuasive and con-
vincing force and effect of the entire evidence in the case.
If you find for (defendant), you will not consider the matter of dam-
ages. But, if you find for (claimant), you should award (claimant) an
amount of money that the greater weight of the evidence shows will fairly
and adequately compensate (claimant) for such [loss] [or] [damage] as
was caused by the intentional interference. Such interference is the cause
of [loss] [or] [damage] if it directly and in a natural continuous sequence
produces or contributes substantially to producing such [loss] [or]
[damage].
Id.
MI 7.2 Interference With Contract Terminable At Will Or With Pro-
spective Business Relations; Competition Or Financial Interest Defense.
The issues for your determination on the claim of (claimant) against (de-
fendant) are whether (defendant) interfered with business relations be-
tween (claimant) and (name) and did so improperly and intentionally; and
if so, whether such interference caused damage to (claimant).
The first question is whether (defendant) interfered with (claimant's)
business relations with (name) by inducing or otherwise causing (name)
[not to enter into a contract with (claimant)] [not to continue doing busi-
ness with (claimant)] [to terminate or bring to an end a contract which
(name) was not bound to continue with (claimant)] [(describe other
interference)].
If (defendant) did [interfere with (claimant's) business relations with
(name)] [cause (name) to cease doing business with (claimant)], then the
next question is whether, as contended by (claimant), the interference by
(defendant) was improper. A person who enjoys business relations with
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for any damage done by their dogs to . . . persons." ' The construc-
tion of that statute was tested by the Florida Supreme Court in Jones
another is entitled to protection from improper interference with that rela-
tionship. However, another person is entitled to [compete for business] [or]
[advance his own financial interest] so long as he has a proper reason or
motive and he uses proper methods.
A person who interferes with the business relations of another with
the motive and purpose, at least in part, to advance [or protect] his own
business [or financial] interests, does not interfere with an improper mo-
tive. But one who interferes only out of spite, or to do injury to others, or
for other bad motive, has no justification, and his interference is improper.
So also, a person who interferes with another's business relations us-
ing ordinary business methods [of competition] does not interfere by an
improper method. But one who uses physical violence, misrepresentations,
illegal conduct or threats of illegal conduct, and the like, has no privilege
to use those methods, and his interference using such methods is improper.
If (defendant's) inierference was improper, the last question is
whether it was intentional as well. Interference is intentional if the person
interfering knows of the business relationship with which he is interfering,
knows he is interfering with that relationship, and desires to interfere or
knows that interference is substantially certain to occur as a result of his
action.
If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim of
(claimant), [that (defendant) intentionally interfered with (claimant's)
[contract] [business relationship] with (name),] then your verdict should
be for (defendant).
"Greater weight of the evidence" means the more persuasive and con-
vincing force and effect of the entire evidence of the case.
[However, if the greater weight of the evidence does support the claim
of (claimant), then you shall consider the defense of (defendant). On the
defense, the issue for your determination is whether (defendant) acted
properly in interfering as he did.]
If the greater weight of the evidence [does not support the defense of
(defendant) and the greater weight of the evidence] does support the claim
of (claimant), the [sic] your verdict should be for (claimant).
If you find for (defendant), you will not consider the matter of dam-
ages. But, if you find for (claimant), you should award (claimant) an
amount of money that the greater weight of the evidence shows will fairly
and adequately compensate (claimant) for such [loss] [or] [damage] as
was caused by the intentional interference. Such interference is the cause
of [loss] [or] [damage] if it directly and in a natural and continuous se-
quence produces or contributes substantially to producing such [loss] [or]
[damage].
Id. [Notes and Comments omitted].
301. FLA. STAT. § 767.01 (1985).
Torts 1235
341
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. 302 Several boys, one of them the son of
Roy Davis, the respondent's insured, hitched the dog owned by the Da-
vis family to a wagon. While so hitched, the dog chased another dog.
The wagon hit and injured another one of the boys, Donnie Jones. The
dog itself never touched Jones.303 The major questions raised before the
supreme court 0 4 were whether the statute should be interpreted as
broadly as its words, or restricted to risks associated particularly with
dog ownership and whether the dog was a cause of the injury.305
Arguably, these two issues blend into each other. Dean Prosser has
stated the issue to be one of the limits of liability for injuries caused
without fault:
The intentional wrongdoer is commonly held liable for conse-
quences extending beyond the scope of the foreseeable risk he cre-
ates, and many courts have carried negligence liability beyond the
risk to some extent. But where there is neither intentional harm nor
negligence, the line is generally drawn at the limits of the risk, or
even within it. This limitation has been expressed by saying that
the defendant's duty to insure safety extends only to certain conse-
quences. More commonly, it is said that the defendant's conduct is
not the "proximate cause" of the damage. But ordinarily in such
cases no question of causation is involved, and the limitation is one
of policy underlying liability. 8"
Generally, strict liability is imposed upon some activity which it is
reasonable but highly dangerous to do.30 7 Thus, if this reasoning were
followed, the statute would apply only if the injury was caused by a
302. 463 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1985).
303. Id.
304. The trial court directed a verdict for Jones but the Second District Court of
Appeal reversed in Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 408 So. 2d 769, 772 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
305. Jones, 463 So. 2d at 1155. Another issue considered was whether the policy
of insurance covered the accident at all. The policy had been issued to cover accidents
in relation to a nursery business, and the supreme court found that since the dog in-
volved was a watchdog, the function of which was to run free in the nursery, and since
the dog was doing so at the time of the injury, the issue of whether the facts showed
that the dog's action was within the scope of coverage of the policy had been properly
left by the trial court to the jury. Id. at 1156.
306. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971). [Footnotes omitted].
307. "In general, strict liability has been confined to consequences which lie
within the extraordinary risk whose existence calls for such special responsibility."
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 518 (4th ed. 1971).
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peculiar characteristic of dogs.308 The Second District Court of Appeal
acknowledged that a dog chasing another dog is a "canine characteris-
tic."30 9 The dog, however, did not, itself, hit the boy. Only because the
dog was hooked to a wagon was there an injury. Therefore, said the
Second District Court, the canine characteristic did not cause the
injury.3 10
The supreme court rejected this argument, holding that the statute
imposes strict liability in any situation where, by the normal rules of
causation, the dog was a proximate cause of the injury.311 Thus, while
some "affirmative or aggressive act by the dog is required,"3 2 it is not
required that the act be directed specifically against the one injured, as
had been required by some earlier cases. 3 The supreme court found
by implication, that contrary appellate court opinions had improperly
ignored doctrines of concurrent causation, holding that only one of the
two actual causes was the proximate cause of the injury. 1 4
308. Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 408 So. 2d 769, 771 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
309. Id.
310. Id. The Second District Court of Appeal also argued for a narrow interpre-
tation because of the interesting enacting history of the statute. On two different occa-
sions, the statute, as enacted, applied to damage to livestock only and each time the
compiler had added language making the statute applicable to people. Id. The Second
District Court of Appeal answered this objection by noting that the statute in its pre-
sent form had been re-enacted and was, therefore, valid. Id. The supreme court did not
address the point directly, only noting that "plain and unambiguous language in a stat-
ute needs no construction and creates the obvious duty to enforce the law according to
its terms." Jones v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d 1153, 1156 (Fla. 1985).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., Rutland v. Biuel, 277 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(plaintiff heard a dog cry out, looked down, saw the dog, stepped down and tripped
over the animal) The Second District held "that F.S. section 767.01 F.S.A. is not ap-
plicable to a situation where the dog takes no affirmative or aggressive action toward
the injured party. Id. at 809. [Emphasis added].
314.
In the ordinary negligence context, a defendant is liable for injury
produced or substantially produced in a natural and continuous sequence
by his conduct, such that "but for" such conduct, the injury would not
have occurred. Such liability is not escaped in the recognition that the in-
jury would not have occurred "but for" the concurrence or intervention of
some other cause as well. The defendant is liable when his act of negli-
gence combines with some other concurring or intervening cause in the
sense that, "but for" the other cause as well, injury would not have
occurred.
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One reason for adopting "negligence" proximate cause standards
in this strict liability context was "the difficulty of fashioning a worka-
ble and administrable alternative to the traditional notion of proximate
cause." '15 The court was concerned about the struggle to define just
what is and is not a canine characteristic, and shied away from the
horrific vision of expert witnesses endlessly debating the true limits of
behavior dubbed "Canine." 316
An example of the problem can be seen in Mapoles v. Mapoles.3 17
A dog in a car managed somehow to discharge a shotgun (probably by
bumping it) which was also in the car.318 The majority opinion, later
approved by the supreme court in Jones,319 simply held that as long as
"the injury resulted from the affirmative act of the dog,"320 the owner
would be liable.3 2 ' By contrast, the dissent was led to reject liability
because "dogness played no more a part than if the trigger had been
jostled by a cat or a falling sack of groceries." '22 Such an approach
invites speculation about what is unique "dogness" as opposed to char-
acteristics which are to be found both in dogs (covered by the statute)
and cats (not covered by the statute). It would require, in effect, that a
court define the essence of "dog." It is this philosophical quagmire that
the supreme court declined to enter. 23
Jones, 463 So. 2d at 1156. The court apparently adopted this same proximate cause
rule for the strict liability statutory action, rejecting by implication any narrowly
drawn proximate cause rules. The court stated, "The standards of causation applicable
in the case of ordinary negligence were amply satisfied in this case." Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. In dissent, Justice Overton found no such problem, arguing that such
characteristics were things such as "biting, barking, chasing, jumping, vicious or ram-
bunctious conduct." Id. at 1161. Of course, the majority's point might well be made
out of the dissenting position. It could easily be argued that the injury was, at least in
part, caused by "chasing" and the court would then have to decide whether the fact
that the dog was hitched to a wagon when it exhibited its "chasing" behavior ought to
be deemed legally significant. Id. at 1160. It was precisely to avoid such issues that the
majority held as it did. Id.
317. 350 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
318. Id. at 1138.
319. It was the conflict between Mapoles and Jones which brought the issue
before the supreme court.
320. Id. The court noted that, in its view, the statute essentially had the effect of
making dog owners insurers for damage done by their dog.
321. Id.
322. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
323. The facts of other cases are also instructive. In Smith v. Allison, 332 So. 2d
631 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976), a dog on the road and the attempt of a vehicle to
1238 [Vol. 10
344
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/15
1986] Torts 1239
Thus, dog owners in Florida are strictly liable 24 for damage
caused by their dogs, and the liability is recognized to be very broadly
construed.3 25 This decision will make it easier for plaintiffs to prove
avoid it resulted in a crash. The district court of appeals rejected the notion that the
dog had inflicted the damage and saw the case rather as one where "the damage re-
suited from some physical agency set into motion by a chain of events which may have
been triggered by the presence of the dog," id. at 634, and so declined to apply the
statute.
By contrast, in English v. Seachord, 243 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1971), plaintiff jumped up on a car and injured himself after defendant's dog growled
at him. The court reversed the jury verdict for defendant because the charge to the
jury by the trial judge had permitted the jury to consider plaintiff's alleged contribu-
tory negligence. Id. at 195. The court stressed that contributory negligence was not a
defence as such and that only plaintiffs provocation of the dog or other conduct which
would be "so blatant as to supersede the dog's behavior as the legal or proximate cause
of plaintiffs injuries," would be a defense. The court noted that the statute made the
dog owner "virtually an insurer," as to injuries caused by the dog. This opinion was
cited with approval in dicta in a per curiam opinion dismissing a writ of certiorari
previously issued, because of a finding that no conflict among the circuits actually ex-
isted. Seachord v. English, 359 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1972). "[T]he scholarly opinion by the
District Court of Appeals Judge David L. McCain [in English] is eminently correct in
enunciating the law." Id. (English was also cited with approval in Jones).
In Brandeis v. Felcher, 211 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968), dogs were
jumping at a four feet high fence along a sidewalk. This scared children who ran into
the street where one of them was hit by a truck. Id. at 606-07. The court of appeals
reversed the summary judgment granted by the Dade County Circuit Court and re-
manded the case. Id. at 609. The court held that liability under the statute was not
predicated on contact between the dog and the plaintiff and that the only question was
whether the dog was a proximate cause of the injury. Id. at 608. The court applied a
"substantial factor" test, as used in negligence when concurrent causes are present, and
argued that the issue of causation was the same under the statute as in a negligence
case. Id. at 609. The court followed a trend it perceived in Florida toward permitting
juries to decide such questions. "The Courts of Florida have become increasingly lib-
eral in allowing a jury to pass upon questions similar to this." Id.
The statute was held to apply by the Third District Court of Appeal when a Great
Dane ran into the street and plaintiffs car swerved to avoid it causing him to strike a
power pole. The court noted that the dog had taken an "aggressive action," and that
under the statute, defendant remained liable in a multiple cause situation. The court
also noted that comparative negligence was not a defense to the action. Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Greenstein, 308 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
324. "Section 767.01 is a strict liability statute which has consistently been con-
strued to virtually make an owner the insurer of the dog's conduct." Jones v. Utica
Mut. Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d at 1156.
325. The court displayed an understanding of the multiplicity of ways in which a
causative agent can result in an injury. "Thus, it also cannot be said that liability is
only appropriate when the animal actually touches the plaintiff, for animals and people
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such cases.326
XVII. Medical Malpractice
The Florida legislature has provided a detailed statutory scheme to
regulate actions for medical malpractice.32 7 Parts of that scheme were
examined in a series of cases by the Florida Supreme Court during the
last year. Section 768.56 provides for court-ordered attorney's fees to
the victorious party in medical malpractice actions and regulates the
awarding of said fees.3 28 In Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v.
Rowe,3 29 the constitutionality of that section was tested.
The court upheld the section against due process and equal protec-
tion claims, as well as the claim that the provision denied access to the
courts in violation of the Florida Constitution.330 The court rejected the
notion that the attorney's fee provision was an unlawful penalty. Al-
though the statute might deter the filing of some claims (particularly
those where chance of success was slight), it could also encourage
others (particularly those in which the chance of success was high).3 31
can cause injuries in a variety of ways without actually touching the injured party." Id.
This same understanding was present when the supreme court extended liability for
bystander emotional distress and adopted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See supra sections II and III.
326. It should be noted that earlier supreme court decisions relating to dog bites
determined that a related statute, FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (1975), dealing with liability for
dog bites, superseded the common law, Belcher v. Stickney, 450 So. 2d 1111 (Fla.
1984) and also superseded common law defenses, leaving only statutory defenses avail-
able. Donner v. Arkwright-Boston Mfg. Mut., 358 So. 2d 21 (1978).
327. FLA. STAT. § 768.41 (1981).
328. FLA. STAT. § 768.56 (1981). In Young v. Altenhaus, 472 So. 2d 1152 (Fla.
1985), the supreme court held that the section could not be applied to actions which
accrued before the effective date of the statute. The court noted the general rule that
statutes which "interfere with vested rights," or which are "substantial in nature," will
only be applied prospectively while those which "relate only to the procedure or remedy
are generally held applicable to all pending cases." Id. at 1154. Since there had been
no obligation to pay the opposing party's attorney's fees before the statute, the statute
could be applied only prospectively. Id. On the authority of Rowe and Young, the su-
preme court upheld a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal which had held
the section to be constitutional. The case was Karlin v. Denson, 472 So. 2d 1155 (Fla.
1985). The Fourth District Court of Appeal decision can be found at 447 So. 2d 897
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
329. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
330. Id. at 1146.
331. The court also noted other examples of attorney's fees statutes in Florida.
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The court also considered how a determination of the amount of
attorney's fees was to be made. The approach requires a court to "de-
termine the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation."3 2
The court must then set a reasonable hourly rate for the work done.333
The number of hours reasonably expended, determined in the
first step, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, determined in the
second step, produces the lodestar, which is an objective basis for
the award of attorney fees. Once the court arrives at the lodestar
figure, it may add or substract from the fee based upon a "contin-
gency risk" factor and the "results obtained. '334
More generally, the court saw the issue of two competing rules (the "English" rule,
that the victor obtains attorney's fees from the vanquished, and the "American," that
each side pay its own fees), with the choice solidly within the scope of legislative deci-
sion. 472 So. 2d at 1147-48.
332. Id. at 1150. The supreme court stressed the necessity of accurate and com-
plete record-keeping by attorneys and that the attorney could include only hours which
could be "properly" billed to the client. The court noted that failure to maintain such
records could result in the total hours allowed by a court being reduced. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 1151. In general, the court instructed that the criteria in Disciplinary
Rule 2-106(b) of the FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY be used.
These are:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tion involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitatios imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers per-
forming the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Id. The first part of the process would be determined using factor number one, the
second part, by using the rest with the exception of "'time and labor required,' the
'novelty and difficulty of the question involved,' the 'results obtained,' and '[w]hether
the fee is fixed or contingent.'" Id. at 1150-51. The court stated that the fee calculated
by the court should be increased in contingency cases by a "contributory risk factor,"
somewhere between 1.5 and 3 inclusive, and that when it would seem that the chance
for success at the start was about even, the correct multiplier would be 2. The amount
of the award may not exceed that which was stipulated in the fee agreement between
attorney and client, but is not strictly governed by it either because it is being paid by
the other party which was not a party to the agreement. Id. The computed figure can
also be reduced if there was a failure to prevail on some of the claims of relief. Id.
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Other key provisions in the statute33 5 were upheld in Florida Pa-
tient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina.33 The case involved medi-
cal malpractice which left a 27-year-old woman with irreversible brain
damage, blindness in one eye, and a refractured leg. The jury awarded
a total of over twelve million dollars. 37
Florida's statutory scheme establishes a patient's compensation
fund. The primary defendants are directly responsible only for the first
one hundred thousand dollars and the fund become responsible for the
rest. The statute also permits the court to determine the manner of
payment for liabilities over two hundred thousand dollars .3 8 The court
noted that the purpose of the act was to spread the losses from medical
malpractice in a way which benefits both the patients and the health
care providers, and that plaintiff is not denied recovery of her claim
under the fund system.3 39 The various methods of payment were also
upheld. "We find the legislation at issue does not implicate a funda-
In summary, in computing an attorney fee, the trial judge should (1)
determine the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation; (2)
determine the reasonable hourly rate for this type of litigation; (3) multi-
ply the result of (1) and (2); and, when appropriate, (4) adjust the fee on
the basis of the contingent nature of the litigation or the failure to prevail
on a claim or claims. Application of the Disciplinary Rule 2-106 criteria in
this manner will provide trial judges with objective guidance in the award-
ing of reasonable attorney fees and allow parties an opportunity for mean-
ingful appellate review.
Id. at 1151-52.
335. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.54(2)(b), 768.54(3)(e)3, and 768.51 (1981).
336. 474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam).
337. The young woman will need round the clock nursing care and has a life
expectancy of 40 years. The award reflected past and future medical/nursing care, past
and future lost earnings, and past and future pain and suffering. Id. at 785-86.
338. Id. at 786. The trial court also held unconstitutional a cap of one hundred
thousand dollars to be paid from the fund in any given year on a claim. This cap was
repealed in 1982, but the trial court ruled that the earlier provision applied to the case.
The supreme court disagreed, holding that the cap provision and the later amendment
repealing it were statutes which controlled procedure or remedies, and thus applied to
all cases pending at the time of the change. Since the 1982 amendment to section
768.54 applied, it did not have to evaluate the earlier form of the statute. The court did
note, however, that the cap on payments per year would have prevented the fund from
paying even the actual costs of the patient's care. Id. at 787. Payment may be ordered
to make a lump-sum payment or to make periodic payments. FLA. STAT. § 768.51
(1981).
339. The court noted, however, that it was not considering what might be the
result if the fund proved to be insolvent or for other reasons could not pay the claim.
474 So. 2d at 789.
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mental right or suspect classification. 3 40 The court found that the leg-
islation had a rational relation to the interest in protecting public
health by easing the upward trend in medical and insurance costs. 341
"We specifically uphold the constitutionality of sections 768.54(2)(b),
768.54(3)(a)3, and 768.51, Florida Statutes (1981)."342
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. The judgment was vacated on the grounds that some evidence had been
improperly admitted and that the error was not harmless. The court did not address the
issue of damages because the judgment had been vacated. Finally, the court noted that
the issue of attorney's fees, if any, would be governed by the process set out in Florida
Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). 474 So. 2d at 790.
Justice Ehrlich had not participated in Rowe or Young, but did participate in all
except the attorney's fees section of Von Stetina. Justice Ehrlich explained his reasons
for recusing himself on the attorney fee issue:
I had been a witness in the trial of a case wherein a former law part-
ner, John E. Mathews, Jr., was plaintiff and a number of doctors were
defendants. The trial of that case resulted in a favorable verdict for the
doctors, who, post-judgment sought to assess attorney's fees against plain-
tiff Mathews pursuant to section 768.56. While the trial court refused to
assess attorney's fees on constitutional grounds, the DCA in Polhman v.
Mathews, 440 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), reversed the trial judge on
that issue, and discretionary review was sought and accepted by this
Court. Counsel for Mathews filed an amicus brief in this case on that one
issue. That was the reason for my recusal.
474 So. 2d at 794. Since the issue of attorney's fees had been settled, Justice Ehrlich
saw no reason why he could not participate in the remainder of the issues raised in Von
Stetina. On rehearing, Justice Ehrlich elaborated upon his decision. Justice Ehrlich
acknowledged that when a recusal was mandated, a change of condition did not permit
a judge to re-qualify to hear the case, but:
Here, I recused for cause on only one issue of Von Stetina. That issue
was legally and procedurally severable from the remaining issues. As a
matter of judicial economy, I withdrew from consideration of any issue in
that case. There was no legal bar to my considering issues relating to lia-
bility and damages, but my presence during argument and conference on
those issues and my recusal during argument and conference on the attor-
neys' fees would have been awkward and inefficient. As noted in my expla-
nation appended to the Court's opinion in Von Stetina, there came a time
when judicial economy would no longer be served by my withdrawal from
consideration of issues unrelated to attorneys' fees in this case. Rather, as
a matter of judicial economy, it was necessary that I consider these issues.
No legal bar had been removed. There was no change in circumstances
which allowed me to 'requalify.' I have never considered any aspect of the
issue from which I was legally and ethically required to recuse myself.
474 So. 2d at 795-96. The other members of the court expressed their "full approval"
of Justice Ehrlich's explanation in a short per curiam opinion. Id. at 795.
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XVIII. Conclusion
The tort issues confronting the Florida Supreme Court in 1985
ranged widely over the diverse landscape of this interesting area of law.
Almost invariably, the question which will be asked is "Who won?"
Did plaintiffs or defendants make the most gains?
This question is not easily answered. Plaintiffs made gains by con-
vincing the court to recognize new duties in the emotional distress area,
for example, while defendants won a round on causation with the re-
fusal to recognize the market share theory. The state, as a defendant,
was granted significant protection from liability with the interpretation
of the sovereign immunity waiver statute, and there may be some de-
bate about which interests were protected when the medical malprac-
tice provisions were upheld.
While no group will be completely pleased with all of the 1985
supreme court decisions, each side can claim some significant victories
during the year. The situation is analogous to that of Alice and the
various creatures which she encountered in Wonderland. After swim-
ming in the pool of tears, the group held a "caucus race" to get dry.
There was no set course in the race and the runners, who were placed
at various points randomly around the course, started and stopped run-
ning whenever they liked. Eventually, the question was asked, "Who
has won?" The answer was, "Everybody has won, and all must have
prizes. ' '343
343. L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 31 (1898).
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If It Moves, Search It: California v. Carney Applies
the Automobile Exception to Motor Homes
I. Introduction
The fourth amendment1 is a revolutionary construct. It was in-
tended by the constitutional framers to safeguard the people of the re-
public from the arbitrary exercise of governmental authority.2 Among
the most offensive abuses during colonial history which motivated its
ratification were writs of assistance3 and general warrants.4 Under
color of the crown, agents of the sovereign exposed the colonists to in-
discriminate general rummaging and ransacking. At will, and often-
times without a whisper of suspicion, petty tyrants could enter homes
and destroy possessions under guise of a sanctioned contraband search. 5
A man's home was, to be sure, no longer his castle.
The attitude of the constitutional framers was forcefully restated
by the Supreme Court ninety five years later in Boyd v. United States:
1.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. M. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 497 (1978).
3. Writs of assistance were used by custom house officers for the purpose of de-
tecting goods smuggled into the colonies. The writ was not returnable to the sovereign's
magistrate following its execution, operated as a continuing license to search and seize,
and empowered the executing official to search wherever goods were suspected. N. LAs-
SON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 59-60 (1937).
4. See id. at 81 n.10 and E. CORWIN. THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 301 (13th ed. 1973). General warrants are defined as English process which
was issued for the arrest of persons charged with having libeled the state. The warrants
were issued officially and without naming an individual sought. In 1766, the House of
Commons voided their further usage. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (5th ed. 1979).
5. N. LASSON, supra note 3, at 60. For historical background reviews of the
fourth amendment by the Supreme Court, see Standford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-
485 (1964), Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 E. Tenth St., Kansas City,
Missouri, 367 U.S. 717, 724-729 (1961), and Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-
365 (1958).
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a person's security, liberty, and the privacy of his property were sacred
rights, not to be defeased by the invasions of government. 6 The use of
warrants might seem inimical when the Court has so clearly inter-
preted the fourth amendment as subordinating the authority of the gov-
ernment to the rights of its citizens. The amendment, however, does not
proscribe all searches, only those which are unreasonable. And when a
warrant to search is sought, the neutrality of the judiciary is interposed
between public authority and the individual. In recent times, the ra-
tionale of the warrant process has been explained simply in the follow-
ing manner. The requirement that a warrant be secured from a magis-
trate before a search, is justified on the theoretical premise that a
neutral and detached magistrate is more impartial than an officer
whose duty is to zealously enforce criminal laws.7 This requirement
also provides some assurance that the information giving rise to the
search request was not manufactured after the event.8
In 1919, with the attention of the nation no longer diverted to the
war in Europe, its focus was drawn to another conflict, the war of pro-
hibition at home. The eighteenth amendment was ratified in that year
as a proscription against the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors."9 That addition was anomalous to the Constitu-
tion. To the mind of one observer, it was ill-considered and had nothing
to do with regulating the exercise of the federal powers, or with the
6.
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitu-
tional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of
the case then before the court, with its ambitious circumstances; they ap-
ply to all invasions, on the part of the Government and its employees, of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the break-
ing of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the
essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right
has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
7. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1947).
8. Adams v. Williams, 467 U.S. 143, 152 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Judge Friendly's dissent in Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1970)).
See Gardner, Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and Their Contents: Fourth
Amendment Considerations in a Post-Ross World, 62 NEB. L. REV. 1, 4 (1983).
9. "After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the expor-
tation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to jurisdiction thereof for
beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
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framework of government."0
To augment the eighteenth amendment, Congress passed the Na-
tional Prohibition Act. 1 This enactment provided, in part, a directive
to seize, take possession, and arrest any person discovered in the act of
transporting illegal intoxicating liquor. 2 In 1925, the Supreme Court
was asked to consider an arrest made under authority of the Act. At
the horns of the legal dilemma was a basic contradiction represented by
the fourth amendment on the one hand and the National Prohibition
Act as the handmaid of the eighteenth amendment on the other. It was
against the backdrop of the fourth amendment's time honored protec-
tions from unreasonable searches and the Court's later restatement of
those guarantees in Boyd that the arrest would be measured.
In its 1925 landmark decision, United States v. Carroll,3 the Su-
preme Court favored federal agents engaged in the war against the
transportation of intoxicating liquors and thereby sharpened the teeth
of the National Prohibition Act. When a federal agent had probable
cause to believe that a particular vehicle was transporting contraband,
the vehicle's ready mobility practically precluded the agent's securing a
warrant to search. Automobiles, the Court concluded, must necessarily
be excepted from the warrant requirement.
Although sixty years have passed, Carroll's principal tenet has
survived. The lynchpin which continues to justify warrantless automo-
bile searches is mobility of the vehicle. It should be noted in passing
that the eighteenth amendment 4 and the National Prohibition Act1 5
10. H. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 13-14 (1925)
(Reissued 1969).
11. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, § 26, 41 Stat. 305 (1919).
12.
When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of the law
shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the law,
intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or
other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors
found therein being transported contrary to law. Whenever intoxicating
liquors transported or possessed illegally shall be seized by an officer he
shall take possession of the vehicle and team or automobile, boat, air or
water craft, or any other conveyance, and shall arrest any person in charge
thereof.
41 Stat. 305, 315 (1919).
13. United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
14. The eighteenth amendment was repealed effective December 5, 1933 by U.S.
CONsT. amend. XXI.
15. The National Prohibition Act was repealed in large part by ch. 740 title I, §
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which gave form to the opinion were repealed in the 1930's. Carroll's
continuing viability serves to underscore the significance of the Su-
preme Court's contribution to the evolving character of the fourth
amendment.
It is not surprising that the automobile exception would one day be
tested on what has in the 1980's become a common place user of the
roadways - the motor home. The Court in California v. Carney"6 re-
cently concluded that a motor home, within the context of the fourth
amendment, is more like a car than a home. Although the decision
attempts to define an objective standard under which a motor home
may be searched without a warrant, it must appear to some that the
fourth amendment protections against the indiscriminate and arbitrary
exercise of governmental authority - those evils which fired the caul-
dron of revolution - have paled in significance.
This Case Comment will examine the Carney decision and offer an
historical recounting of the automobile exception in the context of its
fourth amendment origin.
II. The Automobile Exception
Only under limited circumstances have warrantless searches re-
ceived the Court's imprimatur. In Katz v. United States, Justice Stew-
art wrote, "[s]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions. ' 17 Among those appears the automobile
exception, which was established by the Court in Carroll. Excepted
from the warrant requirement was the search of an automobile "for
contraband goods where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, be-
cause the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdic-
tion in which the warrant must be sought."' 8 This language provides
1, 49 Stat. 872 (1935).
16. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). For a commentary on the
circumstances when warrantless searches and seizures have been authorized, see W. LA
FAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3-6 (1978). Major exceptions to the warrant require-
ment were noted to be, search incident to a lawful arrest, search under an emergency
setting where loss or destruction of evidence is feared, and search with consent. See
also Comment, The Automobile Exception: A Contradiction in Fourth Amendment
Principles 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 933, 934-935 (1980).
18. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
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the precise point from which the automobile exception developed. Be-
cause a motor home can be quickly moved, Carroll's principal holding,
the Court reasoned, was equally applicable to motor homes.19 Carroll's
precedential value demands its review in this Comment.
The Carroll decision arose out of the prohibition era seizure of
bootleg whisky. Carroll and his companion were stopped by prohibition
agents and a state officer as their Oldsmobile roadster was enroute
from Detroit to Grand Rapids, Michigan on December 15, 1921.20 A
search of the vehicle was conducted without a warrant. The search ex-
tended behind the seat upholstery of the lazyback where the agents
uncovered sixty-eight bottles of concealed contraband whisky and gin.21
Appealing their convictions, the defendants contended that the
search and seizure violated their fourth amendment rights.22 The Court
affirmed the convictions and held that the officers were justified in con-
ducting the search and seizure,23 though no precedent was cited.24 It
further held that the National Prohibition Act expressly provided for
the seizure and arrest. 5
The Carroll Court's creativity appears in its analysis of Congress'
intent. Congress, the Court inferred, intended to except road vehicles
from the warrant requirement. 2 The Court acknowledged that fourth
amendment constructions since the founding of the republic focused
upon the reasonableness of searches while also distinguishing searches
19. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2066.
20. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 135.
21. Id. at 136. On redirect examination, one officer who was present at the scene,
described the Carroll roadster search in the following manner: "[tihe lazyback was
awfully hard when I struck it with my fist. It was harder than upholstery ordinarily is
in those backs; a great deal harder. It was practically solid. Sixty-nine [sic] quarts of
whiskey in one lazyback." Id. at 174 (Reynolds, J., separate opinion).
22. Id. at 135.
23. Id. at 162. The Court took judicial notice of the fact that Detroit's position
on the international border with Canada made it an active smuggling center. See
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 166 (1949). The Carroll court found probable
cause existed because Carroll and his companion were known to have been principals in
a proposed undercover sale two months previous, the automobile was identical to that
Carroll was seen in the night of the proposed sale, and the automobile was traveling
westerly from the direction of Detroit. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 160. In Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), Justice Powell (concurring) adds clarification,
noting that a Carroll search necessarily requires that probable cause be supported by
"specific knowledge about a particular automobile." Id. at 281.
24. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.
25. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, § 26, 41 Stat. 305, 315-16, (1919).
26. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147.
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of structures and vehicles.2 7 An amendment to the Act imposed misde-
meanor penalties upon officers who conducted building searches "mali-
ciously and without probable cause."'28 However, both the Act and its
Amendment were mute as to searches of vehicles. Congress was in-
ferred therefore to have left the way open for the holding in Carroll.29
Because Carroll's roadster could be quickly moved, prohibition agents
were justified in conducting a search of the entire vehicle for contra-
band liquor and foregoing the rigors of the warrant process. 30
One interesting development in the Carroll analysis was fashioned
by a divided Court in Chambers v. Maroney.3 1 In 1970, the Justices
considered a challenge to the admission of evidence which had been
seized without a warrant from the defendant's automobile. It is note-
worthy that the vehicle was impounded at the police station at the time
of the search,3 2 and not on the open road. What exigencies existed to
justify the vehicle search in Carroll all but evaporated with the vehicle
seizure in Chambers. Police had probable cause however to arrest the
defendant.38 Justice White wrote: "[f]or constitutional purposes, we see
no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before
presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other
hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. ' 34 Justice
Stewart later characterized Chambers in the following way: "where the
police may stop and search an automobile under Carroll, they may also
seize it and search it later at the police station. '8 5
In 1974, a second prong in the search analysis emerged. Justice
Blackmun, writing for a plurality in Cardwell v. Lewis, reasoned that
since a car's occupants and contents were in plain view and cannot
evade public scrutiny, one's expectation of privacy was less than in a
27. Id. at 153.
28. An Act Supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, ch. 134, § 6, 42 Stat.
222, 223-224 (1921).
29. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147.
30. For a reference of other Supreme Court decisions which relied upon vehicu-
lar mobility, see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
31. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
32. Id. at 44.
33. Id. at 46-47. Observers in addition to the victim of the armed robbery re-
ported to police that one of the four suspects was wearing a sweater, another a trench
coat, and that they had fled in a "light blue compact station wagon." Within an hour,
police stopped a vehicle which, along with its occupants, matched the description
provided.
34. Id. at 52.
35. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 463 (1971).
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home.36 The case differed factually from all car search cases which had
been decided to that point.37 The defendant was requested to appear at.
the Office of the Division of Criminal Activities for questioning in con-
nection with a murder investigation. Later police executed an arrest
warrant. The defendant released his car keys and claim check from a
nearby public lot in which his car was parked.38 The car was then im-
pounded. Without a warrant, police examined the car's exterior by
matching tire tread impressions and paint scrapings with crime scene
samples.39 The defendant objected unsuccessfully to the admission of
evidence from this "search." Justice Blackmun concluded that the ex-
amination of a car's exterior was not unreasonable under the
circumstances.40
In what was prophetic dictum, Justice Blackmun observed that a
motor vehicle "seldom serves as one's residence."''1 As a legal conclu-
sion, the Justice's'prescience was realized eleven years later in Carney.
The rationale of the two decisions differed in one major respect, how-
ever. Since the clear emphasis of the Court's reasoning in Carney was
on vehicular mobility, Cardwell's plain view rationale serves little to
advance one's understanding of how the Carney motor home exhibited
a reduced expectation of privacy with the interior drapes drawn.42 A
reasonable conclusion is that, as to motor homes, mobility and not plain
view justifies the application of the warrant exception.
One further automobile case, Coolidge v. New Hampshire,43 helps
to make clear the foundation upon which Carney was formed. In yet
another plurality opinion,44 Justice Stewart applied the brakes to the
automobile exception. Carroll, the Justice concluded, was not intended
36. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). Justice Blackmun was joined by
Chief Justice Burger, Justice White and.Justice Rehnquist. Justice Powell filed a con-
currence. iGeneral guidelines in this area were provided in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967). "What a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection ... [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351.
37. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 588.
38. Id. at 587.
39. Id. at 588.
40. Id. at 592.
41. Id. at 590.
42. See infra note 67.
43. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
44. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion, parts of which were joined by Justices
Douglas, Brennan and Marshall.
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to extend to the Coolidge facts.4 5 Approximately two hours after the
defendant's arrest pursuant to a magistrate's warrant, police im-
pounded his two automobiles under authority of a search warrant. 46
Over the following fourteen months, police conducted three vehicle
searches.47 Both the seizure and subsequent station house searches were
held unconstitutional. 48 In what has become often quoted rhetoric, Jus-
tice Stewart remarked that "[t]he word 'automobile' is not a talisman
in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disap-
pears. ' 49 The absence of exigent circumstances rendered the Carroll
search standard inappropriate.50 The defendant posed no police threat
because he had been cooperative throughout the police murder investi-
gation although he was presented with sufficient opportunity to have
destroyed incriminating evidence. Furthermore, because police sus-
pected for a period of time that the defendant's car was related to the
crime, 5 1 ample opportunity existed to secure a valid search warrant.52
III. California v. Carney, The Case
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) received uncorroborated
information that a motor home had been used for the purpose of ex-
changing marijuana for sex. 53 A private organization known as "We
Tip," an acronym for We Turn In Pushers, furnished DEA with this
information in previous communications by letter and telephone.5 4 As
the Dodge Mini Motor Home stood parked in a downtown San Diego
public lot on May 31, 1979, surveilling agents noted the correspon-
dence of its license plate and that of the motor home described in the
earlier tips. 55 Mr. Carney and another person entered the home and
drew the interior window shades. 56 The companion exited one and one-
45. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 458.
46. Id. at 447.
47. Id. at 448.
48. Id. at 473.
49. Id. at 461.
50. Id. at 462.
51. Id. at 460.
52. Id. at 472.
53. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
54. People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 595, 602, 668 P.2d 887, 809, 194 Cal. Rptr.
500, 502 (1983). Agents knew that the vehicle "belonged" to a Lee Bowman. Peti-
tioner's Brief on the Merits at 6, California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066.
55. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d at 602, 668 P.2d at 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
56. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
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quarter hours later, and when challenged by the agents, related the
account of an exchange. Sexual contacts had been bartered for mari-
juana.51 At the agents' request, the companion returned and knocked
on the door.5 8 The knock brought Carney who then stepped outside
where the waiting agents confronted him.59
An initial search was immediately made of the motor home's inte-
rior without a warrant and without consent.6 0 The agent observed "ma-
rijuana, plastic bags, and a scale of the kind used in weighing drugs on
a table,"'" and then placed Carney in custody.6 2 A subsequent search
at the police station revealed additional marijuana concealed in the
cupboards and refrigerator. 63
Carney's state court history began in the Superior Court of San
Diego County by information charging possession of marijuana for
sale.6 4 At the preliminary hearing, Carney sought unsuccessfully to
suppress the evidence of the two searches. The magistrate concluded
that the evidence seized in the initial search was admissible because the
agent who entered the vehicle was entitled to ascertain the presence or
absence of others.6 5 The subsequent search, the magistrate concluded,
was a permissible routine inventory search. 6 The sole evidentiary basis
upon which the superior court later denied Carney's motion to suppress
was the reporter's transcript of testimony taken at the preliminary
hearing.67 From that record, the superior court decided that probable
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. An agent testified at the preliminary hearing that he "stepped one step
up" to determine for "safety reasons" whether other persons were present. People v.
Carney, 117 Cal. App. 3d 36 (opinion omitted), 172 Cal. Rptr. 430, 433 (1981).
61. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The specific section provides as follows: "[e]very person who possesses for
sale any marijuana, except as otherwise provided by law, shall be punished by impris-
onment in the state prison." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11359 (Deering 1984).
65. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2068. Federal courts justify protective sweep searches
as a means of preventing the destruction of evidence and also when particular circum-
stances pose a threat to police or third persons. See United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d
187, 191-192 (9th Cir. 1982). For a good analysis of the merits of a general versus a
per se rule authorizing protective sweep searches and practical concerns for their appli-
cation, see Joseph, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Protecting Arresting Officers from
Attack by Persons Other than the Arrestee, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 95 (1983).
66. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2068.
67. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4, n.2, California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct.
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cause existed,68 that the warrantless search was authorized by the auto-
mobile exception, and as an instrumentality of the crime, the motor
home was subject to seizure.6 9
Carney pled nolo contendere and was placed on probation for
three years. The state's appellate court affirmed the trial court's
order." °
Holding that Carney enjoyed fourth amendment protections which
were violated by the warrantless search, the California Supreme Court
reversed Carney's conviction. 71 The state's high court perceived a shift
in the line of cases extending from Carroll. The automobile exception
was no longer principally justified by mobility; instead, the emerging
rationale was the diminished expectation of privacy associated with the
automobile. 2 In addition, the prosecution failed its burden of justifying
the warrantless entry of Carney's motor home under the facts
presented.73
When confronted with the prospect of enlarging the automobile
exception to include motor homes, the California Supreme Court recog-
nized their hybrid nature - motor homes possess a car's attributes of
mobility as well as a home's privacy characteristics. 4 Ultimately, the
court concluded that "a motor home is fully protected by the fourth
amendment and is not subject to the 'automobile exception.' "5 This
conclusion rested squarely on its opinion that the "essential purpose [of
a motor home] is to provide the occupant with living quarters. ' 76
On review granted to the State of California, a six to three justice
majority of the United States Supreme Court rejected the state court's
2066.
68. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2068. Specifically, the superior court found that proba-
ble cause to arrest and a reasonable belief that the motor home contained contraband
were adequately supported by the anonymous phone calls, We Tip information, and the
statement of Carney's companion. Joint Appendix at JA-6-JA-8, Carney, 105 S. Ct. at
2066.
69. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2068.
70. People v. Carney, 117 Cal. 3d 36, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981).
71. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d at 610, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
72. Id. at 605, 668 P.2d at 811, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
73. Id. at 612, 668 P.2d at 816, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
74. People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597, 606, 668 P.2d 807, 812, 194 Cal. Rptr.
500, 505 (1983), rev'd sub nom. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066.
75. Id. at 610, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507. The court noted that
while motor homes were potentially subject to warrantless searches, the justification
must be founded on criteria other than the automobile exception.
76. Id. at 606, 668 P.2d at 812, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
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decision. 7 According to California v. Carney, law enforcement officers
need not secure a warrant to search a motor home as long as probable
cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circum-
stances coexist. Although it was a case of first impression, the decision
was clearly premised upon those tenets fashioned by the Court sixty
years earlier in Carroll.
A. The Burger Majority
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger commenced with a
review of the cases adhering to Carroll as their precedent. In so doing,
the majority exposed its predisposition for resolving Carney along the
identical lines used to judge the reasonableness of warrantless searches
of automobiles. The opinion recites earlier decisions which traditionally
justified such searches.78
A vehicle's potential for mobility distinguishes it from a stationary
structure. Consequently different considerations have been furthered to
justify the vehicle's being accorded a lesser degree of fourth amend-
ment protection. While a warrant to search one's home may be pre-
sumptively required, the exigent circumstances created by a vehicle
with contraband serve to justify its search without one. The litany re-
cited by Carroll and its line - including Chambers v. Maroney, Cady
v. Dombrowski, Cardwell v. Lewis, South Dakota v. Opperman, and
United States v. Ross - has done little to alter this conclusion over the
past sixty years.79
77. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
78. Id. at 2069.
79. Cited for this proposition are the following cases, each of which expressly
relies upon Carroll: Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) ("the opportunity
to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable"); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 441 (1973) ("the original justification advanced for treating automobiles differ-
ently from houses, insofar as warrantless searches of automobiles by federal officers
was concerned, was the vagrant and mobile nature of the former"); Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality) ("[a]n underlying factor in the 'Carroll- Cham-
bers' line of decisions has been the exigent circumstances that exist in connection with
movable vehicles"); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) ("the inher-
ent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical
necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible"); United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-807 (1982) ("[g]iven the nature of an automobile in
transit ... an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit
substance"). Also cited is Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), but it is
properly distinguished from the rest. The Cooper Court opined "that searches of cars
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Chambers provides an appropriate case model to illustrate these
points. Justice White expressly declined to indicate "every conceivable
circumstance" when a warrantless automobile search could be con-
ducted. 0 Clearly when there is a "fleeting target"8 " or when the "op-
portunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable,"8 2 a
search of an auto for particular articles under circumstances of proba-
ble cause must be made immediately. 3 Alternatively, the auto must be
seized and held pending receipt of the magistrate's warrant.8 4 In
Chambers, police were on the lookout for a "light blue compact station
wagon"' 5 within an hour of an armed robbery. 8 At the time it was
stopped, probable cause existed to arrest the occupants and search the
passenger compartment for weapons and stolen property.87 The vehicle,
however, was not searched until its impoundment and the arrest of its
occupants an unspecified time afterward.88 Justice White concluded:
"[tihe probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so
did the mobility of the car."8 9 This clear reference to mobility patron-
izes its historical utility as a justification for warrantless open road
searches. Of curiosity, however, is its relevance in the setting of a sta-
tion house impoundment yard.
Two additional rationale explain warrantless vehicle searches. Be-
cause a vehicle's use on the public roadways necessarily exposes it to
pervasive regulation, such as state and local vehicle codes,90 an occu-
that are constantly movable may make the search of a car without a warrant a reason-
able one." Id. at 59. No reliance upon Carroll was expressed nor necessary since the
impounding of the defendant's vehicle was compelled by state statute. Other cases com-
plete the Carroll line but were not cited. See also Husty v. United States, 282 U.S.
694 (1931); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Dyke v. Taylor Imple-
ment Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); and Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973).
80. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 50.
81. Id. at 52.
82. Id. at 51.
83. id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 44.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 47-48.
88. Id. at 47.
89. Id. at 52.
90. For instances of federal official contact with vehicles on public highways,
Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, and Opperman, 428 U.S. 577, serve to illustrate activity pursu-
ant to express statutory authority. More pervasive contacts occur at state and local
levels as a result of motor vehicle regulation codes, vehicle registration, and operator
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pant does not enjoy the same expectation of privacy she would in her
home. Another explanation is premised upon the vehicle's configura-
tion; since the car's passenger compartment is in plain view it is subject
to public scrutiny.91 Of the two explanations the former proved more
applicable to Carney. The majority was direct in noting that vehicle
regulation arises out of a "compelling governmental need" and derives
its justification from "overriding societal interests in effective law
enforcement. '92
The Court also took note of its prior statements on the scope of
vehicle searches. A Carroll search would appear to extend to the entire
interior of the vehicleY3 In other cases, the Court has upheld searches
of concealed compartments and repository areas within the vehicle.9 4
Inquiry into the scope of a search may also take into account the legal
status of the occupants relative to the vehicle. Carney's connection with
the motor home is unclear. He was known to have been inside the liv-
ing quarters before his arrest. There is also a suggestion that he was
not the registered owner.95 If the incidence of governmental regulation
upon owners and operators is offered to explain their reduced privacy
expectations, it does not necessarily follow that other individuals' ex-
pectations are concomitantly reduced. This contention is irrelevant,
however, in those jurisdictions which hold that no occupant of a vehicle
licensure requirements.
91. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590.
92. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070.
93. See supra text accompanying note 21. The Carroll search was conducted
under express authority of the National Prohibition Act. The reduced expectation of
privacy rationale was unnecessary to justify the search without a warrant.
94. See, Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 ("[ijf probable cause justifies the search of a
lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its con-
tents that may conceal the object of the search"); Cady, 413 U.S. at 433 (police, with-
out a warrant, conducted a search of the locked trunk to locate a comatose accident
victim's service revolver. The search of the trunk was justified because police exercised
custody of the vehicle which had been disabled along the highway and, according to
standard departmental procedure, such a search was designed to avert the potential
that the weapon would fall into irresponsible hands); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 47 (police
had probable cause to arrest the occupants of a car suspected of being involved in a
recent robbery and the search of a compartment beneath the dashboard for weapons
and fruits of the crime was justified); United States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985)
(the initial search of a pickup truck was conducted by customs agents in removing
sealed packages from the vehicle and since the vehicle was reasonably believed to con-
tain contraband, the warrantless search was held to be not unreasonable).
95. See supra note 54.
1986] 1257
363
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
may object to its search by a peace officer.9 6 As to Carney's circum-
stances, the majority concluded that the search of the motor home was
not unreasonable and was conducted with abundant probable cause.
Despite the similarities between a motor home and a stationary
home, the majority was convinced that a motor home was aptly suited
to the rationale offered by Carroll and its line of cases.9 7 The Dodge
Mini Motor Home was readily mobile, its license subjected the vehicle
to governmental regulation, and an objective observer could conclude
from its location in a public lot that the motor home was being used for
transportation, as distinguished from residential use. 8
As evidenced by the lack of unanimity in the Carney Court, deci-
sions concerning warrantless vehicle searches have engendered dispa-
rate positions. Commentators, as well as the Court itself, chronicle con-
fusion in this area.99 In an apparent attempt to reduce potential
uncertainty, the majority did speculate as to indicia which might objec-
tively indicate whether or not a warrant need be secured. Objective
factors suggesting the use of a motor home as a residence appear in a
terse footnote. These include its placement on blocks; lack of a license;
connection to utilities; and difficulty in accessing public roads. 100
B. The Stevens Dissent
The dissent 01 attacked the majority on several bases. The automo-
bile exception doctrine relied upon by the majority impliedly favors
governmental interests. Without the exception, government officers
would be hamstrung in their efforts to enforce laws 02 in those settings
96. State v. Hamilton, 264 N.C. 277, 285, 141 S.E. 2d 506, 512 (1965), cert.
denied 384 U.S. 1020.
97. See supra note 79.
98. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070.
99. See, e.g., Cady, 413 U.S. at 440 (referred to this subject as "something less
than a seamless web"); Ross, 456 U.S. at 817 (characterized the topic as a "troubled
area"); W. LA FAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 509 (1978) (noted that several decisions
in this area are difficult to reconcile, for example, the Chambers' warrantless vehicle
search at the station house lacked those exigent circumstances which were the grava-
men of Carroll, 267 U.S. at 514); and Gardner, Searches and Seizures of Automobiles
and Their Contents: Fourth Amendment Considerations in a Post-Ross World, 62
NEB. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983).
100. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071 n.3.
101. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071 (Stevens, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
102. Ross, 456 U.S. at 806.
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where a vehicle was transporting contraband. The majority erred for
the following reasons. Because Carney presents facts which concern the
search of a home, albeit motorized, the traditional rationale supporting
the automobile exception is not applicable. 103 Furthermore, the absence
of valuable trial court experience and precedent delimiting motor home
searches necessarily foregoes the evolution of reasoned guiding princi-
ples.104 Controlling precedent, the dissent offered, was established by
the Court's earlier decision of Payton v. New York,10 5 with its bright
line test holding that warrantless searches of a home are presumptively
unreasonable.10 6 Evaluation of the reasonableness of any search must
necessarily include the surroundings in which it is executed. 0 7
Justice Stevens criticized the majority's general willingness to en-
tertain minimally significant fourth amendment cases, such as Carney.
By having granted discretionary review of a state court decision which
would only modestly extend precedent in the subject area, the decision
was improvident. 10 8 In addition, principles of sound court administra-
tion militated against granting review because the conflict was not then
fully percolated. 09
Motor homes are hybrids which possess characteristics of both
permanent structures and vehicles. This prompted Justice Stevens to
encourage the delineation of meaningful guidelines to denote the pres-
ence of fourth amendment interests." 0 Relevant lines of separation in-
103. In no setting are fourth amendment protections of one's privacy clearer than
in one's home. Except under exigent circumstances, a warrant is required to breach the
threshold. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980).
104. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2073.
105. Payton, 445 U.S. 573.
106. Id. at 586.
107. See, Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile Search: Exception Without Jus-
tification, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (1980).
108. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2072.
109. Id. at 2073. Justification for immediate intervention is rare. The Court
should decline review until a conflict has fully percolated. Such a strategy assures that
its decision on matters of national significance will have the benefit of a conflict which
has developed as a result of trial court experimentation and explanation. See, Es-
TREICHER & SEXTON, NEw YORK UNIVERSITY SUPREME COURT PROJECT, Appendix
to the Executive Summary A-4 at 22-23 (198_) as cited in Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2073,
n. 8. This epoch undertaking on the Supreme Court's workload appears in published
form. See, Estreicher and Sexton, New York University Supreme Court Project, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. (1984). The authors address two points of contention argued by the
Carney dissent for declining to accept jurisdiction (i.e. the conflict was not "fully perco-
lated" and was "improvident"). Id. at 720-744.
110. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2073.
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clude noting whether the vehicle is in motion or at a standstill; the
manner in which it is fixed to the land and its potential to be quickly
moved; characteristics lending to its service as a residence, and the
means of mobility; and finally, whether it is fashioned for use on land
or water.' Lines of distinction can be drawn. The California Vehicle
Code offers evidence. 1 2 Instead, the majority's categorical treatment of
motor homes summarily denies distinctions which might be applied to
differentiate the diverse lifestyles known to benefit from mobile living
and the variety of uses to which motor homes are suited." 3
The focal point of the dissent's argument is the recognition that at
the time a motor home's owner dwells within, there exists a "substan-
tial and legitimate expectation of privacy.""11 4 No doubt such vehicles
are susceptible to warrantless searches, but only when traveling on a
public thoroughfare or when an immediate search is necessitated by
exigent circumstances."15 The Carney facts were noted to lack exigency
for three reasons: first, the motor home was parked in a public lot and
not traveling on a public roadway; second, a warrant could have been
secured from a magistrate available in the courthouse only a few blocks
distant;" 6 and third, a statutory procedure existed to secure a warrant
over the telephone." 7
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 243 (Deering 1984) ("A 'camper' is a structure
designed to be mounted upon a motor vehicle and to provide facilities for human
habitation or camping purposes. A camper having one axle shall not be considered a
vehicle"); and CAL. VEH. CODE § 362 (Deering 1984) ("'[a] house car' is a motor
vehicle originally designed, or permanently altered, and equipped for human habita-
tion, or to which a camper has been permanently attached...
113. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2073.
114. Id. at 2075.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2076.
117. Id. at n. 16. This argument does not appear in Respondent's briefs. The
dissent relied upon CAL. PENAL CODE § 1526(b) (Deering 1983) ("[i]n lieu of the
written affidavit ... the magistrate may take an oral statement under oath which shall
be recorded and transcribed. The transcribed statement shall be deemed to be an affi-
davit for the purposes of this chapter."). This telephone warrant procedure was consid-
ered sufficient to protect fourth amendment rights as well as satisfy police concerns
regarding loss of evidence. Significantly, exigent circumstances which give rise to war-
rantless searches necessarily are limited by this procedure. People v. Morrongiello, 145
Cal. App. 3d 1, 12-13, 193 Cal. Rptr. 105, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). By way of
further illustration, the federal courts also permit the issuance of a warrant upon oral
testimony. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(D). The procedure is "intended for situations in
which it is not practicable to present a written affidavit to a magistrate or judge, and is
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Because no exigency existed, the dissenters argued that the major-
ity's decision rested upon a conclusive presumption. That is, exigency
arises solely as a result of a motor home's inherent mobility. This con-
clusion, they insist, offends Carroll"" where exigency arose not from
mere mobility but due to practical necessity. It also is contrary to the
Court's holding in United States v. Chadwick,"9 where a footlocker
stored in a car trunk was subjected to a warrantless search by federal
agents. Like a motor vehicle, a footlocker is inherently mobile. How-
ever, the Chadwick Court noted that the footlocker was double-locked
and as such demonstrated the owner's desire that its contents remain
free from public inspection. Mobility alone offers an insufficient basis
for abandoning the warrant requirement. 120
Carney's Dodge Mini Motor Home exhibited both exterior and in-
terior clues that it contained a living space. 12' These indications were
sufficient to communicate the need for obtaining a warrant, failing
which the search without coexistent exigency became "presumptively
unreasonable."' 22
IV. The Carney Search Standard
Searches of motor homes are justified only to the extent that they
are reasonable. 23 The standard of reasonableness articulated by the
Carney Court demands an inquiry by the prospective searcher into cir-
cumstances regarding the vehicle's mobility and its location. 24
A vehicle's ready mobility has been used to justify warrantless
searches for sixty years.125 Although the degree of mobility 26 was un-
necessary to communicate with the magistrate by telephone, radio, or other electronic
methods" (emphasis supplied). 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
670.1 (1982).
118. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132.
119. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 4 (1977).
120. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2076 citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 1.
121. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2077. The dissent noted appointments within the vehi-
cle which were designed to accommodate habitation, such as stuffed chairs, table,
bunk-beds, kitchen, etc.
122. United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
123. See supra note 1.
124. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070-2071.
125. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132.
126. Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 835, 842 (1974).
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defined in the seminal case of United States v. Carroll,127 this aspect of
the inquiry is clearly founded upon long established precedent. The rec-
ord's silence concerning mobility of the Carney motor home and the
Court's bare conclusion that it evidenced ready mobility suggest that
Carney's contribution to the notion of mobility must await case-by-case
decision making. Adding to the uncertainty are interpretive difficulties
with the search standard. The dissent interpreted the Court's opinion as
creating a per se rule: if a motor home is mobile, treat it like a car.
Period. Or restated, a motor home's inherent mobility creates a conclu-
sive presumption of exigency. Another interpretation defines mobility
as active use for transportation. Between the two interpretations lie the
as yet unreported questions of fact. The following points serve to illus-
trate. One can easily distinguish a motor home on the move and a mo-
tor home at a standstill. The former satisfies the standard yet the latter
may not. If a parked motor home possesses the capacity for ready mo-
bility, arguably the standard is met. If a motor home lacks the capacity
for ready mobility, as when it is mechanically disabled, a warrantless
search under Carney is, arguably, unreasonable. These distinctions be-
tween ready mobility and immobility are more than academic. Because
they may reveal the existence of a protected constitutional interest, in-
quiry cannot be made cavalierly.
To justify a warrantless search of a motor home, in addition to its
being readily mobile, Chief Justice Burger implied that it must be situ-
ated in a location which objectively indicates active use for transporta-
tion rather than residence. 128 Because the Carney motor home was
parked in a public lot, its setting objectively indicated its use for trans-
portation. Consequently, the majority found it unnecessary to consider
the application of the warrant exception to a motor home found in a
setting which objectively indicated its use as a residence. a29 The deci-
sion however did propose distinctions to aid in identifying residential
versus transportation use.a3 0 Indicia of a motor home's use for transpor-
tation include the display of a license and convenient access to public
roads.13' A motor home elevated on blocks and hooked up to utilities
127. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132.
128. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071. Historically, the automobile exception has
turned on the vehicle's presence in a "setting that objectively indicates that [it] is being
used for transportation" (emphasis supplied). Id. at 2070-2071.
129. Id. at 2071 n.3.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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suggests its use for residential purposes.132 However, the Court ex-
pressly declined to decide which motor homes were "worthy" or "un-
worthy" of fourth amendment protections. 33 Because a Carney search
demands objective analysis on the part of the prospective searcher, the
general nature of the standard theoretically permits its practical use in
the varied circumstances in which a motor home might be found. Nev-
ertheless, for the explanations offered above, practitioners must look
beyond the limited Carney facts and opinion to find reasoned guiding
principles.
More fundamental than the concerns for the conceptual and
mechanical application of the Carney search standard is the impact of
the Burger Court's decision upon fourth amendment doctrine. How do
protected individual interests fare under the standard? Two cases sug-
gest the answer. In Cardwell v. Lewis, T13 the Court considered the
search of the automobile which was found in a public parking lot.
Though seized from a public setting, the Cardwell auto posed no threat
of flight. The search consisted of paint scrapings taken from the exte-
rior and a tire tread observation made while the vehicle was im-
pounded135 and its owner in police custody.138 There was no privacy
infringement. 37 Nor was there any impermissible privacy infringement
in Carney where an interior cabin search was conducted in a public
parking lot for "safety reasons." 38 The motor home did exhibit a po-
tential for ready movement.139 In combination, these two cases expose
an ever broadening perspective from which the Court will assess future
warrantless vehicle searches. Ultimately, critical fourth amendment
analysis will not be lost on distinctions between interior and exterior
searches, between automobile and mobile residence searches, for they
will have become one. Carroll and Carney however most vividly illus-
trate the extent to which individual interests have yielded to the
Court's construction of the fourth amendment.
In 1925, the Carroll Court considered a roadside warrantless
search of an Oldsmobile roadster smuggling bootleg whiskey. In 1985,
the Carney Court considered a warrantless search of a parked Dodge
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2070.
134. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 585.
135. See supra text accompanying note 39.
136. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 587.
137. Id. at 591.
138. See supra text accompanying note 60.
139. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070.
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Mini Motor Home containing marijuana. In each case, the Court justi-
fied the respective search principally on the grounds that the vehicle's
potential for ready movement forewarned potential for flight. This logic
derives from an historic anomaly 40 and is inapposite to the fourth
amendment protections which were designed to insulate the individual
from arbitrary and indiscriminate exercise of governmental author-
ity.14' Insofar as one's home happens to be mobile, the Carney search
formulation seems to have left a gaping hole in his constitutional guar-
antees against such an exercise.
What privacy interests a motor home owner may have, are pro-
tected, if at all, by the requirement that a prospective searcher objec-
tively conclude that the vehicle's location in a setting suggests its use as
a residence. With that thread, Carney has sought to restitch the consti-
tutional protective fabric left tattered by the unfortunate application of
the Carroll automobile exception to a modern-day phenomenon, the
motor home.
V. Summary
California v. Carney"' is a bold addition to fourth amendment
doctrine. Since the early history of our Republic, the home has been
regarded as the area most deserving protection from governmental in-
trusion. In 1985, however, to the extent one's home evinces ready mo-
bility, the Supreme Court by the force of a 6:3 decision held that such
protection is no longer assured. 43
Carney's holding is uncomplicated. In the context of the fourth
amendment, a motor home is more like a car than a home. And like a
car, a motor home is presumptively susceptible to being searched with-
out a warrant, assuming the presence of probable cause to search in the
first place.
In the main, the fourth amendment requires law enforcement of-
ficers to secure a warrant before conducting a search. To uphold the
warrantless search in Carney, the Court relied upon the automobile ex-
ception doctrine. Automobiles are excepted for essentially two reasons.
The same rationale now obtains to motor home searches. First, a vehi-
140. See supra notes 10, 28 and 29 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
142. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2066.
143. Id.
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cle's intrinsic mobility oftentimes makes securing a warrant futile. 14
Potential for ready movement forewarns potential for flight. Second, a
vehicle's exposure to pervasive governmental regulation of the road-
ways creates a reduced expectation of privacy.' 45 Similarly, a vehicle's
configuration exposes the passenger compartment to public view which
in turn reduces the privacy expectations of the occupant. 146
The challenged governmental actions in Carney were the warrant-
less search of the Dodge Mini Motor Home, as it stood parked in a
public lot in downtown San Diego, and the seizure of an unspecified
quantity of marijuana from the living area. 14 7 The Carney search stan-
dard required that Drug Enforcement Administration agents secure a
warrant to search unless circumstances permitted two objective conclu-
sions - that the motor home was readily mobile and that the vehicle's
location indicates its active use for transportation rather than
residence.14
The sole evidentiary basis for Carney's conviction appears in a
suppression hearing transcript.' 49 That probable cause existed to search
is abundantly clear.' 50 Left unclear are facts which convincingly sup-
port the Court's reliance upon the automobile exception. To the con-
trary, the following suggest that this doctrine is illsuited to the Carney
record; for example, drawn interior window shades reflect the occu-
pants' heightened, not reduced, privacy expectations; a motor home
parked within the confines of a public lot, in excess of the 75 minutes
from the time agents first suspected ongoing illicit activity, failed to
present exigency of such practical necessity that the rule requiring the
securing of a search warrant should be circumvented. The outcome
compels support from an altogether different rationale.' 5 '
The automobile exception is a judicial creation. Its aim - to aid
legitimate law enforcement interests - was first expressed in the prohi-
bition era case, United States v. Carroll.52 In that decision, the Court
sharpened the teeth of the National Prohibition Act' 53 by upholding
144. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
145. See supra note 90.
146. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590.
147. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
148. Id. at 2070-2071.
149. See supra note 67.
150. See supra note 68.
151. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
152. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
153. See supra note 11.
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federal agents' action in conducting a warrantless roadside search of an
Oldsmobile roadster transporting bootleg whiskey. 5 Though both the
Act and the constitutional mandate which authorized it have long since
been repealed, 55 the legacy continues. Sixty years after Carroll, Chief
Justice Burger reasserted its aim by allowing "the essential purposes
served by the exception to be fulfilled.' 56
Carney's contribution to the evolving character of the fourth
amendment suggests a paradoxical result. Despite its boldness, the
Court's predisposed assertion favoring governmental anti-crime pur-
suits will likely yield only nominal influence on law enforcement prac-
tice. As the record demonstrates, other exceptions may more clearly
legitimize warrantless searches. Carney's principal legacy is the shift
which it reflects in the doctrinal perspective of the Court. Traditional
safeguards respecting the search of one's home are today less assured.
The decision offers a head-on challenge to the certainty of Justice
Brandeis' caveat - "in every extention of governmental functions lurks
a new danger to civil liberty.' 5
David C. Hawkins
154. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132.
155. See supra notes 14 and 15.
156. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071.
157. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 436 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Lowe v. Securities and Exchange Commission: The
Deterioration of Financial Newsletter Regulation
I. Introduction
In Lowe v. Securities and Exchange Commission,1 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (hereinafter the SEC) had the authority under the
Investment Adviser's Act 2 (hereinafter the Act) to enjoin the publica-
tion of a financial newsletter by an unregistered financial adviser. The
SEC's activities, designed to protect unsophisticated investors through
the regulation of financial newsletters,3 threatened to collide with the
first amendment freedom of the press.4 In a decision labelled as one of
statutory construction, the Lowe Court interpreted the Act5 to exclude
publishers of impersonal financial newsletters.6 Justice White, while
concurring in the result, criticized the majority and concluded that the
majority's decision, "[i]s in fact based on a thinly disguised conviction
that the Act is unconstitutional as applied to prohibit publication of
1. 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1982).
3. The Act's provision on the findings of the SEC suggests concern over the
availability of the mail to disseminate financial advice. According to the act:
Upon the basis of facts disclosed by the record and report of the Securities
and Exchange Commission ...and facts otherwise disclosed and ascer-
tained, it is found that investment advisers are of national concern, in that,
among other things - (1) their advice, counsel, publications, writings, anal-
yses, and reports are furnished and distributed, ... by the use of the
mails and means . . . of interstate commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1982).
4. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
5. The Investment Adviser's Act of 1940 regulates the profession of investment
advising. The statute codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80-b (1982), sets forth procedural guide-
lines to regulate this profession. This includes a registration requirement for those per-
sons who render financial advice through verbal or written means for a consideration.
An unregistered adviser who renders investment advice is subject to both civil and
criminal sanctions under the Act.
6. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2573.
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newsletters by unregistered advisers. ' '7
In order to understand the Lowe decision, this comment begins
with an overview of the Act and its application to investment newslet-
ters prior to this Supreme Court decision. A separate evaluation of the
"bona fide" newspaper exclusion is included because of its significance
in the Court's ultimate construction of the Act. Next, legislative history
concerning the purpose and proposed application of the Act is analyzed
in an effort to understand its intended scope. The lower court opinions
resulting in the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari are then summarily
discussed with a focus towards the divergence of opinion between and
within the courts.
The majority opinion delivered by Justice Stevens and joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor is then examined
and evaluated in view of the strong concurring opinion delivered by
Justice White and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist. Although the majority decision states a conclusion based on stat-
utory construction, this comment will examine the influential nature of
first amendment concerns in the majority's decision.
In conclusion, this comment articulates some possible ramifications
of the Lowe decision that may have been produced unnecessarily
through the majority's determination to avoid the first amendment is-
sue. An effort is made to determine whether confronting the constitu-
tional issue would have better balanced the competing interests of first
amendment concerns and the protection of the investing public.
II. The Investment Adviser's Act
The Investment Adviser's Act8 of 1940 was enacted to protect the
public from abuses in the securities industry.9 The stock market crash
of 1929 brought a new awareness of the influence investment advisers
were capable of wielding. Abuses of this influence were thought to have
contributed in large part to the crash of 1929.10 As the activities of
investment adviser's resumed and then increased following the crash,
the need for federal legislation to protect unsophisticated investors be-
came apparent.11
7. Id. at 2581 (White, J., concurring).
8. See supra note 5.
9. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963).
10. Id. at 186.
11. S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 21 (1940).
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According to a House Report, "The essential purpose of [this leg-
islation] is to protect the public from the frauds and misrepresentations
of unscrupulous tipsters and touts and to safeguard the honest invest-
ment adviser against the stigma of the activities of these individuals by
making fraudulent practices by investment advisers unlawful."12 In the
drafting of the Act, the primary goal of protecting the public from
fraud and manipulation was balanced with the need to protect the fidu-
ciary nature of an adviser-client relationship. 13
The Act, codified at title 15, section 80b of the United States
Code requires investment advisers to file a registration with the SEC. 14
The registration application requires disclosure of past misconduct in-
volving financial matters as well as information on the advisers current
business. "Investment advisers,' as defined by the Act, must be reg-
istered with the SEC or they will be prohibited from engaging in advi-
sory activities. This prohibition extends to the use of the mail to dis-
seminate financial advice. 17
Investment advisers registered under the Act must keep records
and may be required to file reports when the SEC deems it necessary to
protect the public.18 Both reports and records must be made available
for public inspection. 19 The Act's regulatory power includes injunctive
relief available whenever the SEC finds that an adviser is, or is about
to, violate a provision of the Act. 0 According to the Act, upon a show-
ing that a violation has occurred or is about to occur, an injunction
shall issue without bond.2' This order can require compliance with the
Act, prohibit future violations, or both. Additionally, criminal proceed-
ings can be instituted for violations of the Act.22
Under the Act, the SEC is given the power to revoke, suspend or
deny the registration of an investment adviser. If the adviser has been
convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving the purchase or sale of
securities within ten years preceding the filing of the application, he
12. H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 28 (1940).
13. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 191.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1982).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c) (1982).
16. See infra text accompanying note 25.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1982).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (1982).
19. Id.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1982).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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may be barred from registering under the Act. If the adviser is con-
victed of a felony or misdemeanor involving securities while he is regis-
tered, his registration may be revoked or suspended. Before such disci-
plinary measures are taken the SEC must also determine that the
public interest is benefitted by the revocation or denial of registration
and that the misconduct took place within the scope of the adviser's
business.2 3 The SEC is also granted these powers upon a finding that
the adviser has falsified material information on an application or in a
report filed with the SEC.24
An investment adviser is defined under the Act as:
[A]ny person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or writings,
as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in,
purchasing or selling securities or who, for compensation and as a
part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports
concerning securities .... 25
The first element of this definition involves the rendering of invest-
ment advice to others. Exactly what qualifies as investment advice is
not clear. For example, a publication containing information on a vari-
ety of investments may or may not qualify as an investment advisory
publication under the Act.
The SEC has concluded that a person who provides advice, recom-
mendations or analyses, concerning securities, but not relating to spe-
cific securities, would generally be deemed an investment adviser, as-
suming such services are performed as part of a business and for
compensation.26 This definition includes persons who advise clients di-
rectly or through publications or writings. The advice can be specific or
can be related to the general advantages or disadvantages of investing
in securities compared to other investment opportunities.27
The second element in the definition of an investment adviser re-
23. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (1982).
24. Id.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 276.563 (1984); Applicability of Investment Advisers Act to
Certain Publications, 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 56,156A (Jan. 10, 1977).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 276.770 (1984) (Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to
Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other Persons who Provide Investment
Advisory Services as an Integral Component of Other Financially Related Services, 5
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 56,156B (Aug. 13, 1981)).
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quires that the person be "engaged in the business" of advising others.
The SEC views someone as "in the business" if he gives advice more
than incidentally in the course of his business.28 Other determinative
factors are how specific the advice is and whether any special compen-
sation is received for the advice. According to the SEC, a person is in
the business "if, on anything other than rare and isolated instances, he
discusses the advisability of investing in, or issues reports or analyses as
to, specific securities or specific categories of securities. ..."29
Finally, a person must receive compensation for his financial ad-
vice to qualify as an investment adviser. Any economic benefit received
as a result of financial advice or in payment for a package of services
including financial advice, is sufficient compensation for purposes of the
Act. This compensation does not have to be attributed to a specific item
of information. Commission payments resulting from investment infor-
mation qualify as an economic benefit for purposes of the definition.30
Some investment advisers are excluded from the registration re-
quirements of the Act. Among those excluded are advisers who do not
engage in interstate business transactions (including use of the mail)
and those who had fewer than fifteen clients in the preceding year.
Others excluded from registration include advisers having only insur-
ance companies as clients, banks or lending institutions, and attorneys
who give investment advice only incidentally to their profession. Argua-
bly, the most ambiguous exception applies to publishers of "bona fide"
newspapers and news magazines of general and regular circulation.31
III. The "Bona Fide" Newspaper Exception
According to the Act, publishers of "bona fide" newspapers, news
magazines and business or financial publications are excepted from the
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982).
Note: Other investment advisers excluded from the provisions of the Act are: a)
banks or bank holding companies, lawyers, accountants, engineers, or teachers whose
performance of such service is incidental to the practice of the profession; b) brokers
and dealers who receive no special compensation and engage in the activity only inci-
dentally to their profession; c) persons who engage solely in activities relating to securi-
ties guaranteed by the United States or securities issued or guaranteed by corporations,
in which the United States has an interest and d) such other persons not within the
intent of this Act as the SEC may designate.
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definition of investment adviser if these publications are of general and
regular circulation. 32 However, the Act does not explicitly set forth
what qualifies as a "bona fide" newspaper.
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wall Street Tran-
script Corp.,33 the leading case raising this issue, the "bona fide" news-
paper exception was defined as "those publications which do not devi-
ate from customary newspaper activities to such an extent that there is
a likelihood that the wrongdoing which the Act was designed to prevent
has occurred.'34 The Second Circuit indicated that the format or ap-
pearance of the publication was not the critical issue in determining
whether a publication was "bona fide." According to Wall Street Tran-
script, the question of whether a publication is a bona fide newspaper is
made by examining the nature of the publication's practices. 35
The Wall Street Transcript court studied the contents of the pub-
lication and the likelihood that readers would respond to this informa-
tion as financial advice. If the contents warrant such a conclusion then
the publication is not a "bona fide" newspaper for purposes of the
Act.3 6 Further, no reason was found to substantiate the argument that
Congress intended to exclude all newspaper publications from the re-
quirements of the Act. The court explained in a note, "[i]t appears
rather that those newspapers referred to as 'bona fide' were considered
to be those outside the regulatory intent of the Act. ' 37 The court
reached this conclusion by applying the language of the Act which ex-
cludes "bona fide" newspapers from regulation as well as "such other
persons not within the intent of this paragraph. . . ." The Second
Circuit interpreted this language to mean that the validity of an exclu-
sion can be determined by examining what the Act was logically cre-
ated to regulate.3 9 If the publication falls within an area which the Act
was intended to regulate, then it is probably subject to the registration
requirements.
The SEC has ruled that publishers of books and periodical articles
are excluded from the Act in a number of situations. According to the
SEC, the definition of an investment adviser does not include the au-
32. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982).
33. 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
34. Id. at 1377.
35. Id. at 1378.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1377, n.9.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982).
39. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d at 1377.
1272 [Vol. 10
378
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/15
Lowe v. S.E.C.
thor of a book or periodical unless the publication contains reports, rec-
ommendations or otherwise advises readers on specific securities or is-
suers. In addition, the publication must not be one of a series which is
intended to be updated or supplemented and the publisher must not
engage in any other activity which would qualify as investment advi-
sory activity under the Act.40
IV. SEC v. Lowe
In 1983 the SEC brought suit in federal district court to enjoin
Christopher Lowe and Lowe Management Corporation from publishing
investment newsletters as an unregistered financial adviser. In 1981
Lowe's registration was revoked and he was barred from associating
with any financial adviser. This action followed the discovery of Lowe's
failure to disclose prior criminal convictions in New York and an ad-
ministrative finding that he had misappropriated client funds.41
Lowe continued to publish advisory newsletters after the revoca-
tion of his license. These newsletters included the Lowe Investment and
Financial Letter and the Lowe Stock Advisory. A third publication was
in the planning stages but no issues had been distributed at the time
the SEC brought suit. Lowe also offered a telephone "hotline" for sub-
scribers of six months or more.42
The Lowe Investment and Financial Letter had between 3,000 and
19,000 subscribers. A subscription cost thirty-nine dollars for one year
and seventy-nine dollars for three years. The publication included ad-
vice on investing in treasury bills, stocks and money market funds. It
also recommended the desirability of purchasing or selling specific
stocks. 3
The Lowe Stock Advisory contained purchase, sale and hold rec-
ommendations on low-priced stocks. It also analyzed the general trend
of the market. A few hundred clients subscribed to this service. The
SEC did not allege that fraudulent or misleading information was con-
tained in any of these publications.44
40. Applicability of Investment Adviser's Act to Certain Publications, see supra
note 26.
41. SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
42. Id. at 1361.
43. Id.
44. Subscribers only complaints about Lowe's services concerned the lack of reg-
ular publication. The District Court explains this problem, "[t]he lack of regularity of
publication - an understandable problem in view if the amount of time the publisher
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The district court defined the central issue as whether the SEC
could restrain Lowe from publishing his newsletters, which the court
termed impersonal financial advice, by denying him registration status
under the Act.45 To reach his decision, Judge Weinstein construed the
statute as differentiating between personal and impersonal advice of-
fered through publications although the statute itself contained no jus-
tification for this approach. He suggested, however, that this construc-
tion was necessary to prevent a ruling that the Act as applied to all
publications is unconstitutional."
The court's rationale evolved around a belief that the Act may
involve an unconstitutional prior restraint on publication. The SEC
argued that the publication of financial newsletters constitutes a cate-
gory of commercial speech and thus can be regulated more closely than
other areas of first amendment protection. 48 The district court dis-
agreed with the SEC's analysis and concluded that publishers of finan-
cial newsletters are entitled to full first amendment protection.49
The district court concluded that even under a commercial speech
doctrine the publication of Lowe's newsletters could not be constitu-
tionally enjoined. The court adhered to the doctrine developed in Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, °
which established guidelines for regulating commercial speech. Under
these guidelines the restraint must not be more extensive than neces-
sary to achieve the desired purpose. 5' Since the SEC can require Lowe
to disclose his past misdeeds, Judge Weinstein reasoned that a total
has been devoting in recent years to defending himself before federal and state law
enforcement agencies." Id. at 1361-62.
45. Id. at 1362.
46. Id. at 1365.
47. Id.
48. Id. Commercial Speech is an evolving doctrine which involves a degree of
permissible regulation of speech which would normally be wholly protected by the first
amendment. Prior applications have largely been related to commercial advertising of
products or services. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) and Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
49. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. at 1366-67.
50. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
51. Id. The requirements outlined in Central Hudson are: 1) whether the publi-
cation concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; If it meets the first criteria, a
restraint will be allowed only if 2) the government interest is substantial; 3) the regula-
tion directly advances the government's interests and 4) is not more extensive than
necessary to achieve the desired goal.
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prohibition on publishing is unnecessarily harsh.5 2
To prevent a conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional as applied
to advisory publishers, the statute was interpreted to mean that regis-
tration can be required but cannot be denied.53 Therefore, if Lowe re-
ported his previous criminal convictions in his application and also met
the other SEC requirements, then he must be allowed to register for
the purpose of publishing his newsletters. The court concluded that the
sanctions of denial of registration, suspension or revocation of registra-
tion and bar from association with an investment adviser would not be
applicable to advisers who render only impersonal advice. Impersonal
advice meant advice which was not formulated for a particular person
but was offered through a subscription list to a group of people.5 4
The SEC appealed this decision to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. The circuit court disagreed with the district court's analysis
and viewed the central issue as "whether the publication of such advice
is protected by the first amendment so as to preclude the SEC from
seeking to enjoin its continuance. ' 55 The Second Circuit found no sub-
stantive basis for the district court's interpretation of the Act which
excluded impersonal investment publications from the Act's injunctive
power. The circuit court examined the "bona fide" newspaper exclusion
and found that Lowe was not engaged in customary newspaper activi-
ties. In fact, his activities were exactly the type of activity the Act was
intended to regulate. The circuit court decided that the SEC has the
statutory authority to revoke Lowe's registration and prohibit the publi-
cation of his newsletter. 6
The Second Circuit began by reasoning that the Act serves as a
permissible regulation of economic activity. It then recognized that
regulation of commercial activity cannot be denied simply because it
involves the press. 58 The court found that in the interests of protecting
the public, the government is able to regulate commercial activity in-
volving speech.59 The decision was based in part on the case of Wall
Street Transcript6" which held that the Investment Advisers Act is not
52. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. at 1366.
53. Id. at 1369.
54. Id.
55. SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 894 (1984).
56. Id. at 898.
57. Id. at 900.
58. Id. at 899-900.
59. Id. at 899.
60. 422 F.2d at 1371.
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unconstitutional simply because it regulates certain kinds of publica-
tions.6" As the Wall Street Transcript court explained, "[i] t is not nec-
essary to base a construction of the Act on the assumption that the
activities involved in giving commercial investment advice are entitled
to the identical constitutional protection provided for certain forms of
social, political or religious expression. ' 1"2 To determine whether a pub-
lication is "bona fide" and thus exempt from regulation under the Wall
Street analysis, a distinction must be drawn between ideological expres-
sions which should be protected and merchandising activities which are
subject to regulation.63
Lowe argued that the prohibition against publishing constitutes an
unconstitutional prior restraint.6 4 The SEC argued that Lowe's news-
letters consisted of commercial speech and are thus subject to greater
control than other publications.6 5 The circuit court defined commercial
speech as speech that involves commercial activity and influences the
economic interests of both the speaker and his audience. 6 The applica-
tion of the doctrine depends on the contents of a publication and its
relationship to an economic activity of the publisher or his readers.6 7
According to the Second Circuit, Lowe's publications could be charac-
terized as commercial speech since they relate to the economic interests
of Lowe and his readers.68 The court reasoned that because Lowe's
publications were potentially deceptive they could be enjoined under
the commercial speech doctrine. The court explained, "[j]ust as the po-
tential for deception may justify the regulation of a profession, . . . so,
too, the potential for deception permits government to ban potentially
deceptive commercial speech."6 9
The Second Circuit decided that the Act is analagous to the li-
censing of professionals in that past conduct can bar the granting of a
license or registration. Since Lowe's past behavior involved among
other things, misappropriating client funds and a larceny conviction,
61. Id. at 1379.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Lowe, 725 F.2d at 901.
65. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commissioi at 28, Lowe v. Securities
and Exch. Comm'n, 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985); See supra note 48.
66. Lowe, 725 F.2d at 900 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S.
at 561).
67. Lowe, 725 F.2d at 900.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 901 (footnote omitted).
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there is substantive rationale to justify barring his registration as an
adviser. The doctrine of commercial speech was interpreted to allow the
government to ban such publications to prevent future deceptive prac-
tices. The court reasoned that it was ridiculous to allow Lowe to pub-
lish misleading advice, and then punish him after the fact since the
public would already be harmed by his fraudulent practices. 0
A. The Circuit Court Dissent
Judge Brieant, in dissent, disagreed with the majority's determina-
tion that Lowe's newsletters were commercial speech. He argued
"[i] nvestment opinion . . . is as much speech protected from prior re-
straint as is political opinion, philosophy or gibberish. Not only for the
Zengers, the Patrick Henrys and the Ellsbergs was this basic freedom
secured, but also for an ex-convict whom the majority assumes to be
motivated towards recidivism."71
Judge Brieant interpreted the majority decision to "impose an in-
junction upon appellee Lowe . . ., which at best, will be illusory and
unenforceable, and at worst, constitutes a prior judicial restraint upon
the publication of regularly issued journals of fact and opinion .... ,,72
He found this result both unconstitutional and unnecessary in light of
the language of the statute which he interpreted to exclude Lowe.73
The dissenting judge discussed the licensing of professionals to de-
termine if Lowe can be subjected to regulation as a professional. Ac-
cording to Judge Brieant, Lowe and his publications were offering a
general information service of fact and opinion. Because Lowe's publi-
cations were available to anyone who subscribed, were received several
days after the news was public and could readily be examined and crit-
icized at the time of publication, they were more like an ordinary news-
paper than a professional opinion. To require Lowe to register in order
to publish these newsletters would be extending a licensing scheme to
the press. Judge Brieant concluded that this result would virtually dis-
regard the enactment of the first amendment.7 4
The majority's interpretation of commercial speech was also criti-
70. Id.
71. Lowe, 725 F.2d at 907 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 903 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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cized by Judge Brieant. He construed recent cases 5 which discuss the
doctrine to apply only to advertising and closely related ways of ap-
proaching potential customers.7 6 He considers this construction to be
particularly appropriate in view of the Supreme Court's attempts to
define commercial speech in these cases. The Supreme Court's defini-
tion of commercial speech has been closely intertwined with advertising
and commercial activities according to the dissent.
77
Judge Brieant concluded that Lowe's newsletters were more than a
commercial endeavor. In fact, he finds Lowe's publications were com-
parable to other financial magazines such as Forbes or Barron's since
they offer impersonal third party analysis of stocks.7 8 To require these
magazines to register in order to be published would clearly be an un-
constitutional prior restraint.
Judge Brieant continued by arguing that even if Lowe's publica-
tions constituted commercial speech, the injunction failed to meet the
criteria outlined in Central Hudson79 and therefore could not be up-
held.80 Accordingly, he found that the injunction does not directly ad-
vance a governmental interest and is in fact more severe than necessary
to effectuate a legitimate purpose. 81
In conclusion, Judge Brieant agreed with the statutory construc-
tion and ultimate decision of the district court.82 He found that the Act
is not unconstitutional on its face and should not be interpreted as in-
consistent with the first amendment if another construction is possible.
Judge Brieant considered the injunction to be too vague to be either
effective or enforceable and because it served no legitimate purpose it
75. Judge Brieant cites a list of cases for the proposition that all recent Supreme
Court commercial speech cases have related to advertising: Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983); Matter of R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1
(1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 438 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assocs. v.
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
76. Lowe, 725 F.2d at 905 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 906 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
79. See supra note 51.
80. Lowe, 725 F.2d at 907 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 910.
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should not have been issued.83
V. The Supreme Court Decision
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether "an injunction against the publication and distribution of peti-
tioner's newsletters is prohibited by the first amendment, '8 4 the major-
ity ultimately decided that Lowe was not an investment adviser and
thus avoided the first amendment issue.8 5 Three justices agreed that
Lowe should not be prohibited from publishing his newsletters but
would have held that the Act was unconstitutional to the extent it pro-
hibits an unregistered person from furnishing impersonal investment
advice through publications.86
A. The Lowe Majority
The Lowe Court began by examining the legislative history to de-
termine the purpose and intended scope of the Investment Adviser's
Act.87 This first step was necessitated by the Court's desire to avoid, if
possible, the first amendment question.8 8 The Court focused on lan-
guage in the history indicating that person to person investment advice
was conducive to fraudulent practices and thus regulation was needed
to protect investors. The Lowe Court appeared to formulate a definition
of investment adviser which was based on personal interaction and trust
between investor and adviser. This definition places the adviser and in-
vestor in a fiduciary relationship. Frequent personal contact is an im-
portant element of this definition. The Lowe Court concluded, "peti-
tioners' publications do not fit within the central purpose of the Act
because they do not offer individualized advice attuned to any specific
83. Id.
84. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2562.
85. Id. at 2573-74. Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and
O'Connor joined in the majority opinion (Justice Powell took no part in the decision).
86. Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger joined with Justice White in a
concurring opinion. Although they concurred in the result, they did not agree with the
reasoning of the majority.
87. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2563.
88. Id. The Court recognizes a duty to avoid a constitutional issue if there is a
reasonable alternative. Since both the district court and the dissenting judge in the
court of appeals asserted that the case should be decided on statutory grounds, the
majority believed the constitutional issue may well be eliminated or narrowed through
statutory analysis.
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portfolio or to any client's particular needs."89
To reach this characterization of an investment adviser the Lowe
Court examined congressional reports containing opinions on what type
of legislation was needed and who it should include. The Court began
its survey by examining a 1940 study conducted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission on investment trusts and investment compa-
nies. 90 This report analyzed problems in the investment industry. The
Lowe majority found language in the Report which suggested that the
application of the regulations be limited to personal advice and sub-
scription-list publications were specifically excluded. 91 Representatives
of the investment counselors stated in the report that the primary pur-
pose of an investment counselor was to provide personalized investment
advice to clients. 92
The 1940 SEC report concluded that there were two main catego-
ries of concern in the investment industry: 1) distinguishing the legiti-
mate counselors from the fraudulent ones and 2) organization and
management of investment firms.93 The Investment Adviser's Act was
intended to address these problems.9 4
The Lowe majority found further support for its position in the
hearings on the bill which resulted from the SEC's study.95 Descrip-
tions of the advisory profession stressed person to person, individually
tailored advice.96 The Court stressed the importance of language in a
House Report discussing the revised bill which became the Act.97 The
report states, "[t]he title also recognizes the personalized character of
the services of investment advisers and especial care has been taken
...to respect this relationship between investment advisers and their
clients."9' 8 The Court interpreted this language to imply that only per-
sonal advice rendered through publication is meant to be regulated.
The House Report goes on to say, however, that investment advisers
utilizing the mails for transacting their business must register with the
89. Id. at 2572.
90. Id. at 2563. See S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 11.
91. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2563.
92. Id. at 2564.
93. Id. at 2565.
94. The bill which resulted from the SEC's Report was introduced by Senator
Wagner.
95. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2566.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2569.
98. H.R. REP. No. 2639, supra note 12.
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SEC.99 Arguably, the language "respect this relationship" was intended
to prevent unreasonable encroachment or interference in the business
dealings between adviser and advisee.
The majority definition appears to overlook the language of the
statute which clearly includes persons who advise others, "either di-
rectly or through publications. . ." as investment advisers. 100 The lan-
guage also includes a person who "promulgates analyses or re-
ports. .. ."101 The Court also overlooks the fact that a report or
analysis is often tailored to general needs and not individualized recom-
mendations. In addition, the introductory portion of the Act reflects the
congressional intent to include publications. The Act reads, "it is found
that investment advisers are of national concern, in that, among other
things - (1) their advice, counsel, publications, writings and analyses
and reports are furnished and distributed . . . by the use of the mails
and means and instrumentalites of interstate commerce . ".. ,2
Legislative material includes impersonal publications and cites ex-
amples of the manipulative power of these advisory services.10 3 A Sen-
ate Report expressed the need for regulation of financial publications
because of "their potential influence on security markets and the dan-
gerous potentialities of stock market tipsters imposing upon unsophisti-
cated investors .. ."1o It is also significant that these Senate Com-
mittee reports define an investment adviser as anyone falling within a
wide range of classifications, including those offering impersonal advice
to a specified category of clientele and those sending advice through the
mail.110 5 This definition appears to include publishers of impersonal
newsletters.
In S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,106 the Supreme
Court construed the Investment Advisers Act broadly to effectuate the
purpose of preventing the perpetration of fraud upon the public.10 7 In
Capital Gains the Court granted the SEC the power to compel the
99. Id.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1l) (1982) (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-I (1982).
103. See Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission at 16, Lowe v. Securi-
ties and Exch. Comm'n, 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985).
104. S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 11.
105. Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission at 16, Lowe v. Securities
and Exchange Commission, 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985).
106. 375 U.S. at 180.
107. Id. at 195.
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defendant to disclose his trading activities of the stocks he recom-
mended in his publication.108 The Court specifically mentioned the lan-
guage of the statute in a note, indicating that publications were in-
tended to be included in the Act.109
The Lowe majority concluded that the Act's definition of invest-
ment adviser, read without knowledge of the drafter's intent, appeared
to include Lowe, unless he was entitled to the "bona fide" newspaper
exclusion. To determine the parameters of the exclusion, the majority
read the language of the Act in light of what they viewed as legislative
concern over first amendment violations. The Court believed this con-
cern stemmed from a 1940 report prepared by the Illinois Research
Council, discussing the possible constitutional ramifications of includ-
ing impersonal advice within Illinois' regulation of investment counsel-
ors. This report was submitted to and examined by Congress. The re-
port recommended the exclusion of impersonal publications from the
definition of investment counselor to prevent the possibility of first
amendment infringement.110 The Lowe majority apparently concluded
that the Illinois Report was persuasive evidence of the congressional
intent to limit the scope of the Act to personal publications. Because
Congress was made aware of the possible constitutional ramifications of
including impersonal advice within the Act, the Court reasoned that
they must have taken a course designed to avoid this undesirable result.
Therefore, Congress must have intended to exclude impersonal publica-
tions from the requirements of the Act.
The Court recalled that prior to the adoption of the Act, two cases
recognizing prior restraint on speech as unconstitutional had emerged
as landmark decisions." One case was specifically mentioned in the
108. Id. at 181-82.
109. Id. at 187 n.15.
110. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2567-68 (citing Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Sub-
committee on Securities and Exchange of the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. pt 1, p. 27 (1940)). Note: The Court finds significance in
the difference between the original draft of the "bona fide" newspaper exclusion which
read, "the publisher of any bona fide newspaper or newsmagazine of general circula-
tion" and the final version which reads, "the publisher of any bona fide newspaper,
news magazine or business or financial publication of general and regular circula-
tion .. " The majority notes the broadening of the exclusion following the introduc-
tion of the Illinois report thereby indicating the legislators concern that they draft leg-
islation consistent with constitutional principles.
11. Id. at 2570; see Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Near v.
Minnesota ex. rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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legislative history which the Lowe Court found to be indicative of the
legislators' intention to avoid constitutional implications.112 According
to the majority, "[C]ongress, plainly sensitive to first amendment con-
cerns, wanted to make clear that it did not seek to regulate the press
through the licensing of nonpersonalized publishing activities."'113
Since Lowe's newsletters were impersonal in character and pub-
lished on a regular schedule, the Court felt they fit within the "bona
fide" newspaper exclusion. 1 4 According to the majority, "bona fide"
was defined to be most closely analagous to the term "genuine." Since
Lowe's publications "are not personal communications masquerading in
the clothing of newspapers, news magazines or financial publica-
tions,"115 they are genuine. The majority concluded that the plain lan-
guage of the exclusion, read with the intent of Congress to prevent con-
stitutional problems, justified this result. The Lowe Court reasoned that
"[tlo the extent that the chart service (Lowe's publication) contains
factual information about past transactions and market trends, and the
newsletters contain commentary on general market conditions, there
can be no doubt about the protected character of the communications,
a matter that concerned Congress when the exclusion was drafted." 6
The majority's definition seems to overrule the SEC's decision on
who must register as an investment adviser. Prior to Lowe, the SEC
required impersonal financial publications which were addressed pri-
marily to investors to register. 117 The SEC grants a "bona fide" publi-
cation exception only where a publication judged by its content, promo-
tion, readership and other matters, does not appeal to readers generally
as an investment advisory publication." 8 Thus the SEC concentrates its
analysis on whether the publication would be used by an investor for
making decisions on buying, selling, or otherwise handling securities."19
The decision in Wall Street Transcript'20 helped to define the parame-
112. Lowell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
113. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2570.
114. Id. at 2572-73.
115. Id. at 2572.
116. Id. at 2573.
117. See, e.g., Applicability of Investment Adviser's Act to Certain Publications,
supra note 26; New Directions Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letters [1984-85 New
Decisions Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 77,917 (April 2, 1985).
118. Applicability of Investment Adviser's Act to Certain Publications, supra
note 26 at n. 1. See also Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371.
119. Id.
120. 422 F.2d at 1371.
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ters of the "bona fide" newspaper exclusion. The Wall Street Tran-
script court held that "bona fide" was meant to include publications
engaged in ordinary newspaper activities and which are not likely to
engage in the improper behavior envisioned by the Act. 121
The Lowe Court explained their variance with these definitions by
reasoning that the former guidelines lacked insight into the purpose of
the legislation and the intent of Congress when they drafted the Act.
According to the Lowe Court, Congress did not intend to regulate im-
personal publications because they were aware of the liklihood of first
amendment infringement. The Lowe majority also concluded that the
creators of the Investment Adviser's Act had no intention of regulating
impersonal investment advice because this would not serve the public
purpose of protecting those involved in a fiduciary relationship. A fidu-
ciary relationship is characteristic of an adviser-client relationship. The
majority determined that Congress enacted the exclusion to prevent in-
trusion into the protected area of public acquisition of information
through publications. Therefore, the Court concluded that Lowe is enti-
tled to the "bona fide" newspaper exclusion and is not an investment
adviser within the definition of the Act. 22 "
The majority's construction of the history of the Act is similiar to
that made by the district court. Both identify two distinct categories of
regulation within the Act; one dealing with personal advice and one
dealing with impersonal advice through publication. As the district
court recognized, the language of the statute does not support this con-
struction of the Act.12 Both courts seem to agree, however, that Con-
gress must have intended this result to prevent an intrusion into the
rights guaranteed by the first amendment.
B. Justice White's Concurrence
Justice White would categorize Lowe as an investment adviser
121. Id. at 1377; See also Securities and Exchange Commission v. Suter, 732
F.2d 1294 (1984) (holding that investment adviser's publication was not "bona fide"
newspaper).
122. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2573.
123. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. at 1365. "Admittedly there is no suggestion on the face
of the statute that persons whose only advisory capacity is the publication of imper-
sonal investment suggestions, reports and analyses should be treated differently . . .
from other persons within the definition of investment advisor. . . . Nevertheless, this
interpretation is suggested by constitutional considerations." Id.
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within the jurisdiction of the Act.1 24 He concurred with the majority
result because he believes that the Act's prohibition on publishing by
unregistered advisers engaged in rendering impersonal investment ad-
vice is unconstitutional. 125
He agreed with the majority on the proposition that a statute
should not be construed to conflict with constitutional objectives if an
alternative construction is possible.12 6 He emphasized however, that the
construction must be "fairly possible.'1 2 7 The duty of the court he con-
cluded, is not to rewrite legislation but to construe it in accordance
with legislative objectives since it is the legislature's duty to define pub-
lic policy. 128
Turning to the plain language of the Act, Justice White found that
Lowe is an adviser unless his newsletter is a "bona fide" publication of
general and regular circulation. Justice White believed Lowe clearly
met the Act's initial criteria of engaging in the business of rendering
investment advice through publications or writings. According to Jus-
tice White, the critical issue was "whether the 'bona fide publications'
exception is to be construed so broadly as to exclude from the definition
all persons whose advisory activities are carried out solely through pub-
lications offering impersonal investment advice to their subscribers.' 2 9
Justice White thought substantial weight should be given to the
SEC's interpretation of the applicability of the Act to publishers. 30
The SEC has included publishers of newsletters and market advice in
the definition of investment adviser since the enactment of the legisla-
tion.' The SEC has defined the "bona fide" newspaper exclusion "as
applicable only where, based on the content, advertising material, read-
ership and other relevant factors, a publication is not primarily a vehi-
cle for distributing investment advice.' i3 2
The majority appeared to adopt a broader interpretation of the
124. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2586 (White, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 2587.
126. Id. at 2574 (White, J., concurring).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2574-75 (White, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2576.
131. Id. E.g., Applicability of Investment Adviser's Act to Certain Publications,
supra note 26; The SEC and the First Amendment - Enforcement Not Infringement
[1984-85 Transfer Binder], FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) % 83,701 (Nov. 1, 1984).
132. See, e.g., Applicability of Investment Adviser's Act to Certain Publications,
supra note 26 at 44,055-3 n.1 (emphasis added).
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"bona fide" publication exception than the SEC had allowed. Justice
White construed the majority's expanded definition as broad enough to
encompass all publications that do not offer personal investment advice.
This broadening of the definition, according to him, appears both illogi-
cal and inconsistent with the language of the Act, which defines invest-
ment adviser as one who renders advice either directly or through pub-
lications or writings, or who issues analyses or reports. 33
Justice White felt that if Congress intended the "bona fide" news-
paper exception to include all publications there would have been no
reason to include the language "or through publications" in the statute
itself. He determined that the specific nature of the language indicates
that both direct advice or advice issued through publication was to be
included in the scope of the Act. He could find no logical reason for the
"bona fide" term if Congress had not intended that the content of a
publication be examined to determine if it fit the exclusion. Justice
White concluded that the majority's interpretation fails to recognize
the fundamental principle of giving effect to all the language of a
statute. 34
In Justice White's view, the Act's history does not support the con-
clusion that persons who engage in giving investment advice through
publication are to be excluded from the definition of investment ad-
viser.' 3 5 In fact, representatives of both the SEC and the investment
advisers thought that the Act would include these publications. 136
Douglas T. Johnston, the Vice President of the Investment Counsel of
America stated in a subcommittee hearing:
The definition of investment adviser as given in the bill, in spite of
certain exclusions, is quite broad and covers a number of services
which are entirely different in their scope and in their methods of
operation. For example, as we read the definition, among others, it
would include those companies which publish manuals of securities
such as Moody's, Poor's and so forth; it would include those com-
panies issuing weekly investment letters such as Babson's, United
Business Service, Standard Statistics, and so forth .... 113
133. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2576-77 (White, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 2577-78 (White, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 2578 (White, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2565 n.38 (quoting Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Subcommittee on
Securities and Exchange of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. p. 711-712 (1940)).
1286 [Vol. 10
392
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/15
Lowe v. S.E.C.
Justice White points to language in a Senate Report preceding the
final draft of the Act which says, "[w]ith respect to a certain class of
investment advisers, a type of personalized relationship may exist with
their clients."' 13 8 He emphasizes the phrases "a certain class" and "may
exist" to demonstrate a legislative intent to recognize both personal and
impersonal advisory services in the Act.139 The majority relies on a sub-
sequent committee report,1 40 accompanying the final draft of the Act,
which they construe as recognizing only the personal services of an in-
vestment adviser within its language."
According to Justice White, the history of subsequent revisions of
the Act seems to include these impersonal publications.1 42 Language in
a Senate Report included "financial publishing houses not of general
circulation" in the scope of the Act. 43 Nearly ten years later a Senate
Report again describes the Act as relating to "the business of issuing
analysis or reports concerning securities."' 44
Justice White found the purposes of the Act frustrated by the ma-
jority's interpretation. 45 A construction of the Act which excludes pub-
lishers of impersonal advice from regulation renders the SEC ineffec-
tive in its attempts to protect investors who read these publications.
The SEC has consistently tried to protect the public from fraud and-
manipulative practices, particularly scalping. 46 In scalping, an adviser
purchases a stock and then begins recommending it to his clients.
When the price rises the adviser sells his stock at a profit. 47 Justice
White concluded that the majority effectively overruled Capital Gains
Research Bureau,48 leaving the SEC with little effective means of
138. See S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 22 (1940).
139. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2579 (White, J., concurring).
140. H.R. REP. No. 2639, supra note 12.
141. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2569 n. 46 (White, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 2580 (White, J., concurring).
143. Id. See S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960).
144. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2580 (White, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 2580 (White, J., concurring).
146. Id.
147. According to Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 181, scalp-
ing is the practice of buying securities shortly before recommending them as invest-
ments to clients. As soon as the market price of the recommended stocks rise, the
adviser sells his shares at a profit.
148. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2581 (White, J., concurring). Justice White recalls the
holding of Capital Gains Research Bureau:
[In which we held] that the antifraud provisions of the [Act] could be
invoked against the publisher of an investment advisory newsletter who
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preventing serious fraud or self-serving manipulation through these
publications.149
According to Justice White, the majority's efforts to avoid the con-
stitutional question led the Court to adopt a construction of the Act
which is unnecessarily narrow. 150 He points to the Court's traditional
policy of construing securities statutes broadly to enable them to effec-
tively achieve their purposes.15' As Justice White explained:
The certainty that the Advisers Act provides a remedy against
scalping thus remains, for me, a persuasive reason for not adopting
a construction of the Act that would exclude petitioner. In addi-
tion, the antifraud provisions of the Act are supplemented by re-
porting requirements that may be used [to] aid the SEC in uncov-
ering scalping. By taking petitioner outside the category of
investment advisers, the Court places him beyond the reach of
these additional tools for uncovering deceit. 52
Justice White argued that the Lowe majority assumed Congress
enacted the legislation in 1940 with first amendment constitutional is-
sues in mind. 5 3 He concluded that the majority's construction of the
Act empowered the legislature with constitutional foresight, because
the majority assumed Congress would not have drafted an Act violative
of the first amendment.154 Justice White found this reasoning far-
fetched. As he explained, "[t]he court thus attributes to the 76th Con-
gress a clairvoyance the Solicitor General and the Second Circuit ap-
parently lack - that is the ability to predict our constitutional holdings
45 years in advance of our declining to reach them.' 55 In light of the
legislative history and the language and purpose behind the Act, he
concluded that the Act should be reasonably construed so as to include
Lowe within its parameters. 56
Justice White next turned to the question of whether the first
had engaged in scalping, and that such an advisor could be required to
make full and frank disclosure of his practice of trading on the effect of his
recommendations.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. n.9.
153. Id. at 2582 (White, J., concurring).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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amendment permits the SEC to permanently enjoin Lowe from pub-
lishing his impersonal financial newsletters. He explained that the Lowe
Court is required to balance two important competing goals in this
case. One is the protection of first amendment privileges. The other is
the governmental right to protect the public through regulation and
licensing. Justice White recognized that professional licensing has been
held constitutional, and the government does not lose its right to license
simply because speech or publication is involved in the activities of a
profession. 57
Justice White used the example of an attorney as a constitution-
ally licensed professional. Although an attorney is involved in speaking
and writing, high moral and educational qualifications can be required
of entrants. The SEC argued that it has the same right to require high
ethical and moral standards of investment advisers. These advisers are
in a position to harm the public both through publication and personal
communication of fraudulent or misleading material. The SEC believes
that the government has a compelling interest in the protection of the
public. Therefore, a licensing requirement is justified, as in other pro-
fessions, regardless of the element of speech used in the practice of this
profession. 58
The SEC suggests that an invalidation of the licensing require-
ments for publishers of impersonal advice would render other licensing
provisions open to attack.15 9 As an example, the SEC refers to an attor-
ney who distributes an impersonal newsletter regarding recent law de-
velopments.' An attorney is required to be licensed as a professional
engaged in the practice of law even though his newsletter is not tailored
to an individual's needs."' The SEC would question the validity of
such a licensing provision if the Lowe Court held that it is unconstitu-
tional to require impersonal publishers to be registered.162 Justice
White found the argument flawed however, because there is no prece-
dent for extending a licensing scheme to publication or speech them-
selves.'6 3 He apparently concluded that the Act's registration require-
ments are not limited to the regulation of professionals but appear to
157. Id. at 2582 (White, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 2583.
159. Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission at 34, Lowe v. Securities
and Exch. Comm'n, 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985).
160. Id. at 34, n.44.
161. Id. at 34.
162. Id.
163. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2583 (White, J., concurring).
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extend to anyone who desires to publish information concerning
securities.
Justice White pointed to an imaginary line which must be drawn;
dividing the regulation of a profession from the regulation of free
speech. He appeared to draw a distinction between a professional giv-
ing personal advice and someone giving general information to whom-
ever will listen.
The SEC argued that an investment adviser is a fiduciary and the
legislature intended broad regulatory powers be given the SEC to pro-
tect the public. According to the SEC, the legislature is the proper fo-
rum to determine the purpose and extent of a statute and their decision
should be respected. Justice White found this argument unpersuasive,
apparently because it assumes Congress writes only constitutional legis-
lation and ignores the constitutional system of checks and balances. He
pointed out that the judiciary function of reviewing legislation is to in-
sure that it is constitutional.8
Relying in part on an analysis by Justice Jackson in Thomas v.
Collins,1 65 Justice White explained that a regulation of speech can
stand only if it is in conjunction with the valid regulation of a profes-
sion. He reasoned that someone who renders individualized advice to a
client can be properly regarded as engaged in a profession. Justice
White characterized the speech used by a professional as a by-product
of the practice of the profession. He concluded that a licensing statute
prohibiting these personal communications in the absence of the re-
quired license, is constitutionally based on the government's right to
regulate a profession. He cautioned, however, that where no personal
relationship exists and the publisher does not purport to render advice
for any specific individual, then a license requirement ceases to be a
regulation of a profession and deteriorates into a prior restraint on pro-
tected speech.' 6
Justice White was careful to point out the distinction between a
licensing scheme to regulate a profession and a licensing scheme that
restricts publishing of impersonal information to those who obtain a
license. The Act's requirement of a license for one who engages in giv-
ing person to person, individually tailored advice is constitutional, the
same as requiring a physician to obtain a license.167 What becomes ob-
164. Id. at 2583-84 (White, J., concurring).
165. 323 U.S. 516, 544-48 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 2584-85 (White, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 2585 (White, J., concurring).
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jectionable is the Act's ability to prevent unregistered advisers from
publishing impersonal investment advice for a general audience. 161
Justice White continued his analysis by examining the SEC's con-
tention that Lowe's newsletters could be regulated in the context of
commercial speech."' Under a commercial speech theory, 170 if the pro-
hibition advances a substantial government interest, then it may be per-
missible.171 Lowe argued that his newsletters were fully protected
speech because they did not involve a commercial transaction.172 Jus-
tice White concluded that there is no reason to categorize these news-
letters to reach a decision. 73 Since the Act makes it unlawful for an
unregistered adviser to publish both personal and impersonal invest-
ment advice, it cannot be constitutional as it exists.174 Justice White
explained, "[s]uch a flat prohibition or prior restraint on speech is, as
applied to fully protected speech presumptively invalid and may be sus-
tained only under the most extraordinary circumstances.' ' 5
Justice White reasoned that even under a commercial speech the-
ory, the Act's remedy is too extreme. A total prohibition on publishing,
because the SEC fears Lowe may one day defraud or mislead, is unrea-
sonable. Although a legitimate government purpose is served by the
Act, the proposed restraint is too broad. According to Justice White,
"[o]ur commercial speech cases have consistently rejected the proposi-
tion that such drastic prohibitions on speech may be justified by a mere
possibility that the prohibited speech will be fraudulent."'1 6 He sug-
gested application of the Act's antifraud provisions as an acceptable
alternative to a total prohibition on newsletter publishing.177
Justice White would define investment adviser to include publish-
ers of impersonal investment advice. He found the provisions of the Act
pertaining to the antifraud and reporting sections constitutional and
reasoned that these provisions could be applied to both registered and
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See supra note 48.
171. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2585 (White, J., concurring). See Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985). For the elements of constitutional com-
mercial speech regulation see supra note 51.
172. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2585 (White, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 2586 (White, J., concurring).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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unregistered investment advisers engaged in publication. Justice
White's constitutional objection is expressly limited to that portion of
the Act which requires advisers giving impersonal investment advice
through publication to register with the SEC. In conclusion he empha-
sized, "I would hold only that the Act may not constitutionally be ap-
plied to prevent persons who are unregistered (including persons whose
registration has been denied or revoked) from offering impersonal in-
vestment advice through publications such as the newsletters published
by petitioner.' 78
VI. Effect of the Lowe Decision
The Supreme Court's decision in Lowe broadens the scope of the
"bona fide" newspaper exception to include all publishers of impersonal
investment advice. This interpretation of the Act will probably result in
the extinction of newsletter regulation under the Act. The Lowe deci-
sion may well inspire a new proliferation of self-serving, manipulative
publications disguised as financial newsletters. Under the Act's new in-
terpretation, the SEC may be powerless to control or regulate these
impersonal publications.
The Lowe Court derived its "impersonal" distinction from the leg-
islative history of the Act. The Court construed this history as limiting
the scope of the Act to individually-tailored advice rather than the gen-
eral information offered in Lowe's newsletters.17 9 However, the concur-
rence in Lowe cited numerous examples of legislative history which in-
dicated an intent to include these impersonal publications.'a1 Also, the
clear language of the Act defines an adviser as one who renders advice
"either directly or through publications."18' Futhermore, the Act's
scope as indicated in the section of the Act relating to the findings of
the SEC, clearly includes publications. 82 These sections of the Act
draw no distinction between publications offering personal advice as
compared to impersonal advice. As the district court admitted, the Act
itself provides no justification for such a distinction. 8 3
The Lowe Court's construction of the Act made only brief mention
178. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2587 (White, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 2572.
180. Id. at 2578-80 (White, J., concurring).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1982).
183. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. at 1365.
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of the SEC's rulings on the applicability of the Act. Previous court
decisions applying the Act to newsletter publishers, were granted only
minimal consideration in the majority's reasoning.8 In a suprising re-
versal, the Supreme Court apparently overruled an early Supreme
Court interpretation of the Act in the case of Capital Gains Research
Bureau.185 The decision rendered under the Act in 1963, held that a
financial newsletter publisher could be required to disclose his personal
interests in the securities he recommended to his subscribers. 186 Follow-
ing the Lowe decision, the SEC may have no recourse under the Act
against impersonal newsletter publishers who engage in self-serving ac-
tivities such as scalping. 187
Prior to Lowe many states, including Florida, had required news-
letter publishers to comply with the registration provisions of the
Act.8 8 By denying registration status to those advisers convicted of fi-
nancial-type crimes and by requiring advisers to disclose possible con-
flicts of interest, investors were given both protection and forewarning
of the likelihood of deceptive or fraudulently published advice. As de-
scribed in Capital Gains, "[a] fundamental purpose . . . [of the Act]
was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in
the securities industry." 89 It now appears that this fundamental pur-
pose of the Act, protection of the public, will erode under the Supreme
Court's analysis.
Justice White concluded that a less onerous and more defensible
ruling would have been a decision that held unconstitutional the portion
of the Act which prevents unregistered publishers from publishing im-
personal newsletters. 90 According to Justice White, had the majority
held that portion of the Act unconstitutional, these publishers could
still be controlled through the reporting and antifraud provisions of the
Act.' 9' Under this analysis, the original purpose of the Act, which was
to protect the investing public, 92 could still be effectuated although to
184. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2571-72.
185. 375 U.S. at 180.
186. Id.
187. See supra note 147.
188. Edwards, Comptroller clears way for newsletters, Fort Lauderdale Sun-
Sentinel, Aug. 14, 1985, at § D, at 1, col. 1.
189. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 at 186.
190. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2586-87 (White, J., concurring).
191. Id.
192. See H.R. REP. No. 2639; supra note 12; H.R. REP. No. 2179, 86th Cong.,
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a reduced degree.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Lowe was arguably too
broad in that it undermines the purposes of the Act and results in the
deregulation of a potentially harmful interstate activity. A newsletter is
inherently dangerous because of the wide range of investors that can be
readily approached through its subscribers.1 93 A compelling example of
the need to protect readers of financial newsletters was presented in
1981 when one man "was credited with singlehandedly knocking 23.8
points off the Dow Jones Industrial Average. . . by advising subscrib-
ers to his Early Warning Service . . . to sell everything and short
stocks. 1 194 This was a reversal of the advice he issued on the preceding
day which indicated that the next 50 points on the Industrial Average
would "be a piece of cake."195
The practice prior to Lowe was to require investment publishers to
register and to bar the registration of those advisers who have been
convicted of financial misdealings. This policy provided some protection
for investors since an adviser was forced to disclose his previous mis-
conduct and could be barred from acting as an adviser if the SEC
deemed the sanction appropriate. Following Lowe, these subscribers
will have no help in gauging the reliability or truthfulness of a financial
newsletter or its publisher. To determine the soundness of a publishers
advice, investors will have to rely on their common sense, a method
which apparently failed to work in the 1920's.
VII. Conclusion
The Lowe decision is apparently an unwarranted break with the
modern trend of protecting the public and stabilizing our economy
though the regulation of investment activity. The old era of caveat
emptor 96 has reemerged under the majority's decision to exempt im-
personal newsletter publishers from regulation under the Act. Until
2d Sess. 3 (1960); S. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1934).
193. Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission at 15, Lowe v. Securities
and Exch. Comm'n, 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985).
194. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the First Amendment - En-
forcement Not Infringement, [1984-85 Transfer Binder], FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
87,116 (quoting Bayless, If You Believe in Joseph Granville Stay Out of Los Angeles
on April 10, Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1981, at 25, col. 1).
195. Id.
196. Caveat emptor is defined as "let the purchaser beware." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
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new regulations designed to prevent fraudulent practices through these
publications emerge from Congress, investors should not trust the pub-
lications' so-called "advice." These newsletters can be published by vir-
tually anyone and there is no guarantee that such "advice" is anything
more than a publisher's not-too honest effort to get rich quick.
Lori Denise Coffman
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Work Product: The Anticipation of Litigation
Requirement Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.280(b)(2).
When an accident occurs which results in injuries or property
damage an investigation is usually conducted within a short period of
time to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties involved. De-
pending on the magnitude of the harm, the likelihood that some legal
action will be taken by one of the parties is high. Many businesses,
aware of this potential, often conduct in-house investigations of acci-
dents involving their employees or occuring on their premises to deter-
mine the cause and prevent recurrences. Once an action is ultimately
filed, one of the questions which frequently arises is whether a party
may obtain witness statements and reports gathered by the adverse
party during its preliminary investigations.
Section 1.280(b)(2) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure' pro-
vides that "documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of
litigation" are considered work product, and are therefore protected
from discovery.2 Unfortunately, the phrase "prepared in anticipation of
1. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2) states in part:
Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b)(3) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangi-
ble things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or trial by or for an-
other party or by or for that party's representative, including his attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or agent, only upon a showing that
the party seeking discovery has need of the materials in the preparation of
his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the sub-
stantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery
of the materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concern-
ing the litigation.
2. The protection from discovery is not absolute. Once a showing has been made
by the party resisting discovery that the materials were prepared in anticipation of
litigation, the burden then shifts to the party seeking discovery to show that there is
substantial need for the material, and that the substantial equivalent cannot be ob-
tained without undue hardship. If this showing is established, production will be or-
dered. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2).
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litigation" has created considerable confusion among Florida's courts.3
Some cases are in direct conflict with each other, while others simply
lack clarity.
Despite this continued confusion, the Supreme Court of Florida
has yet to interpret Rule 1.280(b)(2). Therefore, the only source of
guidance has been conflicting decisions from the state's district courts
of appeal and the federal courts.4 Some courts have held that since not
all accidents lead to litigation, an investigation following an occurrence
is not necessarily prepared in anticipation of litigation.5 These cases
look at the facts of the case before determining whether to accord the
material "work product" protection. However, other courts have held
that all statements and information secured after an occurrence which
might give rise to a claim are prepared in anticipation of litigation.6
The result is a split among Florida courts.
This Note will focus on Florida's application of work product pro-
tection to materials prepared before litigation commenced. First, it will
examine the history and development of the protection afforded trial
preparation materials, which is essential for an understanding of the
policies underlying the protection from discovery provided by Rule
1.280(b)(2). Second, it will discuss the applicable case law in Florida,
focusing on the inconsistencies and confusion among the district courts
of appeal in applying the work product rule to trial preparation materi-
als. Third, there will be an analysis of the decisions addressing this
issue in federal court and the highest courts of other states. Next, this
3. Brown v. Superior Court in and For Maricopa Cy., 137 Ariz. 327, 333, 670
P.2d 725, 732 (1983).
4. The Florida courts have relied to some extent on Florida decisions interpreting
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) since FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2) was amended to conform to
the federal rule. See Cotton States Mutual Ins. Co. v. Turtle Reef Assocs., 444 So. 2d
595, 596 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
5. E.g., Airocar, Inc. v. Goldman, 474 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. White, 447 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Cot-
ton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turtle Reef Assocs., 444 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McGann, 402 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Dixon, 330 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1976); Surette v. Galiardo, 323 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
6. E.g., Florida Cypress Gardens, Inc. v. Murphy, 471 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Gonyea, 455 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Walt Disney World Co. v. Cotto, 462 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, 435 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1983), rev. denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Monroe, 276
So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied 283 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1973).
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Note will suggest methods to clarify the existing confusion as to which
materials have been prepared in anticipation of litigation. The proposed
standards will require a distinction between cases brought by a third
party against a liability insurer and those which are claims by the in-
sured against its insurer. It will demonstrate that because the primary
purpose of the initial investigation conducted by a liability insurer is
different from an insurer's investigation of its insured's loss, a different
standard of discovery protection is required. As to other types of busi-
nesses which conduct investigations following accidents, this Note will
suggest that the courts take a case by case approach focusing on the
facts before determining whether materials should be accorded work
product protection. Various factors are set forth to aid the court in
making the determination. Finally, a suggestion is made that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court should adopt these standards, thereby providing a
clear precedent for the lower courts to follow. The proposed standards
will assure a proper and predictable application of work product protec-
tion throughout the state.
II. Development of the Work Product Concept
A. Pre-Hickman v. Taylor7
"The adoption in 1937 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
initiated a slow revolution in attitude toward pretrial discovery that led
to the development of a work product doctrine in the United States."8
Through the Federal Rules, discovery rather than pleadings became
the primary method for adversarial parties in a lawsuit to gather infor-
mation.9 Shortly after the enactment of the Federal Rules, district
courts often faced situations where the provisions of the Rules were
invoked by a party who wanted to prevent the production of his trial
preparation material.10 Discovery of documents was restricted under
Rule 34 unless a showing of good cause was made.11 This showing of
7. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
8. Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 760, 766
(1983).
9. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30 advisory committee note, 5 F.R.D. 433, 457-59
(1946) (proposed amendment).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 was amended in 1970. The amendment eliminated the
requirement of "good cause" and made ordinary documents routinely discoverable
upon a showing of relevance.
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good cause for the production of all documents and things was required
whether or not trial preparation material was involved.12 However, the
courts differed as to the required showing under the "good cause"
test.13
The split in the courts led the Federal Rules Advisory Committee
to suggest changes in the Rules, which would clear up the confusion
over the proper protection to be afforded to trial preparation materi-
als.' 4 However, such changes were not adopted by the United States
Supreme Court. Instead, the court "chose to articulate the standard of
protection for work product in its forthcoming decision"' 5 of Hickman
v. Taylor.6
B. Hickman v. Taylor
Hickman v. Taylor 7 is the leading case setting the standards of
the work product concept. In Hickman, the tug "J.M. Taylor" sank
while towing a car float across the Delaware River.' 8 Five of the nine
crew members drowned.' 9 Shortly thereafter counsel for the defendant
tug owners interviewed each survivor and obtained statements from
them.20 One year later plaintiff attempted to obtain copies of the writ-
ten statements of the witnesses and copies of the memoranda of counsel
regarding the oral statements and other matters.2 The defendants re-
fused to comply claiming such reports called for "privileged matter ob-
tained in preparation of litigation."22
The issue in Hickman was to determine to what "extent . ..a
party may inquire into the oral and written statements of witnesses, or
other information, secured by an adverse party's counsel in the course
12. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 500 (1970) [Hereinafted cited as Proposed Amendments].
13. Since "Rule 34 require[d] a showing of 'good cause' for the production of all
documents and things, whether or not trial preparation is involved, courts . . . differed
over whether a showing of relevance and lack of privilege [was] enough or whether
more . . . [was needed]." Id.
14. Special Project, supra note 8, at 771.
15. Id. at 773.
16. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 498.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 499.
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of preparation for possible litigation after a claim has arisen." 23 Al-
though the United States Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals denying discovery, it did so on a differ-
ent basis. While the appellate court previously broadened the attorney-
client privilege2 4 in discovery proceedings, the Supreme Court instead
"created a new privilege to meet the situation opened up by the new
breath of discovery." 25
The Supreme Court declined to extend the attorney-client privi-
lege beyond its traditional boundaries. 26 The material being sought in
Hickman was not information disclosed by a client to his attorney, but
instead, was information gathered by the attorney from "a witness
while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation. 2 7 However, even
though the material sought was not privileged, in the traditional sense,
the Court nevertheless held discovery was not proper. Instead of adopt-
ing the traditional and absolute privilege, which would deny discovery
under all circumstances, the United States Supreme Court created a
qualified privilege which would generally bar discovery. However, it
left the possibility of work product discovery open where the need is
great enough.28
In Hickman, the United States Supreme Court recognized a dif-
ference between "written materials obtained or prepared by an adver-
sary's counsel with an eye toward litigation"29 and "oral statements
made by a witness to [the attorney], whether ... in the form of
mental impressions or memoranda.13 0 In making the distinction the
Court suggested that the written materials may more often be discover-
able than oral statements. Written materials were found to be discover-
able "[w]here relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an
attorney's file and where production of those facts is essential to the
23. Id. at 497.
24. The court of appeals recognized that the conventional attorney-client privi-
lege was not applicable because the materials in question were obtained by the attorney
from third parties, and not the client. Nevertheless, the court stated that the attorney-
client privilege should be broader in discovery proceedings than in the law of evidence
to exclude testimony. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 222 (3d Cir. 1945).
25. J. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.10, at 251 (1985).
26. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.
27. Id.
28. J. HAZARD, supra note 25, at 252.
29. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
30. Id. at 512.
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preparation of one's case." 3' 1 Other circumstances under which such
statements may be discoverable are found where the document is ad-
missible in evidence: 2 if it "give[s] clues as to the existence or location
of relevant facts . .. [if it is] useful for purposes of impeachment or
corroboration, [or if] the witnesses are no longer available or can be
reached only with difficulty." 33 However, the Court found that the dis-
coverability of oral statements would be justified only in a "rare situa-
tion."'3 4 The Court stated that if any attorney is forced to "repeat or
write out all that witnesses have told him . . . grave dangers of inaccu-
racy and untrustworthiness"3 5 would arise.
Although the Supreme Court noted that discovery rules were to be
accorded a "broad and liberal treatment",3 6 it stressed that "like all
matters of procedure, [discovery] has ultimate and necessary bounda-
ries."'3 7 Further, it noted that in applying this new qualified privilege to
limit discovery, various important policies are being furthered. First,
lawyers will be free to develop their theories, strategies, and approaches
without fear that the opposing party may gain access to same.38 The
Court states "[w]ere such materials open to opposing counsel on mere
demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain un-
written; .. . [t]he effect on the legal profession would be demoraliz-
ing." 9 Secondly, Hickman's policies serve to encourage individual re-
search and investigation, and discourage the use of an opponent's work
as a substitute for their own efforts.40 Finally, the Court believed that
the "interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly
served"41 by unrestricted discovery practices. Much litigation subse-
quent to the Hickman decision sought to further these policies in apply-
ing the new qualified rule.42 However, for over twenty years the matter
was left to the federal courts to decide on a case by case basis. 43
31. Id. at 511.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 513.
35. Id. at 512-513.
36. Id. at 507.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 511.
39. Id.
40. Proposed Amendments, supra note 12, at 501.
41. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
42. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 82 at 554 (1983).
43. Id. Many states enacted rules to solve some of the troublesome areas left by
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C. After Hickman - Rule 26(b)(3)44
Some of the post-Hickman problems were eliminated by certain
1980 Amendments to the Federal Rules. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26(b)(3) 4' partially codified 46 the Hickman decision. Rule
26(b)(3) extended the work product immunity to non-attorneys en-
gaged in trial preparation. 47 Additionally, the requirement of "good
cause" under the old federal rule was eliminated for one of relevance
and absence of privilege.48 However, the new rule explicitly required a
special showing for trial preparation materials. Therefore, where one
party attempts to obtain materials prepared in anticipation of litigation
by the opponent, the party seeking discovery must make a "showing of
substantial need. . . and an inability without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. ' 49 The re-
quired special showing before allowing discovery of materials prepared
in anticipation of litigation reflects the Federal Rules Advisory Com-
mittee's view that the informal evaluation and investigation of each
side should be protected thereby encouraging independent preparation
and avoiding one side relying and obtaining the benefit of the other
side's detailed preparatory work.50 Further, an even greater protection
is given to materials prepared by an attorney or other representative of
the client, which reflects their opinions, mental impressions, conclusions
or legal theories.51
Despite attempted clarification of the Hickman decision, Rule
the Hickman decision. See, 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 2022 at 189 n. 98 (1970 & Supp. 1985).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
45. Id.
46. Federal Rule 26(b)(3) did not completely codify the work product doctrine
set forth in Hickman v. Taylor. The standard of Hickman protected both "tangible"
and "intangible" work product. However, Rule 26(b)(3) only applies to "tangible"
work product. Rule 26(b)(3) expanded the standard of Hickman by explicitly ex-
tending the protection from discovery to materials prepared by non-attorneys. Also, it
set forth the showing which was required to overcome the immunity from discovery.
See Comment, Ambiguities After the 1970 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Relating to Discovery of Experts and Attorney's Work Product, 17 WAYNE
L. REv. 1145, 1158 (1971).
47. Proposed Amendments, supra note 12, at 502.
48. Id. at 500.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 501.
51. Special Project, supra note 8, at 784.
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26(b)(3) left ambiguities 2 with which the courts must deal. One such
ambiguity arises in restricting its scope to materials "prepared in antic-
ipation of litigation." The explicit restriction in the rule adds emphasis
to the determination of when anticipation of litigation begins. 3 The
determination is difficult to ascertain in many cases where the investi-
gation following an occurrence may have multiple purposes.
In making the determination of whether or not the material should
be afforded work product protection it is important for the courts to
base their decision on the policy justifications of the work product doc-
trine. The central justification of the work product doctrine is to protect
a party's preparatory work from his adversary. Although open and lib-
eral discovery practices are promoted in our system, a party should not
be penalized for his promptness in investigating an accident. The U.S.
Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Hickman rationales in its most re-
cent decision of Upjohn Co. v. United States.4 In Upjohn, the Court
explicitly stated that the policies underlying the work product doctrine
furthered a "strong public policy."55
D. Florida's Rule 1.280(b)(2)
Florida's Rule 1.280(b)(2) 56 was enacted to conform with Federal
Rule 26(b)(3) . The latter codified 58 the principles of the work product
doctrine set forth in Hickman.59 An analysis of a work product claim
under Rule 1.280(b)(2) of the Florida Rules is bifurcated between a
determination of whether documents constitute work product, and if so,
whether the party seeking production is unable to obtain the substan-
tial equivalent of the document by other means.6 0
52. Ambiguities which are beyond the scope of this Note involve the standard of
protection to be given to oral statements and other intangible work product; whether
use of the material in subsequent litigation should be protected; and the ownership of
the work product immunity.
53. Special Project, supra note 8, at 784.
54. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
55. Id. at 398.
56. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
58. See supra note 46.
59. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 495.
60. The focus of this Note is on the first issue under Rule 1.280(b)(2): whether
materials were prepared in anticipation of litigation. This Note does not discuss the
criteria required to show substantial need and undue hardship. The determination of
whether the material was prepared in anticipation of litigation does not affect the reso-
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III. Florida Law
Presently, no Florida court has established a clear precedent on
the issue of the discoverability of prelitigation material. The existing
case law is composed of various confusing and conflicting decisions. Be-
cause the facts of each case are important for a proper application of
the work product protection, Florida cases will be examined to illus-
trate how similar cases are yielding different results.
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis,61 a Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal case addressing the issue of the discoverability of prelitigation ma-
terial, stands for the proposition that accident reports are prepared in
anticipation of litigation."2 Winn Dixie involves a slip and fall accident
at a grocery store. The plaintiff sought accident reports relating to the
same store for a number of years prior to his alleged injury.6e A discov-
ery order was entered and defendant sought review by way of writ of
certiorari.6 4 The plaintiff contended that the reports were prepared by
Winn Dixie or its agents in the ordinary course of business, and thus
discoverable. 5 The court dismissed this argument with the following
statement:
It is hardly arguable that an accident report of a slip and fall inci-
dent in a grocery store, prepared by the grocery store employees or
agents, is not a document prepared in anticipation of litigation.
Those reports certainly are not prepared because of some morbid
curiosity about how people fall at the market. Experience has
shown all retail stores that people who fall in their stores try to be
lution of the second issue under Florida Rule 1.280(b)(2) which concerns the showing
required for discovery of work product. See, 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2025 (1970 & Supp. 1985). Also beyond the scope of
this Note is the application of work product in the insurance bad faith context. For
information on this issue, see J. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES
§ 3.71 (1983).
61. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, 435 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1983), rev. denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984).
62. See, e.g., Florida Cypress Gardens, Inc. v. Murphy, 471 So. 2d 203, 205
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Gonyea, 455 So. 2d 1342,
1344 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Walt Disney World Co. v. Cotto, 462 So. 2d 486
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Karch v. MacKay, 453 So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1984).
63. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, 435 So. 2d, 307, 308 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983), rev. denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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compensated for their injuries. Experience has also shown those
stores that bogus or frivolous or exaggerated claims might be
made. A potential defendant's right to fully investigate and memo-
rialize the results of the investigation should not be restricted any
more than should a potential plaintiff's. Our system of advocacy
and dispute settlement by trial mandates that each side should be
able to use its sources of investigation without fear of having to
disclose it all to its opponents. This allows for free discussion and
communication during preparation for litigation. If all reports and
other communications of the litigants were available to the opposi-
tion then those communications would certainly be stilted, un-
revealing and thus self-defeating in their purpose.66
The Second6 7 and Fifth"8 District Courts of Appeal have followed this
approach.
However, in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Mc-
Gann,69 the Fourth District Court of Appeal, also faced with a slip and
fall case at a supermarket, did not follow the Winn Dixie standard. The
court in reviewing the trial court's discovery order did not make the
presumption made by the court in Winn Dixie, that all accident reports
are prepared in anticipation of litigation. Instead, it found that the de-
fendant failed to make the required showing that the statements taken
by employees or agents of the store concerning the accident were pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation, and thus were not protected from
discovery. 70 This standard has been consistently followed in the Fourth
District Court of Appeals. 1
The Winn Dixie and McGann cases are a clear illustration of a
conflicting interpretation and application of the work product rule in
factually identical cases. The position taken by the court in Winn Dixie
seeks to protect a litigant's informal evaluation of his case and encour-
ages independent preparation for trial. Additionally, such a view pre-
vents one side from obtaining automatic access to the preparatory work
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Florida Cypress Gardens, Inc., 471 So. 2d at 203; Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc., 455 So. 2d at 1342; Nationwide Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d at 547.
68. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 435 So. 2d at 307; Walt Disney World
Co., 462 So. 2d at 486.
69. 402 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
70. Id. at 1362.
71. E.g., Airocar, Inc. v. Goldman, 474 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. White, 447 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Surette v. Galiardo, 323 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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of the other side upon a simple showing of relevance, 2 which is the
standard required when the material is not considered work product.
However, one major criticism of the approach taken by Winn Dixie is
that it fails to consider that there may be circumstances where reports
are prepared for reasons other than litigation.73 For example, there are
situations where accident reports are prepared for reasons pertaining to
safety, public relations,7 4 or possibly in an attempt to amicably resolve
a claim. It is argued that a rule of thumb approach can foreclose such
considerations and may lead to an improper application of the work
product rule..
Other cases which have generated much confusion are those in-
volving insurance companies. Courts have failed to recognize that the
standards used in evaluating these cases must take into account the
nature of the insurance business. Unlike other businesses, an insurance
company's regular course of business is to investigate claims. Further-
more, courts often neglect to distinquish between the discoverability of
a liability insurer's investigation material and an insurer's investigation
material pertaining to a claim brought by its policyholder. The result is
confusing precedent which provides little predictability of the protec-
tion an insurance company may expect of its investigation material.
An example of a case involving an insurance company, which is
confusing and unclear as to its scope, is Cotton States Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Turtle Reef.76 The case involved an action by an insured
against its insurer. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
statements and materials prepared by a party's investigator or insurer
are protected from discovery only when prepared in contemplation of
72. When the materials being sought are not privileged, Florida Rule
1.280(b)(1) requires, in addition to relevancy, that the information sought be "reasona-
bly calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence."
Rule 1.280(b)(1) states in part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is
relevant to the subject matter of the pending action, whether it relates to
the claim or defense ... of any other party ... [and] is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
Id.
73. Spaulding v. Denton, 68 F.R.D. 342, 345 (D. Del. 1975).
74. 245 ACAD. FLA. TRIAL LAW J. 10 (February 1983).
75. Spaulding, 68 F.R.D. at 345.
76. 444 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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litigation.7 The court further explained that "mere likelihood of litiga-
tion does not satisfy this qualification. ' 78 The case was remanded to
determine if the investigation material was of the type insurance com-
panies conduct in the ordinary course of business, or whether the inves-
tigation file was prepared in anticipation of litigation.79
The decision is confusing as it suggests that documents prepared in
the ordinary course of business cannot also be prepared in anticipation
of litigation."0 An argument can be made that such an analysis over-
looks the possibility that in certain situations the ordinary course of
business is anticipation of legal claims.8" An insurance company's ordi-
nary course of business is to investigate accidents and claims. This does
not mean that such an investigation may not also be in anticipation of
legal action. Therefore, courts should arguably eliminate the ordinary
course of business exception8 2 when determining the discoverability of
insurance companies' files.
Another ambiguity created by the Cotton States case is whether
the standard set forth by the court extends to cases involving actions by
a third party against a liability insurer. In Florida Cypress Gardens v.
Murphy,8 3 a husband and wife brought an action for injuries the hus-
band suffered from an accident in which he was thrown out of a wheel-
chair at Cypress Gardens. 4 The Second District Court of Appeal re-
versed the trial court's order to produce the investigation file of Florida
Cypress Garden's liability insurer. The court refused to follow the Cot-
77. Id. at 596.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The "ordinary course of business" exception is attributable to the statement
used by the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
indicating that materials assembled in the ordinary course of business are considered
equivalent of materials not prepared in anticipation of litigation. Proposed Amend-
ments, supra note 12, at 501. Although this exception is not stated in the Federal Rule,
nor the Florida Rule on work product, some courts have used the rationale in deciding
whether the material should be protected from discovery. E.g. Thomas Organ Co. v.
Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, 371 (N.D. I1l. 1972); Proctor & Gamble
Co. v. Swilley, 462 So. 2d 1188, 1193 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
81. See, e.g., Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94 F.R.D. 131, 134 (S.D. Ga. 1982);
Fontaine v. Sunflower Beef Carrier, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 89, 92 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
82. Special Project, supra note 8, at 855. The Special Project proposes a com-
plete abandonment of the ordinary course of business exception. It suggests an analysis
of each case on its facts. Id.
83. 471 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
84. Id. at 204.
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ton States case and declared:
Without citing Florida law on the point, [Cotton States] relied on
two federal court interpretations of the comparable federal discov-
ery rule. With all due respect, we cannot accept the proposition
that the investigation file of an insurance company concerning an
accident involving its insured was not prepared in anticipation of
litigation simply because its contents may have been obtained prior
to the filing of a formal claim. 85
The court's analysis reflects a misinterpretation of the Cotton States
case. The court failed to factually distinguish Cotton States and Flor-
ida Cypress Gardens. Cotton States involved an action by an insured
against its insurer, while Florida Cypress Gardens involved a claim by
a third party injured at Cypress Garden against Cypress Gardens' lia-
bility insurer. Nothwithstanding the fact that in both cases the material
sought was prepared by or for the insurer, the primary purpose for the
investigation was different. In Cotton States, it is suggested that the
primary purpose of an insurer's investigation into its policyholder's
claim is to determine whether to honor the claim or resist it.86 Al-
though it is true that litigation may result from denial of a claim by an
insurer, this decision is reached after preliminary investigation not re-
lated to litigation."1 In Florida Cypress Gardens, the primary purpose
of the investigation was, arguably, anticipating some legal action by the
injured party, and thus the test of Cotton States was not applicable.88
However, the standard followed by the court in Florida Cypress
Gardens has been rejected by other courts in determining the exent of
protection a liability insurer's file should receive. Florida Cypress Gar-
dens followed the Winn-Dixie89 standard, which held that all investiga-
tive material gathered by a liability insurer is prepared in anticipation
of legal action. This standard was not followed by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Surette v. Galiardo,90 which involved an action
brought by the mother of a minor child who was struck and killed by a
school bus. In Surette, the plaintiff sought to obtain the accident report
85. Id. at 206.
86. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 444 So. 2d at 596.
87. E.g., Carver, 94 F.R.D. at 134.
88. Florida Cypress Gardens, 471 So. 2d at 206.
89. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, 435 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1983), rev. denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984).
90. Surette, 323 So. 2d at 53.
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prepared by the school board and submitted to its liability insurance
carrier."' Rather than make a presumption that the accident report was
privileged, the court required a showing that the report was submitted
to the insurer for use in connection with an anticipated settlement or
defense of a claim, before protecting the material from discovery.9 2
The interpretation of the work product rule is far from consistent.
While some courts make a presumption that witness statement and re-
ports are always taken in anticipation, of legal action,93 other courts
focus on the facts of each case before making the determination. 4 Ad-
ditionally, courts have not clearly distinguished actions brought by
third parties against a liability insurer from those brought by a policy-
holder against its insurer.9 5 This generates confusion among the lower
courts9" which tend to apply the same standard in both situations.
IV. The Law in Federal and State Courts Applying Work
Product Protection to Prelitigation Material
A. Federal Courts
State courts tend to follow federal court* decisions in the applica-
tion of work product protection to trial preparation material. However,
the federal courts offer equally conflicting and confusing precedent
which has not helped the state courts in resolving the anticipation of
litigation issue.9 7
There are various positions taken by the federal courts in applying
work product protection to trial preparation materials. One approach is
to hold that the material cannot be protected under the work product
theory unless the reports or statements reflect the employment of an
attorney. 98 This view directly contradicts the rule, which explicitly pro-
vides protection to documents prepared by or for a party's "attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or agent." 99 Other federal courts
91. Id. at 57.
92. Id. at 58.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 76-88.
96. See Florida Cypress Gardens, 471 So. 2d at 203.
97. Fontaine, 87 F.R.D. at 89; Brown, 137 Ariz. at 327, 670 P.2d at 725.
98. E.g., Thomas Organ Co., 54 F.R.D. at 367; McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d
468 (4th Cir. 1972).
99. FLA. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See, Fontaine, 87 F.R.D. at 92.
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have held that investigative material prepared by a company following
an occurrence is protected by the work product doctrine. 100 This test
"creat[es] a potential for abuse in the hands of companies seeking to
classify virtually everything in their files as work product."101 A differ-
ent standard adopted by federal courts is that enunciated by the Dela-
ware District Court in Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp.102 In Hercules,
the determination of the anticipation of litigation issue is made by ex-
amining the nature of the document and facts of the case.103 A similar
approach was followed in Spaulding v. Denton,10 4 where the United
States District Court stated: "Should any rule of thumb approach be-
come the general rule, it is not hard to imagine insurers mechanically
forming their practices so as to make all documents appear to be pre-
pared 'in anticipation of litigation'."10 5 Other federal courts have re-
quired the presence of specific claims prior to the preparation of the
documents in order to accord the material work product protection.106
Although the presence of a specific claim makes the determination of
the anticipation of litigation issue easier to resolve, it may frustrate the
policy of the work product rule which encourages complete trial
preparation.10 7
Furthermore, in Upjohn Co. v. United States,108 the U.S. Supreme
Court implied that it is not required that specific claims exist before
documents are protected from discovery. In Upjohn, the government
sought production of documents relating to an internal corporate inves-
tigation concerning unauthorized payments to foreign government offi-
100. E.g., Almaguer v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 55 F.R.D.
147 (D. Neb. 1972).
101. Note, Discovering Investigative Reports Under The Work Product Doc-
trine, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 156, 162 (1982); see also Spaulding, 68 F.R.D. at 342.
102. 434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977).
103. Id. at 151.
104. 68 F.R.D. at 342.
105. Id. at 345.
106. E.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 865
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Kent Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 612, 623-24 (5th Cir. 1976); Coastal
Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514, 522 (D. Del. 1980); United States v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 627 (D.D.C. 1979); Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64
F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
107. Note, Work Product Discovery: A Multifactor Approach to the Anticipa-
tion of Litigation Requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), 66 IOWA
L. REV. 1277, 1297 (1981).
108. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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cials in order to secure government business.10 9 Notwithstanding the
fact that the company had conducted its investigation prior to the pres-
ence of a specific claim,110 the Supreme Court held that work product
immunity applied to the facts of Upjohn."' Therefore the case suggests
that materials can be prepared in anticipation of litigation although a
specific claim is not present.
Finally, some federal courts have attempted to solve the problem
by redefining the phrase "anticipation of litigation." For example, some
courts provide that there must be "some possibility"" 2 of litigation, an
"eye toward litigation""'  or "substantial probability" of "imminent"
litigation."' As one commentator put it, this does nothing more than
say that "litigation is anticipated when litigation is anticipated.""115
Thus, courts are free to choose among the wide variety of approaches
provided by the cases addressing this issue. The result is a lack of uni-
formity providing poor guidance for the state courts and confusion
among the federal courts.
B. State Supreme Courts
Various state supreme courts have addressed the issue of whether
witness statements and reports taken after the occurrence of an acci-
dent should be considered prepared in anticipation of litigation."' The
supreme courts in these states found it necessary to address the issue
due to the confusing and conflicting precedent in the lower courts.
However, the issue in these states is not completely resolved. The cases
decided often involved the discoverability of an insurance company's
investigation material. The issue is still unresolved as to the proper
109. Id. at 387-88.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 398-403.
112. E.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979).
113. E.g., Sterling Drug Inc. v. Harris, 488 F. Supp. 1019, 1026 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); United States v. Bonnell, 483 F. Supp. 1070, 1078 (D. Minn. 1979).
114. E.g., Homes Ins. Co. v. Ballenger Corp., 74 F.R.D. 93, 101 (N.D. Ga.
1977); Miles v. Bell Helicopter Co., 385 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
115. Note, supra note 107, at 1278.
116. See Ex Parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 1133 (Ala.
1980); Brown v. Superior Court In & For Maricopa Cy., 137 Ariz. 327, 670 P.2d 725
(1983); Hawkins v. District Court, 638 P.2d 1372 (Colo. 1982); Ashmead v. Harris,
336 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1983); Henry Enterprises, Inc. v. Smith, 225 Kan. 615, 592
P.2d 915 (1979); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McAlpine, 120 R.I. 744, 391 A.2d 84
(1978).
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standard of protection to be accorded to materials prepared prior to
litigation by businesses other than insurance companies.
In those states ruling on the discoverability of investigative mate-
rial prepared by a liability insurer the trend is to accord them work
product protection. However, as to prelitigation material prepared by
an insurer responding to its insured's claim, the court holdings have
varied from state to state. The case of Fireman's Fund Insurance Com-
pany v. McAlpine" is an example of a situation where the investiga-
tion conducted by a liability insurer was found to be an investigation
conducted in anticipation of litigation. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court rejected the case by case approach noting that "it provides for no
uniformity in the manner in which the issue is resolved in the lower
tribunals."'1" Although a similar approach was taken by the Iowa Su-
preme Court in Ashmead v. Harris,"19 that court clearly stated that its
decision was limited to cases involving "routine investigation of an acci-
dent by a liability insurer."120 The court's language indicated that a
different test may well apply when it involves the "investigations initi-
ated to adjust the insured's own loss. ''121
In Brown v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County,122 the
Arizona Supreme Court rejected a single test approach. It criticized, as
too broad, the approach taken by those courts which hold that "all
statements and information secured by insurance company after an oc-
currence . . . are made in anticipation of litigation."' 123 However, the
Brown case involved an action by various policyholders against their
insurer, and not one by a third party against a liability insurer. The
approach suggested by the Brown court is one which considers various
factors before determining whether to accord the material work prod-
uct protection. Those factors are: 1) the nature of the event that
prompted preparation of materials; 2) whether requested materials con-
tain legal analyses and opinions or purely factual contents; 3) whether
material was requested or prepared by a party or its representatives; 4)
whether the investigative material was routinely prepared; and 5)
whether specific claims or settlement negotiations existed at the time
117. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 120 R.I. at 744, 391 A.2d at 84; see also, Ex
Parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d at 1133.
118. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 120 R.I. at 753, 391 A.2d at 89.
119. Ashmead, 336 N.W.2d at 197.
120. Id. at 201.
121. Id.
122. Brown, 137 Ariz. at 327, 670 P.2d at 725.
123. Id. at 328, 670 P.2d at 726.
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the materials were prepared.124
However, in Hawkins v. District Court, Inc.,125 Colorado's Su-
preme Court also faced with a claim by an insured against his insurer,
adopted a different test in determining whether the material sought to
be discovered was work product. The test enunciated by the court was
whether the "document was prepared or obtained in order to defend a
specific claim . [and whether] a substantial probability of imminent
litigation. ."26 existed when the documents were prepared. Argua-
bly, this is an opinion which will give Colorado little guidance, and will
likely continue the inconsistent application of work product protection
in its lower courts.
It is evident that even the state supreme court holdings are not
completely uniform. Nevertheless, in those states where the supreme
court establishes a clear test, there is a precedent set for lower courts to
follow in applying work product protection to cases covered by the
scope of the opinion. Furthermore, insurance companies and other busi-
nesses conducting preliminary investigations in these states will know
with more certainty whether or not their work product will be freely
discoverable by the opponent in litigation. Unfortunately, the confusion
and misapplication of the work product rule in the lower courts of Flor-
ida will continue as long as the Florida Supreme Court continues to
deny review 27 of the anticipation of litigation issue.
V. Suggested Approaches to the Anticipation of Litigation
Issue
The anticipation of litigation issue requires application of different
standards of protection in order to encompass the variety of factual
situations which confront the courts. The following are proposed ap-
proaches to three distinguishable and frequently encountered
circumstances.
A. Materials Prepared by Liability Insurers
"There is little, if any, reason to question . . . that a routine inves-
124. Note, supra note 115, at 1287.
125. Hawkins, 638 P.2d at 1372.
126. Id. at 1379.
127. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, 435 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1983), rev. denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984).
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tigation by a liability insurer is conducted in anticipation of litiga-
tion." 128 Although it is possible that an action may be settled short of
litigation, there is always the possibility that a claim may result in legal
action. 2 " The fact that some cases are settled while others may never
result in a claim does not negate the fact that a liability insurer's initial
investigation is conducted to determine its insured's liability in the
event of lawsuit. With this in mind, it seems logical that the material
gathered by a liability insurer's investigation should be protected from
discovery.
The proposed approach will eliminate the "ordinary course of busi-
ness" exception. This frequently criticized exception'"0 is not an appro-
priate test to determine the protection insurance files merit since it
overlooks the possibility that a liability insurer's ordinary course of bus-
iness is anticipating legal claims. Finally, protecting a liability insurer's
files assures that routine investigations are thorough and effective,
thereby upholding the policy of Hickman v. Taylor.13' It should be
noted, however, that by adopting this approach the opponent may still
have access to the material, but only upon the proper showing of sub-
stantial need and undue hardship.1 32
B. Material Prepared by Insurer in Response to Insured's Loss
In contrast to the investigation conducted by a liability insurer, the
investigation conducted by an insurance company in response to a
claim brought by its policyholder presents a different situation. 13 An
insurer is under a contractual obligation to reimburse its insured, as-
suming the claim is a valid one. Accordingly, its primary purpose dur-
ing preliminary investigation is to determine whether its insured's claim
will be honored. Although it is possible that legal action may result
from a denial of a claim, this determination is reached only after an
insurance company decides not to honor a claim. Therefore, the proper
approach to take in determining which material should be given work
128. Comment, A Routine Investigation of an Accident By a Liability Insurer is
Conducted in Anticipation of Litigation within the Meaning of Iowa R. Civ. P. 122(c)
- Ashmead v. Harris (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1983), 33 DRAKE L. REV. 727, 734 (1983-84).
129. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 120 R.I. at 753-54, 391 A.2d at 89-90.
130. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
131. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 495.
132. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
133. Comment, supra note 128, at 732; see also Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 61 F.R.D. 115, 118 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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product protection will require a temporal analysis. This test should be
one which ascertains the point at which the insurer's focus shifts from
investigating a claim for settlement purposes to an investigation in
preparation of litigation. An insurer's denial of a claim or some other
action indicating to the insured that the claim will not be honored to
the extent expected, is an indication of such change. From this point
forward, any material prepared by the insurer should be protected.
C. Material Prepared by a Business Other than an Insurance
Company
The material prepared by employees of a store, an employer, a
company's agents or other businesses not involving an insurance com-
pany may have multiple purposes besides litigation.3 As such, an ab-
solute rule would be inappropriate. The soundest approach for courts to
take is to consider each case on its facts. There are several factors
which may serve as guidelines for the court in making a determination
of the discoverability of these materials. First, the court must consider
the nature and magnitude of the event that prompted the investiga-
tion.' 3 5 The greater the degree of injury or loss the more likely it is that
a party conducted the investigation anticipating legal action. Second,
the content of the document being sought through discovery should be
analyzed. 36 For example, where a document contains legal analyses
and opinions a clearer showing that the material was prepared in antic-
ipation of litigation is made.13 7 Third, a determination must be made as
to who requested the investigation or prepared the document. 38 Al-
though it is not required that an attorney be involved before protection
is accorded, the presence of an attorney may be an important factor in
resolving the anticipation of litigation issue.'3 9 Finally, the court should
determine whether the materials were of the type that the business rou-
tinely prepared for reasons other than litigation.14 0
134. See supra text accompanying note 73.
135. Note, supra note 107, at 1287.
136. Id. "
137. Id. at 1289.
138. Id. at 1287.
139. Id. at 1292-93.
140. Id. at 1287.
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V. Conclusion
Proper application of Florida Rule 1.280(b)(2)"I will require clar-
ification of the anticipation of litigation issue. To date, the existing pre-
cedent is generating conflicting and unclear decisions.14 2 Such results
"undermine the predictability of work product decisions and the atmo-
sphere of security that predictability fosters."1 43
To provide uniformity in the application of work product protec-
tion throughout the state, the Florida Supreme Court must set stan-
dards which recognize the factual differences among the cases. In doing
so it is important to focus on the primary purpose of a business in con-
ducting an investigation following an accident. A logical and proper
application of work product protection will require that courts distin-
guish between cases involving third party actions against liability insur-
ers and those where insureds bring legal actions against their own in-
surer following the denial of a claim. As previously noted, the two have
different purposes in conducting an initial investigation. 44 Failure to
make a distinction may unduly penalize a liability insurer who dili-
gently and promptly investigated a potential claim while unfairly bene-
fitting a plaintiff who would be able to take advantage of the insurance
company's diligence. Therefore, courts must protect the preliminary in-
vestigation of a liability insurer. On the other hand, investigations con-
ducted by an insurer of its policyholder's claim requires a temporal
analysis to determine at which point the insurer's focus shifted from
evaluating the claim to preparing for litigation. As to cases involving
prelitigation material gathered by one other than an insurance com-
pany, an individual analysis of each case is necessary due to the multi-
ple purposes for which an investigation may have been conducted. Va-
rious factors are proposed as guidelines for the courts to follow in
analyzing the facts of the case.1 45
Once Florida courts establish clear standards, the application of
the work product rule will be more logical and consistent. Furthermore,
the suggested standards offer those who routinely investigate accidents
141. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 61-115.
143. Special Project, supra note 8, at 854.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 128-133.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 135-140.
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an accurate idea of when their investigative material will be protected
from discovery.
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911: The Call That No One Answered
I. Introduction
Across the country, municipalities are updating their public ser-
vice agencies with the addition of advanced "911" emergency telephone
systems.' The systems are designed to immediately dispatch assistance
to community members who have become victims of tragedy. Reduced
response time offered by the "911" system is the primary reason for its
popularity.2
As a result of municipal involvement in implementation of "911"
systems, local governments operating emergency assistance systems
may suffer tort liability for negligent failure to properly respond to a
call. 3 Jurisdictions responding to this dilemma have done so differently.
Courts holding municipalities liable in tort for mishandling "911" calls
predicate their findings on the special duty doctrine4 and the waiver of
sovereign immunity. 5 Other jurisdictions relieve municipalities of all li-
ability based on the doctrines of public duty6 and common law govern-
mental immunity.7
With other jurisdictions responding differently to the issue of
whether tort liability should attach, predicting how Florida courts will
1. There are more than 1,100 "911" systems on line serving more than 45% of
United States residents. Hackworth, 9-1-1: Antidote to Amnesia, 1984 JEMS 24. In
1984, 67.5% of the citizens from thirty-one Florida counties were served by "911" sys-
tems. Division of Communications, State of Florida Department of General Services,
Florida 911 Program (1984). Presently, approximately one-half of Florida's counties,
nearly 80% of Florida's citizens, are served by "911" systems. Telephone interview with
Edward J. Telander, P.E., Communications Engineer, Division of Communications
(Dec. 4, 1985).
2. "Response time has different meanings. It can be 1) the time an incident oc-
curs to the time it is reported, 2) the time it is reported until help is dispatched, or 3)
the time dispatch occurs until help arrives at the scene." Because the person dialing
only has to dial three numbers rather than seven, reporting time is shorter. Also, all
calls go to one center equipped with a multitude of emergency resources utilized to
reduce dispatch time. Hackworth, supra note 1, at 25.
3. Ashman, Negligent 911 Goof-up Proves Costly in New York, 69 A.B.A. J. 354
(Mar. 1983).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 19-22.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 109-12.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 84-94.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 65-69.
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respond is a difficult task. The Florida legislature has taken affirmative
action in developing a statewide emergency telephone assistance plan,8
and has also waived municipal sovereign immunity in tort actions.9 Al-
though the Florida Supreme Court seems to have given new life to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian
River County,1" the district courts of appeal still ponder the decision's
full effects.
This note demonstrates the potential for civil action against Flor-
ida municipalities for failing to properly respond to emergency assis-
tance calls. This note predicts how Florida courts may respond to this
dilemma. In addition, this note will provide an approach which includes
compensating victims of mishandled emergency calls while deferring to
the intent of Florida's legislature.
A. Historical Overview of Florida Municipal Liability
Florida municipalities have not always enjoyed sovereign immu-
nity1 to the extent the state has. Prior to the enactment of Florida's
8. FLA. STAT. § 365.171 (1985).
9. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1985). The statute provides in part:
(1) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X, State Constitution, the state, for
itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immu-
nity for liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act. Ac-
tions at law against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions to re-
cover damages in tort for money damages against the state or its agencies
or subdivisions for injury or loss of property, personal injury, or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
agency or subdivision while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment under circumstances in which the state or such agency or subdivi-
sion, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant, in accordance
with the general laws of this state, may be prosecuted subject to the limi-
tations specified in this act. Any such action may be brought in the county
where the property in litigation is located or, if the affected agency or
subdivision has an office in such county for the transaction of its customary
business, where the cause of action accrued.
10. 342 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 371 So.
2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
11. This article does not purport to cover the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
depth. For an historical overview of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Van Al-
styne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Law Making in a Statutory Milieu, 15
STAN. L. REv. 163 (1962); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage
Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1963); Spader, Immunity v. Liability and the Clash of
Fundamental Values: Ancient Mysteries Crying Out for Understanding, 61 CHi.-KENT
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waiver statute, traditional common law municipal immunity only at-
tached for governmental functions, as opposed to proprietary functions.
Governmental functions are those functions exercised on behalf of the
state for the benefit of the general public1 2 or those done in furtherance
of the public welfare.1 3 Thus, while pursuing this type of state objec-
tive, a municipality was shielded from tort action.
A municipality was subject to tort liability if injury resulted from
the negligent performance of a proprietary function. Proprietary func-
tions are "those done for the public's convenience and enjoyment."1 4
When a municipality is performing functions for the specific benefit of
a community embraced within its municipal boundaries rather than for
the general public, the municipality is exercising a proprietary func-
tion. 15 Thus, under the governmental-proprietary distinction, only tor-
tious acts committed in furtherance of a proprietary function were
actionable.
Municipal liability in Florida has also been predicated on the doc-
trine of respondeat superior.16 The governmental- proprietary distinc-
tion was totally ignored in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach.'7 The
Florida Supreme Court held that an individual suffering injury as a
direct result of a municipal employee's negligence would have an ac-
tionable claim against the municipality, as long as the employee acted
within the scope of his employment. However, the court did continue to
recognize immunity for municipalities for actions taken in the exercise
of judicial, legislative, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial functions. 8
Although respondeat superior remains a separate tort claim in Florida
for municipal liability, the application is greatly restricted.
The special duty doctrine, as developed by the Florida Supreme
L. REV. 61 (1985).
12. Budetti & Knight, The Latest Event in the Confused History of Municipal
Tort Liability, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 927, 928 (1978).
13. Note, How Much Wrong Can the King Do? A Look at the Modern Sover-
eign Immunity Doctrine in Florida, 13 STETSON L. REV. 359, 360-61 (1984).
14. Id. at 361.
15. Budetti & Knight, supra note 12, at 929.
16. The scope of this article does not pursue the tort action of respondeat supe-
rior in detail. See, e.g., Comment, Employer Liability For Assaults By Employees, 48
Mo. L. REV. 655 (1983); Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fel-
low Servant Rule, 1837-1860, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (1984).
17. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
18. Id. at 133.
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Court in Modlin v. City of Miami Beach,19 supplanted the governmen-
tal-proprietary distinction as a premise for governmental immunity
from tort liability. The Modlin court limited those situations in which
an injured individual could recover from a municipality.2 ° Only when
the municipality or its employee owed a specific duty to the individual
complaining could the municipality's negligence be actionable.21 The
duty must be something more than that owed by a public officer to the
public generally.22
With little resistance, the special duty doctrine remained the
source of municipal tort liability until the Commercial Carrier Corp.
decision in 1979.23 Unsatisfied with the present state of municipal tort
law at that time, due in part to enactment of the sovereign immunity
statute, the Florida Supreme Court disposed of the special duty doc-
trine. Now when dealing with municipal liability, courts are to deter-
mine whether the decision to further governmental actions is accom-
plished at either a planning level or operational level.24 Negligence
resulting from furtherance of planning level decisions is not actionable
because the public importance of these decisions requires governmental
immunization from tort liability. However, any injuries incurred during
promotion of governmental interests at an operational level are subject
to tort liability. Because these acts are ministerial in nature, the sover-
eign immunity doctrine is inapplicable.
19. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
20. Id. at 76.
21. Id. at 75; see Sapp v. Tallahassee, 348 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 1977). The Florida Supreme Court held that before
a municipality could be held liable for the negligence of its employees, a special duty
must be shown. A special duty is something more than the duty a municipality owes
the general public. See also City of Tampa v. Davis, 226 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1969). The Second District Court of Appeal decided that a municipality could be
liable in tort, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, only when the complainant was
in privity with the municipal employee.
22. Modlin, 201 So. 2d at 76. See, e.g., Evett v. Inverness, 224 So. 2d 365 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969). The court held the city owed no duty, other than that owed to
the general public, to plaintiff's decedent, killed by an intoxicated driver previously
stopped but released by police.
23. See Note, supra note 13, at 362-63. The Florida waiver statute was enacted
in 1975. Commercial Carrier Corp. was not decided until 1979. During this time pe-
riod, there was little deviation from the special duty doctrine. See generally Pennington
v. Serig, 353 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Metropolitan Dade County v.
Kelly, 348 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
24. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1018-19. See also infra text ac-
companying notes 115-32.
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Although the Commercial Carrier Corp. court attempted to settle
the confusion surrounding Florida municipal tort liability, the law
seems more unsettled now than previously. This uncertainty, which
arises from the lower courts' inability to distinguish planning level and
operational level functions, creates a dilemma when courts are faced
with a tort action arising out of a municipality's failure to properly
respond to a "911" emergency call. As the "911" issue has yet to re-
ceive judicial attention by Florida courts, the ensuant sections survey
how courts of other jurisdictions have reacted to cases involving a mu-
nicipality's failure to properly answer emergency calls.
B. Municipal Liability for Failing to Respond Properly to an
Emergency Assistance Call
A municipality's decision to develop a "911" emergency reporting
system to counter "increased incidence of crimes, accidents and medi-
cal emergencies, inadequacy of existing emergency reporting methods
and the continual growth and mobility of the population, 25 is benefi-
cial to recipients of the service. The "911" system, however, is not flaw-
less. Specific instances of the system's shortcomings have left courts
throughout the United States confronted with issues of negligence, mu-
nicipal tort liability and sovereign immunity in cases where emergency
calls are mishandled.
The New York Court of Appeals examined these issues in De
Long v. County of Erie.2" The De Long court upheld an award of dam-
ages to the husband and children of a woman brutally victimized in
their home by an intruder.27 The decedent, Amelia De Long, was in
her home on the morning of October 25.28 Hearing a burglar in her
home, she immediately dialed "911 ."29 After receiving assurance that
assistance had been dispatched, De Long remained in her home await-
ing police arrival.30 Unfortunately, the complaint writer incorrectly re-
corded the complaint.3" Emergency assistance was dispatched to an in-
25. Hackworth, supra note 1, at 24.
26. 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983).
27. Id. at 304, 457 N.E.2d at 720, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
28. Id. at 300-01, 457 N.E.2d at 719, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
29. Id. at 300, 457 N.E.2d at 719, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
30. Id. at 301, 457 N.E.2d at 719, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
31. Id. The complaint writer, after incorrectly recording the address, informed
the dispatcher to send police to 219 Victoria, in the City of Buffalo. Amelia De Long's
correct address was 319 Victoria, in the City of Kenmore.
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correct address in the wrong city.32 The police finally arrived, but
Amelia De Long was pronounced dead on the scene.
33
Amelia De Long's family sued for negligence. Affirming the lower
court opinion, the court recognized that the county and city developed
a special relationship with Amelia De Long. 4 The city and the county
implemented a special emergency service designed to take calls at a
designated center and then relay them to the proper public safety
agency.3 5 The public safety agencies offered the "911" plan as the sys-
tem to utilize in an emergency situation.36 In addition, a dispatcher
personally assured the victim that help was on the way, furthering her
reliance upon police.37 These factors created a special duty38 owed to
the victim by the city and the county. Each entity breached its duty."
Thus, compensation was awarded to the victim's family for her wrong-
ful death.
The Washington Supreme Court has also confronted the issue of
32. Id.
33. Id. Kenmore police arrived on the scene after a neighbor made a direct call
to the police department. By the time paramedics arrived, the victim was dead.
34. Cf. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). The New York Court of Appeals held that the city was not
liable in tort to an assault victim who had requested police protection on a number of
previous occasions. "[T] here is no warrant in judicial tradition or in the proper alloca-
tion of the powers of government for the courts, in the absence of legislation, to carve
out an area in tort liability for police protection to members of the public." Id. at 583,
240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899. But see Judge Keating dissenting: "[tihe
essence of the city's case [suggests] . . . '[b]ecause we owe a duty to everybody, we
owe a duty to nobody.'" Id. at 585, 240 N.E.2d at 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
35. De Long, 60 N.Y.2d at 302-03, 457 N.E.2d at 720-21, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 614-
15.
36. Id. at 302, 457 N.E.2d at 719, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
37. Id. at 301, 457 N.E.2d at 719, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
38. See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). The city was liable for the wrongful death of plaintiffs intestate.
An actionable special duty was created when police failed to provide promised protec-
tion after decedent aided police in arresting and convicting a fugitive from justice. See
also supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
39. De Long, 60 N.Y.2d at 305, 457 N.E.2d at 722, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 616. Also,
at the time this action was instituted by Dennis De Long, there was in existence,
within the laws of New York, a waiver of immunity statute. N.Y. JuRIsDIcTION LAW §
8 (McKinney 1983), in part, provides that "[t]he state hereby waives its immunity
from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same
determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the su-
preme court against individuals or corporations ... " However, the De Long court
never referenced this statute in its opinion.
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police failure to properly respond to an emergency call. In Chambers-
Castanes v. King County,40 plaintiffs, a married couple, were proceed-
ing through a small Washington town when they were stopped in traffic
behind a pick-up truck.41 Two men exited the truck and began to man-
handle the couple.42 When the men finally retreated from the scene, the
wife phoned for assistance.4 3 After numerous calls requesting assis-
tance, police finally responded to the call.44 Unfortunately, the assail-
ants fled, avoiding apprehension.45
In plaintiffs' action for negligence, the Chambers-Castanes court
concluded that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was inapplicable
and held King County subject to liability in tort.46 Because the legisla-
ture had abolished the sovereign immunity doctrine,47 the court carved
out a narrowly circumscribed exception.48 High level discretionary acts
exercised at an executive level remained cloaked with sovereign immu-
nity.49 In comparison, operational level decisions, such as dispatching a
police officer to the scene of a crime, were not cloaked with immunity.50
The two are distinguished as follows: a decision to dispatch an officer in
response to an emergency call involves the type of discretion exercised
every day,51 not a decision involving a basic governmental planning
consideration. 52 Therefore, the operator's failure to properly dispatch
40. 100 Wash. 2d 275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983).
41. Id. at 278, 669 P.2d at 454.
42. Id.
43. Id. A number of other persons witnessing the events also phoned for police
assistance. They were assured, as was plaintiff, that help was on its way.
44. Id. at 280, 669 P.2d at 454.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 281, 669 P.2d at 457. The Washington Supreme Court has accepted
the test established in Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246,
250, 407 P.2d 440, 444 (1965), as an exception to the rule that the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity is abolished. See infra text accompanying notes 129-31.
47. 100 Wash. 2d at 281, 669 P.2d at 456. WASH. REv. CODE ANN § 4.92.090
(1986) states "[t]he State of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or propri-
etary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the
same extent as if it were a private person or corporation."
48. 100 Wash. 2d at 281, 669 P.2d at 456.
49. Id. at 282, 669 P.2d at 456. In a footnote, the court explained high level
discretionary acts. To determine whether acts were exercised at a truly executive level,
the court should apply the four-prong test established in Evangelical United Brethren
Church. See infra text accompanying notes 129-31 and 145-50.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court noted that "[tjo fall within the exception ... , the discretion-
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an emergency assistance call is an operational level determination sub-
ject to liability. 53
The Washington Supreme Court also recognized the creation of a
special relationship between plaintiffs and the county.5" The operators
assured plaintiffs after each call that assistance had been dispatched. 55
Since plaintiffs continually sought assistance, a nexus developed giving
rise to reliance on the part of the plaintiffs. 56 Consequently, the court
recognized plaintiffs' claim for damages pursuant to the special duty
doctrine.5 7
C. Municipalities Enjoying Immunity for Failing to Respond
to Emergency Calls
While some jurisdictions refuse municipalities and their entities
sovereign immunity for the performance of discretionary governmental
functions,58 others continue to protect municipalities from tort liability
regarding public safety decisions.59
ary act must not only involve a basic policy determination, but must also be the prod-
uct of a considered policy decision." Id. at 282, 669 P.2d at 456.
53. Id. at 282, 669 P.2d at 456.
54. Id. Plaintiffs also had alleged a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on grounds that
the duty owed by King County to provide assistance was owed to the public generally
and not to any particular individual.
55. Id. at 287, 669 P.2d at 458.
56. See Sapp, 348 So. 2d at 365; Davis, 226 So. 2d at 452.
57. Chambers-Castanes, 100 Wash. 2d at 288, 669 P.2d at 458.
58. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976). The State Fire Marshall
had undertaken an inspection for hazards in a hotel. He breached his duty to disclose
discovered hazards. Consequently, when a hotel fire injured patrons, the state was sub-
ject to liability. Even with a state statute immunizing the state from tort liability aris-
ing out of failure to perform discretionary functions, a common law duty was created
when an affirmative action was undertaken. See also Sorichetti v. City of New York,
65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985), citing De Long, where a
special relationship was held to exist between the City of New York and plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs, a mother and her daughter, brought an action against the city arising out of
injuries they suffered at the hands of the daughter's father. The father refused to re-
turn the child, violating a protective order which restricted his visitation rights because
of previous abusive behavior. Despite awareness of the father's violent propensities
based on his past conduct, police ignored the pleas of the child's mother for her safe
return. The court decided this was adequate to establish an actionable duty to the
mother and daughter.
59. City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 837,
207 Cal. Rptr. 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). After a San Francisco fireman left a fire station
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In Trezzi v. City of Detroit,60 the Michigan Court of Appeals sup-
ported the decision of the City of Detroit to install a "911" emergency
system. Plaintiff in Trezzi complained that the "911" operators at-
tached an unjustifiably low priority rating to emergency calls.6e A
"911" operator passed the call to a police dispatcher who did not dis-
patch assistance for nearly one and a half hours.6 2 As a result of the
police dispatcher's dereliction, plaintiff's decedents suffered numerous
injuries, resulting in their deaths.6 3
The Trezzi court maintained that operating a "911" emergency
assistance system constitutes a governmental function by a municipal-
ity64 protected by Michigan law.6 5 The operation of an emergency dis-
patch plan is an indispensable element in managing a police depart-
ment. 6 The system's operation involves decision making regarding the
seriousness of each call for police assistance. 67 Immediately upon re-
ceipt of a call, an order of priority for response is attached.6 8 The court
determined that this type of system is unique activity associated with
unattended, a fire occurred at a building 300 feet from the station. As the response
time was greatly increased, it was alleged that unnecessary property damage had oc-
curred. The California Court of Appeal, First District, dismissed the complaint based
on the public entity's absolute immunity from tort liability for failure to provide fire
protection and/or from negligence in the provision of such protection. See also Hartz-
ler v. City of San Jose, 46 Cal. App. 3d 6, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). In
Hartzler, a woman allegedly called police twenty times concerning problems she was
having with her estranged husband. The court held that police enjoyed sovereign im-
munity from liability. In the absence of evidence showing that police promised the
victim protection and the woman relied on such promise, a special relationship had not
been created,
60. 120 Mich. App. 506, 328 N.W.2d 70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
61. Id. at 509, 328 N.W.2d at 71. There may have been a number of unidenti-
fied operators taking calls. Operators attach priority ratings to each call based upon its
nature, and police are dispatched accordingly.
62. Id. at 509-10, 328 N.W.2d at 71.
63. Id. at 509, 328 N.W.2d at 71.
64. Id. at 511, 328 N.W.2d at 72.
65. MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 691.1407 (1985) (providing that all governmental
agencies shall be "immune from tort liability ... [in] discharge of a governmental
function ...").
66. Trezzi, 120 Mich. App. at 512, 328 N.W.2d at 72 (Bronson, J., dissenting).
The dissent asks the question "[i]f '911' system is 'indispensable' to police operations,
how did Detroit manage to muddle through the many decades in which no system
existed?" Id. at 517, 328 N.W.2d at 74.
67. Id. at 512, 328 N.W.2d at 72.
68. Id. at 513, 328 N.W.2d at 72.
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operation of a police department. 69 Logically, the city and its police
department are afforded immunity.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reached the same re-
sult as Trezzi but through different reasoning.70 Plaintiffs in Warren v.
District of Columbia,7 ' two of whom were sharing a third floor room,
all resided in the same boarding house.7 2 The third plaintiff and her
daughter occupied a second floor room. 3 During the night, the sound
of the back door being broken down awakened the women.7 4 Two men
entered the house, made their way to the second floor, then raped and
sodomized one of the plaintiffs. 5
Hearing screams from the floor below, plaintiffs on the third floor
telephoned police, requesting immediate help. The police dispatcher
provided assurance that police assistance would be dispatched
promptly. From their third floor room, plaintiffs crawled through their
window to an adjoining roof. Four police cruisers, responding to the
broadcast, arrived at the boarding house. While on the roof plaintiffs
watched the police arrive, conduct a cursory investigation and then
leave the scene.7 6
Plaintiffs crawled back inside their room and again phoned for
help. Once more they were assured that police assistance was on the
way.7 Believing police had arrived, and in an attempt to ascertain the
conditions of the victimized women, plaintiffs called to the second floor,
thereby alerting the intruders to their presence. The abductors then
forced all three women, at knife point, to accompany them to an apart-
ment belonging to one of the men. The abductors held the three women
captive for fourteen hours, robbing and sexually assaulting them.
The three plaintiffs instituted actions against the city and its police
department. Plaintiffs based their claims on the negligent investigation
conducted by police once they were dispatched to the scene and the
69. Id.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 40-57. The court in Chambers-Castanes
flatly rejected the reasoning in Warren as being wholly at odds with its decision.
71. 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1981).
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id.
74. Id. The two men who broke down the door were later identified and charged.
75. Id.
76. Id. One officer drove through the alley behind the house, and proceeded to
the front of the house without stopping. Another officer knocked on the front door, but
departed when no one answered. All the officers left within five minutes of their arrival.
77. Id. Actually, assistance was not dispatched the second time.
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failure to respond properly to the second emergency call. 8
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint. 9 The court in Warren based its opinion on
the "fundamental principle that a government and its agents are under
no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to
any particular individual citizen."' 0 The court denied plaintiffs' conten-
tion that their telephone call requesting assistance created a special re-
lationship.81 The police did not owe any single individual the duty to
provide police protection. 2 The acts and omissions of defendant police
department constituted no more than nonactionable withholding of a
benefit.8 3 Thus, without the establishment of a special duty, plaintiffs'
complaint could not stand. 4
The three dissenting judges in Warren"5 reasoned that if certain
factors are present, a general, nonactionable duty to provide police ser-
vices may narrow to a special actionable duty. 8 First, some sort of
privity must exist between the police department and the victim.8 7 This
relationship must set the victim apart from the general public.88 Sec-
78. Id.
79. Id. Notwithstanding their sympathy for appellants who were tragic victims of
despicable criminal acts, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
80. Id. at 3. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided this case based
solely on common law municipal tort liability. At the time this suit was commenced by
plaintiffs, the District of Columbia had yet to waive sovereign immunity by statute.
The only limitation on any negligence action against the District of Columbia is gov-
erned by D.C. CODE § 12-309 (1985). In part, this section provides that "[a]n action
may not be maintained against the District of Columbia ... unless, within six months
... the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing to the Commis-
sioner [Mayor] of the District of Columbia ... " This section of the code was never
referenced by the court in Warren.
81. Id. at 4.
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id. See also H.R. Moch Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160,
159 N.E. 896 (1928). In Moch, the Rensselaer Water Co. had contracted with the city
to provide them with an adequate water supply. Plaintiffs property caught fire but
there was an insufficient amount of water to extinguish the fire. Justice Cardozo found
that the failure to provide an adequate water supply was, at most, an nonactionable
withholding of a benefit. Id. at 167-68, 159 N.E. at 897-98.
84. Warren, 444 A.2d at 9.
85. Id. Associate Judge Kelly wrote the opinion with whom Associate Judge
Moch and Chief Judge Newman concurred in part and dissented in part.
86. Id. at 9.
87. Id. See also Davis, 226 So. 2d at 451; Sapp, 348 So. 2d at 365-66.
88. Warren, 444 A.2d at 10.
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ond, the public agency must have offered assurances which would cause
the victim's justifiable reliance.89
The dissenters in Warren asserted that the complaint alleged suffi-
cient facts which, if proven, established a legal relationship.90 The po-
lice department owed a special duty to the plaintiff placing the emer-
gency call. Also, after receiving guarantees on two separate occasions
that help was dispatched, the victims chose not to leave the scene, justi-
fiably relying on the dispatcher's assurances that help was coming.
Therefore, the dissenters concluded that an actionable special duty
existed. 1
The New Mexico Court of Appeals also refused to acknowledge
the existence of a special duty in Doe v. Hendricks.92 The court denied
the award of damages to a boy who had been sexually assaulted by a
stranger, even though a call for assistance was placed immediately af-
ter the boy's abduction. 3 Stating that police owed no special duty to
the boy, the court granted the city's motion for summary judgment.94
In rationalizing its position, the Doe court applied the two-step
special duty test.9" The majority decided no relationship existed be-
tween police and the boy. 6 No prior circumstances between the victim
and the officer imposed a duty on the police to protect the boy. 7 In
addition, police made no specific promises which would create justifia-
ble reliance on the part of the victim.98 Thus, without a special rela-
89. Id. See Sapp, 348 So. 2d at 365-66.
90. 444 A.2d at 12.
91. Id.
92. 92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1979).
93. Id. at 500, 590 P.2d at 649. Two teenagers witnessed the youth being drag-
ged into an abandoned house by an adult male. The teenagers relayed their story to
their brother and sister. The sister called police and further relayed the story. The
dispatcher took the message into the office of the chief. The chief was the only officer
available to answer the call. However, the chief was in conference with an out-of-state
sheriff and did not respond to the call. When assistance did not arrive, the two boys ran
to the police station, relayed their story to another officer, who proceeded to the house,
and effectuated the arrest.
94. Id. at 500, 590 P.2d at 649. The court relied on the Peace Officers Liability
Act of 1973, N.M. STAT. ANN.f § 39-8-2, 39-8-4 (repealed 1976). The Act was
designed to protect officers from personal liability arising out of acts committed during
the performance of their activities and within the course and scope of their profession.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
96. Doe, 92 N.M. at 503, 590 P.2d at 651.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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tionship or justifiable reliance, the only duty owed by police was a non-
actionable public duty.9"
II. Florida's Response to Municipal Liability In Failing to
Answer Emergency Asisstance Calls
Florida courts have yet to answer the question of whether a munic-
ipality is liable for failing to properly respond to an emergency assis-
tance call. With a statute that encourages Florida counties to install
"911" emergency systems,100 and a statute that permits the state and
its entities to be sued, 10 1 Florida courts will eventually face this
predicament.
In 1974, the Florida legislature enacted the Florida Emergency
Telephone Act.102 The Act's purpose is "to shorten time required for a
citizen to request and receive emergency"10 3 medical or police assis-
tance. Prior to this enactment, thousands of emergency assistance num-
bers were used statewide.104 The implementation of a three-digit num-
ber system immensely benefits both law enforcement agencies and
public service personnel.10 5
The enactment of the Florida Emergency Telephone Act gave a
statewide system of emergency assistance to the general public. The
plan includes a firm implementation schedule requiring local communi-
ties to direct the telephone utility to install a "911" system within
twenty-four months following receipt of a local government order.,,"
The system must include specific local government requirements for
99. Id. The court said, "[i]f and when the people of New Mexico desire a change
in the public vs. special duty concept, they must seek relief from the legislature...
[that] fix[es] the public policy of the State." Id. at 503, 590 P.2d at 651.
100. See supra note 8.
101. See supra note 9.
102. FLA. STAT. § 365.171(1) (1985).
103. Id. § 365.171(2).
104. Id. This "simplified means of procuring emergency service will result in the
saving of life, a reduction in the destruction of property, and a quicker apprehension of
criminals." The legislature's intent is to establish an emergency "number (911) plan
which will provide citizens with rapid, direct access to public safety agencies ...... Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. § 365.171(4)(e). See also § 365.171(10) ("All public agencies shall as-
sist the division in their efforts to carry out the intent of this section, and such agencies
shall comply with the developed plan."); It is no longer mandatory for counties to in-
stall a "911" system. The expense of installing and operating a "911" system is too
great for some of Florida's rural counties. Telander, supra note 1.
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law enforcement, firefighting and emergency medical services, and may
also include poison control, suicide prevention and emergency manage-
ment services. 107
Lawmakers enacted legislation aimed at assuring an accessible
remedy to those in immediate emergency need. The majority of the
systems developed in Florida are extremely efficient.108 This is gener-
ally the reason a municipality encourages the use of the "911" system
as opposed to direct dialing. However, if a Florida municipality holds
out the "911" system as preferable to another system in time of emer-
gency, a question arises regarding the municipality's liability when the
victim dials "911" seeking help and none arrives.
The issues surrounding Florida municipal liability have not been
clearly decided. First, the Florida legislature, in accordance with the
State Constitution, waived sovereign immunity for tort liability for it-
self and for its agencies and subdivisions.10 In essence, the State per-
mitted itself and its agencies and subdivisions to be sued in tort for
money damages arising out of the wrongful acts or omissions of any
agency's or subdivision's employee while acting within the scope of his
employment."10 As long as the injured plaintiff retains eligiblity pursu-
ant to section 768.28,"' he may sue the governmental entity as if the
entity were an individual." 2
The statute also allows the state to be self-insured by allowing it to
purchase liability insurance for whatever coverage it chooses in antici-
107. Id. at § 365.171(4)(b).
108. Florida 911 Program, supra note 1, at 2. At least seven Florida counties
have an enhanced "911" (E911) system. This system includes selective routing which
guarantees that only the calls originating within a certain jurisdiction are routed to the
Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) responsible for that particular jurisdiction.
E911 systems also include automatic number identification (ANI) which provides the
dispatcher with a display of the caller's telephone number and automatic location iden-
tification (ALI) which provides a display of the caller's address.
109. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (1985).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 768.28(6)(a). This section states that "[a]n action may not be insti-
tuted against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions unless the claimant
presents the claim in writing to the appropriate agency. . . ." Section 5 further pro-
vides that the state is not liable for punitive damages or interest for the period before
judgment. Also, the state is not liable to any one person for a claim exceeding $100,000
or a total of claims in excess of $200,000. Section 7 further states that "process shall
be served upon the head of the agency. . . ." In addition, Section 9(a) provides that
individuals, unless acting maliciously and willfully, shall not be held personally liable.
112. Id. § 768.28(2).
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pation of any claim.113 Agencies, subdivisions and sheriffs may
purchase liability insurance together, or jointly provide other means of
protection against tort liability arising out of their official capacity.11 4
The language of section 768.28 is explicit with respect to the state's
desire to retreat from the doctrine of sovereign immunity and allow
compensation for valid claims arising against the state.
The Supreme Court of Florida, however, does not interpret section
768.28 as totally abrogating the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County,115 the Florida Su-
preme Court had an opportunity to construe the sovereign immunity
statute. The supreme court decided that section 768.28 was broadly
written and the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not totally
abolished.116
Commercial Carrier Corp. reached the Florida Supreme Court117
on writ of certiorari where it was consolidated with a Third District
Court of Appeal case, Cheney v. Dade County.118 Commercial Carrier
Corporation and its insurer were named defendants in a wrongful death
action. 1 9 Commercial Carrier Corporation then filed a third-party
complaint naming Indian River County and the Florida Department of
Transportation (DOT) as third-party defendants.1 20 DOT failed to in-
stall a stop sign or provide pavement markings at the intersection
where the accident occurred.1 21 The third-party complaint sought con-
113. Id. § 768.28(13).
114. Id.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
116. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1015.
117. Id. at 1012-13. Commercial Carrier Corp. allegedly was in conflict with
Gordon v. City of West Palm Beach, 321 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In
Gordon, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a city could be liable for negli-
gence in design, construction or maintenance of streets, but that it could not be liable
for failing to install traffic devices at an intersection.
118. 353 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Commercial
Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.), vacated, 372 So. 2d
1182 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). In Cheney, a third party complaint had been filed
by Cheney and its insurer against Dade County. The complaint alleged that the sole
cause of an intersection collision was Dade County's negligence in maintaining the in-
tersection with proper traffic signals. The trial court held that no cause of action ex-
isted to maintain the third party complaint. The Third District Court, while upholding
the dismissal, certified the question as one of great public interest.
119. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1013.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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tribution and indemnification from Indian River County and DOT for
their negligence in failing to properly maintain the intersection.122 The
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
the third-party complaint. 123
The main issue the Commercial Carrier Corp. court addressed
was the status of municipal tort liability under the governmental versus
proprietary analysis since the enactment of section 768.28.12 The su-
preme court concluded that because section 768.28125 unequivocally in-
cludes municipalities within the definition of state entities subject to
waiver of immunity,126 this distinction died when Section 768.28 be-
came law. In the same breath, the Commercial Carrier Corp. court
also decided that the special duty-general duty dichotomy had no con-
tinuing vitality since section 768.28 became effective. 127 Traditional
municipal tort liability in Florida was subject to a third analysis. l2 8
The Florida Supreme Court adopted a test that considers certain
discretionary governmental functions as either planning-level or opera-
tional-level functions. Planning-level functions enjoy immunity from
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1015-16. See also Note, supra note 14, at 364-67; Note, The Doc-
trine of Sovereign Immunity Is Alive and Well, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 377, 378-80
(1980).
125. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(2) (1985) states: "(2) As used in this act, 'state agen-
cies or subdivisions' including the executive departments, the Legislature, the judicial
branch (including public defenders), and the independent establishments of the state;
counties and municipalities; and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or
agencies of the state, counties or municipalities."
126. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1016.
127. Id. "Predicating liability upon the 'governmental-proprietary' and 'special
duty-general duty' analyses has drawn severe criticism from numerous courts and com-
mentators." Id. at 1016, n.8. Therefore, "Modlin and its ancestry and progeny have no
continuing vitality subsequent to the effective date of section 768.28." 371 So. 2d at
1016.
128. Another problem the Commercial Carrier Corp. court faced was Section
768.28, which unlike the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1975), does
not contain an express exception for discretionary acts to which immunity attaches.
The court responded, however, that the absence of a "discretionary exception" in the
waiver statute does not necessarily preclude immunity. Certain areas of governmental
conduct must remain immune from judicial scrutiny. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371
So. 2d at 10 17-18. See infra text accompanying notes 135-39 for application of the test
established in Evangelical United Brethren Church. See also Evangelical United
Brethren Church, 67 Wash. 2d at 246, 407 P.2d at 440; Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579,
167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960).
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tort liability and comprise those basic policy decisions in which a gov-
ernmental branch makes a conscious decision, balancing the risks and
advantages.1 29 Operational-level decisions are characterized as those
made on an every day basis implementing broad policy plans. 130 Opera-
tional-level decision-making remains subject to tort liability.131
To assist the lower courts in their understanding of the distinction
between planning-level or operational-level decisions, the Commercial
Carrier Corp. court recommended application of a four question test
established in Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State.32 The
four question test asks: (1) Does the challenged act necessarily involve
a basic governmental program? (2) Is the act or decision essential to
the accomplishment of that program as opposed to one which would
change the course of the program? (3) Does the act or decision require
the exercise of a basic policy evaluation, expertise or judgment? (4)
Does the governmental agency have the constitutional or statutory au-
thority to make this decision? If all four preliminary questions clearly
and unequivocally draw affirmative responses, the challenged discre-
tionary act is not likely to be subject to tort liability. If one or more of
the questions suggest a negative answer, depending upon the facts of
the case, further inquiry may be necessary.133
In the event a Florida court were confronted with a tort action
arising out of the mishandling of an emergency assistance call, the
129. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
Two examples of planning-level decisions are Elmer v. City of St. Petersburg, 378 So.
2d 825 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) and Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla.
1985). In Elmer, the city allegedly failed to give its citizens adequate warnings of riot
conditions; this was a discretionary, planning-level decision, not to incite community
havoc, cloaked with immunity. In Everton, an officer's choice not to issue a citation to
an intoxicated driver and to allow him to continue his travels rather than arrest him
was discretionary and cloaked with sovereign immunity.
130. Department of Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071, 1075 (Fla. 1982). Two
examples of operational-level decisions are Weisburg v. City of Miami Beach, 383 So.
2d 1158 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) and Sintros v. LaValle, 406 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Weisburg held that a police department's decision to have its
officers direct traffic is an operational-level decision subject to tort immunity if negli-
gently conducted. Sintres held that a government employee's operation of a vehicle
within the scope of his employment is an operational-level decision subject to tort
liability.
131. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1019.
132. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
133. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1019. The test established in Ev-
angelical United Brethren Church was applied by the Washington Supreme Court in
Chambers-Castanes. See supra text accompanying notes 40-57.
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analysis adopted by the Commercial Carrier Corp. court should be the
controlling precedent.13 4 If, for instance, a Florida resident dials "911"
to report an emergency situation, an operator will likely answer, provid-
ing assurance that assistance will be dispatched. If the operator negli-
gently dispatches police to the wrong address, causing a delay resulting
in injury, the victim may file suit against the police department and the
county as defendants in a civil suit for damages.
The liability of the police department and the county rests with a
court's determination of whether operating a "911" emergency system
is a judgmental, policy making decision, or whether the operation of
the "911" system is merely the implementation of a broad policy deci-
sion subject to tort liability. Defendants should move for dismissal and
a court should base its decision on Commercial Carrier Corp. and its
progeny.
In all likelihood, a court will apply the four prong Evangelical
United Brethren Church test adopted by Commercial Carrier Corp.:
First, does the challenged act necessarily involve a basic governmental
program? 13 5 In the hypothetical, the county and the police department
developed a system of law enforcement designed to secure safety to the
public. The "911" system is part of that overall plan. The language of
the Florida Emergency Telephone Act also indicates that the imple-
mentation of a statewide "911" emergency system involves broad pol-
icy or planning decisions.
Second, is the act or decision essential to the accomplishment of
that program as opposed to one which would change the course of the
program?1 38 Discretion is fundamental; any limit on discretion would
greatly hinder a system of law enforcement. Also, the directing of
emergency assistance to people in need is the primary goal of the
"911" statute. The plan is designed to serve the public, as are the pub-
lic service agencies responsible for responding to calls for help. There-
fore, broad tort liability would defeat the program's objective.
Third, does the act or decision require the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, expertise or judgment? 37 Because most decisions in law en-
forcement affect the rights of citizens, there is a great need for exper-
tise, evaluation and judgment in these decisions. The decision to dis-
134. Evangelical United Brethren Church, 407 P.2d at 445; Commercial Carrier
Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1019.
135. Id. at 445; 371 So. 2d at 1019.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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patch help to a resident as quickly and efficiently as possible is but a
small part of an entire system designed to provide public services. How-
ever, to attach liability where calls are mishandled would undermine
the entire system.
Lastly, does the governmental agency have the constitutional or
statutory authority to make the decision? 13 8 The Florida Emergency
Telephone Act encourages municipalities to adopt the "911" system.
Thus, each municipality has an affirmative duty to establish a compre-
hensive, statewide emergency assistance plan. Also, law enforcement is
given a high level of discretion, because to do otherwise would cause
the system to undergo substantial unknown changes.
With affirmative responses to all four prongs of this preliminary
test, a court, with a reasonable degree of assurance, would classify this
as discretionary, nontortious, governmental conduct. Thus, it would be
a planning-level decision cloaked with sovereign immunity.
The preceding example illustrates that under the Commercial Car-
rier Corp. rationale, the municipality in the hypothetical would be free
from liability. Although the resident properly dialed "911" and re-
ported a burglary, inadequate attention to his call resulted in financial
and physical injury.
Further evidence of the Florida Supreme Court's desire to immu-
nize municipalities from tort liability is found in a recent court opinion,
Trianon Park Condominium v. City of Hialeah. In Trianon Park,"39
due to a severe roof leakage and other building defects, the condomin-
ium owners sustained extensive damage to their property. The owners
brought an action against the City of Hialeah, alleging that the city
was negligent in inspecting the condominiums and in enforcing specific
provisions of the building code pursuant to the city's police power.
Recognizing sovereign immunity for the city, the supreme court
held that the sovereign immunity statute did not create any new causes
of action, "but merely eliminated the immunity which prevented recov-
ery for existing common law torts committed by the government." 40
As the city did not owe a common law duty to the individual owners
for the enforcement of police power functions, it was unnecessary for
the court to reach the planning level versus operational level analysis.
The lack of a common law duty to exercise police power functions,
138. Id.
139. 423 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), vacated, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla.
1985).
140. 468 So. 2d at 914.
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which include building inspections, immediately immunizes the city
from tort liability. The supreme court did, however, state that where a
common law duty existed, or where a statutory duty had been created,
application of the four prong test developed in Evangelical United
Brethren Church141 was necessary to determine whether the city acted
in furtherance of a planning-level or operational-level function. 4 '
The Trianon Park decision suggests that should a court determine
the state's creation of a "911" emergency system constitutes an exer-
cise of a police power function, a common law duty to provide emer-
gency assistance does not exist, and immunity from a negligence action
arising out of a mishandled "911" emergency call would be afforded
the city. However, should the court determine that "911" emergency
assistance could be provided by private persons as well as governmental
entities, the court, recognizing a common law duty, would determine
municipal tort liability in accordance with Commercial Carrier Corp.
and its progeny.'4 3 Application of either rationale ultimately produces
harsh results for the victim.
When a municipality decides to adopt a plan for emergency tele-
phone assistance, decided authority leaves little doubt that the munici-
pality has made a decision for which immunity attaches. Whether im-
munity is justifiable because of the public duty doctrine,144 or because
the decision is quasi-legislative or legislative, 45 or because it is a plan-
ning-level function,' 46 the activity remains immunized from judicial
scrutiny.
However, the addition of other factors, such as those presented in
the hypothetical, invoke the need to reexamine the sovereign immunity
doctrine. Since the Florida legislature enacted the "911" plan, more
than one-half of municipalities statewide have adopted the system. 47
The systems are highly sophisticated and efficient, shortening response
time for calls and providing more protection for the victim.' 48 When a
"911'" call is placed in some counties, the residence from which the call
141. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
142. Trianon Park, 468 So. 2d at 918-19.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 117-31.
144. Warren, 444 A.2d at 4; Doe, 92 N.M. at 503, 590 P.2d at 651. See also
supra text accompanying notes 87-103.
145. Hargrove, 96 So. 2d at 133. See also supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
146. Payne v. Broward County, 437 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
affd, 461 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1985).
147. Florida 911 Program, supra note 1, at 1.
148. Hackworth, supra note 1, at 25.
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originated is immediately recorded by computer and operators know
the immediate source of the call. 149 Most counties utilizing "911" sys-
tems urge their use as opposed to direct dialing to police. These and
many other factors establish a nexus between the public and the public
service agencies. As such a nexus is necessary to create an actionable
duty, the coalition of all these factors may impose liability on a
municipality.
Individuals dialing "911" in times of crisis are relying on the sys-
tem to afford themselves needed assistance. Injustice occurs if these
individuals, not given assistance when dialing "911", are refused com-
pensation for their injuries because the acts of the municipality are im-
mune from tort liability. This injustice calls for a re-evaluation of mu-
nicipal sovereign immunity in Florida.'
Decisions that followed the Commercial Carrier Corp. rationale
have left the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Florida in a confused
state. There is uncertainty among lower courts as to what constitutes
judgmental, nontortious planning-level functions. Commercial Carrier
Corp. calls for a case-by-case application of the test emanating from its
opinion, 51 so that a victim of a municipality's negligence for failing to
properly handle a "911" emergency call could be entitled to compensa-
tion, although it is unlikely he will receive it. Compensation for injuries
resulting from mishandling of a "911" call is unlikely. Yet, the munici-
pality, rather than the individual, is in a better financial position to
bear the loss for injuries resulting from its own negligence. The time
for victims to be compensated for injuries arising out of a municipal-
ity's negligent operation of a public service function is upon us. The
Florida Supreme Court must eliminate confusion in the lower courts by
clarifying the applicability of sovereign immunity to municipalities.
152
149. Id.
150. The scope of this article does not purport to be all inclusive. There could be
instances when the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be applicable. For example,
should an emergency call not be communicated because the "911" computer system is
nonfunctional or because telephone lines are down, the municipality should not be lia-
ble for injury resulting from the "911" call not being handled properly. Injury in this
instance is not the fault of the municipality. But see Galuszynski v. City of Chicago,
131 Ill. App. 3d 505, 475 N.E.2d 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). Twenty-four minutes
elapsed from the time the "911" call was placed until police responded. The court
dismissed plaintiffs' action for failing to allege the existence of a special duty owed by
the police department to complainants.
151. Commercial Carrier Corp., 371 So. 2d at 1022.
152. Before Payne was decided by the Florida Supreme Court, the Fourth Dis-
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The planning-level versus operational-level dichotomy may be the ra-
tionale for deciding municipal tort liability, but it must first be under-
stood before it can be effectuated.
Legislative action would be an alternative solution to the supreme
court's reluctance to clarify confusion circling municipal sovereign im-
munity. The legislature has the power to express to Florida courts its
intent behind section 768.28.153 The Commercial Carrier Corp. court
has carved out an exception to the waiver statute. Since then, district
courts have followed suit by carving out exceptions to the Commercial
Carrier Corp. opinion. To rectify a situation which has left Florida
courts clueless as to the meaning of municipal sovereign immunity, and
a situation which disfavors compensation to individuals injured because
of municipal negligence, the Florida legislature could take affirmative
measures to clarify the sovereign immunity doctrine. Without such ac-
tion, the position of a municipality and a victim remains uncertain and
confused. If the Florida Supreme Court continues to avoid clarifying
the Commercial Carrier Corp. decision, the Florida legislature should
act. It should exercise its official duty and pass legislation which pro-
vides victims of mishandled "911" calls to compensation for injuries
sustained by a municipality's negligence.
III. Conclusion
Municipalities nationwide are utilizing "911" systems to assure
community members rapid access to medical and police services. "911"
allows municipalities to dispatch emergency assistance to injured indi-
viduals with greater accuracy and efficiency. At the suggestion of local
governments, individuals in the community are dialing "911" rather
than direct dialing to receive emergency services.
However, a municipality's mishandling of an emergency call raises
the issue of whether tort liability should attach to this negligent con-
duct. As Florida has yet to deal with this issue, and other jurisdictions
are divided on the liability issue, an interesting problem may confront
Florida courts. The legislature encourages the use of the "911" system,
yet seemingly shields municipalities from liability for negligently oper-
ating the system. This legislative protection potentially creates a situa-
trict Court of Appeal said "continuing with our uncertainty as to the delineation be-
tween operations and planning ... [the] Modlin doctrine may well have been unsatis-
factory but at least we understood it!" 437 So. 2d at 721.
153. FLA. CONST. art. III.
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tion where a person injured as a result of a municipality's negligence is
denied compensation. A re-evaluation of the Florida sovereign immu-
nity doctrine, by either the Florida Supreme Court or the Florida legis-
lature, is the only opportunity an injured victim has to recover damages
resulting from this negligence.
Douglas L. Bates
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The Reemergence of Implied Assumption of Risk in
Florida
I. Introduction
Florida plaintiffs injured by the negligence of others face a famil-
iar obstacle in our court system in their pursuit of compensation for
their injuries. Florida is experiencing the reemergence of the traditional
defense of assumption of risk. This defense, if proved, can completely
bar a plaintiff's recovery of damages.'
In 1977, the Florida Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
Blackburn v. Dorta,2 sought to eliminate the confusion arising from
judicial applications of the defense by merging the defense of implied
assumption of risk3 into the defense of contributory negligence.4 Since
the plaintiff's recovery could be reduced according to fault, although
not completely prohibited,5 legal commentators believed that the elimi-
nation of this defense would benefit the treatment of a negligence
action.6
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1956); See generally Comment,
Assumption of Risk - Adoption of Comparative Negligence, 6 FLA. ST. L. REV. 211
(1978); James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
2. 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
3. Implied assumption of risk exists when the plaintiff's consent to assume a risk
is implied from his conduct, rather than from an express agreement. For example, a
person playing golf assumes all obvious and ordinary risks of the game even though he
has not entered into an actual agreement to do so. Brady v. Kane, 111 So. 2d 472 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
4. The defense of contributory negligence eliminates or reduces the defendant's
liability because the plaintiff contributed to his own injury by failing to act reasonably.
For example, a person who is injured by walking in a dangerously darkened area may
be contributorily negligent because he failed to look out for his own safety. Brandt v.
Van Zandt, 77 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1954) (en banc).
5. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (1973). The principles of comparative negli-
gence require that the plaintiff's recovery be reduced in proportion to his fault. See
generally Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953); Turk, Com-
parative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI-KENT L. REV. 189 (1950).
6. Legal commentators have stated their dissatisfaction with the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk:
The expression, assumption of risk, is a very confusing one. In application
it conceals many policy issues, and it is constantly being used to beg the
real question. Accurate analysis in the law of negligence would probably
447
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
However, the Blackburn holding did not address the separate de-
fense of express assumption of risk,7 which remains a total bar to the
recovery of damages in negligence actions. Unfortunately, the Black-
burn court's statement in dicta, concerning the disposition of express
assumption of risk,8 has resulted in a plethora of interpretations which
have led to an expansion of the doctrine beyond its traditional and his-
toric meaning.'
be advanced if the term were eradicated and the cases divided under the
topic of consent, lack of duty, and contributory negligence. Then the true
issues involved would be more clearly presented and the determinations,
whether by judge or jury, could be more accurately and realistically
rendered.
Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REv. 5,
14 (1961).
"Except for express assumption of risk, the term and concept, assumption of risk,
should be abolished. It adds nothing to modern law except confusion." James, Assump-
tion of Risk, 61 YALE L. J. 141, 169 (1952).
Upon close analysis, it becomes apparent that the defense traditionally
known as 'implied assumption of risk' is in reality nothing more than a
particular form of contributory negligence . . . . Since in negligence cases,
with the advent of comparative fault, it has become totally superfluous, it
should be abolished by name in these cases. Its perpetuation can only lead
to confusion and error.
Kionka, Implied Assumption of Risk: Does It Survive Comparative Fault?, 3 So. ILL.
U.L.J. 371, 400 (1982).
In the decade . . . [since] . . . 1956 there came to be substantial judicial
and scholarly support for the point of view . . . that the doctrine deserves
no existence (except for express assumption of risk) and is simply a confus-
ing way of stating no duty rules or, where there has been a breach of duty
toward plaintiff, simply one kind of contributory negligence.
James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 186-88
(1968). See generally Symposium: Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. REV. 1-166 (1961).
7. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290. The defense of express assumption of risk is
characterized by an actual agreement, made in advance, that the defendant will not be
responsible for injuries to the plaintiff caused by specific risks. See generally McClain,
Contractual Limitation of Liability for Negligence, 28 HARv. L. REV. 550 (1915).
8. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290.
9.
As a general rule, the doctrine of assumption of risk pertains to controver-
sies between masters and servants, though circumstances may arise be-
tween parties other than masters and servants when the doctrine may ap-
ply; but such defense is never available, unless it rests on contract, or . ..
an act done so spontaneously by the party against whom the defense is
invoked that he was volunteer, and any bad result of the act must be at-
tributed to an exercise of his free volition, instead of to the conduct of his
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The effect of this expansion can be devastating to injured plain-
tiffs. For example, a jockey was paralyzed as a result of an incident
which occurred during a race.1" The jury decided that the cause of this
injury was the negligence of the owners of the racetrack. They also
found that the jockey was not at fault. The jury awarded the jockey ten
million in damages. However, the Third District Court of Appeal held
that the jockey should be denied recovery because the jury found that
he had expressly assumed the risk of injury.1
This note suggests that Florida court decisions since Blackburn
have clouded the distinction between express and implied assumption of
risk. Consequently, what the Blackburn court sought to eliminate from
Florida tort law has now been revived by judicial opinions enlarging the
conduct which can be labeled as express assumption of risk.
This avoidance of the Blackburn mandate can be seen by an ex-
amination of recent decisions which expand and redefine a plaintiff's
express assumption of the risk of injury. 2 This note will examine Flor-
ida decisions conflicting with Blackburn, as well as possible options
available to the supreme court concerning the doctrine of assumption of
risk.
II. The Doctrine of Assumption of Risk
A. History
The doctrine of assumption of risk emerged from the master-ser-
vant relationship in the late nineteenth century.13 This doctrine was
adversary.
Cooney-Eckstein Co. v. King, 69 Fla. 246, 254, 67 So. 918, 921 (1915) (quoting Tinkle
v. St. Louis & San Francisco R.R. Co., 212 Mo. 445, 450, 110 S.W. 1086, 1093
(1908) (emphasis added). See generally Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20
HARV. L. REV. 14 (1906).
10. Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), rev'd, 492 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1986).
11. Id. at 1252.
12. See Strickland v. Roberts, 382 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), rev.
denied, 389 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1980). See also O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co.,
413 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Gary v. Party Time Co., Inc., 434 So.
2d 338 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Van Tuyn v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 447 So.
2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 464 So.
2d 1250 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), rev'd, 492 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1986); Robbins v.
Dept. of Natural Resources, 468 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
13. H. LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER & SERVANT § 115 at
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used in several distinct ways to excuse the master from liability when a
servant was injured because of the master's negligence.1 4 The applica-
tion of assumption of risk eased the development of the Industrial
Revolution by reducing the cost of "human overhead."' 5 The added
expense of compensating an employee for injuries which occurred at
work was avoided. As a result, the cost of doing business was lowered. 6
The employer owed the employee the duty to act as a reasonable
person in a comparable situation.' 7 For example, the master's duty to
his servant was to provide a reasonably safe place to work.' 8 However,
the master did not have a duty to protect his servants from risks which
were inherent in the particular employment."9 In order to hold a master
responsible for negligence the servant would have to demonstrate that
his injuries did not result from these inherent risks.2 0 Consequently, ei-
ther the master had not violated his obligation to the servant or he had
no duty to protect the servant from the cause of his injury.2'
In addition, if the servant proved that the master was negligent,
the master could employ the doctrine of assumption of risk as a de-
fense.22 This aspect of the doctrine stated that if the servant continued
to work at the master's place of business despite knowledge of the dan-
ger, the master was absolved from liability.23
305 (2d ed. 1913).
14. Martin v. Des Moines Edison Light Co., 131 Iowa 724, 730, 106 N.W. 359,
361 (1906).
15. Tiller v. Atlantic Coastline R.Y., 318 U.S. 54, 59 (1943). See generally
Pound, Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1940).
16. "The assumption of risk doctrine. . . was attributed by this Court to a rule
of public policy inasmuch as an opposite doctrine would not only subject employers to
unreasonable and often ruinous responsibilities, thereby embarrassing all branches of
business but would also encourage carelessness on the part of the employee." Tiller v.
Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 59 (1943) (quoting Mr. Justice Bradley in
Tuttle v. Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Ry., 122 U.S. 189, 196 (1887)).
17. Martin, 106 N.W. at 361.
18. Bartholf v. Baker, 71 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1954) (en banc). See Tampa
Shipbuilding & Eng. Co. v. Thomas, 131 Fla. 650, 179 So. 705 (1938).
19. See Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Co. v. Lee, 90 Fla. 632, 106 So. 462 (1924).
See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 21.4 at 1178 (1956).
20. 3 H. LABATr, supra note 13, at 3188. See, e.g., Swanson v. Miami Home
Milk Producers' Ass'n, 117 Fla. 110, 157 So. 415 (1934).
21. The first case of note in this area was Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030
(1837).
22. Gallespie v. Thornton, 95 Fla. 5, 117 So. 714 (1927).
23. Id.
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The basis of the master-servant relationship is contractual.2 The
master agrees to pay the servant and the servant agrees to perform
specific tasks for the master. Logically, the doctrine of assumption of
risk was also implemented in contractual agreements independent of
master-servant relationships.25 Parties were free to enter into contracts
which contained exculpatory clauses. These clauses shifted the burden
of loss or injury. The party was said to have assumed the risk.26
As assumption of risk evolved, the courts utilized the doctrine to
describe different concepts. Courts used assumption of risk to define
the scope of the master's duty, the consent of the servant to work with
knowledge of specific dangers, and express agreements to shift the risk
of loss. Courts and commentators attempted to clarify the ensuing con-
fusion by assigning labels and differentiating among several variations
of the doctrine. This effort was unsuccessful, however, and assumption
of risk became commingled with other traditional defenses to
negligence.28
B. Assumption of Risk: A General Definition
The doctrine of assumption of risk includes several concepts. Gen-
erally, the doctrine refers to situations where a party voluntarily con-
sents to encounter a known risk. 9 The doctrine is divided into two ba-
sic areas: implied and express assumption of risk.
Express assumption of risk is traditionally characterized as an ac-
tual agreement between two parties who agree to shift the risk of loss.30
One party agrees to assume the risk of injury, and the other party is
relieved from liability. The agreement may be either oral or written.31
Although these agreements are not favored by the courts, they will be
24. See, e.g., Southern Turpentine Co. v. Douglass, 61 Fla. 424, 54 So. 385
(1911).
25. Fowler v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 121 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1960).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965).
27. See Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Product Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV.
122 (1962).
28. See Green, Assumed Risk as a Defense, 22 LA. L. REV. 77 (1961); Wade,
The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REV. 5 (1961);
James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L. REV. 85 (1968).
29. Bartholf, 71 So. 2d at 483.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
31. Id.
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upheld if certain conditions are met.32 First, the intention of assuming
the risk must be clear and unequivocal.3 3 Second, the parties to the
agreement must have comparable bargaining power.34 Third, the agree-
ment must not be against public policy. 5 For example, an agreement
between an employer and employee whereby the employee assumes all
risks of injury will not be upheld.36 The employer would be using his
superior bargaining position to take advantage of an employee; the em-
ployee's agreement may be the result of economic necessity.37
Implied assumption of risk is divided into two subcategories: pri-
mary and secondary implied assumption of risk. 8 In a negligence ac-
tion, primary implied assumption of risk focuses on the scope of the
defendant's duty. It is used when the defendant either had no duty to
prevent the plaintiff's injury, or he had a duty but did not breach it."9
For example, if a train passanger falls as a result of the normal jostling
movement of the train, the passenger can not recover damages from the
railway company. The train company does not have a duty to protect
its passengers from normal movement of the train. 0
Primary implied assumption of risk, like negligence, focuses on the
duty owed by a negligent defendant to the injured party.4 This doc-
trine applies to activities which have built-ih and unavoidable risks.
Therefore, the scope of the defendant's duty does not extend to protect-
ing the plaintiff from injuries caused by these specific dangers.42 In this
context, assumption of risk is just another way of saying that the de-
fendant is not negligent, since no breach of duty could have caused the
plaintiff to suffer injury.
Secondary implied assumption of risk is an affirmative defense
which can be raised by the defendant to bar the plaintiff from recovery.
32. Ivey Plants, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 282 So. 2d 205, 208 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1973).
33. O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 447 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
34. Ivey Plants, 282 So. 2d at 208. See Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. 64, 65, 18
S.W. 1149, 1151 (1892).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B comment e (1965).
36. Id. § 496B comment f.
37. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 21.6 at 1185-87 (1956).
38. See Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, 31 N.J. 44, 48-49, 155 A.2d 90,
93 (1950).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C comments c-f (1965).
40. Meistrich, 31 N.J. at 56, 155 A.2d at 97.
41. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290.
42. See O'Connell, 413 So. 2d 444, 448 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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A party who does not expressly assume the risk of injury, but volunta-
rily encounters a known risk, has impliedly assumed the risk. 3 His con-
duct creates an inference that he has consented to assume the risk. This
segment of the doctrine focuses on the plaintiff's behavior."" The plain-
tiff's conduct may be reasonable (strict) or unreasonable (qualified) .45
For example, if a person accepts a ride in a car which he knows has
defective brakes, his behavior may be characterized as unreasonable
secondary implied assumption of risk. However, if he accepts a ride in
the same car because it is late at night and it is the only available
transportation, his behavior may be described as reasonable secondary
implied assumption of risk.'6
As indicated, secondary assumption of risk may be characterized
as reasonable or unreasonable.' 7 When the plaintiff voluntarily en-
counters a known risk in an unreasonable manner, the defendant may
raise the defense of assumption of risk. In addition, the plaintiff is con-
tributorily negligent because he failed to act as a reasonable person.48
However, the latter defense cannot be raised if the plaintiff's behavior
in assuming the risk was reasonable. 9
In Florida, the defenses of secondary (unreasonable) implied as-
sumption of risk and contributory fault both served to completely ab-
solve the defendant from liability in spite of his negligence.50 Although
the Florida courts reached conflicting conclusions as to the similarity
and differences of these doctrines,51 the findings were not crucial to the
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965).
44. Id.
45. See Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967).
46. See Gavel v. Girton, 183 So. 2d 10, 13 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Mc-
Conville v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962);
Kionka, Implied Assumption of Risk: Does it Survive Comparative Fault?, 3 S. ILL.
U.L.J. 371 (1982).
47. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 291.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 292.
50. E.g., Gavel v. Girton, 183 So. 2d 10, 13 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
51. The distinctions between assumption of risk and contributory negligence have
been clouded by Florida courts. "The doctrine of assumption of risk is only an engraft-
ment upon the well-established law applicable to contributory negligence." Martin v.
Plymouth Cordage Co., 209 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
"[S]ince both [assumption of risk and contributory negligence] are available to
bar the action, it makes no differences what the defense is called." Kaplan v. Wolff,
198 So. 2d 103, 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
"There is little distinction between the two defenses of [assumption of risk and
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outcome of these cases because the effect was the same. The plaintiff
was barred from recovery regardless of which defense was successfully
pled.
III. Hoffman v. Jones: Elimination of Contributory
Negligence
In 1973, the importance of distinguishing between these defenses
became crucial when the Supreme Court of Florida decided the
landmark case of Hoffman v. Jones.52
In Hoffman, a widow was precluded from recovering damages for
her husband's death, which was the result of the defendant's negli-
gence, because the plaintiff's decedent was found to be contributorily
negligent. 53 In order to alleviate the "harshness" 54 of this result, the
court held that contributory negligence was no longer a complete bar to
recovery. The principles of pure comparative negligence would apply
whenever the defense of contributory negligence was raised.55 There-
fore, if both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent, the plain-
tiff's recovery would merely be reduced in proportion to the degree that
his negligence contributed to the injury.
The court stated that they adopted the system of comparative neg-
ligence because it was the most equitable system.56 Since comparative
negligence "equate[s] liability with fault," 57 the court concluded that
contributory negligence]. Both partake of exposure by a plaintiff to danger, knowledge
of which is attributed to plaintiff; actual knowledge in assumption of risk, and at least
constructive knowledge in contributory negligence." Rickerton v. Seaboard Airline
R.R. Co., 403 F.2d 836, 839 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1968).
In attempting to differentiate between contributory negligence and assumption of
risk, the Blackburn court stated, "[tihe leading case in Florida dealing with the dis-
tinction between the doctrines recognizes that '[a]t times the line of demarcation be-
tween contributory negligence and assumption of risk is exceedingly difficult to de-
fine.'" Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 289 (quoting Byers v. Gunn, 81 So. 2d 723, 727 (Fla.
1955)).
52. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); See Timmons & Silvis, Pure Comparative Neg-
ligence in Florida: A New Adventure in the Common Law, 28 U. OF MIAMI L. REv.
737, 766 (1974).
53. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 437.
54. Id.
55. See Timmons & Silvis, supra note 52, at 743-749.
56. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 438.
57. Id.
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this was "the better doctrine."58
Although the implementation of this system raised questions about
corollary doctrines, the court did not answer these questions. 9 The
court suggested that the lower courts look to the case law decided
under a Florida railroad statute.60 This statute delineated a compara-
tive negligence system in the limited area of negligence actions against
the railroad companies. However, there are no cases dealing with as-
sumption of risk under this statute. A provision of the statute stated
that a person who consents to the injury cannot recover.6' It has been
suggested that this exclusionary provision resulted in the absence of
any case law applicable to assumption of risk. 2
With the adoption of comparative negligence, the courts were
faced with two threshold problems: 1) the courts had to reexamine the
differences between assumption of risk and contributory negligence;
and 2) the courts had to determine whether assumption of risk survived
the adoption of comparative negligence. Predictably the confusion sur-
rounding assumption of risk generated conflicting trial and appellate
court decisions.63
58. Id.
59. Id. at 439.
60. FLA. STAT. § 768.06 (1977), repealed by 1979 Fla. Laws C. 79-163 § 6. This
statute was passed in 1887. It applied only to actions involving the railroads. The stat-
ute was held unconstitutional in Georgia S. & Fla. R.R. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175
So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965), based on due process and equal protective grounds.
61. "No person shall recover damages from a railroad company for injury to
himself or his property, where the same is done by his consent, or is caused by his own
negligence." FLA. STAT. § 768.06 (1977), repealed by 1979 Fla. Laws C. 79-163 § 6.
62. Fisher & Wax, Comparative Negligence: Unanswered Questions, 47 FLA.
B.J. 566, 568 (1973).
63. See, e.g., Dorta v. Blackburn, 302 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
(rev'd 348 So. 2d 287, on remand 350 So. 2d 25) held that defense of assumption of
risk continues to bar recovery in negligence actions despite adoption of a comparative
negligence system.
But see Rea v. Leadership Housing, Inc., 312 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (aff'd Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, on remand 350 So. 2d 25); Parker v.
Maule Industries, Inc., 321 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Hall v. Holton,
330 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
These decisions stated that the defense of assumption of risk was no longer a com-
plete bar to recovery.
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IV. Assumption of Risk in Florida
A. Blackburn v. Dorta
1. Elimination of Implied Assumption of Risk
In 1977, the Florida Supreme Court sought to eliminate resulting
inconsistencies by determining the effect of the adoption of comparative
negligence on the doctrine of assumption of risk. The court granted
certiorari under conflict certiorari jurisdiction6 4 to review three conflict-
ing District Court of Appeal decisions. The cases of Dorta v. Black-
burn,5 Leadership Housing v. Rea,16 and Maule Industries v.
Parker,6 7 were consolidated for review.
In the landmark case of Blackburn v. Dorta, the Florida Supreme
Court held that the doctrine of implied assumption of risk did not sur-
vive the adoption of comparative negligence.18 The court based its opin-
ion on the premise that if the defenses of implied assumption of risk
and contributory negligence are the same then assumption of risk must
be abolished pursuant to the holding in Hoffman v. Jones.69 In addi-
tion, the Blackburn court stated that aspects. of implied assumption of
risk which overlap other principles of negligence will also be elimi-
nated.7 0 To reach this decision, the court systematically defined "a pot-
pourri of labels, concepts, definitions, thoughts and doctrines"7' which
comprise the doctrine of assumption of risk.
64. See .FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
65. 302 So. 2d 450. The plaintiff, Kevin Blackburn, was injured while he was a
passenger in a dune buggy operated by the defendant. The trial court refused to give
an instruction on assumption of risk and the Florida Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court's action.
66. 312 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The plaintiff was injured
when she tripped in a hole in her driveway. She alleged the defendant negligently in-
stalled the driveway. The trial court granted a summary judgment to the defendant.
However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and stated that assumption of
risk was not a bar to recovery.
67. 321 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Plaintiff was injured because
of the defendant's negligent operation of a truck. At trial, the defendant prevailed.
However, the plaintiff contended that it was error to instruct the jury that if plaintiff
assumed the risk of injury, he was completely barred from recovery. The Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the decision.
68. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 293.
69. Id. at 289.
70. Id. at 291.
71. Id. at 290.
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After excluding express assumption of risk from their analysis,72
the court discarded each aspect of implied assumption of risk for vari-
ous reasons. The court described primary implied assumption of risk as
either a lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from the inherent risks of
the plaintiff's activities or that the duty owed by the defendant was not
breached. This aspect of assumption of risk is abrogated because the
concepts of duty and breach are already included in the analysis to
determine the defendant's negligence.7 3
Secondary implied assumption of risk included reasonable and un-
reasonable behavior. Since unreasonable implied assumption of risk is
so similar to contributory negligence and it espouses no separate func-
tion, the court merged this aspect of secondary implied assumption of
risk into contributory negligence. 4 Reasonable implied assumption of
risk is also eliminated. The court reasoned that the retention of this
concept would be unfair and inconsistent with the explicit equitable
reasoning applied in Hoffman v. Jones. The inequity of granting recov-
ery to a plaintiff who unreasonably assumed a risk and denying recov-
ery to a plaintiff whose behavior was reasonable is readily apparent.7 5
Equitable considerations were a collateral basis of the court's deci-
sion. The court clearly stated that their decision would have been the
same based on the reasoning in Hoffman v. Jones.7 6
The Hoffman decision underscored the court's determination to re-
solve cases as equitably as possible.7 7 In adopting comparative negli-
gence, the Hoffman court indicated that the "equation of liability with
fault"78 to determine the plaintiff's recovery achieves this goal. The
Blackburn court adopted this formula. The court held that the defenses
of implied assumption of risk and contributory negligence are merged.
Thereafter, when the defense of implied assumption of risk is success-
fully raised, the principles of comparative negligence will govern the
effect of this defense on the plaintiff's recovery. 79
72. Id.
73. Id. at 291.
74. Id. at 291-92.
75. Id. at 293. The Blackburn court stated: "There is little to commend this
doctrine of implied-pure or strict assumption of risk and our research discloses no Flor-
ida cases in which it has been applied." Id. at 291.
76. Id. at 292.
77. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 438.
78. Id.
79. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 293.
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2. Treatment of Express Assumption of Risk
Although express assumption of risk generally encompassed only a
contractual concept based on actual oral or written consent to a risk of
injury,80 the confusion as to the parameters of this doctrine was fos-
tered by dicta in the Blackburn decision. The court stated:
It should be pointed out that we are not here concerned with
express assumption of risk which is a contractual concept outside
the purview of this inquiry and upon which we express no opinion
herein. . . . Included within the definition of express assumption of
risk are express contracts not to sue for injury or loss which may
thereafter be occasioned by the convenantee's negligence as well as
situations in which actual consent exists such as where one volunta-
rily participates in a contact sport. 81
The trial and appellate courts in Florida have viewed the non-in-
clusive words "such as" as an invitation to expand the doctrine of ex-
press assumption of risk beyond the Blackburn definition.
Traditionally, the courts applied express assumption of risk to con-
tracts, releases and waivers.8 2 Implied assumption of risk was applied in
all other situations in which a person voluntarily encountered a known
risk and therefore, indicated his consent to assume the risk. These cases
included sporting and recreational activities. Historically, however, the
lower courts often used the generic term assumption of risk without
indicating which facet of the doctrine they were applying. 8
Prior to Blackburn the commingling of these terms was not critical
to the outcome of the case. However, after Blackburn, the distinctions
were crucial as to whether the plaintiff was precluded from recovering
damages for his injury.
B. Interpretation of Blackburn: Definition of Express Assump-
tion of Risk by Florida Courts
Subsequently, the trial and appellate courts interpreted the defini-
80. City of Jacksonville Beach v. Jones, 101 Fla. 96, 133 So. 562 (1931).
81. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B comment a (1965).
83. See Gulfstream Park Racing Assoc. v. Miller, 119 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1960) (horse racing); Evans v. Green, 251 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App.) cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1971) (accidental shooting); Rindley v.
Goldberg, 297 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (golf).
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tion of express assumption of risk as stated in Blackburn in a decidedly
expansive manner. Florida courts have determined that express as-
sumption of risk remains a total bar to recovery in four situations: con-
tractual waivers, contact sports, aberrant forms of non-contact sports,
and professional non-contact sports. An examination of the cases which
comprise this area is helpful to understand the present status of the
doctrine.
1. Contracts
The Fifth District Court Appeal addressed the issue of express as-
sumption of risk in O'Connell v. Walt Disney World.84 In this case the
plaintiff, a minor, was injured while on a guided horseback ride. The
plaintiffs alleged that the negligent actions of the defendant caused the
horses to stampede, resulting in plaintiff's injury. The trial court
granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the plaintiff ap-
pealed. The appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that the
release signed by the plaintiffs parents did not contain the specific lan-
guage necessary to absolve the defendants from liability.85
The court added to the expansion of the doctrine in two ways. The
opinion repeatedly altered the Blackburn definition of express assump-
tion of risk. The court incorrectly characterized the defense as applying
to participation in a "sport," "sport situation," "contact or competitive
sports," and "an activity such as a sport."88 The court also examined
plaintiff's behavior to determine if the defense of express assumption of
risk could be applied because the plaintiff was engaged in an aberrant
form of horseback riding.87 However, there was no evidence of partici-
pation in an unusual or aberrant form of horseback riding. Therefore,
the court stated that the defense did not apply in this situation. This
analysis serves to add momentum to the use of a concept which is
outside the supreme court's definition of the defense.88
The opinion does lend some insight into the reasons for the courts
advocation of the expansion of the doctrine. The court stated that the
theory of primary implied assumption of risk is more applicable to this
84. 413 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
85. Id. at 447.
86. Id. at 447-48.
87. Id. at 447.
88. Although the plaintiff in this case was not barred from recovery, the court's
language may be indicative of its inclination to apply the defense of express assumption
of risk if the plaintiff participated in an aberrant form of horseback riding.
1986] 1355
459
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Nova Law Journal
situation.89 This theory is usually applied to inherently dangerous activ-
ities. If the plaintiff was engaged in such an activity, the defendant
would have no duty to protect him from these risks unless the defend-
ant added to these risks. However, this defense is no longer available
because Blackburn held that "[t]his branch or trunk of assumption of
risk is subsumed in the principle of negligence itself."90 Therefore, in
order to continue to bar the plaintiff from recovery, the courts must
resort to the legal fiction of applying express assumption of risk.
Contractual assumption of risk is discussed further in Van Tuyn v.
Zurich American Insurance Co.91 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
stated that the waiver signed by the plaintiff before she rode and was
injured by a mechanical bull ride at defendant's club did not bar recov-
ery. The court held that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment to the defendant. The waiver was invalid because it did not
contain specific language manifesting intent to either release or indem-
nify the club for its own negligence.92
After concluding that the release did not preclude recovery, the
court sought to determine whether the plaintiff expressly assumed the
risk by riding the mechanical bull. They stated that this defense was
unavailable unless plaintiff subjectively understood the risks inherent in
mechanical bull riding and actually intended to assume these risks.
Therefore, the case was remanded to determine whether these factors
could be proven.
Although the plaintiff was not denied recovery, it is disconcerting
that the court attempted to apply the defense to this case since
mechanical bull riding is not a contact sport.93 The court's discussion
may be explained by its statement of the facets of the defense. The
court states, "[f]or express assumption of risk to be valid, either by
contract or by voluntary participation in an activity, it must be clear
that the plaintiff understood that she was assuming the particular con-
duct by the defendant which caused her injury." '94 It should be noted
that the court abandoned the Blackburn definition and substituted the
89. Id. at 448.
90. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 291.
91. 447 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
92. Id. at 320.
93. Of course it is arguable whether mechanical bull riding is a contact sport.
This author views a contact sport as one in which contact is a certainty (part of the
game) and not merely a possibility. Otherwise, all recreational activities could be
viewed as contact sports.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
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word "activity" in place of "contact sport." Furthermore, in dicta, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Van Tuyn agreed with the Fifth
District Court of Appeal in O'Connell that this situation is more
clearly analyzed as primary implied assumption of risk.95
2. Aberrant Forms of Non-Contact Sports
In Strickland v. Roberts,96 the plaintiff, a waterskier, was injured
when he hit a stationary dock. Strickland was trying to spray water on
some youngsters sunbathing on the dock by skiing as close as possible
to the dock. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defend-
ant who was driving the tow boat. On appeal, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the defendant was not negli-
gent. Although this finding resolved all the issues raised on appeal, the
District Court seized the opportunity to discuss the application of ex-
press assumption of risk to the facts before it.
In dictum, the court noted that Blackburn excluded contact sports
from the abrogation of assumption of risk as a defense. Judge Cobb,
writing for the majority, stated that usually waterskiing was not a con-
tact sport. However, the plaintiff was engaged in an aberrant form of
the sport. Therefore, the court inferred that the consequence of engag-
ing in unusual forms of sport was the application of express assumption
of risk. The court concluded that "[t]he risk of hitting a dock inheres
in the sport of narrowly missing it. Strickland having assumed the risk
of his game, played it one too often and lost."' 7 Thus the expansion of
express assumption of risk to include aberrant forms of non-contact
sports was implemented.
In Gary v. Party-time Co.,98 the plaintiff was injured while roller-
skating down a ramp holding ski poles. The trial court granted a di-
rected verdict to the defendant based solely on a release signed by the
plaintiff. The Third District Court of Appeal, without discussion, af-
firmed the trial court's determination as to the sufficiency of the written
release. 99 Although the trial court rejected the validity of express as-
sumption of risk (based on participation in a situation such as a contact
95. Id. at 321.
96. 382 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for rev. denied, 389 So.
2d 1115 (Fla. 1980).
97. Id. at 1340.
98. Strickland, 434 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
99. Id. at 339-40.
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sport) and it was not an issue on appeal, 100 the appellate court took this
opportunity to interpret the non-contractual aspect of express assump-
tion of risk as stated in Blackburn. This discussion is premised by the
court's approval of the Strickland court's expansion of the doctrine to
include "aberrant forms of non-contact sports."10' The court then ap-
plied the Strickland rationale to this case. The court stated that roller
skating down a ramp holding ski poles is aberrant behavior. Therefore,
the court concluded that the plaintiff's action was within Strickland's
definition of express assumption of risk. In a confusing attempt to jus-
tify the Strickland conclusion, the Gary court indicated that participa-
tion in an aberrant form of non-contact sport is somehow analogous to
participation in contact sports.
The Third District Court of Appeal further confused the issue by
stating that the plaintiff is barred from recovery on the basis of the
release "coupled" 102 or "combined"10 3 with voluntary aberrant acts.L
04
However, Blackburn states that express assumption of risk is a valid
defense on the basis of "express contracts not to sue as well as situa-
tions in which actual consent exists such as where one voluntarily par-
ticipates in a contact sport."'' 0 5 The Gary court circumvented the re-
lease as the sole basis for the directed verdict in order to reinforce the
inclusion of aberrant forms of non-contact sports within the definition
of express assumption of risk. It characterized the release merely as
additional "evidence of actual consent to assume the risk of injury"1' 0 6
and not as an express contract not to sue. 01
In Caravel v. Alverez, 08 aberrant forms of non-contact sports
were again included within the scope of express assumption of risk.
Plaintiff's decedent died as a result of a fall while horseback riding.
The jury determined that the plaintiff expressly assumed the risk of his
injuries. The trial court then granted a judgment in favor of the de-
fendant. Appellants argued that the court erred in giving the instruc-
tion on express assumption of risk to the jury, since horsebacking riding
could not be considered a contact sport. In affirming the trial court's
100. Id. at 339 n.3.
101. Id. at 339-40.
102. Id. at 340.
103. Id. at 339.
104. Id.
105. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290.
106. Gary, 434 So. 2d at 339 n.3.
107. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290.
108. 462 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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decision, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the jury may
have decided that riding double on one horse was "an aberrant form of
the sport of horseback riding."109 Therefore, the instruction was proper.
The concurrence implied that this situation was more applicable to
the theory of primary implied assumption of risk. Judge Ferguson
stated that "appellees breached no duty owed to the deceased." 110 Al-
though this theory was raised by the defendant, the majority opinion
stated that it was unnecessary to address this issue.1 '
In Robbins v. Department of Natural Resources,"2 the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal joined the Third, Fourth and Fifth District
Courts of Appeal in Florida in agreement that the doctrine of express
assumption of risk may be raised when the situation involves aberrant
forms of activities. In Robbins, the plaintiff became a quadriplegic as a
result of diving into shallow water at a public park. The accident oc-
curred the second time he went into the lake. However, he testified that
he was not aware of the depth of the water. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment." 3 The DNR successfully
argued that Robbins should be barred recovery because he had ex-
pressly assumed the risk of injury. The First District Court of Appeal
reversed the lower court's decision. On appeal, the court held that sum-
mary judgment was precluded because the evidence presented material
issues of fact."24 Robbins argued further that, as a matter of law, the
doctrine of express assumption of risk was not applicable in this case.
The District Court of Appeals rejected this argument. 11 5 The court em-
phatically endorsed the application of this doctrine to aberrant forms of
activities.
Such an aberrant form of participation in the recreational activity
of diving would be an appropriate occasion for the application of
the defense of express assumption of risk, notwithstanding the fact
that diving is, of course, not a contact sport and involves no other
participants, and that no formal release, consent or waiver form
was involved.' 16
109. Id. at 1157.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1157 n.1.
112. 468 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
113. Id. at 1043.
114. Id. at 1044.
115. Id. at 1043.
116. Id.
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The Robbins court stated that if Robbins was subjectively aware
of the depth of the water and the presence of rocks on the bottom of
the lake, and he knew of the risks but voluntarily dove into the water
anyway, the defense of express assumption of risk could be raised.117
The court cited Kuehner in support of this conclusion. The application
of Kuehner to this case is disconcerting. Kuehner applied this criteria
to a case in which the injury was caused by participation in a contact
sport-karate. 118 The injury in the Robbins case occurred while the
plaintiff was diving. Clearly, diving is not a contact sport. Although the
Robbins court noted this significant difference, the court did not sup-
port their statement by further reasoning. This decision lends addi-
tional encouragement to the inclusion of aberrant forms of activities
within the limits of the assumption of risk doctrine.
3. Contact Sports
An opportunity to clarify the status of this defense was presented
when the supreme court granted certiorari to answer the following cer-
tified question asked by the Third District Court of Appeal in Kuehner
v. Green:"9 "Does express assumption of risk absolutely bar a plain-
tiffs recovery where he engages in a contact sport with another partici-
pant who injures him without deliberate attempt to injure?"'20
In Kuehner, a participant in a karate practice session was injured
when his partner performed a "leg sweep." The Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision that express assumption of
risk served to absolve the defendant from liability. The Florida Su-
preme Court reviewed and affirmed the decision but did not answer the
certified question.12 The court stated that the question was "inappo-
site"'' 22 to the present case. Since the plaintiff was absolutely barred
from recovery and the evidence did not show that the defendant in-
tended to injure the plaintiff this conclusion is unclear. The supreme
court's reasoning failed to clarify the issue and, in fact, added to the
increasing confusion surrounding the doctrine of express assumption of
risk.
117. Id. at 1043-44.
118. Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at 80-81.
119. 406 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
120. Id. at 1161 (emphasis added).
121. Kuehner v. Green, 436 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1983).
122. Id. at 81.
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The supreme court did take this opportunity to extrapolate on the
impact of the doctrine of express assumption of risk as it arises in "sit-
uations in which actual consent exists such as where one voluntarily
participates in a contact sport."'12 3 The court stated that the viability of
contact sports as recreation is dependent on the defense of express as-
sumption of risk.' 24 However, since the basis of the adoption of com-
parative negligence was the desire to foster an equitable relationship
between liability and fault, the court warned that the doctrine of ex-
press assumption of risk must not be used to incur the same harsh un-
fairness as contributory negligence. The doctrine must be "compatible"
with the comparative negligence system.125 If express assumption of
risk is expanded beyond its intended scope, it may evade the intention
of the court's adoption of comparative negligence as evidenced by the
subsequent merger of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence. 126
In defining the boundaries of the doctrine of express assumption of
risk, the court emphatically stated that the contact sport participant
"does not automatically assume all risks" merely by participation. 27 It
noted that voluntary consent to a specific risk is the foundation of ex-
press assumption of risk. The jury must address several issues in deter-
mining whether the participant actually consented to a specific risk. If
the jury finds that the plaintiff subjectively appreciated the risk which
caused the injury and voluntarily participated, express assumption of
risk can be raised by the defendant. The plaintiff's consent relieves the
defendant of liability from the latter's negligence. But if the injury-
causing risk would not have been foreseen by a reasonable man, the
plaintiff's recovery is not affected. However, if a reasonable man would
have expected the risk, the plaintiff's recovery is governed by compara-
123. Id. at 79 (quoting Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 290).
124. Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at 79. It would be easier to implement this interest in a
recreational sport by simply holding that the defendant had no duty not to physically
make contact with the plaintiff.
125. Id. at 79-80.
126. Comment, Torts-Assumption of Risk-Comparative Negligence, 16 DUQ. L.
REv. 417, 424 n.38 (1978). The Supreme Court of Florida expressed its interest in this
problem in the Kuehner opinion. The court stated "for express assumption of risk to
operate compatibly within our comparative negligence system, courts of law must fully
appreciate the scope and proper applications of the doctrine." Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at
80.
127. Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at 80.
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tive negligence principles."' 8 The state high court concluded that the
special verdict submitted to the Kuehner jury included the factors nec-
essary to make a proper analysis of the application of express assump-
tion of risk.129 Therefore, the decision of the Third District Court of
Appeal was affirmed.
It is significant that the factors that the court examined to deter-
mine the appropriate application of express assumption of risk in the
context of contact sports are the very same factors which were neces-
sary before Blackburn to support the defense of implied assumption of
risk.130
In addition, the inclusion of contact sports within the context of
express assumption of risk, instead of implied assumption of risk, is
important. It is suggested that consent to actual contact which is neces-
sitated by this type of activity justifies this placement.' However, this
reasoning cannot be similarly justified relative to non-contact recrea-
tional activities. 3 2 Unlike contact sports, participation in non-contact
activities does not constitute the same consent.
The special concurring opinion of Justice Boyd in Kuehner 3 ad-
dressed the goal the lower courts are trying to achieve by their inter-
pretation of Blackburn.34 The Justice reiterated that traditional reluc-
tance to allow recovery for injuries incurred by sports participants. In
order to retain this policy, Justice Boyd suggested an alternative.
Rather than the "absurd legal semantics which classify voluntary par-
ticipation in a contact sport as an 'express' assumption of the risk," the
Justice recommended that the scope of liability may be reduced by
holding that "[t]he only duty that a person participating in a contact
sport has toward a fellow participant is to refrain from intentional or
128. Id.
129. "Did the Plaintiff, CLIFFORD R. KUEHNER, know of the existence of
the danger complained of, realize and appreciate the possibility of injury as a result of
such danger; and, having reasonable opportunity to avoid it, voluntarily and deliber-
ately exposed himself to the danger complained of?" Id. at 79.
130. The defense of assumption of risk is applicable when the plaintiff knows and
appreciates the risk of danger and voluntarily consents to exposure to that particular
risk. Bartholf v. Baker, 71 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1954); Byers v. Gunn, 81 So. 2d 723 (Fla.
1955); Brady v. Kane, Ill So. 2d 472 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
131. Petitioner's Initial Brief on the Merits at 11, Ashcroft v. Calder Race
Course, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), rev'd, 492 So. 2d 1309
(Fla. 1986).
132. Id.
133. Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at 81.
134. Id. at 81-82.
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reckless misconduct that is not customary to the sport game." 135
In Kuehner, the court limited the application of the doctrine to
contact sports and the inherent risks associated with them.136 It did not
answer the certified question or clarify the limitations of the application
of the doctrine beyond Kuehner or contact sports.
4. Professional Non-Contact Sports
Possible devastating consequences can result from the application
of express assumption of risk to professional non-contact sports. In
Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc.,137 a jockey at the defendant's
track received injuries during a race which resulted in his becoming a
quadriplegic. The jury found that the negligent design of the track
caused his injury. However, the jury also found that although the plain-
tiff was not negligent, he assumed the risk of injury. Plaintiff and de-
fendant both appealed,138 Notwithstanding the fact that Ashcroft had
not signed a release and that horse racing is not a contact sport, the
Third District Court of Appeal held that the defense of express as-
sumption of risk was applicable to professional horse racing, and
thereby completely barred Ashcroft from any recovery. 39
The Third District relied upon Blackburn and Kuehner. The court
stated that the Blackburn court did not limit express assumption of risk
to contracts and contact sports. The appellate court stated that such an
interpretation would be too constricted: "The Blackburn court clearly
contemplated other professional sporting activity when it used the term
'such as' when defining those cases in which actual consent exists and
the express assumption-of-risk defense is available." 40 The court also
held that the special verdict given to the jury was within the standard
expressed by Kuehner.
The Ashcroft court's interpretation of the Blackburn and Kuehner
opinions is confusing. The Ashcroft court ascribes an intention to the
135. Id. at 81.
136. Id. at 80.
137. Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), revd, 492 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1986).
138. The trial judge refused to apply the jury's finding of express assumption of
risk. Instead, the judge granted a remittitur reducing the plaintiff's award from the
jury of $10 million to $5 million. The plaintiff refused to accept the remittitur. Ash-
croft, 464 So. 2d at 1253-54 (Baskin, J. dissenting).
139. Ashcroft, 464 So. 2d at 1251.
140. Id.
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supreme court to include professional non-contact sports within the def-
inition of express assumption of risk. 41 This conclusion seems faulty in
light of the supreme court's concern that "[i]f contact sports are to
continue to serve a legitimate recreational function in our society ex-
press assumption of risk must remain a viable defense to negligence
actions spawned from these athletic endeavors." 142 In addition, al-
though the jury instruction1 43 was in accordance with the Kuehner
standard, 4 Kuehner applied this instruction to a fact pattern involving
karate, a contact sport. The Ashcroft court ignored the threshold re-
quirement that the injury resulted from participation in a contact sport.
Also, the Kuehner court clearly limited the application of the doc-
trine to "those bodily contacts inherent in the chances taken. 1 45 Since
negligent track design is not within the inherent risks of horse racing,
Calder should not have been allowed to raise the defense which barred
Ashcroft's recovery.
Most important, Ashcroft ignores the Kuehner reiteration of the
supreme court's equitable objectives as stated in Hoffman v. Jones.1 46
This equitable concept was advanced by Hoffman's abrogation of con-
tributory negligence and the discarding of implied assumption of risk in
Blackburn.
In her Ashcroft dissent, 4' Judge Baskin stated that she "would
narrow the focus of the inquiry to the propriety of the jury instruction
on express assumption of risk under the facts of this case. 148 In a
straightforward analysis, she concluded that Ashcroft did not assume
the risk of injury by express contract or participation in a contact sport.
A further examination of the facts in light of the inherent risks of horse
racing also does not absolve Calder of liability. Although a participant
may assume inherent risks, Judge Baskin concluded that "the danger-
ous condition created by Calder [is not] an inherent danger in the sport
of horse racing. '"49 Finally, Ashcroft's behavior was neither unusual
nor aberrant. Therefore, according to Judge Baskin, the jury instruc-
tion was incorrect and a new trial should have been granted.
141. See supra text accompanying note 125.
142. Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at 79.
143. Fla. Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) § 3.8.
144. See supra text accompanying note 128.
145. Kuehner, 436 So. 2d at 80.
146. Id.
147. Ashcroft, 464 So. 2d at 1252.
148. Id. at 1254.
149. Id. at 1255.
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The Supreme Court of Florida granted review in Ashcroft v. Cal-
der Race Course, Inc.1 50 It was hoped that this opinion would give ex-
plicit guidance to the lower courts as to the application of express as-
sumption of risk in Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court's review of Ashcroft did not result in
an emphatical clarification of contexts in which the doctrine of express
assumption of risk may be viable. In its reconsideration of the Ashcroft
decision by the Third District Court of Appeal, the supreme court held
that "there was no express assumption of risk with respect to the negli-
gent placement of the exit gap and it was error for the judge to instruct
the jury on assumption of risk." 1 1 Pursuant to Kuehner, the court
stated that the doctrine only applies to risks inherent in the particular
sport.152 The court agreed with Judge Baskin's dissent 53 that negligent
placement of the exit gap was not such a risk.154 Therefore, the court
reversed the decision of the lower court and ordered the reinstatement
of the $10 million jury award to Ashcroft. 155
However the supreme court did not expressly state that the doc-
trine of express assumption of risk is applicable to horse racing. In be-
ginning their analysis by stating that they are "[a]ssuming that express
assumption of risk applies to horse racing.. ,"."I the court extenuates
the inclusion of the sport of horse racing within the doctrine. Arguably,
the court has failed to make a policy decision concerning the doctrine's
applicability to horse racing. The court has skirted that issue by hold-
ing that the negligent placement of the exit gap wasn't an inherent risk
of horse racing. Therefore, it was unnecesessary for the court to decide
if express assumption of risk was applicable to the activity in which the
plaintiff was participating when he was injured.
150. Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 464 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), rev'd, 492 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1986).
151. Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 11 Fla. L. Weekly 307, 308 (July 11,
1986).
152. Id. at 307 (quoting Kuehner v. Green, 436 So. 2d 78, 80 (Fla. 1983)).
153. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
154. Ashcroft, 492 So. 2d at 1311.
155. Id. at 1314. The court also based their decision on the duty of reasonable
care which a landowner owes to an invitee. Further the court held that the trial judge
had abused his discretion in granting a remittitur. Id. at 1313.
156. Id. at 1311.
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V. Options
There is a myriad of approaches available to the Supreme Court
of Florida to resolve the confusion regarding the parameters of express
assumption of risk. Although the particular approach chosen may be
disadvantageous to plaintiffs, it is of paramount importance that the
court delineate a clear standard that the lower courts can follow in a
consistent and predictable manner. Further, injured parties will be bet-
ter able to judge the viability of a possible complaint if a straightfor-
ward test is adopted by the court.
The Supreme Court of Florida may choose to put its seal of ap-
proval on the application of express assumption of risk to situations
involving contracts and contact sports.'57 However, even in cases involv-
ing contracts and contact sports, courts will have to decide on the scope
of the doctrine on a case-by-case adjudication.
The doctrine will preclude recovery in those instances when a
party has expressly consented to expose himself to a particular risk,
either by contract or participation in a contact sport. These sports may
include wrestling, football, karate, hockey, and similar activities where
consent to contact is a necessary part of the game.
However, if the contact which was the proximate cause of his in-
jury was not a normal part of the sporting activity, then the injured
plaintiff will be allowed to recover. These instances may include inten-
tional or reckless conduct, and behavior which is a violation of the
rules. A case-by-case examination of the type of action which caused
the injury would determine whether the defense of express assumption
of risk should be applied to bar the plaintiff's recovery.
The obvious weakness of this proposal is that determinations based
on this method may yield inconsistent rulings which would create con-
fusion as to the parties rights and obligations under Florida law. Nu-
merous decisions would be necessary before a framework of consented
behavior could be formulated. In addition, this option abandons the
traditional legal theory which limited express assumption of risk to con-
tracts or other forms of express agreement.
However, this course is in accordance with the Florida Supreme
Court's decision in Kuehner v. Green. The fact situation in Kuehner
involved a contact sport and the court did not give any indication of an
157. The proposal is merely consistent with the treatment of express assumption
of risk by the Florida Supreme Court. The supreme court has never applied the doc-
trine of express assumption of risk beyond contracts or contact sports.
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intention to further expand the doctrine of express assumption of risk
beyond contracts and contact sports.
The supreme court may also attempt to reconcile the various lower
court decisions by reaffirming the fact that Florida has adopted a sys-
tem of comparative negligence and, consequently, assumption of risk is
no longer a viable defense. Therefore, in those situations where the de-
fense of assumption of risk would have been raised, a correct analysis
would require a finding of no duty owed.
In theory, this option revives primary assumption of risk. In other
words, it is lack of duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff that
precludes recovery rather than a finding that the plaintiff had expressly
assumed the risk of injury. For example, in the context of football, the
players have no duty to protect each other from anticipated contact.
Several states have totally abolished all assumption of risk termi-
nology on the rationale that "the bench and bar. . . unhappily cling to
the terminology of assumption of risk and continue to be misled by it
even while purporting to think of it as merely a convertible equivalent
of negligence . . . ."15 It is suggested that contract law competently
governs express assumption of risk.159
The Utah Supreme Court in Jacobson Construction v. Structo-
Lite Engineering60 stated that "[w]hat is important is the concept em-
bodied in the comparative negligence statute, and the particular labels
assigned to the type of fault should not interfere therewith.",,
This proposition""' is consistent with the evolution of Florida negli-
gence law. It avoids a departure from the principles of a comparative
negligence system which eschews the complete denial of recovery to an
injured plaintiff. Yet, this option also allows the Florida Supreme
Court to make a more definitive public policy statement.
The trial court's analysis would begin with an inquiry into the
scope of duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff under each partic-
ular fact situation. This eliminates the necessity for the jury to consider
the application of assumption of risk in reaching its verdict.
When the jury makes its determination as to the defendant's negli-
158. McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 273, 196 A.2d 238, 240
(1963).
159. See Jacobsen Construction Co., Inc. v. Structo-lite Engineering, 619 P.2d
306, 310 (Utah 1980); James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
160. Jacobsen Construction, 619 P.2d at 311.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., McGrath, 41 N.J. at 272, 196 A.2d at 238.
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gence, it will be resolving as well the issue of whether the plaintiff is
precluded from recovering damages. Therefore, the jury's findings as to
damages will be in keeping with the equity of comparative negligence
principles.
Under existing decisions the jury can easily become confused by
the process of determining defendant's negligence, plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence, as well as considering non-contractual express assump-
tion of risk.
An example of this confusion is demonstrated by the verdict in
Ashcroft. Although defendant Calder Race Course, Inc. was negligent,
plaintiff Ashcroft, who was not negligent, was completely barred from
recovery because the jury found that Ashcroft had expressly assumed
that risk of injury. 163
Finally, the supreme court may choose to allow the expansion of
express assumption of risk in negligence actions to include contracts as
well as all recreational and sports activities. Defendants will be permit-
ted to raise the defense of contributory negligence to reduce the plain-
tiff's recovery and assumption of risk to bar recovery.
The plaintiff will be prevented from recovering damages in a wide
range of activities. Since these activities were formerly included within
the area of implied assumption of risk, this would signal a re-examina-
tion of Blackburn. A clear statement of the risks which the plaintiff is
deemed to have assumed is required. Otherwise, participation in recrea-
tion activities may be discouraged by the certain preclusion of recovery
for injuries suffered.
This approach is especially harmful because participation in recre-
ational sports activities has a positive effect on the individual as well as
the entire community. This type of activity should be fostered and not
discouraged.1 6 4
VI. Conclusion
Throughout the State of Florida, the doctrine of express assump-
tion of risk has been expanding haphazardly. The Florida Supreme
163. Ashcroft, 464 So. 2d at 1251. Ashcroft knew and appreciated the specific
danger caused by the design defect in the track. It is arguable whether his choice to
ride was voluntary. However, the issue is whether the jury should have been instructed
as to the defense of express assumption of risk.
164. Segoviano v. Housing Auth. of Staniseous County, 143 Cal. App. 3d 162,
175, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578, 587-88 (Cal. 5th Ct. App. 1983) (flag football).
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Court should define the parameters of the doctrine in a clear and defi-
nite manner to avoid the abrogation of the comparative negligence sys-
tem. The stature of this system must be supported by the body which
created it. Not only is it unfair to bar recovery to a party in a negli-
gence action, merely because he has made the reasonable decision to
participate in a sporting activity, but it is not in keeping with the spirit
of the supreme court's decision in Hoffman v. Jones to adopt a compar-
ative negligence system in Florida which "equate[s] liability with
fault."16 2
Susan S. Faerber
165. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 438.
1986] 1369
473
et al.: Nova Law Journal Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
Congress Demands Stricter Child-Support
Enforcement: Florida Requires Major Reforms to
Comply
I. INTRODUCTION ................................
II. HISTORY OF CHILD-SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITY ......
A. The Duty to Support ......................
B. Reasons for the Failure to Meet Support
Obligations: Correcting a Myth .............
C. States' Attempts to Alleviate the Child-Support
Enforcement Problem ......................
III. EARLY AMENDMENTS TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT:
TITLES IV-A AND IV-D ........................
IV. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AMENDMENTS OF
1984 ........................................
A. Utilization of Specific Enforcement Procedures
1. Mandatory Wage Withholding ..........
2. Liens, Bonds, Security, and Guarantees...
3. Reporting to Consumer Credit Agencies ..
4. Expedited Procedures ..................
B. Equalization of Enforcement Services for Non-
Welfare and Welfare Families ..............
1. Incentive Programs ....................
2. Federal Income .Tax Refund Programs ...
3. Imposition of Fees .....................
C. Improved Enforcement of Interstate Collections
D. Federal Financial Participation and Penalties.
1. Reduction of Federal Share of Costs .....
2. Audits and Penalties ...................
E. Other Micellaneous Provisions ..............
V. FLORIDA'S COMPLIANCE WITH CONGRESS' MANDATE:
MAJOR PROBLEMS & RECOMMENDATIONS .........
A. The Need for Enactment of Specific Legislation
B. The Need to Improve Delivery of Child-
Support Services ..........................
C. The Need to Allocate More Revenue to the
Florida Child-Support Program .............
1372
1373
1373
1375
1376
1378
1380
1381
1382
1385
1387
1388
1390
1391
1392
1393
1394
1394
1394
1395
1396
1397
1398
1402
1404
474
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/15
1372 Nova Law Journal [Vol. 10
VI. CONCLUSION .................................. 1404
I. Introduction
Millions of American children live in poverty.1 Many of these chil-
dren live in single-parent families and receive little or no support from
their absent parent.' The number of families headed by a single-parent,
usually the mother,3 is steadily increasing due to the rising number of
divorces, desertions and out-of-wedlock births.4 Lack of support from
the absent parent is often the cause of the childrens' poverty.5 Surpris-
ingly, only a little more than half of the single mothers with minor
children have support orders from a court,6 and of the women who have
court awards for support, fewer than half receive full payment. Even
more shocking is that nearly one third of the fathers under court order
1. NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT CENTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Nonsupport and Poverty are Topics at Charleston,
CHILD SUPPORT REP., Dec. 1985, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Nonsupport and Poverty].
"Children . . . constitute 40 percent of all poor people .... ." Id. See OFFICE OF
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
9TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 9TH ANNUAL RE-
PORT]. See also Letter from William J. Page to Governor Robert Graham (September
30, 1985) (submitting FLORIDA GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CHILD SUPPORT, FINAL RE-
PORT (1985)), stating: "[M]ore than one in five (22.5 percent) of children in 1983 were
living in poverty .... "
2. Nonsupport and Poverty, supra note 1, at 4. "In fact, 55 percent of all chil-
dren in single-parent households live in poverty." Id.
3. Hunter, Child Support Law & Policy: The Systematic Imposition of Costs on
Women, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2 (1983). Ninety percent of single-parent families
are headed by females. Id.
4. "From 1970 to 1981, the number of divorces in the United States more than
doubled, and the number of children living with one parent increased by fifty-four per-
cent, to a total of 12.6 million children, or one child in five." Id. at 1. It is estimated
that half the children born today will live at some point in their life in a single-parent
family headed by a female. Chambers, Child Support in the Twenty-First Century, in
THE PARENTAL CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 284 (J. Cassetty ed. 1983) (citing Moy-
nihan, Children and Welfare Reports, 6 J. INST. SOCIOECON. STUD. I (Spring 1981)).
5. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF CHILD SUP-
PORT ENFORCEMENT, CHILD SUPPORT: AN ANNOTATED LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 1
(1984).
6. NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT CENTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Secretary Heckler Announces Child Support Initia-
tive, CHILD SUPPORT REP., (special ed.) Aug. 1984 at 2 [hereinafter cited as Heckler
Announces Initiative].
7. Id.
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to pay child support fail to make a single payment.8
Parental failure to support children forces many single-parent
families onto the welfare roles. Congress, concerned with the growing
welfare budget, has attempted to shift the burden of support back to
where it belongs - on the parents. The various provisions of the Child
Support Enforcement Amendments of 19849 are Congress' latest at-
tempts to force the states to adopt effective legislation designed to rem-
edy this serious, nation-wide child-support enforcement problem. A
state's failure to comply with the child-support enforcement sections of
the Social Security Act10 could result in a reduction of federal welfare
funds."'
After a brief description of the history of the child-support en-
forcement laws, this note focuses on the legislative efforts to alleviate
the enforcement problem. The major concentration of this note is a
presentation and analysis of Congress' 1984 Amendments to the child-
support enforcement section of the Social Security Act. Finally, this
note discusses what Florida must do to comply with Congress'
mandate.
II. History of Child-Support Responsibility
A. The Duty to Support
Many of the current child-support enforcement problems are
deeply rooted in the common law. Historically, the common-law duty
to support children rested primarily on the father.1 2 The father owed
this duty not only to the child, but to the state, 3 to prevent the child
from becoming a public burden.14 Some courts held that the duty to
support children is both a legal and a moral duty'1 while other courts
8. Id.
9. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98
Stat. 1305 (to be codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.). See infra note 70 for de-
tailed list of enacted and amended sections.
10. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-667 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 603(h) (West Supp. 1985).
12. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340, 351 (1903); State v. Langford, 90 Or. 251,
176 P. 197 (1918); Walborsky v. Walborsky, 197 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1967).
13. Strecker v. Wilkinson, 220 Kan. 292, 298, 552 P.2d 979, 984 (1976).
14. Coler v. Corn Exch. Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 140, 164 N.E. 882, 884 (1928).
15. In re Mogus, 73 F. Supp. 150, 152 (W.D. Pa. 1947); Osborn v. Weatherford,
27 Ala. App. 258, 259, 170 So. 95, 96 (1936).
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held it is merely a moral duty. 6 The moral duty to care for children
too young to care for themselves was often based on the reciprocal
right of a parent to receive the services and earnings of his children.17
Some early court decisions extended to the mother the duty to support
if the father failed to fulfill it;'" however, other decisions held that since
a father's duty to support his children rested on his reciprocal right to
receive the value of their services and the mother did not have that
right, the mother was not obligated to provide child support.' 9 Recent
court decisions, on the other hand, have shown a trend toward holding
both parents responsible for the support of their children.20 Many states
have enacted statutes which equalize the obligation.2 '
Generally, the parental support obligation continues until the chil-
dren attain the age of legal majority.2 Divorce does not terminate the
obligation. 3 It can extend beyond the age of majority if the parent so
agrees in a separation agreement2 4 or if the child is physically or men-
tally impaired and therefore incapable of self-support.25
Another support problem concerns the duty to support illegitimate
children. At English common law, an illegitimate child was called nul-
lius filius, son of no one.26 The court imposed no obligation on either
parent to support the child.2 A later English statute imposed on the
mother the duty to support the illegitimate child. 8 In the United States
some jurisdictions required the mother to support her illegitimate child,
16. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 369, 150 A. 905, 914 (1930); Ramsey v.
Ramsey, 121 Ind. 215, 217, 23 N.E. 69, 70 (1889).
17. Hollingsworth v. Swedenborg, 49 Ind. 378, 381 (1875).
18. Hunter v. State, 100 Okla. Crim. 119, 134 P. 1134 (Okla. Crim. App. 1913);
Bullard v. Bullard, 195 So. 2d 876, 879 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
19. Gilley v. Gilley, 79 Me. 292, 296, 9 A. 623, 624 (1887).
20. Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977); Birge v. Simpson, 280
So. 2d 482, 483 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Kern v. Kern, 360 So. 2d 482, 484 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Variety Children's Hosp., Inc. v. Vigliotti, 385 So. 2d 1052,
1053 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
21. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1)(a) (Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT. § 44:1-143 (West Supp.
1985).
22. Dunbar, 190 U.S. at 351.
23. Elble v. Elble, 100 Ill. App. 2d 221, 241 N.E.2d 328 (I11. App. Ct. 1968).
24. Venuti v. Venuti, 185 Conn. 156, 160 n.3, 440 A.2d 878, 881 n.3 (1981).
25. Sudduth v. Scott, 394 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
26. Hehr's Adm'n v. Hehr, 288 Ky. 580, 585, 157 S.W.2d 111, 114 (1941);
State v. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 298, 73 P. 375, 376 (1903).
27. Tieman, 32 Wash. at 299, 73 P. at 376.
28. Id.
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but other jurisdictions did not.2 9 Absent a statute, the father had no
duty to support his illegitimate children.30 However, in 1973 the United
States Supreme Court held that a child cannot be denied support from
the father "simply because its natural father has not married its
mother."31
B. Reasons for the Failure to Meet Support Obligations: Cor-
recting a Myth
Statistics show that the popular belief that fathers fail to pay their
support obligations because they cannot afford to pay is a myth. If that
belief were true, men with lower incomes, arguably, would have higher
failure rates. 2 However, a Los Angeles study found little relationship
between income and noncompliance with court-ordered support pay-
ments.3 3 Other researchers found that men who failed to pay any child
support had incomes higher than men who had fair or poor records of
payment.3 4 Furthermore, the amount of the award is often low and
sometimes inadequate to cover the costs of raising a child.35 For exam-
ple, a study revealed that in Denver, Colorado, two-thirds of the fathers
ordered to pay child support had monthly support orders which
amounted to less than their monthly car payments.36 Ironically, the ac-
29. Id.
30. Myers v. Harrington, 70 Cal. App. 680, 683, 234 P. 412, 413 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1925).
31. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
32. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences
of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1181, 1256
(1981).
33. Id. A 1978 study in Los Angeles County found that of fathers making
$20,000 or less per year, twenty-seven percent made either irregular or no child-sup-
port payments at all; of fathers making between $20,000 and $30,000, twenty-two per-
cent made irregular or no child-support payments; of fathers making between $30,000
and $50,000 per year, twenty-nine percent made irregular or no payments. Id.
34. Id. That same study showed that eighty percent of fathers had the ability to
pay. Id. at 1239 n.205.
35. In 1983 the U.S. Census Bureau reported that of 8.4 million female-headed
families, 5.5 million received no support from the absent parent, 1.9 million received an
average of $100 per month and only I million received up to $200 per month for child
support. W. DIXON, THE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: UNEQUAL PRO-
TECTION UNDER THE LAW v (J. Duggan ed. 1985) (available through the National
Forum Foundation). Court awards for support cover less than fifty percent of the cost
of raising a child. Hunter, supra note 3, at 1.
36. Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empirical Study of
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tual standard of living for men actually rises after a divorce. 37 There-
fore, the inability to fulfill support obligations does not appear to be the
major reason fathers fail to meet their support obligations. "A better
explanation for the lack of compliance lies in the absence of. . .effec-
tive enforcement procedures." 8
C. States' Attempts to Alleviate the Child-Support Enforce-
ment Problem
Only in the last twenty years has the federal government provided
assistance to children left destitute by their parents' deaths or deser-
tions. Prior to that, states shouldered the entire responsibility of provid-
ing support for these destitute children. 9 Traditional state remedies in-
clude criminal nonsupport statutes penalizing the parents' willful
failure to provide support and the use of civil contempt to enforce
child-support orders.4 0 Judges, however, have been reluctant to jail ab-
sent parents for willful noncompliance.41 Although incarceration for
contempt or neglect is sometimes an effective means of enforcement,
that subject is beyond the scope of this note.
One of the problems inherent in state regulation of child support is
that the lack of uniformity among state laws results in unequal protec-
tion for children. States' responses to the problem of nonsupport vary
widely. Some states have enacted strong legislation and have invested
substantial sums to enforce child support while other states have inef-
fective enforcement laws and have made little financial commitment.42
Studies show that states which have enabling legislation and make ade-
quate financial commitments to enforce the support legislation collect
more money from absent parents than do states without similar legisla-
Establishment and Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the Denver District
Courts, 57 DEN. L.J. 21, 36 (1979), noted in Hunter, supra note 3, at 7.
37. Weitzman, supra note 32, at 1250. A California study revealed that divorced
men showed a forty-two percent improvement in their standard of living while their ex-
family's standard dropped a dramatic seventy-three percent. Id.
38. Id. at 1257.
39. R. HOROWITZ & H. DAVIDSON, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 28 (1984).
40. H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 51
(1981).
41. FLORIDA GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CHILD SUPPORT, FINAL REPORT app. C.
3 (1985) [hereinafter cited as FLORIDA REPORT].
42. See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 9TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 33-34 (1984).
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tion and commitments.43
In many states a factor contributing to the support problem is the
apathy among those charged with enforcing support laws. For example,
judges and legislators have often been reluctant to become involved in
what they consider a family dispute." A report to the Senate showed
that "judges and lawyers found support cases boring and in some in-
stances were hostile to the idea that fathers are responsible for their
children . . . . 45Furthermore, even "state welfare agencies seem un-
interested in enforcing child-support obligations." 46 Arguably, a signifi-
cant number of fathers simply fail to pay support because they know
they can do it with impunity.47 Recognizing this as the real reason for
noncompliance with support orders, Congress enacted legislation
designed to force states to enact their own laws to ensure compliance
with child-support orders. Sections III and IV of this note discuss Con-
gress' legislation and the recent amendments.
43. See, e.g., W. DIXON, supra note 35 at 65-77.
"Probably the most interesting contrast in the Nation is between two
nearby midwestern States: Michigan and Illinois. Michigan invested
$123.67 per female-headed household in 1984, compared to $42.29 for Illi-
nois, a factor of nearly 3 to 1. Michigan's results were that the average
weekly collection per female-headed household was $17.74, compared to
Illinois's $1.87, a factor of more than 9 to 1. Michigan collected $7.46 for
every dollar in administrative costs, while Illinois spent a dollar to collect
only $2.30 in child support." Id. at 66-67.
44. See H. KRAUSE, supra note 40, at 51.
Thousands of unserved child support warrants pile up in many jurisdictions
and often traffic cases have a higher priority. The blame for this situation
is shared by judges, prosecutors and welfare officials alike, and is rein-
forced by certain myths which have grown up about deserting fathers.
The Committee on Finance in 1974 as cited in S. REP. No. 387, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
1-50, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2401 [hereinafter cited as S.
REP. No. 387].
45. Katz, A Historical Perspective on Child Support Laws in the United States,
in THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION 19-20 (J. Cassetty ed. 1983).
46. Id. at 20.
47. See D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY 100 (1979). Chambers compares
the support payments made in Genessee County, Michigan to those made in Wastenaw
County, Wisconsin. In Genesee County, which had a rigorous support enforcement sys-
tem, men made payments at high levels. In Washtenaw, which had a passive support
system, low levels of payment were made and "many who paid erratically apparently
found that their haphazard payments were ignored or followed by hollow threats or
that, even if they were arrested, they were released and then forgotten." Id. at 100.
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III. Early Amendments to the Social Security Act: (Titles IV-
A and IV-D)
The federal government first became involved in the support of
needy children when it passed an amendment to the Social Security
Act. Title IV-A, Aid to Dependent Children, now called Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC).4 Simply stated, an AFDC
family is one which receives welfare funds under Title IV-A. The So-
cial Security Act encouraged state participation in the AFDC program
by reimbursing state funds used in support of needy families with a
parent absent from the home. Over the years, the reason for requesting
this aid has changed dramatically. Congress originally designed AFDC
to assist the widows and children of deceased or disabled men. How-
ever, AFDC now provides aid primarily to low-income families where
there is a living father who is voluntarily absent from the home.49
In 1974, Congress, motivated by a skyrocketing AFDC budget, 50
attempted to jolt the states out of their apathetic attitude towards
child-support enforcement. Senator Long, the chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, expressing congressional .dissatisfaction with wide-
spread noncompliance, stated: "Is it fair to ask the American taxpayer
- who works hard to support his own family and to carry his own
burden - to carry the burden of the deserting father as well? . . . We
can - and we must - take the financial reward out of desertions." 5'
In an attempt to alleviate the burden on the American taxpayer,
Congress passed a comprehensive law dealing with child support: Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act.52 Title IV-D created a federal and
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1982) (The title of IV-A was enacted in Act of Jan.
2, 1968, 81 Stat. 911).
49. C. ADAMS & D. COOPER, A GUIDE FOR JUDGES IN CHILD SUPPORT EN-
FORCEMENT 5 (A. Kaye ed. 1982) (Available through Child Support Enforcement,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). In eighty-seven percent of the
AFDC cases, the reason for receiving aid is the father's absence from the house. Id.
"The portion of the caseload eligible because of father's death was 42% in 1940, 7.7%
in 1961 and 4% in 1973." Note, Enforcement of Child Support Obligations of Absent
Parents - Social Service Amendments of 1974, 30 Sw. L.J. 625, 632 (1976).
50. AFDC costs were $7.6 billion in 1973. KRAUSE, supra note 40, at 307; Dod-
son & Horowitz, Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984: New Tools for
Enforcement 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3051 (1984).
51. Katz, supra note 45, at 19, citing the 118 CONG. REC. 8291 (1972).
52. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-667 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985) (enacted by Act of Jan.
4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2351 (1976)).
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state partnership to establish and enforce awards for child support.5 3
Under Title IV-D, states retained primary responsibility for the collec-
tion of child support, while the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, now called the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), imposed standards and .made regulations through the newly
created Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE).5 The OCSE is
responsible for national administration of the child-support enforce-
ment program, which required each state to establish its own IV-D
agency. 5 The state IV-D agencies are responsible for making regula-
tions for locating absent parents, establishing paternity and support ob-
ligations, and for enforcing child-support orders.56 Title IV-D also es-
tablished the Federal Parent Locator Service 57 and mandated each
state to establish a parent locator service.5 8 States in compliance with
OCSE standards received federal incentive payments of seventy-five
percent of their costs.
59
The 1974 Title IV-D legislation provides services to all families,
including those not receiving AFDC assistance.60 The procedures
AFDC families must follow are different from other families. To be
eligible for child-support services, AFDC recipients must cooperate
53. See W. DIXON, supra note 35, at 7, which states:
How States are forced to comply with federal requirements for child
support enforcement is a brief, but interesting story. Title IV-A (AFDC)
reimburses the States for at least half the cost of AFDC through a con-
tract between the federal government and each State, called the "State
Plan for AFDC". One provision of this State Plan permits Congress to
modify it (by legislation) without the State's being able to reject the
changes.
To implement Title 4D, Congress modified Title IV-A by requiring
States to accept the new Title 4D, OR ELSE! The "or else", of course,
was risking the loss of millions of dollars of federal money for AFDC. All
States accepted Title 4D.
Title 4D, on the other hand, established the need for a "State Plan for
Child Support". You guessed right. States must accept new 4D amend-
ments by Congress in order to be in compliance with Title 4D to be in
compliance with Title IV-A.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 652(a) (1982).
55. Id. § 652(a)(1).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 653.
58. Id. § 654(8).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 655(a)(1) (1979) (amended by Act of Sept. 3, 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 401 substituting "70 percent" for "75 percent").
60. 42 U.S.C. § 654(6)(A) (1982).
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with the state. As a condition for AFDC eligibility, a mother must pro-
vide information to help the state locate the absent father, or in cases
where it is first necessary to establish paternity, the mother must iden-
tify the father.6 Furthermore, the custodial parent must assign to the
state her rights to child support owed by the absent parent.6 2 The
money collected by the state from the absent parent is used to offset
AFDC payments made to the family.63 Families not receiving AFDC
assistance may apply to the state IV-D agency for child-support ser-
vices.64 A fee for child-support services may be charged to families not
receiving AFDC.65
IV. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984
Although the 1974 social security amendments helped establish
and enforce child-support orders,66 ten years later the nation-wide sup-
port problem remained.67 Parents under court orders for support con-
tinued to avoid making payments, and states did not have effective en-
forcement procedures or laws. Congress, concerned about the social
and economic effects of nonsupport, began a bi-partisan effort to force
states to collect support payments more aggresively and efficiently. This
effort resulted in the unanimous passage of the Child Support Enforce-
ment Amendments of 1984.68 President Reagan signed the bill into law
commenting that "[ilt's an unfortunate fact of our times that one in
four American children live in single-parent homes and millions of
these children endure needless deprivation and hardship due to the lack
of support by their absent parent . ,,69 Through the 1984 Amend-
61. Id. § 602(a)(26)(B).
62. Id. § 602(a)(26)(A).
63. Id. § 658(a).
64. Id. § 654(6)(A).
65. Id. § 654(6)(B).
66. S. REP. No. 387, supra, note 44, at 2,407.
67. The census bureau reports that only $6.1 billion was collected out of $9.9
billion owed in child-support payments in 1981. Heckler Announces Initiative, supra
note 6, at 2. In 1984, state agencies opened up over two and a half million new cases to
establish and collect support which resulted in less than 100,000 successful collection
cases. DIXON, supra, note 35 at 2.
68. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98
Stat. 1305 (to be codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.). See infra note 70 for de-
tailed list of enacted and amended sections.
69. R. Reagan, Remarks of the President at signing ceremony at Child Support
Conference in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 16, 1984) reprinted in NATIONAL CHILD SUP-
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ments, Congress almost completely overhauled Title IV-D of the Social
Security Act.70 Title IV-D deals with federal grants given to states to
aid needy families with children in their area of child support and es-
tablishment of paternity. 1
The 1984 Amendments have four primary objectives: 1) to require
all states to use specific child-support enforcement procedures, which
have proven successful in the states which have employed them; 2) to
provide equal availability of enforcement services for non-welfare, as
well as welfare, families; 3) to improve interstate support services; and
4) to force states to improve child-support enforcement performances
through periodic auditing and a reduction of federal financial assis-
tance to states. 2 This section will discuss and analyze these objectives
seriatim.
A. Utilization of Specific Enforcement Procedures
The 1984 Amendments require states to enact specific legislation
and implement procedures to improve their child-support services as a
condition to continued receipt of federal AFDC funds.73 The deadline
for compliance for most provisions was October 1, 1985.7" However, if
a state proved to the Secretary of Health and Human Services that
legislation was needed to bring the state plan into compliance with fed-
eral requirements, the state was given until four months after the end
of the state's first legislative session held after October 1, 1985 to pass
whatever legislation was necessary to comply with the 1984 Amend-
PORT ENFORCEMENT CENTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
CHILD SUPPORT REP., special ed. Aug. 1984 at 3.
70. Title IV of the Social Security Act is subtitled, Grants to States For Aid and
Services to Needy Families with Children and for Welfare Services. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-
731 (1982). Part D under Title IV is called Child Support and Establishment of Pater-
nity. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-667 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985). The Child Support Enforce-
ment Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305, enacted 42 U.S.C.
sections 666 and 667, amended sections 602, 603, 606, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656,
658, 664, 671, 1315, and 1396(a), and 26 U.S.C. 6103, 6402 and 7213, and enacted
notes under 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 606, 652, 654, 657, 658, and 667, as well as notes under
26 U.S.C. § 6103. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (West Supp. 1985).
71. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-667 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
72. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, 9TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (1984) [hereinafter cited
as 9TH ANNUAL REPORT].
73. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a) (West Supp. 1985).
74. Id.
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ments' requirements.7 5
Although the 1974 Title IV-D legislation permitted the states to
use existing state laws, the 1984 Amendments to Title IV-D require
states to enact specific legislation designed to strengthen child-support
enforcement. The specific enforcement procedures mandated by the
1984 Amendments are those procedures successfully used by states
with high collection rates. This section reviews the major enforcement
requirements.
1. Mandatory Wage Withholding
The most important new tool for enforcement is the mandatory
wage withholding provision. The court orders for child support or modi-
fications must automatically include a conditional provision for wage
withholding to collect delinquent support obligations.7 6 This require-
ment enables all support recipients, including those represented by pri-
vate counsel, to have some method of initiating wage withholding in the
event of a support delinquency. Although all families qualify for wage
withholding, the procedures for obtaining wage withholding differ, de-
pending on whether the family is on AFDC or registered with the local
IV-D agency. Non-AFDC recipients must register with the state IV-D
agency when the support order is entered to initiate automatic wage
withholding." Once a family has registered for IV-D services withhold-
75. 50 Fed. Reg. 19,608.
76. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(8) (West Supp. 1985).
77. Id. § 666(b)(1)(2). These subsections provide:
(1) In the case of each absent parent against whom a support order is
or has been issued or modified in the State, and is being enforced under
the State plan, so much of such parent's wages (as defined by the State for
purposes of this section) must be withheld, in accordance with the suc-
ceeding provisions of this subsection, as is necessary to comply with the
order and provide for the payment of any fee to the employer which may
be required under paragraph (6)(A), up to the maximum amount permit-
ted under section 1673(b) of Title 15. If there are arrearages to be col-
lected, amounts withheld to satisfy such arrearages, when added to the
amounts withheld to pay current support and provide for the fee, may not
exceed the limit permitted under such section 1673(b), but the State need
not withhold up to the maximum amount permitted under such section in
order to satisfy arrearages.
(2) Such withholding must be provided without the necessity of any
application therefor in the case of a child (whether or not eligible for aid
under part A) with respect to whom services are already being provided
under the State plan under this part, and must be provided in accordance
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ing triggers automatically, requiring no further court action, 8 when the
support becomes overdue in an amount equal to one month's pay-
ment."" Automatic withholding can trigger earlier at the state's option
or at the option of the absent parent.8 0 Families not already registered
with the IV-D agency may apply for services to trigger automatic with-
holding after an arrearage occurs, and the agency will initiate the with-
holding at that time.81
The amount withheld must equal the amount of support due8 2 and
at the state's option may include a fee to cover the employer's costs of
withholding.83 Additionally, the amount must be within the limits set
by section 303(b) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.84 Withhold-
ing must comply with state procedural due process requirements." The
with this subsection on the basis of an application for services under the
State plan in the case of any other child in whose behalf a support order
has been issued or modified in the State. In either case such withholding
must occur without the need for any amendment to the support order in-
volved or for any further action (other than those actions required under
this part) by the court or other entity which issued such order.
Although the language of this section does not distinguish between IV-D and non-IV-D
families, the legislative history clearly does.
Withholding must occur without amendment of the order or further
action by the court. The Committee believes that this requirement is par-
ticularly crucial to the effectiveness of any income withholding provision,
because it means that the custodial parent will not have to experience the
costs and delays involved in returning to court to get a garnishment decree
or a new support order. Under the Committee provision, the required with-
holding procedures must be provided without the need for any application
therefor on behalf of all IV-D (both AFDC and non-AFDC) families.
Families who are not receiving IV-D services may file an application for
such services to trigger the initiation of withholding by the agency on their
behalf.
S. REP. No. 387, supra, note 44, at 2,423.
78. Id. § 666(b)(2).
79. Id. § 666(b)(3)(A).
80. Id. § 666(b)(3)(B),(C).
81. Id. § 666(b)(2).
82. Id. § 666(b)(1).
83. Id. § 666(b)(6)(A)(1).
84. Id. § 666(b)(1). The Consumer Credit Protection Act section 5.303(b) states
that fifty percent of the disposable income for an obligor with a second family may be
garnished and sixty percent for an obligor without a second family. The percentages
increased by five percent if the arrearage accrues at a certain time in the pay period.
15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(1982).
85. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(b)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1985). Once the state law grants
1986] 1383
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obligor must be given advance notice of the withholding and an oppor-
tunity to contest it.86 Moreover, the obligor's only grounds for con-
testing the withholding is that there is a mistake of fact.87 If the with-
holding is contested, the state must notify the obligor of the results of
its decision within forty-five days of the advance notice.88
If the obligor does not contest the withholding, a notice, containing
only enough information to enable compliance, is sent to the em-
ployer.89 An employer who fails to withhold wages after proper notifi-
cation is liable for the amount which should have been withheld.9" An
employer must withhold wages for child support before complying with
any other obligation because withholding for child support91 "must
have priority over any other legal process under state law against the
same wages . "..."92 An employer may aggregate all support monies
he is obligated to disburse for all employees into one check.93 If an
obligor terminates his employment, the employer must notify the state
and forward his last known address and the address of the new em-
ployer if known. 94 Additionally, to prevent retaliation by the employer,
any employer who fires or disciplines an employee as a result of a with-
holding order is subject to a fine.9"
A state is free to extend its withholding 'provision to other sources
of income.96 Therefore, commissions, bonuses, retirement benefits, pen-
individuals an entitlement, that interest cannot be taken away arbitrarily. The ade-
quacy of process due these individuals is determined by weighing the interest of the
individual in having the additional safeguard and the risk of error in the current proce-
dure along with the value of having an additional procedure against the interest of the
state government in not providing the procedure. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976).
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (b)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1985). The notice must inform
the obligor of the amount owed and the amount to be withheld. Id.
87. Id. § 666 (b)(4)(A). Mistake of fact is limited to a mistake in the amount of
support owed or mistaken identity of the obligor. Dodson & Horowitz, Child Support
Enforcement Amendments of 1984: New Tools for Enforcement, 10 FAM. L. REP.
3,051, 3,053 (1984).
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (b)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
89. Id. § 666 (b)(6)(A)(ii).
90. Id. § 666 (b)(4)(C).
91. Id. § 666 (b)(7).
92. 50 Fed. Reg. 19,611 (1985). Implementation of Child Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 19,611 (1985).
93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(b)(6)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
94. 45 C.F.R. § 303.100(d)(x) (1985).
95. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(b)(6)(D) (West Supp. 1985).
96. Id. § 666 (b)(8).
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sions, unemployment benefits, worker's compensation, dividends, royal-
ties, and trust accounts may be considered income by the states and
subject to wage withholding. This provision is particularly important
in cases where the obligor does not receive a regular salary or is self-
employed. Each state must designate a public agency to receive, record
and forward payments.98 There must be a provision in the state laws
for the termination of withholding under certain conditions.99
2. Liens, Bonds, Security, and Guarantees
Other procedures mandated by the 1984 Amendments, which are
useful tools against obligors who are not salaried employees, are the
procedures for the imposition of liens and the posting of security bonds
or guarantees. As previously stated, high-income, self-employed absent
parents obligated to pay child support have as poor a record of nonpay-
ment as any other class, perhaps even the worst. 100 Because these indi-
viduals are not salaried employees, the wage withholding provision of
the 1984 Amendments will not enforce their payments. Aware of this
fact, Congress included in the 1984 Amendments the requirement that
states must have and use "[p]rocedures under which liens are imposed
against real and personal property for amounts of overdue support
owed by an absent parent who resides or owns property in the
State."'01 Under these procedures, the liens, which may attach prior to
a default or arrearage, provide not only a means of enforcing support
obligations, but also may deter the absent parent from defaulting.
The problem, however, is that neither the 1984 Amendments nor
the federal regulation implementing the requirement for lien proce-
dures provides any guidance for uniformity among the states. 02 States
are apparently free to use either existing lien laws and procedures or
implement new ones. Neither the statute nor the rule mandates a spe-
cific method for perfecting these liens, and neither requires that child-
support liens acquire a higher priority against the property than other
97. See FLA. STAT. § 61.1301 (1985).
98. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(b)(5) (West Supp. 1985).
99. Id. § 666 (b)(10). These conditions are limited to such circumstances as "the
disappearance of the custodial parent and child for an extended period so that it be-
comes impossible to forward payments, the child reaching the age specified, or the
child being legally adopted by someone else." Dodson, supra note 87, at 3,053.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
101. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(4) (West Supp. 1985).
102. See id.; 45 C.F.R. § 303.103 (1985).
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liens. Just as current lien laws vary from state to state, the child-sup-
port lien procedures will also vary greatly. Nonetheless, the child-sup-
port lien requirement may greatly improve the effectiveness of child-
support enforcement throughout the country.
Another requirement of the 1984 Amendments which targets, but
is not limited to, the higher income, self-employed child-support obli-
gor, is the posting of bonds, security or some type of guarantee. States
must use "[p]rocedures which require that an absent parent give secur-
ity, post a bond, or give some other guarantee to secure payment of
overdue support ... ."0o The Office of Child Support Enforcement
recognized a difficulty with the bonding procedure 04 when implement-
ing regulations for this requirement. "The majority [of] commenters
expressed concern that no bonding company will risk underwriting
child-support payments because of the long-term commitment of the
support obligation and the high rate of noncompliance with these obli-
gations."10 5 Clearly, this reality represents a major drawback to an oth-
erwise tremendously useful enforcement device. Nonetheless, the
OCSE "urge[s] States and local IV-D agencies to educate local bond-
ing companies of the efficacy of underwriting child-support obligations
in cases where the absent parent has been a minimal credit risk in
other credit ventures."106 Because these minimal-credit-risk absent par-
ents are as delinquent as any other class when it comes to making their
support payments, the bonding procedure could be a valuable enforce-
ment tool if utilized effectively. 07
In addition to the bonding procedure, the procedures for providing
security or a guarantee may be equally effective for improving child-
support enforcement. The OCSE recognized that the state IV-D
agency could hold in escrow various assets of the obligor parent, i.e.
stocks, bonds and other negotiable instruments. 08 As it did with the
103. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(6) (West Supp. 1985).
104. See 50 Fed. Reg. 19,631 (1985).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107 These parents can get bonded because of their good credit ratings. The
bonding companies should realize that the reason these parents are as delinquent as
any other group in child support payments is that they have traditionally been able to
be delinquent with impunity. Bonding companies should further recognize that if these
parents are bonded, a motivation exists to keep payments current. These parents may
gain satisfaction from tormenting their ex-spouses with delinquent payments, but they
will not risk their credit rating or the wrath of the bonding companies for that pleasure.
108. Id.
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requirement of imposing liens, however, the OCSE fell short of enact-
ing specific regulations for states to follow, opting instead "[t]o provide
States with flexibility in this area ... 1.I"' Although there is some-
thing to be said in favor of permitting states the flexibility to develop
their own procedures, by doing so the OCSE has fallen short of its
obligation to ensure improvement of child-support enforcement. By per-
mitting state legislators to compromise these procedures, the OCSE
missed the opportunity to require states to adopt specific, efficient pro-
cedures to ensure enforcement of child-support obligations and, in turn,
save the taxpayer money. On the other hand, the 1984 Amendments'
requirements of procedures for imposing liens, posting bonds, and giv-
ing security or other guarantees have the potential to greatly reduce the
nation-wide support enforcement problem. Of course, states are re-
quired to ensure other requirements of due process before using these
procedures.110
Still another enforcement tool which the 1984 Amendments re-
quire states to use is a state income tax refund offset.1 ' Anyone who
has registered with the IV-D agency in a state that has state income
taxes qualifies for the state income tax refund offset program.112 The
state tax program permits states to intercept state tax refunds owed to
parents who are in arrears with child support and use the refund to
offset the overdue support payment. 13 Advance notice and an opportu-
nity to contest the offset must be provided to the obligor. 114
3. Reporting to Consumer Credit Agencies
An additional feature of the 1984 Amendments requires states to
report support arrearages to consumer credit reporting agencies when
the agency requests the information and when the amount of overdue
support is more than $1,000.115 States may, however, report arrearages
of less than $1,000.111 States may also charge the credit reporting
agency a fee for providing the information.117 States must provide the
109. Id.
110. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(b) (West Supp. 1985).
111. Id. § 666 (a)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 303.102 (1985).
112. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 666 (a)(7).
116. Id. § 666 (a)(7)(A).
117. Id. § 666 (a)(7)(C).
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obligor advance notice and an opportunity to contest. 118 The potential
problem with this tool is that states are required to report arrearages
only when the agencies request the information. There is fear that the
agencies will have no interest in requesting the information, particu-
larly when they are required to pay a fee.119 Although states apparently
may provide the information voluntarily, 20 the OCSE stopped short of
requiring states to report support payment arrearages to the credit
121agencies.
4. Expedited Procedures
Another extremely valuable, yet somewhat complicated, enforce-
ment technique which the 1984 Amendments require is the use of ex-
pedited procedures for the establishment and enforcement of support
orders.' 2 2 By requiring states to use expedited legal procedures to ob-
tain and enforce orders for child support, Congress has attempted to
remedy another problem often encountered by custodial parents. In ju-
risdictions with crowded court dockets, parents often experience long
delays in obtaining support orders.' 23 Not only does judicial delay
cause financial hardship on custodial parents and their children, but
delay also exacerbates the support enforcement problem. 124 Delays can
cause the custodial parent to lose contact with the absent parent,
thereby jeopardizing the establishment of the support order.'2 5 Further-
118. Id. § 666 (a)(7)(B).
119. 50 Fed. Reg. 19,631-32 (1985). On the other hand, consumer credit report-
ing agencies should be interested in this information because under the 1984 Amend-
ments, wage withholding for child support has priority over any other legal process
against those same wages, therefore arrearages in child support payments will affect
the obligor's ability to satisfy other debts. Id.
120. Id. at 19,632.
121. Id. at 16,931.
122. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (a)(2) (West Supp. 1985); 45 C.F.R. § 303.101 (1985).
States may use expedited procedures to establish paternity. U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(2)(B).
123. FLORIDA GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CHILD SUPPORT, FINAL REPORT app.
C.3 (1985) [hereinafter cited as FLORIDA REPORT]. In Florida "6.2 weeks was esti-
mated as the average time it took to arrange for a court hearing in child-support en-
forcement matters." Office of the Auditor General, State of Florida, Performance Au-
dit of the Child Support Enforcement Program Administered by the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services in Conjunction with Various Other State and Local
Agencies 18 (Dec. 18, 1985) [hereinafter referred to as PERFORMANCE AUDIT].
124. PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 123, at 17.
125. Id.
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more, court delay can result in such substantial arrearages that the
absent parent is unable to pay the past-due amounts. 26 Under the rules
adopted pursuant to the 1984 Amendments, states must use either ex-
pedited administrative or expedited quasi-judicial procedures in lieu of
standard full judicial procedures in all IV-D cases.12 7 However, politi-
cal subdivisions which can prove they already have effective and timely
court systems may apply for an exemption from expedited proce-
dures. 12 8 Decisions resulting from expedited procedures have the same
force and effect as full judicial decisions. 2 9 Of course, the expedited
procedure must provide due process to all parties involved. 130 Decisions
reached under expedited procedures may be ratified by a judge and are
then subject to appellate review.131 If a case is inappropriate for expe-
dited procedures, perhaps because it deals with complex issues, it may
be decided pursuant to traditional judicial proceedings. 3 2 However, a
state must first use expedited procedures to establish temporary support
orders in complex cases.133 Congress provides financial incentives for
cases heard under expedited procedures. Federal funds are available to
pay a portion of the salaries of administrative or quasi-judicial officials
such as special masters or family court commissioners, but not for the
salaries of judges in child-support matters.3
Expedited procedures are an important tool for states to improve
support enforcement because custodial parents will begin receiving pay-
ments after dissolution or separation much sooner than in the past. Ar-
guably, however, the expedited procedures have an inherent drawback.
The proper, equitable amount of a support order is often one of the
most contested issues of a dissolution proceeding and the discovery of
assets, the valuation of assets, the determination of the paying parent's
ability to pay and the custodial parent's needs are understandably time-
consuming. 3 5 The OCSE regulations may be too ambitious by requir-
ing completion of ninety percent of the IV-D cases in three months,'3 6
126. Id.
127. 45 C.F.R. § 303.101 (1985).
128. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
129. 45 C.F.R. § 303.101(c)(1) (1985).
130. Id. § 303.101(c)(2).
131. 45 C.F.R. § 303.101(c)(5),(6) (1985).
132. Id. § 303.101(b)(4).
133. Id.
134. 45 C.F.R. §§ 304.21(a), (b)(2) (1985).
135. See Horowitz, Congress Gets Tough, 8 FAM. ADvoc. 3, 6 (1985).
136. 45 C.F.R. § 303.101(b)(2)(i) (1985).
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ninety-eight percent within six months,137 and one hundred percent
within twelve months. 13 Although AFDC cases may not require the
depth of discovery or time that other cases may require, states that use
expedited procedures for all child-support orders are equitable determi-
nations which require careful analysis. By reducing these determina-
tions to formulas in expedited hearings, states run the risk of sacrificing
true equity for speed and convenience.
On the other hand, the expedited procedure has the potential to be
a more effective and more equitable means of making support determi-
nations than the current system if certain standards are met. For exam-
ple, the quasi-judicial officials must be well-qualified and develop ex-
pertise in the area of child support. That many circuit court trial
judges do not relish presiding over domestic relation contests is no se-
cret. A circuit court judge's distaste for support proceedings may actu-
ally reduce his determinations to formulas lacking careful analysis. An
expert quasi-judicial official whose sole responsibility is to preside over
child-support cases may well be the best person to make equitable
determinations."3 9
B. Equalization of Enforcement Services for Welfare and Non-
Welfare Families
While the 1974 IV-D 14 0 legislation provided for services to non-
welfare families 4 1 as a preventive welfare measure, the federal fiscal
137. Id. § 303.101(b)(2)(ii).
138. Id. § 303.101(b)(2)(iii).
139. In New York, hearing examiners have been assigned to hear IV-D support
cases.
Hearing examiners do not hear matters relating to custody or visita-
tion, contested paternity, requests for orders of protection or for exclusive
possession of the marital home. These must be heard exclusively by judges.
Hearing examiners not only make orders of support, they can order an
undertaking to assure payments are made, commit the respondent to jail
upon confirmation by a judge, and order any relief a judge can to enforce
the order. If the respondent defaults in appearing and it can be proven he
was personally served with process, there are no second chances, no second
requests: An order of support must be entered.
NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT CENTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVIcEs, New Law Expedites Enforcement in New York, CHILD SUP-
PORT REP. Dec. 1985 at 2 (original emphasis).
140. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (a)(5) (West Supp. 1985).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 654 (6)(A) (1982).
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incentive to the states was for services provided to AFDC families.
In practice, therefore, non-AFDC families often found it difficult, if not
impossible, to get child-support assistance.143 Carter v. Morrow4 illus-
trates that in 1983 non-welfare families in North Carolina were refused
child-support services which were readily available to welfare fami-
lies.145 North Carolina had been providing in-court legal representation
to AFDC families, but not to non-recipients of AFDC. 4 The United
States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina held
that Congress' clear intent was that welfare and non-welfare families
are to receive the same IV-D services. 147 The Morrow court enjoined
the North Carolina Department of Human Services from continued
discrimination against persons on the basis of their welfare status.14 8
Congress intended the 1984 Amendments to resolve any lingering
doubts regarding who is eligible to receive services under the IV-D pro-
gram. The purpose of the 1984 Amendments is to assure "that the as-
sistance in obtaining support will be available . . . to all children...
for whom such assistance is requested.' 49 Clearly, Congress intended
to make child-support services available equally to AFDC and non-
AFDC families. 50 Families not on welfare may now be more aware of
child-support services because states must publicize the availability of
enforcement services through public service announcements made on a
frequent basis.'
1. Incentive Programs
Under the IV-D program prior to the 1984 Amendments, the fed-
eral government, in order to stimulate collections, provided a fixed in-
centive which allowed the states and political subdivisions to retain
twelve percent of all support monies collected for AFDC families.
142. Id. § 658(a)(amended 1984).
143. See FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123 at 23.
144. Carter v. Morrow, 562 F. Supp. 311 (W.D.N.C. 1983).
145. Id. at 314.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 315.
148. Id. at 318.
149. 42 U.S.C.A. § 651 (West Supp. 1985).
150. S. REP. No. 387, 98TH CONG., 2d Sess. 1-50, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2,419. [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 387].
151. 42 U.S.C.A. § 654(23) (West Supp. 1985).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 658 (1982)(amended 1984).
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The states, however, received no incentive for monies collected on be-
half of non-AFDC families. Furthermore, AFDC collections are used
to reimburse the state and federal government for their pro rata share
of public assistance payments. 153 As a result, many states and political
subdivisions focused on the financial reward provided for AFDC collec-
tions and neglected their services to non-AFDC families.5 Addition-
ally, the fixed incentive under the prior law provided little impetus for
states to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their child-support
programs.
In order to encourage the states to equalize their provision of ser-
vices to all families and to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of
their programs, the 1984 Amendments provide a new incentive sys-
tem155 for both AFDC and non-AFDC collections.1 58 A sliding scale
has replaced the fixed percentage in computing the incentive to be paid
each state.15 7 The federal government pays the states a minimum in-
centive of six percent for all collections; however, if a state's perform-
ance meets federal criteria for efficiency and effectiveness, the incentive
payment to that state could reach as high as ten percent. 58 The new
incentives program is a great improvement over the old program. The
new incentives encourage the states to make their child-support services
more effective and efficient and to make them available to all families.
Furthermore, the new incentives provide a great opportunity for states
to increase their percentage of federal financial assistance because fed-
eral incentives for non-AFDC collections should be even higher than
for AFDC collections because non-AFDC fathers have a greater ability
to pay than welfare fathers.' 59
2. Federal Income Tax Refund Program
The 1984 Amendments permit non-welfare and foster-care cases
to utilize the federal income tax refund program previously limited to
AFDC clients. 60 Non-AFDC clients may collect past-due child-sup-
port that exceeds five hundred dollars from the federal income tax re-
153. 42 U.S.C.A. § 603 (West Supp. 1985).
154. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at 13.
155. 42 U.S.C.A. § 658 (West Supp. 1985).
156. Id. § 658(b)(2).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 658(b)(2), (c)(2).
159. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at 24.
160. 42 U.S.C.A., § 664 (West Supp. 1985).
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fund due to the absent parent.161 Notice must be sent to the absent
parent, and he must have an opportunity to contest the order.162 If the
absent parent has remarried and has filed a joint return with his new
spouse, the procedure protects the share of the refund due to the new
spouse.1
63
3. Imposition of Fees
Although states must now provide child-support services equally to
non-welfare and welfare families, one area of minor inequality remains.
Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 654(6)(8) to require states to charge
"an application fee for furnishing ... services ... ."" Under the
prior provision, a fee was not mandatory.6 5 The fee cannot exceed
twenty-five dollars unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services
determines that administrative costs require a higher fee. 16 Further-
more, although the upper limit must be uniform nationwide,6 7 each
state may vary the amount an individual must pay based on that indi-
vidual's ability to pay.168 Under the OCSE rules, states may either
charge a flat fee or establish a schedule, but the schedule must be tied
to the applicant's ability to pay.16 9 AFDC families, on the other hand,
are not charged a fee for any services. Arguably, this inequality is de
minimus because the fee charged to IV-D families is low and unlikely
to discourage them from applying for services.
The 1984 Amendments permit states to charge an additional
twenty-five dollar fee to non-AFDC clients who request the federal in-
come tax refund offset program.17 0 States may impose still another
twenty-five dollar fee for payments made through the Child Support
Clearinghouse.172 States may continue to charge for the actual costs of
the collection services172 and impose charges against either the custo-
161. Id. § 664(b)(2)(A).
162. Id. § 664(a)(2)(A), (3)(A).
163. Id. § 664(a)(3)(A).
164. Id. § 654(6)(B).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 654(6)(B) (1982)(amended 1984).
166. 42 U.S.C.A. § 654 (6)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1985).
167. Id.
168. Id. § 654(6)(B)(ii).
169. 45 C.F.R. § 302.33(c)(2)(iv)(A), (B) (1985).
170. 42 U.S.C.A. § 664 (A)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
171. Id, § 666(c).
172. Id. § 654(6)(B),(C).
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dial or absent parent. 1 3
C. Improved Enforcement of Interstate Collections
Another problem area encountered by many parents is the en-
forcement of child-support awards across state lines.7 4 Under the 1984
Amendments, states must use their wage withholding systems to en-
force out-of-state support orders.1 5 There is new incentive for states to
cooperate because the 1984 Amendments provide that both the state
where the custodial parent resides and the state where the absent par-
ent works will receive federal incentive payments.7'1 Expedited legal
procedures also apply to interstate cases.17 7 States must cooperate with
each other to obtain and enforce orders for child support. 1 8 Therefore,
mandatory state procedures, such as the imposition of liens and the
posting of bonds, apply to interstate cases.17 9 Additionally, the 1984
Amendments set aside grants of money to encourage states to use new
or innovative methods to improve interstate collection. 180
Congress has mandated a nationwide uniform child-support en-
forcement act. Not only has Congress required each state to meet cer-
tain standards in order to receive federal funds, but Congress has also
established enforcement standards which will receive full faith and
credit among the sister states. Because many absent parents live in dif-
ferent states than custodial parents, the cooperation requirement of the
1984 Amendments may be one of the most valuable child-support en-
forcement provisions.
D. Federal Financial Participation and Penalties
1. Reduction of Federal Share of Costs
Another method of congressional pressure on each state to increase
the effectiveness of its program is the reduction of the federal share of
administrative costs of the state enforcement program. Currently the
173. Id. § 654(6)(C)(i), (ii).
174. See FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at app. C.4.
175. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (b)(9) (West Supp. 1985).
176. 50 Fed. Reg. 19,626 (1985).
177. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (a)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
178. Id. § 654(9).
179. Id.
180. Id. § 655(e).
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federal government pays seventy percent of each state's administrative
costs for providing child-support services to both welfare and non-wel-
fare families . 81 However, in 1988 and 1989 the federal rate will drop
to sixty-eight percent, and in 1990 it will drop again and remain there-
after at sixty-five percent.18 2 The legislative history states that "[b]y
increasing the state matching share, the Committee expects that State
responsibility for and interest in the effectiveness of child support en-
forcement and paternity establishment services will also be in-
creased."18 3 In other words, Congress believes that by gradually in-
creasing the percentage of costs payable by the states, the states will
have greater incentive to make their child-support programs more cost
efficient.
While decreasing the amount of federal financial participation in
many areas, the 1984 Amendments increased federal funding for com-
puterized enforcement systems in order to encourage states to develop
more efficient child-support services. Federal matching funds of up to
ninety percent are available for the "planning, design, development, in-
stallation or enhancement of an automatic data- processing and infor-
mation system." 184 These automated systems will record child-support
payments made and report any delinquencies.1 85
2. Audits and Penalties
Auditing is another procedure included in the 1984 Amendments
designed to make state programs more effective. One of the duties of
the OCSE is to audit state child-support programs at least once every
three years.188 The auditor must make a report to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, who determines if the state child-support
enforcement programs conforms to the requirements of the IV-D stat-
ute.187 Two types of sanctions exist for noncompliance. The first sanc-
tion is a reduction in federal AFDC benefits to any state not in sub-
stantial compliance with Title IV-D.8 8 The second type of sanction
181. Id. § 655(a)(2).
182. Id.
183. S. REP. No. 387, supra note 150, at 2,419.
184. 42 U.S.C.A. § 655 (a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
185. 50 Fed. Reg. 19,640 (1985).
186. 42 U.S.C.A. § 652 (a)(4) (West Supp. 1985).
187. Id.
188. Id. § 603(h)(2).
The 1984 amendments require that OCSE conduct audits of State enforce-
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occurs when the Secretary of Health and Human Services refuses to
approve a state plan. The secretary will dissaprove any state plan that
the audit shows does not comply with IV-D requirements. 18 The secre-
tary's refusal to approve a state plan results in termination of all fed-
eral financial participation in that state's child-support program.9 0 If,
for example, a state refuses to cooperate with another state, or fails to
conform to any other requirement of Title IV-D, that state loses its
seventy percent federal matching funds and incentives for its child-sup-
port program. Therefore, as a result of an audit, any state found not in
substantial compliance with Title IV-D will incur two penalties: reduc-
tion of state AFDC funds and termination of federal financial partici-
pation in the state's child-support program.
E. Other Miscellaneous Provisions of the 1984 Amendments
The Secretary of Health and Human Services may exempt a state
from a particular requirement if that state can demonstrate that the
required procedures would not increase the effectiveness and efficiency
of that state's current program.' 91 In other words, the burden is on the
state to prove that an existing procedure is so effective that the state
child-support program would not be improved by implementing the new
procedure mandated by the 1984 Amendments.' 92 This is a refreshing
approach by Congress since legislators, in an attempt to improve an
ment programs at least once every 3 years, or annually if a State has been
found not to be in "substantial compliance" with Federal requirements.
Before any penalties are imposed, however, a State is allowed a maximum
of one year to implement a corrective action plan. Following this, if the
State is still out of substantial compliance, a penalty of 1-2 percent of its
Federal AFDC funds will be imposed on a quarterly basis. The penalty
will increase 2-3 percent for the second consecutive instance of noncompli-
ance with the same audit criteria and to 3-5 percent for all subsequent
failures. If another area is found out of compliance, another separate no-
tice is issued, and another corrective action period is started.
NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT CENTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, Child Support Enforcement Audit Rules Issued, CHILD SUP-
PORT REP. Feb. 1986 at 1.
189. 42 U.S.C.A. § 652(3) (West Supp. 1985).
190. Id. § 655(a)(l)(A); Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 655(a)(1)(A), only states with
approved plans under 42 U.S.C.A. § 654 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985) will receive ap-
propriated sums.
191. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(d) (West Supp. 1985).
192. 50 Fed. Reg. 19,633 (1985).
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area of law, often enact legislation which actually retards the progress
already made in some jurisdictions. The exemption enables states that
are one or more steps ahead of the 1984 Amendments to continue pro-
gress as usual. 193
Custodial parents who are IV-D clients and have spousal support
orders as well as orders ,for child support and who live in the same
household as the child may have their spousal support order enforced
along with the order for child support.""' In addition, the state IV-D
agency may petition the court to include medical support in a child-
support order if health insurance is available to the absent parent at a
reasonable cost. 9 5
V. Florida's Compliance with Congress' Mandate: Major
Problems & Recommendations
Florida must resolve serious deficiencies before it will receive the
Secretary's approval of its state plan. Unless the Florida legislature en-
acts new laws in the 1986 legislative session, Florida will lose all fed-
eral financial participation in the state child-support program and will
incur a reduction in federal AFDC funds. Areas requiring legislation
include provisions for expedited procedures, establishment of guidelines
for child support, liens on personal property, and wage withholding. Of
course, in addition to enacting necessary legislation, Florida must im-
prove its operations for the delivery of child-support services by ex-
panding service to non-AFDC families. Florida must also expand its
child-support program to provide services to a greater number of fami-
lies because federal criteria require that seventy-five percent of the
cases must be served at any given time.'
The 1984 Amendments require the governor of each state to ap-
point a commission to study the child-support program in that state197
and make a report on its findings and recommendations. 98 Governor
Graham appointed a state commission composed of attorneys, judges,
public officials, divorced parents and various experts in the field of child
193. For example, Congress included a waiver procedure for Wisconsin's pilot
enforcement program. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub.L. No.
98-378, § 22, 98 Stat. 1,326.
194. 42 U.S.C.A. § 654 (4)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
195. Id. § 652(0.
196. 45 C.F.R. § 305.20 (1985).
197. 42 U.S.C.A. § 654 note(a) (West Supp. 1985).
198. Id. § 654 note(d).
1986] 1397
500
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/15
Nova Law Journal
support.""' On October 1, 1985 the Florida Governor's Commission on
Child Support presented its report200 to Governor Graham. In addition
to the report of the state commission, the Florida Office of the Auditor
General conducted a performance audit of the state child-support en-
forcement program and issued its recommendations in a report dated
December 18, 1985.201 This section of the note discusses the major ar-
eas of current Florida noncompliance.102
A. The Need for Enactment of Specific Legislation
The 1984 Amendments require states to use expedited procedures
in all IV-D cases. 0° Under the 'OCSE rules Florida must use adminis-
trative or quasi-judicial proceedings to establish and enforce child-sup-
port orders if the custodial parent has applied to the state IV-D agency
or is on AFDC.0 4 Justice Boyd of the Florida Supreme Court believes
there are better ways to speed up the judicial process than the use of
administrative or quasi-judicial officials. Justice Boyd has already taken
steps to make child-support determinations more timely. He recom-
mended to the Florida Legislature the addition of twelve circuit court
judges in fiscal year 1985-1986.105 He also issued an administrative or-
der on April 12, 1985 that requires judges to hear child-support cases
within fifteen days of a request and to make determinations within ten
days.20 6 Expressing his views on quasi-judicial officials he writes:
The Court has some concern about requiring the use of mas-
ters. Masters are limited in their authority to making recommenda-
tions which must be reviewed by a judge. Experience has shown
that the use of masters adds on another layer of bureaucracy con-
tributing to delay. I strongly believe that with adequate prepara-
199. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at iv-vi.
200. FLORIDA GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CHILD SUPPORT, FINAL REPORT (1985).
201. PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 123.
202. A complete list of specific legislation which must be enacted by Florida in
order to comply with the 1984 amendments can be found in OFFICE OF CHILD SUP-
PORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, STATE
CHILD SUPPORT LEGISLATION AND THE 1984 FEDERAL AMENDMENTS: A 54 JURISDIC-
TIONAL ANALYSIS 21 (December 1985).
203. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (a)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
204. 45 C.F.R. § 303.101 (1985).
205. PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 123, at 18.
206. Letter from Chief Justice Boyd to Auditor General Ernest Ellison, found in
PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 123, at 51-52.
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tory services and a few additional judges, Florida can alleviate any
delay now existing in hearing child support cases and prevent the
necessity of creating another tier to the court system.207
Other alternatives have been suggested by the state commission.
They recommend the establishment of a family court division in the
Office of the Courts Administrator.0 " Under the current system child-
support cases must compete with criminal and other civil cases for lim-
ited judicial time. Unfortunately, in jurisdictions with crowded court
dockets, judges are forced to hear child-support motions on their morn-
ing motion calendars in order to comply with the administrative order
requiring speedy support determinations. Frequently this means that
each attorney is allowed only five minutes to present his case. While
these hearings may technically comply with Justice Boyd's administra-
tive order, five minutes is often not a sufficient amount of time to per-
mit the judge to make an informed and equitable decision. The growing
number of divorce cases and the distaste that some judges have for
domestic issues makes the establishment of a family court division a
good alternative to the present system.
The state commission also recommends Florida adopt new rules of
civil procedure similar to the Florida Rules of Summary Procedure to
expedite the judicial process. 20 9 The Florida Rules of Summary Proce-
dure shorten the time limit for service of pleadings and discovery, thus
allowing cases to be disposed of in a more timely manner.2 10
Florida should request exemptions as provided for in the 1984
Amendments for political subdivisions already handling cases in a
timely manner.211 However, the subdivisions must prove to the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services that their present handling of cases
qualifies as timely. 2 Unfortunately, many subdivisions which are pres-
ently operating child-support programs in a timely manner may not be
able to prove this to the secretary because these subdivisions may not
have the necessary statistics available.
Another problem frustrating many parents is the lack of consis-
tency in the amount of support awarded. 2 3 Even in the same judicial
207. Id. at 52.
208. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at 42.
209. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at 32.
210. Id.
211. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
212. Id. § 666(d).
213. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at app. C.2.
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circuit, children under similar circumstances are awarded widely dispa-
rate amounts for child support.214 Custodial parents often compare the
amount of their support orders to the amounts awarded to custodial
parents in similar circumstances and conclude the amount of their sup-
port order is inadequate, while non-custodial parents compare amount
of support awards and conclude the amount of their order is exces-
sive.2 15 "Such inequity is bound to lead to disrespect for the legal judi-
cial system at best and, at worst, non-compliance with support orders
by those who feel they were the victims of an unfair and arbitrary pro-
cess."2 16 To remedy this problem the 1984 Amendments require states
to establish support guidelines by October 1, 1987.217 Florida must de-
velop guidelines which can be either aspirational or mandatory to be
used by judges to establish the amount of the award for child sup-
port.21 The guidelines must include specific numerical criteria to be
used in computing the amount of the support order.21 9
The provision requiring these support guidelines is one of the most
controversial provisions of the 1984 Amendments. 220 The chairman of
the Family Law section of the American Bar Association warns that
"support guidelines may create more problems than they solve." '221 On
the other hand, the state commission considers the guidelines "neces-
sary to achieve equity and adequacy in child support awards. 222 One
drawback to guidelines is that they offer a mechanical approach to set-
ting amounts for support, generally based on the basic needs of the
child and the parent's ability to pay. 2 3 Guidelines may fail to consider
special needs of a child. A case-by-case approach, on the other hand,
woud be less likely to overlook those needs. Justice Boyd expressed his
reservations about support guidelines by citing Rook v. Rook,224 "in
214. Id. at 31-32.
215. Cassetty, Emerging Issues in Child-Support Policy and Practice, in THE
PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION 3, 5 (J. Cassetty ed. 1983).
216. Id. at 5-6.
217. 42 U.S.C.A. § 667 (West Supp. 1985).
218. Id. § 667(b).
219. Id. § 667.
220. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c) (1985).
221. Albano & Dennis, Child Support Guidelines: A Necessary Evil?, 8 FAM.
ADVOC. 4 (1985).
222. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at 32.
223. Bruch, Developing Normative Standards for Child-Support Payments: A
Critique of Current Practice, in THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION 119 (J.
Cassetty ed. 1983).
224. Rook v. Rook, 469 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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which the Fifth District Court of Appeal stated that a mechanized ap-
proach to establishing child support would contravene the Court's deci-
sion in Canakaris v. Canakaris."'2 The Canakaris decision gives
judges wide discretion in domestic matters, including child support.226
Another disadvantage to guidelines is that they are often based on min-
imum levels of support established for poor families.227 The use of such
guidelines is inappropriate for families with middle level or high in-
comes. The state commission recognizes these problems and therefore
recommends that Florida adopt guidelines which include considerations
for children with special needs, parents with very low incomes or "other
extraordinary circumstances. ' 2s The state commission further urges
that the low level of support provided in the AFDC program not be
used in calculating a child's basic needs 22 9 and it recommends that
Florida adopt the Melson Formula,230 an approach that incorporates
both cost and income sharing concepts.
Wage withholding is another controversial subject. Although Flor-
225. Letter from Chief Justice Boyd to Auditor General Ernest Ellison, supra
note 206, at 52 (referring to Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)).
226. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1204 (Fla. 1980).
227. See Cassetty, supra note 215, at 6.
228. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at 33.
229. Id. at 33-34.
230. Judge Melson developed the Delaware child-support formula in I.B. v.
R.W.W.B., No. A-3000 (Del. Fain. Ct. 1977); see also Emsley v. Emsley, 467 A.2d
700, 702 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983). The Melson Formula is based on three principles:
[1] Parents are entitled to keep sufficient income to meet their most
basic needs in order to encourage continued employment.
[2] Until the basic needs of children are met, parents should not be
permitted to retain any more income than that required to provide the
bare necessities for their own self-support.
[3] Where income is sufficient to cover the basic needs of the par-
ents and all dependents, children are entitled to share in any additional
income so that they can benefit from the absent parent's higher standard
of living.
These principles were formulated into a guideline that serves as the
method under which the Court presumes that a fair and equitable amount
of child support will be derived. This presumption is rebuttable in that it
will be applied unless and until a parent presents facts that persuade the
Court that an application of the formula would be inequitable to either the
absent parent, the custodial parent, or the child.
CHIEF JUDGE R.D. THOMPSON, DEL. FAM. CT., THE DELAWARE CHILD SUPPORT
FORMULA - STUDY AND EVALUATION: REPORT TO THE 132ND GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2
(April 15, 1984) (available from The Family Court of the State of Delaware, 900 King
St., Wilmington, Delaware) (emphasis in original).
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ida has had statutory provisions for wage withholding in effect since
1982,281 much disagreement exists over the procedures that should be
used to initiate the withholding. Under current law, wages will be with-
held in IV-D cases if the support is overdue by thirty days.182 Argua-
bly, a shorter triggering period is required to provide adequate security
to the child. The state commission recommends that all child-support
orders have provisions for immediate wage withholding without waiting
for a delinquency to occur.23 3 One advantage to the immediate with-
holding is that no stigma would accompany wage deductions since all
parents, not just delinquent payers, would have support payments auto-
matically deducted from their wages.
To comply with the 1984 Amendments, Florida must enact legisla-
tion to provide for the imposition of liens against real and personal
property to insure child-support payments. Under the bill23 4 proposed
by the Florida Senate, when an obligor's support payment becomes
overdue, the obligee or his agent may record a claim of lien in the
amount of the overdue payment. 235 "The lien shall attach to all non-
exempt real and personal property currently owned or subsequently ac-
quired by the obligor." 238 Notice must be sent to the obligor whose
grounds for contesting the lien is limited solely to a mistake of fact.237
B. The Need to Improve Delivery of Child-Support Services
Florida has a poor record for providing child-support services. It
currently ranks last among the states in providing child-support ser-
vices to families headed by women.238 In 1984 only twenty-four percent
of Florida's families headed by women were receiving child-support
services.39 In fact Florida's performance appears to have been getting
worse in recent years. In 1984, there were not only fewer cases in
231. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at 72.
232. FLA. STAT. 61.181(3) (1985).
233. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at 73-74.
234. Fla. S. 224, 9th Leg., 2d Leg. Sess. (1986).
235. Id. at 28.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. W. DIXON, THE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: UNEQUAL PRO-
TECTION UNDER THE LAW 10 (J. Duggan ed. 1985)(available through the National
Forum Foundation).
239. Id.
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which payments were collected from absent fathers240 but fewer absent
fathers were located than in 1983.41
These statistics are particularly distressing because the demand for
child-support services is very high in Florida. 42 This high demand for
services is due in part to Florida's high out-of-wedlock birth rate.243
Children born out-of-wedlock are likely to require state assistance in
establishing paternity and enforcing support orders.2 44 Florida's divorce
rate for families with children, the eighth highest in the nation2 4 5 is
also a factor contributing to the high demand for child-support services.
According to the state commission there are two principal reasons
for Florida's poor record.246 First, Florida has concentrated on provid-
ing child-support services almost exclusively to AFDC families.2 47 Be-
cause most families are not on AFDC2 48 they have been unable to re-
ceive support services. Only seven percent of non-AFDC families
receive child-support services.2 49 The 1984 Amendments have elimi-
nated a major reason for this disparity - the old incentives program
which encouraged the unequal treatment of welfare and non-welfare
families. Furthermore, Florida Statutes section 409.24 requires that
child-support services be provided equally to all families.2 50
According to the state commission the second reason Florida is
ranked last in the nation in providing child-support services to families
headed by women is that Florida has not maintained an adequate staff
of child-support workers.2 51 Staff workers in Florida have caseloads
more than twice as heavy as the national average. 52 Only three states
240. Id. at 48.
241. Id. at 52.
242. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at 6. There is an estimated backlog of
250,000 cases of Florida families needing, but not receiving, child-support services. Id.
243. Id. at 7. Twenty-five percent of children born in Florida are born out-of-
wedlock; however, the national average is less than twenty percent born out-of-wedlock.
Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at app. A-2.
246. Id. at 7.
247. Id. at x. Thirty-eight percent of Florida AFDC families receive child-sup-
port services. Id.
248. W. DIXON, supra note 238, at 10. For example, there are 370,000 families
headed by women in Florida, and only 78,000 of those are on AFDC. Id. at 10.
249. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at x.
250. FLA. STAT. § 409.2567 (1985).
251. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at 7.
252. Id. at 8.
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assign their support workers more cases than Florida assigns its work-
ers.253 Florida stands to lose federal funding because of its poor service
delivery system if Florida fails to meet the OCSE requirements
254
which provide that "75 percent of cases must be currently served at
any given time.' 255 The Florida legislature should allocate more money
to the child-support enforcement program to hire, train and better com-
pensate staff workers. Furthermore, Florida should improve the current
automated child-support information systems to increase staff effi-
ciency.256 Expanded federal funding 57 for automated systems makes
the acquisition and improvement of computer systems a particularly
wise investment.
C. The Need to Allocate More Revenue to the Florida Child-
Support Program
The child-support program is cost beneficial to Florida. Although
Florida spent over four million dollars providing child-support services,
it recouped nearly four times that amount from support payments re-
covered from absent parents, fees paid by non-AFDC families and fed-
eral incentive payments. 258 If the legislature allocates more money to
the child-support program, the program will recover more money from
absent parents. As a result, federal incentive payments will increase
and produce an even greater net gain for the state.259 The state com-
mission calls the child-support program "a highly productive financial
arrangement for the government and the citizens of Florida. It is most
unusual for state government to provide a social service and, at the
same time, earn or recover 377 percent of the state's program costs. 26 0
VI. Conclusion
The increasing number of divorces, desertions and out-of-wedlock
253. Id. at app. A-5.
254. 45 C.F.R. § 305.20 (1985).
255. Letter from William J. Page to Governor Robert Graham (September 30,
1985) (submitting FLORIDA GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CHILD SUPPORT, FINAL REPORT
2 (1985)).
256. See FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at 45.
257. 42 U.S.C.A. § 655(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
258. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at x.
259. Id. at 2.
260. Id. at 15.
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births results in the increasing number of single-parent families. It is
estimated that half the children born in the United States today will
live in a single-parent family at some point in their lives.26x These chil-
dren run a high risk of living lives of poverty because they often receive
little or no support from their absent parent. Taxpayers have been
forced to assume the responsibility of providing support for these chil-
dren through the AFDC program. In order to reduce the taxpayers'
burden and to force absent parents to assume their parental duty to
support their children, the federal government invaded a traditional
state domain - child-support enforcement. The most recent federal ac-
tion, the Child Support Amendments of 1984, revised various provi-
sions of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act and provides new federal
incentives and penalties to force the states to use specific child-support
enforcement procedures which other states have successfully utilized.
Wage withholding is perhaps the most important new procedure for
support enforcement. Other new provisions include the requirements
for the imposition of liens and the posting of bonds to secure support
payments, mandatory tax refund offset programs, and the use of expe-
dited procedures to accelerate the establishment and enforcement of
child-support orders. The 1984 Amendments clearly require that states
provide child-support services equally to AFDC and non-AFDC
families.
In order to continue receiving federal funds for the state child-
support program and to avoid a reduction in federal AFDC funds,
Florida must pass the required legislation and make significant im-
provements in its system for the delivery of child-support services.
Since the child-support program is cost-beneficial, the Florida legisla-
ture has no excuse not to allocate more money to the child-support pro-
gram. The Florida Governor's Commission on Child Support declared
"[ilt is clear ... that [the] establishment and enforcement of child
support obligations is the most significant and useful public policy in-
strument for reducing poverty among children in the United States. 262
Maureen Gallen
261. Chambers, Child Support in the Twenty-first Century, in THE PARENTAL
CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION 283, 284 (J. Cassetty ed. 1983).
262. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 123, at 11.
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